

MAYOR OF LONDON

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# A SHARED ENDEAVOUR

Working in Partnership  
to Counter Violent  
Extremism in London

THE LONDON COUNTERING VIOLENT  
EXTREMISM PROGRAMME REPORT 2018-2019

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# 1. Foreword



As Mayor of London, keeping Londoners safe is my top priority. Over the last few years we have seen an unprecedented shift in the threat from violent extremism. London has suffered tragic terrorist attacks at Westminster, London Bridge, Finsbury Park and Parsons Green, with attempts at perpetrating subsequent attacks foiled. I made *standing together against hatred, intolerance and extremism* a priority for my Mayoralty but the tragic loss of life and widespread injury resulting from events in 2017 led me to announce my intention to deliver a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme to identify what more could be done to renew and improve efforts to tackle all forms of extremism in our city.

I am proud that London is a beacon of open, diverse and inclusive values and that, on the whole, we do not just acknowledge our differences we celebrate them. However, we know that every single day the real and constant threat from the spread of violent extremism weighs heavily on our minds. Despite London continuing to be the most diverse and inclusive city in the world there are some individuals who remain determined to divide us, to sow the seeds of hatred within our communities and to spread perverse and twisted ideologies. This is damaging our society and the integration of our communities, and, in its most extreme form, has led to the loss of innocent lives on our streets through acts of grotesque violence.

I was determined that my CVE Programme would put listening and learning right at the heart of this work and I tasked City Hall officials with the delivery of an extensive and innovative

engagement and consultation phase which would hear from experts, authorities, stakeholders, women's groups, young people and all of the capital's communities so that their views could shape the Programme.

This Programme has delivered the most comprehensive city-wide listening exercise ever in this policy area. It has heard the voices and opinions of thousands of community members, stakeholders and experts. I was particularly determined to hear from the voices of those who, in the past, have not been heard but who are often the most important to listen to, including from minority and marginalised communities, women and young people. I am pleased to say that this Programme has heard these voices. I am truly grateful to everyone who has participated.

This report has been shaped by all of those who have engaged with the Programme and sets out opportunities for renewed and improved activities across the core themes of better **strengthening** communities against extremism, **encouraging** communities to stand up to hate and intolerance, **safeguarding** vulnerable people from radicalisation and **stopping** the spread of extremist ideologies.

Whilst it was helpful to separate findings and recommendations across the strengthening, encouraging, safeguarding and stopping themes, it is important to fully recognise the strong overlapping nature of both the challenges and solutions to countering violent extremism and as such this document must be read in that context.

*“We need to root out inequality and poverty which all too often lie at the heart of disenchantment and resentment, feelings extremists seek to exploit.*

*We must do more to empower communities to speak out and challenge hate crime and extremist views.*

*We need communities to report concerns to the police and local authorities and we need to find lasting solutions that will stop the spread of violent extremism completely.”*

*- Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London*

The findings of this Programme are stark. Good work in London has been evidenced but it is clear that our ability to tackle violent extremism currently is simply not good enough, putting our safety and security at risk. Efforts to improve and renew are needed urgently. This report sets out several recommendations which should be immediately implemented.

My Programme also undertook a full and frank assessment of existing counter extremism delivery in London, including the work of the Government's counter radicalisation strategy, Prevent. We found that Prevent has done some good work, no doubt saving lives, and I welcome some of the recent efforts to boost transparency and grass roots engagement. But we also found examples of historical and current failings and shortcomings. In some sections of society there is both misunderstanding and a deep mistrust of Prevent. It's time for a rethink to make this strategy more effective.

This is why I welcome the independent review of Prevent but against the backdrop of the heightened scale and pace of the threat of violent extremism, improvements simply cannot wait alone for a lengthy review process. The Government must listen to the findings of this Programme and implement improvements immediately.

The causes of violent extremism are immensely complex and can involve a diverse range of issues. There is no single pathway into violent extremism and there is no absolute check list as to who might be vulnerable to

radicalisation. This means that there is no single solution to fix this challenge and therefore for us to truly defeat violent extremism we must look to mitigate this threat from multiple angles.

We need to root out inequality and poverty which all too often lie at the heart of disenchantment and resentment, feelings extremists seek to exploit. We must do more to empower communities to speak out and challenge hate crime and extremist views. We need communities to report concerns to the police and local authorities and we need to find lasting solutions that will stop the spread of violent extremism completely.

We will only be able to counter violent extremism most effectively if all in society work in partnership together. This report sets out recommendations for improved efforts from the Government, local authorities, police, stakeholders and London's communities. As Mayor of London I will do everything in my power to reduce the risk of violent extremism in the capital. I am investing £1million into new City Hall activity to bring additional value to this vital policy area.

We must all stand together to tackle hatred, intolerance and extremism to ensure that we keep Londoners safe and uphold and cherish the values that extremists so hate, democracy, justice, equality and our openness to others.

To truly defeat extremism, this must be a shared endeavour and we all have an important role to play.

**Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London**

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*This is the final report of the Mayor of London's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programme. It has been produced following the most comprehensive and in-depth city-wide engagement ever in this policy area and has been shaped by listening to community members, stakeholders and experts.*



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## The context

In 2017, the UK saw an unprecedented shift in the threat of terrorism with London suffering four appalling attacks alongside many further plots which were foiled by the police and security services.

In December 2017, the Mayor launched the CVE Programme to identify opportunities to improve and renew efforts to tackle violent extremism in the capital.

The programme had three core objectives: to identify opportunities to renew and improve work to **strengthen** London's minority and marginalised communities from extremism, to **safeguard** vulnerable people from radicalisation, and to stop the spread of extremist ideologies. The Mayor also asked the programme to consider how to **encourage** communities to stand up to extremism and to deliver a **full and frank assessment** of existing counter extremism delivery.

