# Group Violence Intervention London:
An Evaluation of the Shield Pilot

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Tom Davies, Lynne Grossmith & Paul Dawson
MOPAC Evidence and Insight

MOPAC

MAYOR OF LONDON
OFFICE FOR POLICING AND CRIME

Executive Summary

Background

Gang, group and serious street orientated violence continue to be a significant problem in London, demanding innovative and collaborative solutions. In June 2014, at MOPAC's Policing Global Cities: Gangs Summit, Professor David Kennedy delivered a keynote speech outlining the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) approach he developed in Boston during the 1990's (known as 'Ceasefire'). Professor Kennedy was subsequently invited by MPS Trident to deliver a two day 'Ceasefire University' in the GVI model. As a result, the MOPAC Evidence and Insight team, with input from MPS central intelligence, undertook analysis using crime and social demographic data to develop a comprehensive borough level picture on gang and youth violence. The analysis was used to identify potential pilot boroughs with whom MOPAC initially engaged in dialogue, and this was followed up with senior level meetings with Lambeth, Haringey, Westminster, Hackney and Newham between August and October of 2014. Agreement followed from these meetings to proceed with Lambeth, Haringey, and Westminster. In selecting the three boroughs MOPAC recognised the strength of their community safety partnerships and willingness to trial the Group Violence Intervention approach.

To this end, Shield - an adaptation of the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) strategy - was developed as a pilot programme and rolled out in three boroughs (Lambeth, Westminster and Haringey). This report presents learning from the evaluation covering **performance**, **process** (i.e. **implementation challenges and benefits**), and **impact**.

Performance Monitoring

- A total of 19 gangs and 321 individuals were selected across the three boroughs, with one third (n=103) invited to at least one call-in.
- Between June 2015 and March 2016, a total of eight gang call-ins (a key message delivery mechanism) were held, attended by a total of 27 individuals.
- Over the Shield period, Collective Enforcement was triggered on three occasions, each following identification of a threshold offence meeting the stipulated criteria.
- Between June 2015 and July 2016, 40 per cent of the full Shield cohort (n=129) were arrested (in total there were 300 arrests, at an average of 2.3 per arrested individual) and 115 individuals were charged with at least one offence (an average of 1.88 per charged individual, a total of 216 charges) within each borough's live pilot period.

Key Challenges

- Stakeholders questioned **whether a US approach is the most appropriate model for London**, given the lower rates of serious violence, fluidity of gang structures and different legal mechanisms available (i.e. ability to compel call-in attendance).
- Linked to this, ensuring 'swift and certain' enforcement action against gang cohorts created **challenges in the context of ongoing (and often similar) police operational activity** on each borough, particularly given police practice of **not storing risk** (sitting on actionable information re criminal activities) and **lack of available civil sanctions**.

- Key **implementation challenges** included **differences in interpretation of the core elements of the** GVI model between some practitioners. Feedback suggested **programme design** would have benefited from earlier input from the National Network for Safer Communities (NNSC), and it was perceived that the operating model lacked clarity for practical application, contributing to delays in roll out and a lack of standardisation.
- **Initial engagement of local communities and gaining support for the pilot were perhaps the greatest challenges.** The pilot highlighted general poor community relations across statutory agencies in all boroughs, as well as strong resistance from some to the pilot.

Key Benefits

- Over the course of the pilot, **significant progress was made in engaging local communities, individuals, and voluntary groups** with a shared desire to reduce violence and offer assistance and support to gang involved youths. Practitioners highlighted the benefits of using Shield as a **conversation starter** with previously disengaged groups, making **positive links between the community, police and local authority**.
- Where delays in implementation did occur, the **enhanced consultative process**, and subsequent buy-in and involvement were thought to be positive.
- Practitioners and community representatives all noted a **positive shift in the levels of transparency and openness** regarding the information that Local Authorities and Police held.
- Shield prompted **a reinvigorated and wider reaching mapping of the available local services** for gang involved young people, across partner and voluntary sector agencies.
- Despite challenges, **all three boroughs have mainstreamed elements of Shield into their business-as-usual activity** including governance structures; collective efficacy and the encouragement of gang 'self-policing'; and more developed community engagement.

Key Learning for Future Initiatives

- **Partnership Working:** Although boroughs reported a positive impact beyond the Shield specific remit (particularly between police, probation and third sector organisations), feedback indicated that **wider partnership buy-in** would be necessary for any future iteration. Specifically, via enhanced civil enforcement opportunities, legal mechanisms to compel call-in attendance and fast tracking of cases through the CJS.
- **Communication:** Improved messaging and a more **sensitive approach to branding and community consultation** may have been beneficial to the programme, such as more frequent sharing of information, best practice and learning between boroughs, with local communities and *between* and *within* agencies. A primary focus on specific types of group orientated violence (i.e. stabbings and shootings) rather than 'the gang' may have aided community buy-in and wider communication of the pilot's core aim of violent reduction.
- **Programme Design:** Inter-agency and community complexities have made it difficult to resource; communicate; and standardise a viable model. Implementation challenges can be anticipated and built into any future iteration.

Borough Specific Learning

Across the three boroughs Shield was implemented on a phased basis. The following case studies present a brief narrative of the key implementation challenges and benefits specific to each borough. Full breakdowns of performance data and findings are documented in the main report.

Lambeth volunteered to be the first borough to go live and initially faced significant local opposition to the implementation of Shield within parts of the community, resulting in some local resistance politically. Despite these challenges, as well as enacting change from an already established way of working, Lambeth's partnership worked closely with organisations and individuals within the community to deliver Shield. Having volunteered to be the first live borough, Lambeth generated some key learning; for example, the adaptation from a voluntary borough wide call-in to a more focused approach utilising the compelling of probation supervised individuals.

Lambeth delivered two rounds of collective enforcement. The activity immediately highlighted the differences in the law enforcement operational practice between the UK and USA. Notably for the pilot, the preference for dynamic risk management in the UK compared to the willingness to 'store risk' and hold onto actionable information until there is an act of serious violence in the US. This presented challenges in ensuring 'swift and certain' enforcement action.

The biggest shift within the borough was seen within the governance structures. Although statutory partners within the borough had been working with community organisations and members, the governance structure required by Shield saw formal community representation at both strategic and operational levels within the borough. This has helped provide a more established bridge between statutory partners and the community and this set up is still in place.

Westminster was the second borough to go live and took a slightly different approach. From the borough's perspective, the distribution of in-scope gangs across the borough made a single gang call-in as stipulated by the National Network for Safer Communities (NNSC) over complicated and unnecessary. Although delaying 'go-live', the eventual agreement was to hold three separate call-ins in areas local to the gang. Despite the NNSC's initial reluctance to approve of the interpretation of the GVI model in this way, their stance changed when Prof Kennedy visited London in December 2015, acknowledging the benefits of a GVI approach that adapts to the local conditions and incorporates frontline expertise.

Westminster delivered one instance of collective enforcement, experiencing similar challenges to Lambeth. Positive community involvement and ongoing engagement by the statutory partners led to the borough holding a community driven call-in style event shortly after the formal end date of the pilot, attended by at risk individuals, families and community members. More so than the other boroughs, Westminster reported that Shield acted as a focal point for reviewing and refreshing the existing approach, ensuring that resources were targeted in the most effective manner.

Haringey experienced the most initial community opposition to Shield but by the end had, perhaps, the most complete community engagement approach. Over the course of several months, with significant initial facilitation by Community Development Foundation, there was sustained engagement from statutory partners and MOPAC with community organisations and members, acknowledging some significant underlying tensions and issues. This led to the design of a model that focussed on support to exit the gang and a strong community voice underpinned by enforcement under the banner of Communities Against Violence (CAV). The borough held its first call-in early in March 2016.

CAV continues to operate within the borough and it is hoped the positive engagement from all partners will continue. The early involvement of community members, alongside increased transparency in the development of the local model provides solid foundations for similar future initiatives and MOPAC would encourage other areas to replicate this approach.

Programme Impact

- The pilot was set against significant MPS wide increases in violence against the person (VAP) offences between June 2015-May 2016 and the previous year; this was reflected across all three pilot boroughs.
- Whilst all three boroughs recorded decreases in gang flagged violence (violence with injury only), the MPS also recorded a decrease over the comparison period.
- Comparing the Shield cohort offending to that of matched control gangs over the live pilot periods, no significant difference could be detected across suspect/arrest/charge categories for serious violence or gang flagged violence. No difference could be detected across wider measures such as VAP or all offending. **Overall, there was no clear indication that Shield has had any influence upon borough level violent offending.**
- Due to data limitations it was not possible to assess referrals and outcomes robustly.

Discussion

Shield was a pilot programme established to generate learning in tackling gang and related violence. It was not possible to demonstrate a significant reduction in violence across the targeted Shield groups - this does not indicate a GVI approach does not work or is not fit for London - rather that the challenges in implementation resulted in no clear test of the model.

None-the-less, the pilot has generated genuine learning; notably demonstrating how communities and statutory partners can work together (both formally and informally). It is hoped that these lessons can be adopted to help reduce the risk and vulnerability of those high risk young people which will be beneficial when planning any similar future initiatives.