## The challenge

In a keynote address in February 2019, former Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Assistant Commissioner, Specialist Operations, Sir Mark Rowley said that "The acute threat we face from terrorism will only be tackled when the whole of society understands and responds to the chronic threat from extremism."<sup>1</sup>

The issue of violent extremism is complex. There is no single profile of a terrorist and no one pathway into radicalisation. Therefore, there is no solitary solution. To effectively challenge extremism, we must identify and understand all of its drivers and address them with the entire range of interventions at our disposal. This can only be done if all in society - authorities, stakeholders, families and communities - work together as a shared endeavour.

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1. Policy Exchange, 2018, Extremism and Terrorism: The need for a whole society response, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/the-colin-cramphorn-memorial-lecture-by-mark-rowley/>

## Our approach

Throughout the programme, we were determined to listen to those voices that have previously been unheard, hearing views which have previously been absent in countering violent extremism discussions and some that have been previously dismissed including minority and marginalised communities, disempowered women and young people.

Whilst the programme sought out engagement with academics, it has purposefully not looked to deliver a heavily academically focussed programme and instead concentrated the framing of this report on the combined thoughts of community members, stakeholders and experts.

We set no arbitrary parameters for the areas of countering violent extremism we focused on and as such allowed those who engaged with the programme to help steer our work. This led to the programme identifying and discussing a broad spectrum of extremism-driven harms but focusing mostly on manifestations of hate, intolerance, violence and terrorism.

In turn, the breadth of the harms identified meant that the programme looked at solutions spanning a wide range of policy areas - social integration, community engagement, education, policing and security.

## Our key findings and recommendations

The programme has revealed that while there is much to be positive about, there are several key areas that require urgent improved and renewed action if we are to satisfy ourselves that all possible steps are being taken to effectively counter violent extremism.

Whilst this report has sought to separate findings and recommendations across the following five chapters, it is important to underscore the strong overlapping nature of both the challenges and solutions to countering extremism. It therefore must be recognised that recommendations which are placed in one chapter are likely, upon occasion, to benefit overarching objectives in other chapters. The full list of Programme Recommendations can be found at [Annex 1](#).

## **1. Strengthening communities by building resilience to extremism**

Two-thirds of Londoners see strong, cohesive and integrated communities as effective in reducing the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism.

However, evidence gathered for this programme indicates Government cuts to key services such as youth and community services alongside English language courses are being acutely felt in communities and put efforts to strengthen and better integrate communities at risk.

We call on the Government to reverse these cuts and call on partners to work more closely together to ensure that London is a place of safety, community and opportunity for all. This must incorporate empowering women and involving young people.

## **2. Encouraging communities to stand up to extremism**

Throughout the Programme, communities demonstrated that they are well placed and moreover willing to stand up to extremism.

However, the Programme heard concerns about a lack of support, resources and information which is holding back activity that stands up to extremism.

As a result, the Mayor is committing to providing a small grants programme to civil society groups delivering projects which directly counter extremism, offer positive alternatives to vile ideologies and encourage others to stand up to hate and intolerance.

Still, we recognise that City Hall cannot solve these problems alone and we call on the Government to step up and significantly increase its investment in bottom up delivery which encourages and supports communities to stand up to extremism.

### **3. Safeguarding vulnerable Londoners from radicalisation**

We know that communities want to be the first line of defence in protecting vulnerable people from radicalisation and found that 66% of Londoners would tell the police if they were worried about an individual being manipulated or exploited towards extremism or terrorism.

However, we found that 64% of Londoners would not know how to seek help from the authorities. This is a serious concern, and we call on the Government, National Counter-Terrorism Police HQ and local authorities to take actions to address this awareness gap.

After a full and frank assessment of existing counter-radicalisation delivery we found that this reassures some but causes fear and concern in others.

To ensure existing strategy is most effective we call for renewed efforts to improve delivery but also boost engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts.

### **4. Stopping the spread of extremist ideologies**

Extremists have proved motivated and adept in spreading their messages of hate to a wide audience. Our research found that a quarter of Londoners experienced or witnessed views promoting, endorsing or supporting extremism over the last 12 months.

Participants drew particular attention to the use of the internet by extremists to promote their ideologies and also to fundraise.

More must be done by the Government and tech companies to reduce the ability for those who wish to use the internet to promote violent extremism, and to increase the ability of the public to refer such content to the authorities for swift consideration to removal.

## 5. City Hall leadership, coordination and collaboration to keep Londoners safe from extremism

Many of the community participants of the programme stated that they look to the Mayor and City Hall for leadership and embraced the Mayor's decision to deliver a countering violent extremism programme.

We recognise the unique role City Hall can play in supporting efforts to counter extremism in London and set out plans for City Hall to become a local, national and international hub of good practice sharing and peer to peer learning.

Furthermore, in a city so rich with private enterprise, cultural and sporting infrastructure, more needs to be done to create strong and long-lasting public and private sector partnerships where resources and skills can be shared, and the reach of countering extremism delivery amplified. City Hall will scope potential opportunities for new partnerships.

The Mayor is determined to lead from the front in tackling extremism and in light of this report, is committing to new investment totalling more than £1 million to fund:

- a new City Hall CVE Programme,
- a small grants programme for civil society groups,
- counter radicalisation safeguarding awareness for City Hall commissioned services,
- counter extremism awareness sessions delivered through City Hall and partner networks,
- the convening of pan-London thematic good practice sessions, and
- potential future research.

This report recognises that City Hall can't solve this problem alone and that many of the recommendations of this report will not be actioned unless the Government provides the necessary resources.

We hope that the Government, partner agencies, stakeholders and communities will come forward in a similar spirit to City Hall and help deliver the recommendations of this report. By working together, all in London can better strengthen minority and marginalised communities from extremism, encourage communities to stand up to extremism, increase the ability to safeguard vulnerable people from radicalisation and more effectively stop the spread of extremist ideologies.

### 3. DEFINING COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

*The Programme recognises that at present there are no universally agreed definitions for terms such as 'extremism', 'violent extremism' and 'radicalisation'. Where definitions have been used, these are often contested amongst experts, academics, stakeholders and within wider society.*

*The Programme therefore allowed for a broad approach to the definition of these terms, giving licence to community members, stakeholders and experts to lead the Programme into areas which they associated with countering violent extremism, rather than setting rigid defined parameters.*

The term 'violent extremism' was considered by many to relate to any violent act associated to extremism (therefore including examples such as violence motivated by hate). However, the Programme found that in the main, community members, stakeholders and experts would associate the term 'violent extremism' with terrorism and 'violent extremist groups' with those organisations that avowedly support and promote terrorism. Therefore, a considerable focus was placed by the Programme on countering terrorism. This also meant that a notable focus was also placed on assessing the Government's counter terrorism strategy CONTEST and most specifically the Prevent strategy, which seeks to "stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism"<sup>2</sup>.

It was also considered that 'non-violent extremism' can potentially create the fertile ground from which violence can flourish and therefore participants directed the Programme to consider extremism more holistically, not focusing solely on those ideologies that are avowedly violent but to also include ideologies which seek to portray other communities as intrinsically different, deny rights, promote negative stereotypes, dehumanize or blame entire ethnic, religious or cultural groups. Much of the Programme therefore speaks to concepts around countering extremism more broadly, recognising that segregation, intolerance, hate, violence and terrorism can all be symptoms of extremism.

It was helpful when needed, to use definitions to start conversations and set research parameters and for this the following definitions were used by the Programme.

**Hate crime:** The Home Office defines hate crime as "Any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice towards someone based on a personal characteristic."<sup>3</sup>

**Extremism:** The Prevent Duty and Counter-Extremism strategy, both published in 2015, define extremism as "The vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as extremist."<sup>4</sup>

2. Home Office, 2015, Prevent duty guidance, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>

3. Home Office, 2018, Hate Crime, England and Wales, 2017 to 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2017-to-2018>

4. Home Office, 2015, Counter-Extremism Strategy <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy>

**Terrorism:** There is a legal definition of terrorism in the UK which can be found in the Terrorism Act 2006 where terrorism is defined as "An action or threat designed to influence the Government or intimidate the public. Its purpose is to advance a political, religious or ideological cause."

The action or threat would need to relate to "Serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property, endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system."<sup>5</sup>

**Radicalisation:** Government guidance refers to radicalisation as "The process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups."<sup>6</sup>

The Programme recognised that symptoms of extremism can manifest in different ways and should be reflected upon as a spectrum of harms. This spectrum includes but is not limited to isolation, segregation, marginalisation, harmful practices, intolerance, hate, the denial of rights, violence and terrorism.

It was agreed that the causes of these harms are too complex to simply connect every instance of them to extremism or an extremist ideology. There was wide agreement by participants that extremism must be rooted in an ideology or movement where societal change is sought. Therefore, the term 'countering extremism' in respect to this Programme can be reflective of countering this spectrum of harms where the causes driving each instance are rooted in an ideology or movement attempting to enact societal change.

In recognition to the spectrum of harms crossing societal, safeguarding and security policy areas, the Mayor asked the Programme to work with the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, the Deputy Mayor for Social Integration, Social Mobility & Community Engagement and the Deputy Mayor for Education and Children.



The current threat from extremism was considered in detail, particularly around the suitability of the current manifestations of extremism and terrorism to the methodological approach of the Programme. A detailed write up of the threat from extremism can be found at [Annex 2](#).

Due to the time limited nature of the Programme and the extraordinarily wide range of symptoms of extremism across the spectrum of harms, the Programme focused on five themed areas as set out in this report. This was partly owing to the Programme being naturally led to these themes by participants but also as clear areas for improved and renewed activity emerged early on and throughout the Programme relating to these themes.

The Programme recognises that continued research and engagement is required on many of the aspects relating to extremism that the Programme did not focus on.

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5. Home Office. 2006, The Terrorism Act 2006, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-terrorism-act-2006>

6. Home Office, 2015, Prevent duty guidance, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance>

## 4. LISTENING



## Ensuring that Londoners shape the Programme

The Programme set out to put listening and learning right at the heart of this work. Through the delivery of an in-depth and innovative engagement portfolio the Programme heard from community members, stakeholders and experts.

Through a comprehensive spread of engagement offers, the Programme has listened to the voices and opinions of thousands of community members, stakeholders and experts including successfully managing to hear from those who, in the past, have not participated in opportunities to engage previously or been given the chance to have their voices heard.

This has included participation from minority and marginalised communities, including women who previously have felt disempowered to engage with the authorities or in some instances have been blocked from participating, but also young people whom have too often been overlooked.

“The Mayor’s Programme gathered women from across London to share our views on what we need to do to make our young children and families safe from extremism and radicalisation. We were listened to and it reinforced that together as women there is nothing we cannot achieve.”

Women’s group leader –  
CVE team engagement

“A member of the Mayor’s countering violent extremism team came to speak to us about extremism, intolerance and radicalisation. It was great to be given the opportunity to speak about these issues because at school we don’t usually talk about it. What was great though is that our opinions are shaping a London programme. I liked that we were listened to. It was about us influencing the Mayor and his views.”

Young person –  
CVE team engagement

Hearing from such a diverse array of London’s communities has meant that grassroots voices have been at the heart of our listening. This has ensured that the Programme has delivered effective and evidence-based findings and recommendations.

## Methodology

The Programme included five key engagement phases.

### i. Programme led stakeholder meetings

Initially, the Programme team mapped out key stakeholders who are actively involved and engaged in existing counter-extremism delivery across London or well placed to offer a view on this policy area and invited them to attend private stakeholder meetings.

This was made up of stakeholders across multiple cohorts including but not limited to, the police, central government, local authorities (elected members and officers), civil society groups, charities, think tanks and regulatory bodies.