1. Introduction

Context

Gang[i], group and serious street orientated violence continue to be significant problems in London, demanding innovative and collaborative solutions. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) recorded 233,928 violence against the person (VAP) offences between September 2015 and August 2016; an increase of 10 per cent on the previous year. Over the same period, there have been recent rises in proxy indicators of gang violence, such as stabbings (up four per cent) and firearms discharges (up 43 per cent).[1] MPS data indicates there are currently around 182 active street gangs across the capital, with approximately 3,500 individuals identified as involved in violent gang related criminal activity, although it is recognised this is only an estimate of a complex picture. Previous research indicates these individuals are involved in a disproportionate amount of serious offending in London; accounting for 9% of all personal robbery, 16% of serious youth violence, and 40% of shootings.[ii]

The need for innovative interventions on the pilot boroughs is supported by findings from the Public Attitude Survey (PAS).[2] Concern about gangs in the local area is linked to lower levels of confidence in the police – only 49 per cent of those who consider gangs a problem report the police are doing a good job, compared to 72 per cent of those not reporting gangs as a problem. Respondents in Shield boroughs reported some of the highest levels of concern around gang problems in their local area (Lambeth, 18%; Haringey, 19%) and lower levels of confidence in policing than the MPS average (Haringey, 56%; Lambeth, 62%).[iii]

An array of local and nationally led interventions have aimed to address the harm caused by groups/gangs. Since 2012, the Home Office Ending Gang and Youth Violence team[iv] has worked with local areas to develop local strategies, whilst also driving national policy changes such as mandatory sentences for knife and gun crimes.[v] In London, MOPAC's Strategic Ambitions on Gangs and Serious Youth Violence, governed by a multi-agency Gangs Panel, has generated a number of co-commissioned projects such as London Gang Exit and youth support through Redthread in major trauma centres. However, the evidence base for 'what works' in UK gang interventions is still lacking. The implementation of a Group Violence Intervention (GVI) model, funded by MOPAC in 2014, sought to formalise an intervention approach with previously proven success.

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[1] All data from MPS MetMIS; 'Stabbing' relates to knife crime with injury, with 160 more victims making a total of 3877 for period Sep15-Aug16, 160 more than the previous year. There were 302 firearms discharge incidents over the same period, up 92 on the previous year.

[2] The Public Attitude Survey (PAS) is a pan-London continuous survey run by MOPAC. It is based on a random sample of respondents at pre-selected addresses, with a total of 3,200 Londoners interviewed face-to face each quarter, yielding an annual sample of 12,800 interviews. The survey asks a variety of questions around crime, justice and policing.

The GVI/Shield Strategy

Pioneered in Boston in the late 1990's as 'Operation Ceasefire', a problem-orientated policing approach to tackle gang violence; GVI has been developed and implemented in a number of US cities[vi] as a multi-agency and community involved intervention for violence reduction.[vii] It is designed to focus criminal justice, social service and community attention on the small number of group or gang involved individuals who commit a disproportionate amount of serious violence. There are three core elements to the GVI strategy:

1. **Community Voice –** Mobilising local communities and key moral voices to re-enforce the message that the community wants gang involved individuals to be safe, alive and out of prison and that violence will not be tolerated.
2. **Consequences of Violence –** Future violence will be met with swift and certain action, with police and partners paying special attention to the entire group through available and proportionate legal and civil sanctions when a member commits a violent act.
3. **Help for those who ask –** providing individuals with a route out and the opportunity to exit from the criminal lifestyle.

Fundamental to the approach is the communication of a unified message from police, partner agencies and community representatives that: **the violence must stop; there will be swift and certain consequences across the entire group if it does not; and there is help available to those who wish to exit the gang.** One of the mechanisms for delivering this is to 'call-in' influential gang members to speak to them directly. It is this element, designed to create collective accountability, and convey clear community norms against violence, that sets GVI apart from business as usual enforcement and intervention.[viii]

GVI Evidence Base

Multiple evaluations of GVI initiatives in the United States indicate significant successes, with reductions in homicide and non-fatal shootings of between 35-60%, although there is still a deficit of rigorous randomized evaluations.[ix] To date, there has been a limited application of the GVI strategy in the UK. In January 2005, Strathclyde Police (now Police Scotland) implemented a version of GVI in Glasgow, achieving significant success in decreasing weapon carrying and violence among gang involved youths, although reporting no significant reductions in physical violence.[x] The GVI approach was adapted to fit the locality; for example, call-ins (renamed self-referral sessions) were predominantly voluntarily attended following a long period of focused engagement.[xi]

In London, the 2009 Pathways programme[xii] was based on GVI principles but encountered strong implementation challenges (i.e. a delayed start, one borough withdrawing and changes to the core model such as individual versus group call-ins). Aspects of the GVI/Ceasefire strategy informed the creation of Trident Gang Crime Command (TGCC), the revamped MPS response to gang violence launched in 2012. More recently, elements of the GVI approach have been implemented by several London boroughs, usually via an MPS led partnership approach, though none have received rigorous evaluation.[xiii]

About Shield

Shield, the London adaptation of the Group Violence Intervention (GVI) strategy[xiv] began in 2014. The overarching aim of the Shield pilot was **the reduction of 'serious violence'[3] by the identified gangs on the pilot boroughs**; Lambeth, Westminster & Haringey. Potential secondary benefits included increases in individuals exiting the gang, uptake in interventions and greater community mobilisation and confidence. A Shield partnership agreement formalised the collective commitment of MOPAC and partners[4] to the approach outlined in the Shield operating model (OM) and based on the core elements of GVI described above. Boroughs were selected through a combination of assessing local pre-existing police/local authority gang infrastructures and analysis of local crime and population data (see appendix). For the purposes of the evaluation, 'go-live' was determined by the first time the Shield message was delivered to the selected cohort.

Ahead of any messaging and enforcement activity, boroughs were asked to secure community representatives willing to work with the Shield partners to facilitate a unified approach and have direct input in cohort selection. Boroughs were asked to notify selected individuals of their involvement in the pilot, either in person or via letters to their home addresses. The OM advocated inviting a small number of gang members from each gang to attend a call-in, receiving a clear and unified message from Local Authority, Community and Police representatives reinforcing the key elements; that the violence must stop; that there will be legal consequences if it does not and there is help available to those who wish to exit the gang. From this point, if a cohort member committed an act of serious violence from a pre-defined list (known as a 'threshold' or 'trigger' offence) 'Collective Enforcement'[5] would be initiated against the entire gang, using any available and proportionate police or civil enforcement options, for a period of two weeks. The process, from nominal selection onwards could be repeated as required over the live period.

The pilot commissioned direct input and guidance from the US team who developed the GVI approach; the National Network for Safer Communities (NNSC). MOPAC also secured the services of the Community Development Foundation (CDF) to facilitate community engagement on all pilot boroughs.

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[3] Serious Violence, essentially 'Most Serious Violence'; Murder and attempted murder; Grievous Bodily Harm – with or without intent; Weapon Enabled Crime (incl. stabbings, excluding knife possession); Violent Disorder, including Rioting; Possession of a Firearm offences; Kidnapping; False Imprisonment; Aggravated Burglary (all types).
[4] Trident, local MPS, Probation services (National Probations Service (NPS), Community Rehabilitation Centre (CRC), Youth Justice Board (YJB), National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
[5] 'Collective Enforcement' is MOPAC terminology for the focussed enforcement response initiated against all members of a gang when one individual commits a threshold offence whilst Shield is live. It is designed to ensure the gang will be held 'collectively accountable for violence committed by a fellow member, countering the group dynamic that drives violence' (NNSC, 2013). The report discusses the possible confusions around Shield's enforcement operational practice linked to the use of this terminology.

2. Evaluation Methodology

The Evidence and Insight team at the Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC) conducted the Shield evaluation. A holistic plan was designed, with the intention of measuring the process learning and any potential impact Shield had on its aims – foremost but not limited to, the reduction in serious violence committed by the selected cohort and gangs. Additional outcome measures (which were dependent on data capture) included intervention uptake, message delivery and call-in attendance. Whilst not quantifiable, community related benefits are discussed in process learning.

In terms of process learning the evaluation utilised a mixed methodology including staff surveys (n=53, over two phases); interviews with key practitioners (n=18); ethnography at community meetings/call-ins; borough reports and assessment of performance data via the Shield Activity Tracker (SAT), an E&I developed data capture tool for practitioners.

It was decided to explore potential impact via a matched control sample – that is, comparing Shield nominals to similar individuals on non-pilot boroughs on key outcomes (i.e. suspected; arrested; charged). This was selected as the most robust feasible methodology, although it limits the weight of causal statements in comparison to a Randomised Control Trial (RCT). A version of propensity score matching was used on a borough and gang level, matching offending prevalence, specialisms, gang demographics as well as some individual elements to ensure the validity of the match (see appendix for more detailed breakdown). Pre/Post analysis of more general offending rates was used to supplement findings.

3. Results

The report is focussed upon four areas of learning from the Shield programme - these are learning from **performance monitoring, the challenges of implementation, wider lessons about programme process** and the **impact upon offending.**

Performance Monitoring

Performance data was collected via borough reports and the Shield Activity Tracker (SAT) in an attempt to understand who was selected to be part of the Shield cohort; what needs they had; what offers of help were provided and what enforcement activity occurred. Results from the SAT indicate:

- A total of 19 gangs and 321 individuals were selected across the three boroughs:
    - Lambeth - 8 gangs, 132 individuals.
    - Westminster - 6 gangs, 90 individuals.
    - Haringey - 5 gangs, 99 individuals.

- Individuals selected were exclusively male.
- The average age of the total cohort was 21.5 years, with a minimum age of 13 (Lambeth) and a maximum age of 44 (Haringey).[6] Lambeth had the youngest cohort (average age 20.1), similar to Westminster (average age 20.4). Haringey had an older average age of 24, with a greater proportion of individuals in the 25-34 bracket (31%, n=31).
- In terms of ethnicity, the overall cohort was 85% (n=272) Black African-Caribbean and 94% (n=300) Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME). Haringey had the greatest proportion of African-Caribbean individuals (96%, n=95). Westminster had the most diverse cohort with one quarter Arabic/North African (28%, n=25).[7] Cohort ethnicity was broadly reflective of the demographics of specific gang affected areas within the pilot boroughs, and in line with that on the MPS Gangs Matrix.[8] Figure 1 provides further breakdown of the selected cohorts.