## ii. Programme led strategic engagement sessions

Where appropriate, private meetings with stakeholders mushroomed into broader strategic engagement sessions. This included thematic sessions with multiple stakeholders from a shared area, such as the education or youth worker sector.

This also included sessions with grass roots community service users of the stakeholders, including young people and marginalised women.

The Programme team hosted over 50 strategic engagement sessions with stakeholders and communities from across London, meeting with over 1400 participants in total. Sessions took one of four forms:

**Roundtables** Sessions consisted of three to four questions relating to the Programme's core objectives. These sessions enabled the Programme to absorb the views, experiences and ideas of thematic audiences where issues were highlighted, gaps and barriers identified, and discussion and debate had on potential solutions.

"We were pleased to be invited to contribute to City Hall's consultation. We believe that addressing extremism shouldn't be seen in isolation and we felt that City Hall staff were able to see this approach in action through meeting our staff, young people, parents and stakeholders."

**Evan Jones** Head of CCE Development, St Giles Trust

**Workshops** At these sessions, attendees were asked to focus on solutions to specific issues previously identified by communities and other stakeholders, such as identifying opportunities to renew and improve a specific thematic issue.

"It was great to be included in such a diverse group of people from different backgrounds to discuss the difficulties of gaining referrals from the public. The sessions created a safe space for discussion focussing on the challenges faced in different communities which led to meaningful suggestions for the report."

**Participant** CVE team engagement (workshop session)

**Facilitated discussions** These sessions were often with young people and delivered a combination of learning about extremism as well as exploring views, experiences and ideas from the audience.

“I was able to offer groups of young people from our network of schools the unique opportunity to participate in shaping the conversation and policy on some of the most pressing issues facing our society today - namely radicalisation and extremism. Not only did this opportunity allow young people to explore a topic they seldom get the opportunity to discuss openly and in a supportive environment, but they were able to directly participate in influencing policy through the Mayor’s extensive outreach to Londoners. I’m sure the experience will stay with them for a long time and shape their lives ahead.”

**Liam Duffy** Director, Since 9/11

**Partnership workshops** At these sessions the Programme collaborated with external organisations to run theme specific workshops.

“This was one of the most productive and thought-provoking graduate sessions that I have been lucky enough to be involved in.”

**Connor Natella** Regional Graduate Manager (South), National Citizens Service

### iii. Community led engagement

The Programme was successful in engaging members of grass roots communities including those who feel marginalised along with the previously unheard. However, the Programme recognised that not everyone would be willing to take City Hall officials up on the offer of engagement and therefore sought to work with civil society partners to deliver community led engagement. This allowed the Programme to further diversify its engagement portfolio and increase the ability to hear the views of ‘hard to engage’ communities who might be ‘at risk’ from extremism.

In August 2018 the Programme delivered an open and competitive grant application process which invited civil society organisations to bid for small grants to deliver community led engagement. Three organisations received grants:

#### ANTI-TRIBALISM MOVEMENT

- Undertake engagement with members of London's BAME communities
- Focused on young people, parents, practitioners and members of the disabled community.

#### FAITHS FORUM FOR LONDON

- Undertake engagement with young people from London's faith community
- Peer-led engagement delivered by young people and focus groups from age 13-26

#### SMALL STEPS COMMUNITY

- Undertake engagement with London's white communities
- Focused in areas with evidence of historical right-wing extremism activity

### Successful grant holders

**Anti-Tribalism Movement (ATM)** secured a grant to undertake engagement with members of London's minority communities.

This engagement was with BAME community members (predominately from East African diasporas). It focused on four cohorts. Young people, parents (predominately mothers), practitioners working within the community and also members of the disabled community.

The ATM were able to use their trusted status within the community to engage those who ordinarily would not have participated in an authority-based engagement exercise.

This engagement highlighted challenges around a lack of awareness on when to get help, how to get help and what help does and does not consist of. It also highlighted the importance of engagement between communities and statutory stakeholders.

"The Mayor's Countering Violent Extremism Programme enabled us to engage and listen to a wide range of Londoners about their understanding of CVE. The proactive and honest engagements of the Programme have enabled Londoners to propose realistic and collective ideas to root out violent extremism within our society."

**Adam Matan OBE** Managing Director,  
Anti-Tribalism Movement

**Faiths Forum for London** (FFL) secured a grant to undertake engagement with young people from London's faith community, in partnership with **Integrity UK**. This included peer led engagement delivered by young people across London's faith community (who were trained in research techniques) which included polling and focus groups across London with people from the age of 13 up to 26.

As the engagement was led by young people of faith, this resulted in an environment where people felt comfortable in speaking their mind. Furthermore, as all researchers worked in pairs which were made up of different faith adherents, this engagement also created interfaith dialogue boosting interaction and awareness.

"Young people from faith backgrounds often do not engage in public debate and are not always listened to. Previous attempts to gather their opinions have achieved limited success as they have been reluctant to speak openly about these issues to researchers employed by public authorities. Young people are more likely to have an honest discussion with someone they can identify with."

**Faiths Forum for London**  
Community led engagement

This engagement made several recommendations for improved and renewed delivery, particularly in relation to integration and opportunity but also found a strong disconnect between participants and statutory stakeholders most prominently in respect to countering extremism delivery (particularly the Prevent strategy).

**Small Steps Community** secured a grant to undertake engagement with London's white communities.

The Programme initially struggled to find logical landing points for engagement with white British communities in London. Also, whilst other stakeholders could helpfully signpost the Programme to infrastructure allowing access to many minority communities, few stakeholders were able to do so around white British communities.

This innovative and dynamic engagement saw Small Steps Community reach out in ways which would not have been possible for City Hall officials. This included wearing hi-visibility vests and speaking to people in the high street, in cafes and at bus stops.

The engagement focused on white communities across London (which was not limited solely to white British communities), with a focus on areas where historically there had been potential evidence of previous right-wing extremism activity.



"We were able to empower communities simply by showing them that their opinion was valued. People liked being asked for an honest reply and not taking people's details helped us get honest answers."

**Small Steps Community**  
Community led engagement

This engagement found small but worrying pockets of active right-wing extremism support and broader intolerant sentiment across London. The engagement also evidenced large vulnerability across this cohort to right-wing extremist messaging.

In total the three grant holders engaged with over 800 'hard to engage' Londoner's from groups 'at risk' of being targeted by extremists.

Whilst many of the recommendations made by these organisations have been included in this Programme, a number, particularly those that span other policy areas, will remain under consideration and be sent to the relevant teams in City Hall.

The reports from the three grant holders can be found at [Annex 3](#).

#### **iv. Time limited, open to all Londoners, formal consultation opportunity**

The Programme opened a six-week consultation opportunity which was available to all Londoners via the Greater London Authority's Talk London platform.<sup>7</sup>

This gave all Londoners the opportunity to consult with the Programme and also participate in two discussion forums themed on "keeping Londoners safe from extremism" and "empowering London's communities to stand up against extremism".

"The key thing to remember is these participants are people too. Ideology is often inherited, and we should focus on reform, not punishment."

*Keeping Londoners safe from extremism* discussion forum response – Talk London

The consultation opportunity garnered over 1,300 completed responses.

The results from this consultation are available via a link at [Annex 4](#).

7. Mayor of London, 2019, Talk London, <https://www.london.gov.uk/talk-london/>

## v. Commissioned research

Recognising the limitations of a consultative process and wanting to ensure that views were representative of London's diverse communities, the Programme commissioned the global engagement and public opinion company YouGov to deliver commissioned research<sup>7a</sup> with a cohort of representative Londoners.

This research enabled the Programme to speak with a statistically sound level of certainty to a London view on specific issues of interest.

The commissioned research engaged with over 1000 Londoners.

The results from this research are in [Annex 5](#).

## Specialist Advisers

The Mayor committed this Programme to being shaped by experts, and so a cohort of six Specialist Advisers, who have significant experience and understanding of countering violent extremism issues, barriers and opportunities, were appointed to provide independent advice and challenge to the Programme.

**Sajda Mughal** is a survivor of the London terrorist attacks on 7th July 2005 and leads the multi-award-winning women's charity JAN Trust, which works to educate communities to tackle extremism, marginalisation and violence against women and girls.

**Sasha Havlicek** is the founding Chief Executive Officer of the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). ISD is a leading global 'think and do tank' dedicated to powering real world solutions to hate, polarisation and extremism. She regularly advises governments and the private sector at the highest levels on matters of counter-terrorism, counter-extremism and integration.

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7a. YouGov, Commissioned CVE,

[https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus\\_uploads/document/5h3fiq3l43/MOPACResults\\_181005\\_Extremism\\_London\\_W.pdf](https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/5h3fiq3l43/MOPACResults_181005_Extremism_London_W.pdf)

**Nigel Bromage** is a former far-right activist who now dedicates his life to countering far-right extremism and hate. He has first-hand experience of the social and psychological tools far-right extremist groups and activists use to identify, befriend and recruit vulnerable people into extremism.

**Shaukat Warraich** is a multi-award-winning social entrepreneur and is currently the Chief Executive of Faith Associates a pioneering enterprise, developing strategies, organisational and operational capacity for third sector and commercial entities in the UK and abroad. He has been responsible for producing several key pieces of literature in the fields of leadership and management as well as community development.

**Councillor Clare Coghill** was elected Leader of the London Borough of Waltham Forest in May 2017. Councillor Coghill brings rich levels of local authority safeguarding experience to the Programme and is also the London Councils representative on the London CONTEST board.

**Imam Mohammed Mahmoud** has been working closely with young Londoners for over 15 years, creating positive narratives that have led to hundreds of young people becoming more engaged with civil society and their faith. His outstanding courage during the Finsbury Park terror attack of 2017, was recognised around the world and led to him recently being honoured with the Hubert Walter Award for Reconciliation and Interfaith Cooperation.

It should be stated that whilst Specialist Advisers have contributed their advice, views and challenges to the Programme, the content and recommendations of this report have not been agreed with the advisers and are therefore independent of them. As such the recommendations of this Programme are not necessarily reflective of their views in every area.



## 5. STRENGTHENING COMMUNITIES BY BUILDING RESILIENCE TO EXTREMISM



## Key findings

- Strengthening relationships between Londoners from different backgrounds and boosting opportunity for all Londoners, can be an effective way to build resistance to extremism.
- Government cuts have forced local authorities into making extensive reductions to youth and community services which has reduced opportunities for quality interactions with those who are from different backgrounds and limited exposure to positive role models.
- Boosting a sense of citizenship in schools builds resilience to extremism and encourages active participation.
- Marginalisation is driving inactivity in relation to participation, particularly in disempowered women and young people.
- Some communities in London feel left behind, perceive that they are not benefiting from the city's success and that change has been too rapid resulting in detrimental outcomes to service provision and opportunity.
- Having a strong sense of security, belonging and identity can be key factors in reducing vulnerability to extremism.
- Hate crime can be a great destroyer of sense of security, belonging and identity.

## Overarching ambition

- Create an environment where Londoners can make new connections, breaking down the barriers of social class and economic inequality and bringing those of different ages and backgrounds together in shared quality experiences.
- Increase access to opportunities to help people reach their full potential and feel like they have a proper stake in society.

## The invisible mitigation of extremism

The programme found much evidence that by strengthening the bonds between Londoners and boosting opportunity for all, it is possible to create an invisible resistance to extremism or at least a less fertile ground for it to flourish in.

Two-thirds of Londoners see strong, cohesive and integrated communities as effective in reducing the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

London is a forward-looking, dynamic, global city. Today it is one of the most diverse cities in the world with more than 300 languages spoken on our streets and every faith freely practised.