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[6] Under 18's were included in the Shield cohort (14.5%) but were not part of the same call-ins as adults.
[7] Information on ethnicity should be treated with caution, as it is based on police recorded data rather than self-classified.
[8] The MPS gang nominal database; the Matrix tracks and scores individual gang members based on frequency and severity of violent offending & victimisation. In November 2015, the ethnicity of Matrix nominals was 88% BAME and 77% Black African-Caribbean.

Figure 1: Shield Cohort Overview

- 19 gangs, with a total of 321 individuals selected across three boroughs
- Lambeth originally selected the most currently active & harmful gangs; 12 nominals have been added since & 15 removed.
- Westminster chose all active gangs known to MPS; cohort not refreshed.
- Haringey focused on most harmful gangs but selected cohort late in pilot.
- Individuals worked with exclusively Male.
- Individuals resided across 15 London boroughs, as well as a small number outside the MPS. Croydon had the highest number of cohort members with a last known address on the borough (n=11, 9 on Lambeth, 2 on Westminster).

Haringey
- No. of gangs worked with: **5**
- Gang members in original cohort: **99**
- Total gang members over pilot period: **99**
- No. in custody when selected:
- Age range: **Oldest Cohort** average age **24;** the youngest individual is 16, the oldest 44.
- Included individuals who do not reside on the borough: **17%,** n=13 (14 NK)

Lambeth
- No. of gangs worked with: **8**
- Gang members in original cohort: **117**
- Total gang members over pilot period: **132**
- No. in custody when selected: **17**
- Age range: **youngest cohort** with an average age of **20.1** years; the youngest individual is 13 years old.
- Included individuals who do not reside on the borough: **11%,** n=14 (2 NK)

Westminster
- No. of gangs worked with: **6**
- Gang members in original cohort: **90**
- No. in Custody when selected: **19**
- Age range: average age **20.8**; the youngest individual is 15 years old.
- Included individuals who do not reside on the borough: **21%,** n=19 (one NK)

Note: Unless stated all figures relate to the total Shield cohorts selected over course of pilot.

Shield Cohort Engagement & Offers of Help

Overall, eight call-ins were held over five days during the pilot, three on Lambeth in the ten months they were live; four on Westminster in seven months; and one on Haringey in the month they were live. This resulted in eight separate call-ins and 27 attendees (of 103 invited) over the entire period. Given the low attendance levels it is not appropriate to detail the exact numbers involved.

- For Lambeth's first call-in attempt (early June 2015), gang members were invited to attend voluntarily. The event was on a large scale as advocated by NNSC, catering for around 50 invitees. The event did not attract sufficient participants and was subsequently cancelled. Of those that did attend, three quarters were compelled by Youth Offending Services (YOS), providing early signposting that compulsion may be the best route to securing attendance. Key reasons were perceived to be an unwillingness to lose face in front of rival gang members; an intimidating environment with a large numbers of service providers and observers; the time (midday) and location (Town Hall) of the meeting. Lessons learnt meant the second call-in (October 2015) was more successful, with emphasis on compulsion and a change in venue (held at both a community centre and council offices) resulting in seven individuals attending from a total of 18 invited[9] across five gangs.

- In late September 2015 Westminster held three call-ins in one day across the borough. A total of 22 individuals were invited; the vast majority non-compellable. Although no

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[9] From Youth Offending Service (YOS), Community Rehabilitation Centre (CRC) and National Probation Service (NPS).

one attended the first meeting, a total of seven individuals attended the latter two. Eight cohort members subsequently received a Shield message through custom notifications or other means, resulting in several individuals requesting help straight after their call-ins or highlighting willingness to engage. Westminster's fourth call-in, held in early March 2016 was attended by a small number of members of a single gang, all compelled.

- In the early stages of Shield, Haringey made a commitment to not go ahead without community approval. Implementation was subsequently postponed as the borough and local police worked with community members to design an acceptable local interpretation of GVI. This approach necessitated a substantial delay to 'go live'; Haringey held their first call-in in early March 2016 (less than a month before the pilot end) in a school assembly hall in the north of the borough with a total of five individuals (all compelled) attended with their probation officers. This was held under the banner of 'Communities Against Violence' (CAV).

Post cohort selection, all boroughs initiated a message delivery stage involving all members being notified of their participation in the pilot by letter detailing what this meant for them and what they could do if they wanted help exiting the gang. The methods of message delivery differed between boroughs; for example, in who delivered the message (a combination of local authority, youth workers, local police) and in what frequency. Custom Notifications[xv] were also delivered to some individuals invited to the call-ins who did not attend.[10] Although the SAT was provided to capture data on the message delivery, due to local resourcing issues, it was not possible to robustly document the message delivery component across the whole of Shield (at least 119 received written or verbal notification, the nearest robust metric being the 103 who were invited to attend a call-in).

In addition, a key aim of engagement with the cohort was to provide support in exiting gang life via targeted interventions. However, it appeared that a number of cohort members were already involved with service providers prior to 'go-live' and all boroughs reported difficulties gaining new engagements. This was expected, and reflected in MOPAC's decision, consistent with NNSC advice, not to provide additional funds for the help strand (all three pilot borough Integrated Gang Units are funded by MOPAC). All three boroughs provided a phone number for Shield nominals to call to seek advice and assistance in exiting the gang. Boroughs reported no uptake in referrals through this avenue, with some reporting abusive or threatening calls regarding the programme. Data on referral uptake and outcome was limited. From the available data, Lambeth documented 53 individuals engaging with one or more agencies/schemes, generating a total of 86 separate referrals (June 2015–December 2015). In the views of staff, generally those already being engaged with continued to do so, likewise those who did not. In April 2016, Haringey reported 27 individuals being worked with; again, it is likely these would have been engaged with regardless of Shield.

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[10] Custom Notifications are a form of individualised message delivery adapted to suit specific circumstances.

Shield Enforcement Activity

Over the course of Shield, an uplift in enforcement activity was noted across pilot boroughs. However, the data received by the evaluation was not able to distinguish Shield enforcement as compared to business as usual policing. For example, Lambeth were assigned a Trident unit for the duration of the pilot, who carried out numerous operations, sometimes on Shield involved gangs and sometimes not. The backdrop of continuing rises in youth violence, knife and gun offences also prompted a proactive drive to focus on Matrix individuals, overlapping with the aims of Shield.[11]

Between June 2015 and July 2016, 40 per cent of the full Shield cohort (n=129) were arrested at least once. In total there were 300 arrests (max=7, average of 2.3 per arrested individual) and 115 individuals were charged with at least one offence, totalling 216 charges (max=6, average of 1.88 per charged individual while Shield was live in each borough. The majority of charges were for drugs related offences (44%, n=94, mainly possession). 29% (n=63) of the total charges of cohort members between June 2015 and July 2016 related to violence against the person offences.

Collective Enforcement (CE) was initiated three times across the pilot boroughs, twice on Lambeth (against two different gangs) and once on Westminster. On two occasions (once on Westminster and once on Lambeth) individuals who had attended the call-in went on to commit the threshold offence. When CE did occur, outcomes were often unsatisfactory; the first occurrence on Lambeth resulted in a number of arrests but all individuals were subsequently released with 'no further action'. No threshold offences were identified following Westminster's second call-in and Haringey's first (both held in early March 2016).

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[11] Specifically, Operation Teal; a Trident led MPS operation initiated in June 2015 which used overt and covert tactics to prevent and disrupt knife and gang crime.

The challenges of Implementation

This section documents the main issues to emerge from the implementation of the pilot. Effective implementation is an essential aspect of designing and setting up new programmes. By implementation the report is referring to the process of developing, designing and conducting the programme in question - issues such as learning from the evidence base, having a clear rationale, documenting operating models and guidance for staff, provision of training, effective involvement of stakeholders, data capture and so on. This is important as programmes that are implemented effectively are evidenced to get better results.[xvi] Whilst Shield has many aspects that are required (i.e. operation model, based on evidence) ultimately issues were encountered that hampered implementation. However, many of these were more keenly felt at the beginning of the pilot, with improvement over time; any future iteration should anticipate this and adopt contingency plans.

Translation of GVI to London

Although survey respondents agreed there is a significant gang problem to be addressed, on reflection from the pilot, there were mixed views as to whether a GVI based model can practically work in London. In particular, there was uncertainty about adapting a US model designed to tackle homicides and shootings, to focus on the lower-level violence more prevalent in London. Some staff put forward the differences in available legal mechanisms as a key barrier to successful implementation. It was not popular amongst some police officers, being viewed as either enforcement 'watered down to nothing' or conflicting with a key tenet of UK police practice to not store risk – holding off arresting individuals until Collective Enforcement was initiated.

'There were issues around banking offences; police in the States are more comfortable storing risk'

The differences in structure and organisation of gangs/groups between the US and UK was also raised as a potential barrier to effective implementation, with a suggestion – to some extent supported by literature – that street gangs in London are far more fluid, less hierarchical and organised than in the states.[xvii] This may have impacted on message dissemination between gang members and potentially serves to illustrate early differences of opinion towards the scheme. More generally, some feedback suggested the decision to use 'gang' terminology rather than the NNSC advocated 'group' approach may have influenced negative perceptions of the pilot amongst some community members.

Initial Planning, Set Up & Design

Operating Model Design and Communication

At a senior strategic level there appeared to be a good understanding of the key principles of the GVI approach; senior leaders from MOPAC, MPS (Trident) and Partners had been aware of the overarching strategy for a number of years and elements of the three borough's Integrated Gang Units (IGUs) were already based on GVI principles.[12] However, feedback over the course of the pilot indicated some confusion as to the core driver of the model, with some believing law enforcement was the fundamental aspect (e.g. Trident), and others (e.g. Local Authorities) placing more focus on a collaborative community response, illustrating a crucial difference in approach. There was satisfaction with the (limited) general training required for Shield; although survey and interview feedback indicated the communication of the programmes strategic aims were not always clear.[13]

'There was a significant gap between the theory and the practical implementation'

Whilst it is positive an operating model (OM) was completed, many staff thought it did not provide an adequate blueprint, of either the fundamentals of the approach (e.g. a solid understanding of Collective Enforcement) or a practical, workable framework within which to implement it (e.g. building in 'what if' examples and carrying out dry runs of the key elements of the approach to ensure staff had clarity).[14] To illustrate, due to a perceived lack of clarity in the operating model there was confusion as to what constituted a 'threshold' offence; it took two weeks from the first threshold offence to agree CE should be initiated, meaning the 'certainty' of swift consequences to the group was diminished. Opinion was split amongst practitioners as to the level of evidence required to initiate CE. More positively, wider Shield governance structures were well received, particularly at local level, with one borough explicitly stating that they would continue with the community inclusive structure implemented during Shield.

Doubts were expressed as to whether the approach was adequately disseminated to front line practitioners. This included the need for more frequent sharing of information, best practice and learning between boroughs; and *between* and *within* agencies. In the absence of central Shield communication it was thought fuller updates on how the pilot was progressing would have been beneficial to maintain momentum of key practitioners.

Borough Selection

MOPAC underwent a process of engagement with potential Shield boroughs, meeting with all Chief Executives to establish willingness to participate. Boroughs were then selected to take part in the pilot from a combination of an assessment of local pre-existing police/local authority gang unit infrastructures[15] and analysis of local crime and population data, to ensure sufficient prevalence of preselected 'threshold offences' to measure potential impact. However, the extent to which services were integrated between agencies or attuned to local communities

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[12] MOPAC Gangs Summit took place in June 2014.
[13] Just over half of respondents indicated training was effective (n=17).
[14] Call-in rehearsals were completed by all boroughs.
[15] As carried out by the MOPAC Project Team.

varied, which impacted on external engagement. Some interviewees indicated these pre-existing complexities coupled with community distrust led to implementation delays. Local resourcing and capacity issues were also highlighted as risks from an early stage, particularly in terms of data collection, and remain significant barriers to long-term sustainability. Several interviewees suggested implementation may have been easier in boroughs *without* pre-existing integrated gang units.

NNSC Input

In addition, the delayed contractual agreement with the US-based National Networks for Safer Communities (NNSC), was cited by some as a barrier to planning and design, meaning much development was completed before NNSC were in a position to advise. For example, the need for lead-in analysis (such as local gang incident audits) was not identified until too near 'go live'. This stemmed from an assumption that pre-existing mechanisms (such as the Matrix and MPS gang incident tracking) would be sufficient in terms of preparatory analysis, whereas in hindsight full gang and incident audits were required. Once involved, NNSC input was generally seen as helpful, particularly the on-site advice and guidance by the London based NNSC representative. However, difficulties were again cited around data sharing and the translation of UK specific legal, policing and social service mechanisms.

'NNSC provided conflicting messages, changing to meet the current circumstances.'

Whilst there was some initial reluctance by boroughs to take part in teleconference calls with the NNSC, the visit of Professor Kennedy in late 2015 was viewed as extremely useful, with boroughs commenting on the benefits of his advice and reassurance. Boroughs did indicate they would have preferred a visit earlier in the pilot, likewise video conference calls; call-in examples; and US site visits could have been carried out at an earlier date to help conceptualise the approach for key practitioners. It was also suggested it may have been beneficial to hire Professor Kennedy/NNSC as full time advisors rather than merely an advisory capacity, as some practitioners observed the directives in the GVI handbook and MOPAC operating model were not as stringent as initially advised. For example, Westminster's local adaptations, such as multiple localised call-in venues, were initially questioned by NNSC but praised during the site visits as working well operationally.

Communication of Pilot Aims to Cohort

Further doubts regarding the pilot design and practitioner uncertainty affected the practical application of the approach. For example, the confusion surrounding how to communicate pilot aims meant many of the cohort received multiple letters from Shield (notification, call-in) and other MPS operations with similar objectives.[16] This was thought to dilute Shield specific messaging. In addition, the lack of follow up to home visits and message delivery meant front line practitioners were sceptical as to whether cohort members would even tell their peers about the pilot and specifically the consequences for not stopping the violence. Indicative feedback from youth workers suggests there were some discussions between local youths around Shield.

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[16] Letters for Brixton Splash street festival, Notting Hill Carnival, Operation Teal (Trident) targeting suspected habitual knife carriers.

Senior Policy Support

Staff fed back that more top level support would have been valuable, especially in publically challenging some of the initial negativity and controversies (e.g. conflation with Joint Enterprise).[17] Several respondents indicated MOPAC could have done more to challenge MPS operational actions, which directly impacted on the pilot areas and replicated many of Shield's aims and processes. As a result there were mixed views concerning the degree of influence partners had, which some suggested made management and standardisation of approach more difficult. More clarity in the operating model would have been beneficial, to encourage a more standardised implementation approach.

Standardisation across Boroughs

The Shield pilot ran into delays and challenges regarding standardisation. Although a staggered roll out was expected, it was not anticipated to be over such an extended time period. Lambeth delivered the Shield message to their original cohort in early June 2015, followed by Westminster in late September 2015 and Haringey did not hold their first call-in (under the banner of 'Communities Against Violence' (CAV)) until early March 2016, less than a month before the official pilot end.

Cohort and Gang Selection

Each borough interpreted and implemented the Shield process differently, beginning with approaches to the initial selection of the Shield cohort. Cohorts were selected via a collaborative process between borough and central MPS intelligence. Involvement of the community differed heavily between boroughs, ranging from informal discussions with local youth workers (Lambeth) to official representation at intelligence meetings (Haringey). Although this provided opportunities to incorporate community intelligence and information from other agencies to inform selection, only a small number of individuals were selected who had not previously featured on the MPS gangs Matrix. Throughout the pilot there was consistent consensus from survey respondents and interviewees that the right gangs and individuals were selected by stakeholders. Haringey selected a notably older cohort (maximum age 44) and opted to include some gang members who may better be described as involved in organised crime. There were several other practical variations, including the number of gangs to include and differences in borough understanding around the need for cohort refreshes and nominal de-selection.

> *'…robust enforcement has to be the lead-in the early stages of Shield to set the stall out…'*

Call-ins

A great deal of effort, resource and importance was placed on the gang call-ins, but in practice there were significant challenges, notably; securing attendance of invited gang nominal; the lack of appetite and inadequate mechanisms for compelling individuals to attend; and

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[17] Joint Enterprise is a common law doctrine that allows for several people to be charged with the same offence; even though they may have played very different roles in the crime e.g. persons who did not strike the fatal blow can still be convicted of murder. A Supreme Court decision in February 2016 found that the application of the law had taken "a wrong turn" and been misinterpreted for 30 years.

difficulties facilitating neutrally located multi-gang events. Although the call-ins never intended for the entire gang to be present, but instead were to feature key individuals who would relay the Shield message back to the wider gang, the low numbers of attendees was in contrast to meetings held in the US or Glasgow. This can be explained by the lack of sufficiently robust legal mechanisms to compel attendance compared with the US, and the far shorter lead-in and engagement period with cohort members compared to Glasgow. However, there were still mixed views as to the importance of call-ins to the overall success of the model – with some viewing them as fundamental and others considering them as just one option in a suite used to communicate the key Shield messages.

'There was too much emphasis on call-ins; they shouldn't be the focus, just a method of [message] delivery'

Although there was less cohort attendance at the call-ins than initially hoped (including less cohort members who could realistically be compelled), there was learning from the process – particularly the need to obtain the right people to deliver the message. Preparation (including rehearsals) was thought to be paramount – including understanding the audience; model; message; and nature and tone of the event, rather than reading from a script. Whilst much consideration was given to securing appropriate venues (youth centres appeared to work particularly well), learning indicated this was of lesser importance than tight message delivery. All boroughs put in a great deal of work to secure suitable speakers, either from the local community or with direct experience of gang violence or lifestyles. Practitioners felt the extended lead-in and amended local design ensured those willing to speak were both known and respected by the vast majority of young people involved in the pilot; and therefore able to better connect with the youths in question. Haringey particularly emphasised the benefits of informal mentoring as part of the pilot.

'Success relies upon having strong community individuals who will stand united alongside agencies to set expectations and standards...identifying these individuals is difficult.'

The balance between Community Voice and enforcement was raised, with some practitioners highlighting the sheer number of visible police (and observers) at several of the call-ins as unhelpful. It was felt police input into call-ins could have at times been better planned, with some police speakers perhaps under prepared, although this varied between boroughs. The use of both Trident and local officers for message delivery at one call-in was seen as overkill. Officers with local ties to the estates and areas where the gang members lived may have been able to better engage attendees.

The Extent of Preparatory Engagement

The belief that gaining buy-in from the majority of the community was essential to successful implementation was queried by Professor Kennedy and the NNSC, who emphasised the approach was fundamentally law enforcement based and that community consensus is not necessary to start GVI. The NNSC advocated a non-consultative approach; gaining key representatives buy in, rather than seeking support of whole communities before launching. This interpretation of the operating model was a key marker in the differing Shield approaches across the three boroughs, with Local Authorities leading on community engagement and

playing down the enforcement element. Several practitioners suggested the enforcement aspect could have been handled with greater sensitivity, with one borough's large scale community meetings creating a negative atmosphere pre-launch.