Participants recognised though that communities have been changing rapidly, inequality has increased, and our sense of integration is being put to the test, meaning that we must continue to act, not only to ensure our differences do not breed division, but also to work to build a stronger sense of unity within our city.

More integrated communities can better respond to change, help Londoners to thrive, and foster increased trust and belonging. But one of the lessons from around the world is that a 'hands off' approach to social integration simply does not work.

8. Mayor of London, 2018, All Of Us, [https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/final\\_social\\_integration\\_strategy.pdf](https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/final_social_integration_strategy.pdf)

9. Ibid

That is why the Mayor introduced the first Deputy Mayor for Social Integration, Social Mobility and Community Engagement and is delivering the All of Us strategy<sup>8</sup> which makes clear that social integration is about how we all live together. It is about shaping a city in which people have more opportunities to connect with each other positively and meaningfully. It means supporting Londoners to play an active part in their communities and the decisions that affect them. It involves reducing barriers and inequalities so that Londoners can relate to each other as equals.

The Mayor's All of Us strategy<sup>9</sup> explores how we can better promote shared experiences, support Londoners to be active citizens and tackle barriers and inequalities. Our approach goes further than simply integration between different nationalities, ethnic groups or faiths. It takes account of other important aspects such as age, social class, employment status, sexuality, gender and disability. It is about social integration in a wider context - our bonds as citizens, and how we interact with one another. Many Londoners agreed that through quality interactions with those who are from different backgrounds, resistance can be created to those individuals and organisations that seek to sow hatred and division based on identity and characteristics.

"The more we can stop seeing those with whom we share London as 'other' the better."

*Consultation response*

## Youth and community services reductions

The Programme heard that recent Government cuts have forced local authorities into making extensive reductions to youth and community services, therefore reducing opportunities for quality interactions with those who are from different backgrounds.

Research recently published by the Children's Services Funding Alliance<sup>10</sup> found that council spending on early intervention services for children including Sure Start centres and youth clubs fell nationally by 49% to £1.9bn since 2012.

"Huge amounts of central Government funding have been stripped out of council budgets since 2010 – half a billion pounds alone in Waltham Forest. This has clearly had an impact on our ability to fund youth and community services. This is reducing our ability to bring the community together and opportunities for children to mix with their peers from other backgrounds or have additional contact time with other adult role models."

**Councillor Clare Coghill**  
Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
and Specialist Adviser  
to the CVE Programme

More than 1,000 children's centres and 600 youth clubs have closed across the country. Councils overall suffered a 29% cut in Government funding for children's departments between 2010 and 2017-18 – equivalent to £3bn – despite spiralling demand for a range of services.

The top five children's services "funding cuts' hotspots" identified by the study were all London boroughs – Westminster, Tower Hamlets, Camden, Newham, and Hackney – all of which saw per-child funding reductions of between 45% and 52%. Funding on this basis fell by 37% overall in Greater London.

The Programme was informed that Government cuts to youth and community services have also resulted in reduced connectivity for Londoners with the positive role models, such as youth leaders and sports coaches, who would ordinarily deliver these services.

59% of Londoners think that strong role models in society are effective in reducing the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government must reverse cuts which have forced local authorities to reduce vital youth provision and community services.

10. The Guardian, 2019, Children's Services in England are in financial crisis, charities say, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/26/childrens-services-financial-crisis-big-five-charities>

## Encouraging quality interactions and active participation

The Programme found many examples of community groups creating platforms for quality interactions with people who are from different backgrounds, including but not limited to, interfaith activity, women's empowerment work and the bringing together of young people.

Others told the Programme that whilst national schemes were helpful, there was a perception by some that this had reduced funding opportunities for local providers. These participants felt that more needed to be done to ensure that local schemes are also able to access funds.

There was a strong consensus that more investment is needed to maintain and most importantly amplify effective existing work and support additional local delivery. Many participants told the Programme that there are simply too few opportunities to participate in existing schemes and local providers are not given the funding opportunities to fill this gap. This leads to too few people being given the chance to take part.

"We need to create more opportunities for shared experiences and for people from different backgrounds to be part of something"

*Consultation response*

## Case study: National Citizen Service (NCS)

NCS is open to all young people aged 15-17 and builds skills for work and life, encouraging participants to take on new challenges and meet new friends.

NCS brings together young people from different backgrounds and aims to help them develop greater confidence, self-awareness and responsibility. It encourages personal and social development by working on skills like leadership, teamwork and communication.

Participants develop a social action project to deal with a local issue they are passionate about and spend 30 hours putting the project into action in their community.



City Hall continues to invest in this important area. The Mayor's £45m Young Londoners Fund<sup>12</sup> is helping children and young people to make positive choices and fulfil their potential, particularly those at risk of getting caught up in crime. It supports a wide range of local community projects providing aspirational activities to help support young people to make positive choices, reach their potential and bring people together.

Recognising and celebrating London's diversity and culture is also important in bringing people together and encouraging participation. The Mayor's London Borough of Culture award brings Londoners of all ages and backgrounds together. It puts culture at the heart of local communities, where it belongs and shows that culture is for everyone. Now more than ever, the Mayor wants Londoners to get to know each other and feel part of our great city. In February 2018, Waltham Forest (Borough of Culture 2019) and Brent (Borough of Culture 2020) were awarded £1.35 million of funding to deliver a programme of ambitious cultural activities celebrating the unique character of local people and places.<sup>13</sup>

"One of the ways we have been able to successfully bring our community together is through our programme as the first ever London Borough of Culture. 70,000 people – 23% of our population - attended our opening weekend event, and 850 people have signed up as volunteers. We know that our programme so far has made our residents feel like Waltham Forest is a place that welcomes everyone and has a strong sense of community."

***Councillor Clare Coghill***  
*Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
 and Specialist Adviser  
 to the CVE Programme*

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should invest more to fund activities which bring people from diverse backgrounds together for quality interactions and empower active participation from marginalised and under-represented groups, ensuring that those too often not involved can take part.