Challenges of Community Engagement

From the beginning of the pilot, all boroughs recognised that although the most challenging element of Shield, meaningful community collaboration and input would be crucial to achieving success. Early borough feedback suggested they would have preferred a longer lead-in time for community engagement prior to launch. It was considered by some front-line practitioners that Shield fuelled pre-existing perceptions of enforcement heavy policing amongst community groups, with existing levels of mistrust of the police, local authority and statutory bodies brought into a sharper focus. Two boroughs mentioned their well-known and entrenched issues relating to police-community relations, with some community members making it clear in meetings they believed the policing actions contributed to local gang issues rather than being part of a potential solution. Some local practitioners felt high profile enforcement would only serve to exacerbate such feelings.

'…it is getting the communities on side that is the real challenge and would be the biggest benefit…'

Media Communications
It was felt by a majority of interviewees across roles that media attention surrounding Shield was detrimental to planning and amplified tensions surrounding community engagement – in particular the Mayoral press release in January 2015.[xviii] At this time the press lines indicated a 'tough' enforcement heavy approach, where individuals would be 'collectively punished for the criminal actions of individual members'. This was viewed by many respondents as a misrepresentation of the pilot aims and process, appearing to antagonise many of the communities Shield was trying to engage with.

'[The Mayoral Press release] showed a lack of understanding of local dynamics; a case of five steps forward and ten steps back in gaining community support'

Practitioners thought initial messaging would have benefited from greater sensitivity and consideration of the impact it would have on a highly charged political arena, where race relations and policing are significant issues. Practitioners reported that anti-Shield sentiment spread rapidly across community networks and between pilot boroughs, in turn leading to an equally unhelpful conflation of 'Collective Enforcement' with Joint Enterprise. One borough described the publicity surrounding the pilot as a 'double edged sword' with the good work of the local gang unit highlighted, but at the same time hindered by the negative publicity. All three boroughs indicated a substantial proportion of their pre-existing community gang/street workers were unwilling to be associated with Shield in any way, fearing it could undo positive engagement due the perceived toxicity of the Shield brand.

'Gang unit [outreach] work was tainted through association with the bad publicity surrounding Shield.'

Senior Leadership Engagement

In addition, some interviewees highlighted the perceived lack of top level support as contributing to community reservations. Several respondents thought there was insufficient engagement with local communities or availability from senior leaders at both MOPAC and the MPS, resulting in a failure to persuade local people the pilot was a key priority. Once live, communities reported little feedback as to how the pilot was progressing, although low attendance of Shield meetings or failure to cascade information received may have contributed to this perception. Sharing of up-to-date information on all aspects – particularly enforcement – may have avoided unhelpful rumours regarding police activity, whilst reassuring the community that individuals were not being unfairly targeted.

Borough Specific Challenges to Engagement

As the first borough to go live, Lambeth experienced its own unique challenges, with a difficult lead-in period and large scale public meetings resulting in some local political resistance. Feedback from interviewees and programme boards indicated engagement may have been aided by a localised focus and more informal, targeted pre-pilot discussions. Nevertheless, Lambeth reported benefits in using Shield as a *conversation starter* with previously disengaged groups and individuals, making fruitful links between the community and local police.

Westminster viewed the pilot as an opportunity to refine and refresh their external messaging to the community, eventually reaching out to several hundred representatives across the borough, inviting feedback and suggestions.[18] They found significant variations in willingness of communities to engage, with no apparent correlation to the areas most affected by gang violence.

'[Shield] got different groups talking; many doors have been opened'

The last borough to go live, Haringey involved local communities in the redesign and implementation of the pilot to the greatest extent. This necessitated a thorough reappraisal of the original model and a re-branding to 'Communities Against Violence' (CAV) to quell the negativity surrounding Shield. Although the approach dictated a substantial delay to 'go-live', the enhanced consultative process, and subsequent buy in and involvement were thought to be positive.

Process Transparency

Practitioners and community representatives all noted a positive shift in the levels of transparency and openness regarding the information that Local Authorities and Police held. This included involving a small number of community members in formal processes such as the identification of gang members and assessment of harm, risk and vulnerability. Across the boroughs community representatives with appropriate clearance were invited to take part in meetings relating to the cohort; were privy to reasoning behind their inclusion; and given the opportunity to disagree with submissions or suggest alternatives. Practitioners suggested that although community intelligence of this kind was not forthcoming, the pilot encouraged greater participation from community representatives and partner agencies.

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[18] Total recipients, response rate and feedback collation is on-going locally.

'Allowing [designated] community members to see the Matrix enabled difficult conversations about the demographics of the cohort and wider links to organised crime; an honest approach is beneficial'

It was felt there was an opportunity to demystify what were seen as opaque processes regarding gang lists and in particular the Matrix, by involving community representatives and giving reasoning behind decision making. The enhanced communication and emphasis on two-way information flows were considered by key gang unit practitioners to be positive developments which should be built into subsequent programmes.

Community Voice

The pilot raised fundamental questions regarding the nature and meaning of community engagement. Whilst there was consensus engagement should be an inclusive process, reaching beyond those who had previous dialogue, there was less certainty as to whether the most suitable and/or representative community members were involved. In addition, there was a difference in the level of engagement and interaction, for example between those willing to debate at meetings and those willing to stand next to police and partners and support a consistent message at call-ins. Community speakers were generally very well received by boroughs, both in terms of delivery and perceived cohort response.

'Boroughs went out of their way to find excellent community speakers but didn't always do the same for the other speakers'

There were initial suggestions the pilot was a missed opportunity for the police to build bridges with local communities, by acknowledging they have not always got it right in the past - an approach found to be successful in previous GVI interventions in the United States. Despite this, as the pilot progressed, a strong shared desire to work together to reduce gang violence became evident at meetings. Practitioners felt the positive debate between diverse local community groups; service providers; and key stakeholders ultimately increased co-operation, understanding and information sharing.

'It is crucial to engage all community members, not just those that are supportive of the pilot'

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Wider Process Learning

This section highlights process learning over the course of the pilot.

Partnership and Multi Agency Working

The benefits of a collaborative approach enhanced by the pilot were acknowledged, with boroughs reporting a positive impact beyond the Shield specific remit, particularly with the police; probation; and third sector organisations. Probation services were generally seen as very supportive of the pilot, with high levels of engagement and cooperation despite the considerable resourcing issues. Police co-operation with Local Authorities and partners was strongly praised, with boroughs citing Shield as beneficial in cementing already good working relationships, particularly within gang units.

Intelligence Flow
At the beginning of the pilot the increased quality and availability of analytical product (such as Social Network Analysis), was highlighted with a general feeling the police developed a greater appreciation of the intelligence input from Local Authorities and partners. On a wider level, the pilot also highlighted divergence in understanding between local and central police units regarding gang tensions and individual motivations for violence - with one borough challenging the centrally produced intelligence picture. Although practitioners subsequently noted a decline in centralised resource as the pilot progressed, increased partner intelligence was indicated as learning to incorporate into future process.

'…the tracking and analysis opened our eyes as to how fluid gang structure and membership has become'

Service Mapping
Feedback suggests Shield also prompted a better attempt at mapping the available local services for gang involved young people, across partner and voluntary sector agencies. For example, Haringey provided the local community with an oversight of existing resources and gaps in service provision, to assist when planning new initiatives. CDF were instrumental in facilitating this, negotiating between interest groups, individuals and organisations with conflicting agendas. Their work identified which individuals and groups had a shared purpose of reducing violence and assisted them to better understand how their work can contribute to the bigger picture.

'[By the end of the pilot] local partner intelligence was better reflected'

Partnership Buy-In
However, working across multiple organisations also ran into difficulties, particularly around the perceived commitment from all partners. As the pilot progressed, fewer survey respondents agreed there was an equal commitment from all partners for Shield to succeed or felt confident

colleagues were reinforcing the Shield message and several interviewees highlighted lack of Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) involvement as a key barrier (e.g. fast-tracking offenders).[19] Although it was recognised CPS participation in Shield was to some degree restricted by UK legal framework, all boroughs indicated this would be a key issue to address moving forward. All boroughs found identifying and actioning civil sanctions against cohort members was impractical, with gaining access to civil routes convoluted and time consuming (DWP, TV licensing, parking fines etc.). Other complications included the timing and scope of demonstrative enforcement operations[xix], completed before the scheduled call-ins resulting in a number of arrests of Shield cohort members ahead of the planned engagement.

'[gang related] casework is one thing but the public visibility from CPS participation in Shield quite another'

Co-ordinating Interventions across Partners

Although the 'help' strand of Shield was thought to be essential for long-term success, and boroughs all had strong diversionary focus, practitioners highlighted a number of practical issues which relied on strong partnership working to make the approach work. Some practitioners felt that expectations, particularly amongst the Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS), may have been unduly high. Others questioned why in contrast to the enhanced resource on the enforcement side, there was not a similar enhancement for interventions or referrals. To tackle this, partnership working was seen as paramount, with emphasis placed on how a variety of agencies can incorporate bespoke gang exit services within their standard approach.

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[19] 48% (n=10) and 43%, (n=10) respectively.

Learning to Inform Future Practice

All three pilot boroughs reported that they have mainstreamed elements of Shield into their activity:

- **Lambeth** – Under the 'Tackling Group Offending' (TGO) banner, Lambeth indicated it will employ the governance structure implemented during Shield moving forward, seeking to re-introduce their gangs case management process (G-MAP) whilst maintaining the more dynamic identification process with greater input from community and partners. Mediated contact and targeted support for gang members through the suite of engagement options will continue, with the possibility of further call-ins but at a local and singular gang level. The emphasis on community representation and input in youth violence intervention processes is also being maintained and adapted to emphasize local area input organisation e.g. 'Big Local' Brixton youth violence community 'think tank'.

- **Westminster** - The focused messaging approach that Westminster partners – council, police, probation, housing, the community – finessed over the course of the pilot highlights the desire to have gang involved youth 'safe, alive and out of prison' will continue. Westminster reports the engagement processes driven by Shield has provided a strong groundwork for future development, driving plans to set up a serious youth violence advisory group. Although non-committal about future call-ins, the Shield collective self-policing approach was admired as an innovative tool and there are plans to incorporate elements moving forward. Interviewees reported Shield presented a new opportunity to approach the gang as a whole, encouraging self-regulation which fits with their underlying philosophy of 'Your Choice'. Support offers will not change and are described as already strong.

- **Haringey** – Haringey's more community focused approach highlights the need for local sensitivity, with the borough emphasising the need for a holistic approach to tackling gang and group related criminality going forward. This will focus not just on violence, but on other key issues such as vulnerability and safeguarding related to CSE and County Lines. Communities Against Violence meetings are scheduled for the coming months.

- **Trident** – Feedback suggests some members of Trident felt because Shield's community work was led by Local Authorities, it presented local and central police units with less opportunity to build their own bridges. Therefore, Trident has taken Shield learning to implement a critical friends group on an inner London borough with significant recent increases in gang related violence. This pilot scheme involves the community lead deciding how to tackle gang related issues with police input as appropriate.

4. Impact on Offending

In terms of impact analysis it has only been possible to review data relating to the primary aim of Shield; reducing violent offending. Analysis looked to first compare offending levels of the **a) Shield boroughs to the MPS average** and then **b) offending of the selected cohort** against a matched control (see appendix p.32 for methodology).

Shield Borough Level Offending

Overall levels of gang crime indicators and proxies were compared between the year before Shield (year 1) to the year in which Shield boroughs went live (year 2); (violence against the person; youth violence; gang flagged crime; gun crime; non-domestic knife crime with injury where victim is under 25; gang flagged violence with injury; firearms discharges). It reveals a mixed picture with no clear narrative; however, given the relatively small numbers of individuals involved with the pilot, it is perhaps not surprising there is no clear effect on borough level offending.

Overall the MPS saw a significant increase in 'violence against the person' (VAP) offences[20], the widest definition of violence, including all offences from harassment to murder. In line with this, all three pilot boroughs recorded significant increases on the previous year.[21][22][23] Increases (though not statistically significant) were also apparent MPS wide in youth violence and firearms discharges over the comparison period. All three boroughs also reported non-significant increases against these categories.

Westminster recorded significant decreases in gang flagged crime[24] and non-domestic knife crime with injury[25] where the victim is under 25 (a gang crime proxy measure), whereas in comparison the MPS showed a smaller (non-significant) decrease over the same period.

Lambeth reported a non-significant decrease in gang flagged offences, which may be the result of local recording practice rather than reflective of real terms decline in gang related crime. Lambeth and Westminster recorded decreases in gun crime between the two comparison periods in line with MPS decreases, however the overall low prevalence means caution should be exercised in interpreting these results.

Gang flagged crime (violence with injury only) was explored to control for spikes in operational activity against specific gangs (i.e. proactive operations where gang flagged weapon possession or drug offences may increase). Whilst all three boroughs recorded decreases in gang flagged violence, the MPS also recorded a decrease over the comparison period and the small numbers

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[20] Year 1 (M=17008.83, SD=948.959) and year 2 (M=19168.33, SD=800.557); t(11)=-14.508, p=0.000
[21] Year 1 (M=832.67, SD=70.997) and year 2 (M=893.67, SD=76.245); t(11)= -3.39, p=0.006
[22] Year 1 (M=775.58, SD=39.116) and year 2 (M=863.33, SD=46.682); t(11)=-6.049, p=0.000
[23] Year 1 (M=575.92, SD=31.87) and Year 2 (M=686.00, SD=52.96); t(11)=-8.94, p=0.000
[24] Year 1 (M=6.17, SD=4.687) and Year 2 (M=2.92, SD=2.193); t(11)=2.297, p=0.042
[25] Year 1 (M=4.92, SD=2.539) and Year 2 (M=2.83, SD=1.642); t(11)=2.926, p=0.014

mean caution should be exercised. **Overall, there was no clear indication that Shield has had any influence upon borough level violent offending**.

Shield Cohort Offending

The entire Shield cohort consisted of 321 males; of these, 31 were excluded from the final analysis for various reasons including being removed from the cohort; being assigned membership to multiple gangs; not meeting selection criteria; or indicating changed or unknown gang allegiance. Therefore, final analysis focussed upon a total of 290 individuals across 15 gangs (five in Lambeth; six in Westminster and four in Haringey). A matched comparison group of 397 individuals was identified. See appendix for methodology, borough breakdowns and strength of matched control over a range of demographic and offending data.

Recorded offending was explored using police data, to identify which individuals had appeared as either a named suspect; had been arrested; or had been charged. The analysis took into account the staggered 'go live' dates for each borough starting with the first from June 2015 until the end of July 2016. It is recognised that analysis using police data has a number of limitations in terms of data quality; timescales would not allow for conviction analysis, and as with all police recorded data will not be a true reflection of criminal activity. Chi square tests were used to identify statistically significant differences between groups.

i. *Violence and Wider Criminality*

Given the low prevalence of serious violence, analysis initially explored impact on wider categories of offending. When the Shield cohort (treatment) are compared to the 397 individual males in the matched group (control) it is noted the overall offending (all notifiable offences) and violence against the person offending levels across the period of analysis are very similar (see Table 4, appendix).

When exploring overall effect on offending (all notifiable offences), there was no significant difference between the Shield cohort and the comparison group:

- Overall, the Shield boroughs and control boroughs were broadly comparable in terms of proportion of individuals identified as a named suspect (48%, mean average per person=1.2 vs. 46%, mean average per person=1.35)
- Overall, the Shield and control boroughs were similar in proportion for individuals arrested (40%, mean=0.93 vs. 38%, mean=0.99)
- Overall, the Shield boroughs had a slightly larger proportion of individuals charged than the control (36%, mean=0.68 vs. 32%, mean=0.68)

The similarity between Shield and control groups is further demonstrated by comparing average arrests, normalised against Shield start date, with little difference between the two (see graph 1, appendix p.35).

When exploring overall effect on violence against the person offending only, there was also no significant difference between the Shield cohort and the comparison group:

- Overall, the Shield boroughs had a slightly larger proportion of individuals identified as a named suspect in a VAP offence than the control. (32%, mean=0.52 vs. 27%, mean=0.52)
- Overall, the Shield boroughs had a slightly larger proportion of individuals arrested for a VAP offence than the control. (25%, mean=0.35 vs. 21%, mean=0.35)
- Overall, there was no difference in proportion of individuals charged for a VAP offence between the Shield boroughs and the control. (15%, mean=0.19 vs. 15%, mean=0.21)

ii.   Borough Level Analysis

In terms of exploring effect across specific boroughs, the low numbers of individuals who are suspected/arrested/charged makes analysis difficult. The above analysis was replicated for each borough; only one statistically significant difference between Shield group and control was found:

- Lambeth had a **statistically significant greater proportion of individuals (54%, n=65) charged** for any offence than the control (40%, n=43)[26]

iii.   Custody Analysis

The research also looked at the number of the Shield cohort that had been identified as changing Matrix status from 'live to 'custody' at least once during the period of analysis (a proxy for receiving a custodial sentence); there was no difference in proportion of Shield and control (30% Shield vs. 30% control)

iv.   Serious and Gang Flagged Violence

Given Shield's primary aim of reducing serious violence amongst the selected cohort, **serious violent offending**[27] and **gang flagged violence**[28] were also included in the analysis. Low prevalence of both categories meant analysis was only conducted at the aggregate level across all three boroughs. It was found that:

When exploring serious violent offending there was no significant difference between the Shield cohort and the comparison group:

- Overall, the Shield cohort had a slightly larger proportion of individuals identified as a named suspect for a serious violence offence than the control (19%, mean average per person=0.30 vs. 16%, mean average per person=0.19)

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[26] X^2 (1, N=230) = 4.1693, p = .041162
[27] Serious Violence was a composite of threshold offence categories namely; Murder, Attempted Murder, Aggravated Burglary, Firearms Possession or use; Weapon Enabled Crime (including stabbings, excluding knife possession); GBH and Serious Wounding, Affray, Violent Disorder and Kidnapping.
[28] Due to low prevalence of gang Flagged serious violence, Gang Flagged Violence includes all VAP offences; Aggravated Burglary, Affray, Violent Disorder Firearms Possession or use, Weapons Enabled Crime; Sexual Offences and Robbery with 'GA' flag on CRIS.

- Overall, the Shield cohort had a slightly larger proportion of individuals arrested for a serious violence offence than the control (15%, 0.19 vs. 13%, 0.17)
- Overall, the Shield cohort had a slightly larger proportion of individuals charged (9%, mean=0.10 vs. 7%, mean=0.09)

When exploring overall effect on gang flagged violence only, **there was also no significant difference between the Shield cohort and the comparison group**:

- Overall, the Shield and control cohorts were very similar in terms of proportion of individuals identified as a named suspect (9%, mean average per person=0.10 vs. 8%, mean average per person=0.09)
- Overall, the Shield and control cohorts were the same in terms of proportion of individuals arrested (7%, 0.08 vs. 7%, 0.09)
- Overall, the Shield and control cohorts were the same in terms of proportion of individuals charged (4%, mean=0.06 vs. 4%, mean=0.05)

As a result, there is no clear narrative in terms of an impact upon either overall offending, or on the violent offending of the specific Shield nominals in the 13 months subsequent to delivery.