12. Mayor of London, 2018, Mayor's Young Londoners Fund, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/education-and-youth/young-londoners/mayors-young-londoners-fund>

13. Mayor of London, 2018, London Borough of Culture, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/arts-and-culture/current-culture-projects/london-borough-culture>

### Schools encouraging and promoting active citizenship

Encouraging young people in London to become positive active citizens was seen by many participants as an important way to inoculate against the messaging of extremists. Examples of high-quality delivery of citizenship lessons in schools was described as resulting in students becoming active promoters of respect and tolerance for those who are from different backgrounds.

“Schools have been cited as ‘neutral’ spaces where personal bonds between young people of different backgrounds are formed, which eventually prevents the possibility of prejudice arising in their minds.”

*Faiths Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

Citizenship has been on the national curriculum in England and Wales since 1991, and compulsory in secondary schools since 2002. The City Hall initiative, the London Curriculum<sup>14</sup> uses the capital as inspiration to bring the national curriculum to life at key stages 2 and 3. The programme offers free teaching resources and exciting educational activities for students. Our ambition is to be in every school in London, supporting teachers to help their students connect with their communities and city. The London Curriculum is developing new resources in citizenship for London secondary schools.<sup>15</sup>

Participants regularly stated that education is one of the most important elements in reducing the risk of intolerance, hate and radicalisation and recognised that educational professionals are doing a fantastic job in difficult circumstances such as the backdrop of Government cuts.

However, participants of the Programme stated that the delivery of citizenship lessons aren’t standard (as academies and private schools do not have to follow the national curriculum) and where they are delivered the quality is often variable, with only a very limited number of area-expert practitioners employed.

#### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should invest more to support schools to deliver high quality citizenship content to all young people.

14. Mayor of London, 2018, London Curriculum, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/education-and-youth/london-curriculum>

15. *ibid*

## Marginalisation driving a lack of participation

The Programme set out from the beginning that it would be shaped by views from across London's diverse communities and focused on the importance of hearing from those who were often unheard or previously ignored, especially marginalised communities, disempowered women and young people.

Through the extensive engagement phase of the Programme it encountered significant feelings of marginalisation which had often led to disengagement.

Many participants (particularly within the 'hard to engage' cohorts reached by the community led engagement) felt like they had been neglected and this was causing many to retract from active citizenship and interaction with the authorities.

"Officials don't care.  
People feel ignored."

*Small Steps Community  
Community led engagement*

The Programme was very well received. Many participants commented on how happy they were to have an authority ask them for their views. Several visited City Hall for the very first time and made important steps towards more positive future engagement with authorities.

Many participants recognised the importance of engagement with women who have arguably too often been left out of conversations.

"This is the first time many of these women have visited City Hall. Some very rarely leave the local area they live in. It is important for them to realise that this is their building too. This is a building for all Londoners."

*Community activist  
CVE team engagement*

Young people who participated in the Programme also put forward feelings of marginalisation, believing that they were often ignored which created strong feelings of apathy, limiting active participation.

"Young people do not feel that they are engaged sufficiently with wider civil society, or that they can influence the decisions of local authorities and other statutory agencies. Active communication and engagement between the authorities and young people would help create transparency, build bridges and establish trust."

*Faiths Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

Nevertheless, the number of those willing to engage with the Programme is strong evidence that there is a willingness for marginalised and disconnected cohorts to become engaged. However, the challenge will be for authorities across London to continue to create opportunities for engagement and interaction which will lead to greater participation in wider society.

Local authorities were seen by many participants as the logical points for increased interaction and the Programme found evidence of some good initiatives being delivered by local authorities to engage better with communities who feel marginalised. However, participants set out that Government cuts to local authority budgets have left many authorities struggling to deliver anything above and beyond their statutory requirements, reducing their ability to reach out and engage with communities particularly those who have become marginalised and hard to engage. Although, many participants noted that to deliver upon statutory functions most effectively, local authorities must foster good engagement relationships across their diverse communities.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should adequately resource local authorities to tackle marginalisation and create platforms for engagement with communities, listening to concerns and providing information. This should include a focus on groups who have too often been left out of the conversation including women and young people.

### The importance of supporting language skills

Many spoke to the Programme about barriers to integration and active participation around a lack of English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) provision and the Programme met individuals in London communities who were keen to become more active in society but were held back by language skills.

"If people aren't supported in learning English, is it a surprise that they often become isolated or only interact with people from the same background as them."

*Community activist  
CVE team engagement*

The Programme was told that learners face barriers due to the limited availability and flexibility of ESOL provision. Participants expressed that cuts in funding have made it increasingly difficult to access English language learning and migrants can find themselves locked out, stuck at a basic level, and unable to progress to a proficiency that would support their independence and integration. This disproportionately impacts certain groups, particularly those with child-care responsibilities.

“Many women come through our doors with little to no English skills. There is a huge demand for beginner classes, but there is not enough funding being allocated.”

*Sajda Mughal, Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Funding cuts have resulted in almost half a billion (£490 million) less funding for ESOL over the period 2009/10 to 2015/16. A shortfall of ESOL classes exists in many areas and is acute in London, where over half of providers, rising to two thirds of colleges, report that they struggle to meet demand for ESOL.<sup>16</sup>

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should reverse cuts to the Adult Education Budget (AEB) and invest serious funding through the proposed National ESOL Strategy to develop approaches to fill gaps in provision that can be mainstreamed through the AEB to better meet the needs of all learners. This should include consideration to supporting women with childcare responsibilities who face additional barriers to accessing suitable provision.

### Communities feeling left behind in modern Britain and the importance of boosting opportunity

The Programme encountered areas of London where there was sentiment that the area and community had been left behind, change had been too rapid, with a lack of opportunity to progress and feelings that already limited resources (such as housing, community infrastructure and jobs) were having to be stretched further. These communities felt that they are not reaping the rewards from a growing and prosperous London. This was noted as driving feelings of marginalisation and acting as a barrier to participation.