4. Discussion

Conclusion and Core Learning

Shield was set up in Lambeth, Westminster and Haringey specifically as a pilot scheme based upon prior academic learning to address serious group related violence. The aim of pilot schemes is to implement for a time-limited specific period, explore viability and generate learning. It was not possible to demonstrate a significant reduction in violence across the targeted Shield groups - this does not indicate a GVI approach does not work or is not fit for London - rather that the challenges in implementation resulted in no clear test of the model.

Much of the learning relates to implementation; interpretation of the GVI model; gaining sufficient support from the right partners at the right level; engaging and gaining community buy in to the pilot; and ultimately whether the model can be translated to London - given the different legal mechanisms available such as storing risk for Collective Enforcement and powers to compel call-in attendance.

Positively, opinions towards the scheme changed over time, gradually becoming more favourable to core elements of the approach, notably the collective efficacy element. Despite initial strong misgivings by some practitioners and community members - all three boroughs ended the pilot in the belief it had been a positive learning experience and all are mainstreaming elements of the approach. Most importantly, Shield has opened new channels for dialogue, discussion and action, highlighting a shared determination to work together to help reduce gang related violence across London.

The core learning is:

- **Implementation challenges can be anticipated and built in to any programme** – Many of the implementation problems and delays stemmed from an incomplete understanding of how the fundamental elements of the GVI approach could be practically implemented and how much scope there was for flexibility. Standardisation and data collection issues hampered the evaluation, in terms of determining impact and potential outcomes other than the reduction of violence (i.e. referrals), although it is noted that given the different starting points and pre-existing approaches, standardisation was always likely to be a key risk to the evaluation. Implementation issues were exacerbated by a conflation of 'business as usual policing' (including operations with similar objectives) with Shield specific activity.

- **Meaningful, wide reaching and early community engagement is paramount –** The pilot was thought to have highlighted and helped begin to address some significant issues across disengaged communities, individuals and voluntary groups. This is true both of statutory bodies' relationship with local communities, and local groups' knowledge of each other's work towards reducing gang violence. Shield highlighted the need for an inclusive and wide ranging engagement process for future interventions, in which communities are empowered to contribute (e.g. representation at local

intelligence meetings), and the need to create and support local approaches which complement and collaborate with London wide or national initiatives.

- **Branding & media communication need to be sensitively handled –** Closely linked to community engagement is the need for a strategic approach to messaging and communication. A clear, accurate and sensitive method for communications is vital, as is more nuanced consideration of the branding and terminology applied to such schemes (e.g. the focus on 'the gang' rather than violence per se). Shield's external communications were widely criticised as insensitive and misleading, and were thought to contribute to the considerable barriers to moving the project forward. Haringey's long term approach in involving the community in design (e.g. branding) and implementation (e.g. intelligence access) diverged from the standardised approach, but was thought to achieve positive outcomes in developing community relations.

- **Wider partnership buy-in is needed to facilitate 'Collective Enforcement' effectively -** This is true both for civil opportunities and more serious offences; the ability to fast track cases for 'swift and certain' action is currently limited, although it is recognised that UK legislation may contribute to this. Additionally, obtaining sufficient legal powers to compel nominals to attend call-ins is challenging.

Appendix

Pilot Timeline

The timeline below depicts the key event dates for each of the pilot boroughs. The first call-in signifies the start of 'go-live'. Details of trigger offences dates and subsequent Collective Enforcement activity are included.

Evaluation Methodology

Surveys

Survey One ran for three weeks at the beginning of implementation (from 01/06/2015) and yielded 30 participants. Due to the timing, a far greater proportion of respondents were from Lambeth (57%, n=17), four were from Westminster (n=4), one from Haringey and eight pan-borough. Respondents were divided between Strategic Roles (n=11), Project Managers (n=6) and Practitioners (n=11). Half of respondents were police officers (n=15). Survey Two ran for four weeks around the middle of the programme implementation (from 16/12/2015) and yielded 23 respondents, nine from Lambeth, three from Westminster, one from Haringey and ten pan-boroughs. Overall survey response rates were considered low, but due to a 'snowball' email distribution method across multi-agencies it was impossible to know how many relevant practitioners were reached.

Interviews
Semi-structured, informal interviews were conducted with key Shield practitioners across pilot boroughs over the duration of the pilot. Interviewees were selected from as wide a range of service areas as possible and included analysts, strategic management, central project teams, police officers, youth workers and community development. A total of 18 individuals were interviewed, with all boroughs contacted in the months after the pilot to provide legacy updates.

Borough Feedback

All three boroughs provided regular updates to the Shield programme board on all aspects of programme implementation. All three boroughs also submitted 'lessons learnt' reports to the December 2015 board, as well as further updates at the final board in April 2016.

Cohort Churn

The difficulties in identifying and tracking gang membership and allegiance have been highlighted by the pilot, particularly given the fluidity of many of London's street gangs. This is evidenced in the data collection; individuals swap gang assignation between the Matrix and the Shield lists; are assigned multiple gangs; or are part of gangs who split or rename. For example, a Haringey cohort member assigned to a Haringey gang for Shield, featured on the Lambeth Matrix as an Islington Gang member one year previously. 18 individuals across the three cohorts did not appear on the Matrix at all between 02/06/2015 – 31/08/2016 (11 on Haringey, two on Lambeth and five on Westminster).

- 66 of the Haringey cohort featured on the Matrix the whole time period. 19 nominals appeared partially. The majority (17) were added during the course of the pilot. Only two nominals were removed, both amber (via Intel Management Score) but with low activity.

- 80 of the Westminster cohort featured on the Matrix the whole time period. Four appear partially, two were added whilst two scoring individuals were removed, one moving out of MPS jurisdiction and one for reasons unknown (amber) gang flag removed.

- 93 of the Lambeth Cohort featured across the whole time period. 37 of the Lambeth cohort appeared partially, with the majority of these being removed for no activity/scoring (24). One individual was murdered, whilst several scoring individuals moved to outside the borough (6). Six nominals in the final cohort were added during the time period.

Matched Control Methodology

Impact analysis employed a matched control group methodology. This compares the Shield outcome to statistically similar boroughs and gangs. Although this limits the weight of causal statements in comparison to a Randomised Control Trial (RCT); due to the practicalities of implementation it is the most robust design possible.[29] The level of detail and resources assigned to the matching process (i.e. borough involvement, Social Network Analysis requests, individual level matching) was curtailed, as it became clear that implementation issues, standardisation of approach across boroughs and roll-out delays would affect the ability to assess impact.

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[29] https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf

Control boroughs were identified using a version of 'nearest neighbour matching using a number of key socio-demographic factors, as well as prevalence of various crime types (below) with weighting given to offences viewed by the MPS as gang indicators (e.g. knife and gun crime). The process mirrored the quantitative element of analysis used to select the pilot boroughs. Boroughs were excluded from selection based on a number of rules to control for contamination (e.g. neighbouring boroughs, boroughs with frequent cross-border gang tensions). The final pool of boroughs was decided in consultation with MPS central intelligence unit gang specialists, who provided professional opinion and the latest intelligence picture. Gangs within the selected boroughs were matched using a similar process, based on prevalence and seriousness of offending within each gang across a number of crime types, whilst giving consideration to gang size, and some demographics. The variables matched on are displayed below:

Table 1: Matching Criteria

Borough Matching Criteria
1%, 3% and 5% matching
- GLA Population Estimate 2014
- % of population from BAME groups (2013)
- % people aged 3+ whose main language is not English (2011 Census)
- New migrant (NINo) rates, (2013/14)
- Unemployment rate (2013/14)
- Youth Unemployment rate (2013/14)
- Proportion of the working-age population who claim benefits (%) (May-2014)
- Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2010 (sum of Ward scores)
- Households with 2 or more indicators of deprivation
- Youth Population Rate /100,000
- Number of Schools per 100,000
- youth cohort re-offenders leaving custody per 100,000
- Youth re-offending rate
- Total Matrix
- VAP
- Acquisitive Crime
- Drugs

Most Similar Neighbour Matching
- GA Flagged Crime*
- Serious Youth Violence*
- Knife Crime with injury (Victim Under 24 non DV)*
- Knife Crime*
- Gun Crime Discharges*
- Gun Crime*
- Gangs in GRITS T64 (Oct 14)

Gang Matching Criteria
Most Similar Neighbour Matching
- ABH
- Affray/Violent Disorder
- Firearms
- GBH
- Murder
- Off Weapon
- Osman
- Personal Robbery
- Rape

- Firearm Used
- Knife/Bladed Article Used

(Example Based on GRITS data, Oct 2013 – Sept 2014)

Individual Characteristic Matching Criteria
- Age bands
- Gender make up
- Ethnicity make up
- Number of core members
- Predominant Nationality of Gang
- Criminal Diversity / specialisations
- Nature & Frequency of rivalries (In borough / cross-border) and allegiances

Gangs were matched initially on prevalence of offending across a number of crime types. The final stage involved taking into account gang demographics. The table below displays basic demographics of the gangs included in the pilot by borough and their corresponding matches, aggregated to borough level.

Table 2: Matched Gang Demographics and Matrix Status

Matched Cohort Breakdown		Lambeth		Westminster		Haringey		Overall	
		Treat	Control	Treat	Control	Treat	Control	Treat	Control
Cohort	Count	122	108	85	167	83	122	290	397
Age	Average	20.4	20.4	20.6	20.3	23.3	20.9	21.3	20.5
	Min	14	14	15	12	15	15	14	12
	Max	30	35	31	38	44	29	44	38
	%Under 18	18.0%	24.1%	15.3%	24.0%	8.4%	18.0%	14.5%	22.2%
	%18-24	68.0%	62.0%	72.9%	64.7%	60.2%	65.6%	67.2%	64.2%
	%Over 24	13.9%	13.9%	11.8%	11.4%	31.3%	16.4%	18.3%	13.6%
Ethnic Appearance	White	4.9%	7.4%	9.4%	34.1%	0.0%	2.5%	4.8%	17.1%
	BAME	95.1%	92.6%	90.6%	65.9%	100.0%	97.5%	95.2%	82.9%
Matrix	% on for >90% of Analysis*	77.0%	89.8%	94.1%	73.7%	81.9%	87.7%	83.4%	82.4%
	% Red (Live only, June 2015)**	3.0%	8.3%	4.8%	3.5%	5.4%	4.8%	4.1%	5.2%
	% Amber (Live Only, June 2015)	45.5%	47.2%	41.9%	28.7%	30.4%	34.5%	40.6%	35.4%
	% Green (Live only, Junne 2015)	51.5%	44.4%	53.2%	67.8%	64.3%	60.7%	55.3%	59.4%
	% Custody >90% of Analysis	13.9%	11.1%	8.2%	17.4%	4.8%	13.9%	9.7%	14.6%
	% Live >90% of Analysis	39.3%	41.7%	44.7%	35.3%	54.2%	34.4%	45.2%	36.8%

Figures relate to valid cohort only, some individuals excluded from anlysis due to data complications; *Analysis period=June 2015-July 2016. **Figures are for live nominals only, excluding nominals not on Matrix on 02/06/2015

Impact Analysis

All data for Key Gang Indicators at borough level is sourced from MetMIS (Table 3). Table 4 compares the proportion of suspects for Shield (treatment) and control across all categories, also giving the average and maximum number of each occurrence for an individual (minimum always 0). All data extracted from CRIS using PNC ID and cross referenced with Matrix for quality assurance. Percentage changes in **red** denote increases, **green** decreases and **amber** no change. Statistically significant increases or decreases are highlighted with **blue borders**.

Table 3: Key Gang Indicator Comparison

Offence	OCU Name	Jun-14 to May-15	Jun-15 to May-16	% Change
Violence Against the Person	Lambeth	9992	10724	7.3%
	Westminster	9307	10360	11.3%
	Haringey	6911	8232	19.1%
	MPS	**204106**	**230020**	**12.7%**
Youth Violence	Lambeth	632	705	11.6%
	Westminster	386	399	3.4%
	Haringey	616	650	5.5%
	MPS	**15937**	**16518**	**3.6%**
Gang Flagged Crime	Lambeth	156	99	-36.5%
	Westminster	74	35	-52.7%
	Haringey	113	135	19.5%
	MPS	**1791**	**1660**	**-7.3%**
Gun Crime	Lambeth	106	85	-19.8%
	Westminster	66	60	-9.1%
	Haringey	68	103	51.5%
	MPS	**1915**	**1828**	**-4.5%**
Knife Crime Victim U25 (Non Domestic)	Lambeth	89	102	14.6%
	Westminster	59	34	-42.4%
	Haringey	73	84	15.1%
	MPS	**1681**	**1665**	**-1.0%**
Gang Flagged Violence with Injury	Lambeth	38	27	-28.9%
	Westminster	29	17	-41.4%
	Haringey	42	33	-21.4%
	MPS	**566**	**554**	**-2.1%**
Lethal Barrelled Gun Discharges	Lambeth	16	25	56.3%
	Westminster	5	6	20.0%
	Haringey	5	11	120.0%
	MPS	**212**	**254**	**19.8%**

Table 4: Shield Cohort Offending

Borough	Lambeth		Westminster		Haringey		Overall	
Valid Cohort	122	108	85	167	83	122	290	397
Condition	Treat	Control	Treat	Control	Treat	Control	Treat	Control
Ever Suspect	77	63	41	85	21	35	139	183
%	63.1%	58.3%	48.2%	50.9%	25.3%	28.7%	47.9%	46.1%
Max	10	16	8	15	3	7	10	16
Average	1.93	2.01	1.02	1.47	0.33	0.59	1.21	1.35
Ever Arrest	72	54	34	69	10	26	116	149
%	59.0%	50.0%	40.0%	41.3%	12.0%	21.3%	40.0%	37.5%
Max	7	12	7	14	3	7	7	14
Average	1.56	1.51	0.76	1.05	0.18	0.45	0.93	0.99
Ever Charge	65	43	29	61	10	22	104	126
%	53.3%	39.8%	34.1%	36.5%	12.0%	18.0%	35.9%	31.7%
Max	6	6	6	8	3	5	6	8
Average	1.07	0.98	0.65	0.73	0.14	0.32	0.68	0.68
Ever Suspect (VAP)	57	49	27	44	9	14	93	107
%	46.7%	45.4%	31.8%	26.3%	10.8%	11.5%	32.1%	27.0%
Max	5	10	4	4	2	4	5	10
Average	0.89	0.99	0.39	0.43	0.12	0.23	0.52	0.52
Ever Arrest (VAP)	46	38	20	33	5	12	71	83
%	37.7%	35.2%	23.5%	19.8%	6.0%	9.8%	24.5%	20.9%
Max	4	8	3	3	1	3	4	8
Average	0.6	0.62	0.27	0.28	0.06	0.2	0.35	0.35
Ever Charge (VAP)	29	30	12	20	3	9	44	59
%	23.8%	27.8%	14.1%	12.0%	3.6%	7.4%	15.2%	14.9%
Max	3	5	3	3	1	3	3	5
Average	0.31	0.39	0.16	0.14	0.04	0.14	0.19	0.21
Date Range	Jun-15 to Jul-16		Sep-15 to Jul-16		Mar-16 to Jul-15			

The graph shows average arrests by date offence committed, for all notifiable offences. Post and Pre periods are equal to 30 days. Data is normalised to the start date of each Shield borough. Total period of analysis is 01/01/2015 until 31/07/2016.

References

[i] Whilst the definitional anomalies in the term 'gang' are recognised, this report adopts the term given its ubiquity in current organisational vocabulary. The current MPS definition of a 'gang' is: "A relatively durable, predominantly street-based group of young people who (1) see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible group,(2) engage in a range of criminal activity and violence, they may also have any or all of the following features; (3) identify with or lay claim over territory,(4) have some form of identifying structural feature, and (5) are in conflict with other, similar, gangs." As derived from: http://www.centreforsocialjustice.org.uk/core/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/DyingtoBelongFullReport.pdf

[ii] MetMIS is an internal MPS tool for obtaining police performance data.

[iii] All data from MOPAC's Public Attitudes Survey (PAS) (Q1 15/16 R12) / MOPAC Confidence dashboard.

[iv] Available from: http://www.eif.org.uk/publication/preventing-gang-and-youth-violence/

[v] Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/repeat-knife-offenders-face-new-minimum-prison-term

[vi] Over 50 cities or districts including Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Los Angeles (Source: www.nnscommunities.org)

[vii] Braga, A. & Weisburd, D., (2012). The Effects of Focused Deterrence Strategies on Crime: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of the Empirical Evidence. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 49(3), pp.323–358. Available from: https://campbellcollaboration.org/library.html

[viii] National Network for Safe Communities (2013). Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Available from: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf

[ix] ibid

[x] Williams D.J., et al. (2014) Addressing gang-related violence in Glasgow: A preliminary pragmatic quasi-experimental evaluation of the Community Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), *Aggression and Violent Behaviour*, 19(6) pp.686-691.

[xi] Burns, L., Williams, D. J., & Donnelly, P. D. (2011). A public health approach to the evaluation of the Glasgow Community Initiative to Reduce Violence. In Glasgow's Community Initiative to Reduce Violence: Second year report. (pp. 28). Glasgow: Violence Reduction Unit.

[xii] Metropolitan Police Service (2010) The London Pathways Initiative: Lessons Learned. MPS: Unpublished.

[xiii] See for example; Densley, J. & Jones, D. (2016). Pulling levers on gang violence in London and St. Paul. In C. Maxson & F-A. Esbensen (Eds.), *Gang transitions and transformations in an international context* (pp. 291–305). New York: Springer.

[xiv] National Network for Safe Communities (2013). Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Available from: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf

[xv] Kennedy, David M., and Michael A. Friedrich. 2014. Custom Notifications: Individualized Communication in the Group Violence Intervention. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p304-pub.pdf

[xvi] Dawson P. & Stanko E. (2013) Implementation, implementation, implementation: Insights from offender management evaluations. *Policing. 7*(3), 289-298.

[xvii] There is a continuing debate regarding gang organisation in the UK; see Hallsworth, S. (2013) *The Gang & Beyond: Interpreting Violent Street Worlds* UK: Palgrave Macmillan and Densley, J. (2013) *How Gangs Work: An Ethnography of Youth Violence* UK: Palgrave Macmillan for detailed accounts of the competing perspectives.

[xviii] Mayor launches tough new gang intervention programme, 22 January 2015 https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/one-rule-for-all

[xix] 'Exemplary enforcement action against a local gang ahead of the first borough call-in in order to demonstrate to other gangs that the partnership is serious about ending violence' adapted from National Network for Safe Communities (2013). Group Violence Intervention: An Implementation Guide. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Available from: https://nnscommunities.org/old-site-files/Group_Violence_Intervention_-_An_Implementation_Guide.pdf