Through the Small Steps Community led engagement, the Programme found links between feeling left behind and vulnerability to extremist sentiment in respect to white British communities in some areas of London who struggled to recognise their place in modern Britain. These communities are sometimes targeted by extremists who prey on feelings of marginalisation by blaming immigration or in starker examples peddling false theories of ethnic and cultural ‘genocide’.

Participants regularly commented that more needs to be done to ensure that communities are not feeling left behind and neglected as this can create grievances which extremists seek to exploit.

16. Learning and Work Institute, 2017, Mapping ESOL Provision in Greater London, [https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla\\_esol\\_-\\_combined\\_report.pdf](https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/gla_esol_-_combined_report.pdf)

Extremists often feed off grievances, frequently looking for opportunities to use discontent to sow their own hateful ideologies. Social and economic inequality is often cited as a 'push factor' which can drive vulnerability to exploitation towards extremism. Many spoke to the Programme about strong feelings of lack of opportunity in London, particularly from young people. Participants in East London spoke of being located within view of the Canary Wharf financial district but with feelings that they would not ever be able to work there.

The workplace is also a setting in which people from different backgrounds can meet and form relationships. When some groups are excluded, opportunities for building social integration are missed.

City Hall's 2019-2023 ESF Programme<sup>17</sup> focuses on supporting some of the most disadvantaged people, improving employment opportunities, promoting social inclusion and investing in skills by providing the help people need to fulfil their potential.

This year, the Mayor of London will take on responsibility for the Adult Education Budget (AEB) from central government. This incorporates more than £311 million, to be invested annually in

London's learners to achieve a range of skills within a variety of settings across our capital city.

Building on this, the Mayor has also matched 10% of London's AEB with European Social Funding (ESF) to draw down an additional £71 million to help unemployed people and low paid workers to gain the skills they need to find jobs and progress their careers and help small businesses to upskill their workforces.<sup>17</sup>

The Mayor has also launched a Workforce Integration Network (WIN). This will help to improve pathways for underrepresented groups in the workplace. The WIN programme will begin with supporting young black men aged 16 to 24 years into living wage employment in London. It will focus initially on the construction and digital sectors and will engage other sectors and groups over time<sup>18</sup>

The Mayor's Good Work Standard<sup>19</sup> will bring together good employment practice and links to resources and support from across London to help employers improve their organisations. The initiative has been developed in collaboration with London's employers, professional bodies and experts and employers will be able to apply for accreditation to this scheme.

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17. Mayor of London, 2016, European Social Fund, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/funding/european-social-fund>

18. Mayor of London, 2018, Workforce Integration Network, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/communities/workforce-integration-network-win>

19. Mayor of London, 2017, Good Work Standard, <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/business-and-economy/supporting-business/what-mayors-good-work-standard>

Evidence shows that employers who commit to diverse leadership and embed diversity into their workforce management are more successful and have more engaged workforces.

The working environment should be inclusive, where everyone is treated with respect and feels able to speak up and contribute. Good employers take steps to create equality, harness diversity and create safe and welcoming workplaces. Their values and behaviours reflect the importance of diversity and inclusion and they actively address all forms of discrimination. Everyone should have an equal opportunity to succeed.

Several participants also noted an absence of women senior leaders, or senior leaders from minority backgrounds.

Participants noted that London has one of the strongest, richest and most prosperous private sectors in the world alongside prestigious public sector infrastructure including central government functions.

More must be done to show London's diverse communities that there can be clear pathways into important public and private sector positions ensuring that the workforce of these organisations is reflective of the city's diversity.

"It isn't just important to have good role models at the grass roots level. We also need to have people in powerful and prominent positions in society that people can recognise themselves in, giving them the evidence that they too can replicate that success with the right application."

*Faith Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government should deliver a fundamental review into investment and resource deployment into communities that feel 'left behind', ensuring that all communities are able to share from the success of the city, can fully contribute and feel they belong.

City Hall to continue to encourage employers in London to do more to support opportunity and diversity in the work place by asking them to sign up to the Good Work Standard.

### **Sense of identity, purpose and belonging**

Work can be part of a sense of belonging, but it is often a much wider concept. There was much agreement across the Programme's engagement that a strong sense of identity, purpose and belonging often strengthens resistance to exploitation including from extremism. Clearly those in society that struggle with identity, finding purpose or belonging will *not* all become violent extremists, but a lack of belonging or an identity crisis are potential characteristics which extremists are seeking to exploit.

"People are no longer invested in our society or country and have nothing (to) lose which frees them up to engage in riskier behaviour without consequence."

*Consultation response*

A single identity is often a key tenet of many extremist ideologies. In a city of such great diversity as London, individuals will often have multiple factors which make up their identity. Participants set out that being comfortable, or indeed strongly identifying with, the multiple factors that encompass one's identity was often important in resisting the messaging of those who wish to sow division and hatred.

"There was a time when I didn't feel British, I didn't feel like a Londoner and I didn't feel like a Pakistani (the country my parents emigrated from). I was vulnerable, searching for identity and belonging and people exploited that vulnerability."

*Former extremist  
CVE team engagement*

### **Hate crime and its effect on identity, belonging and a sense of security**

Participants agreed that a strong sense of security is also important in building resistance to extremism alongside identity and belonging. Fear of victimisation can create vulnerability to radicalisation as extremists often pose as the protectors of an ethnic, religious or cultural group.

"During the community engagement consultation, we found a clear link between vulnerability to extremism and hate crime experienced by BAME communities."

*ATM – Community led engagement*



Hate crime has no place in London and that is why City Hall has taken a zero-tolerance approach to it. The lived experience of hate crime and intolerance has a real impact on many Londoners.

Unfortunately, many participants felt that the prevalence of hate crime in London was higher than expected and there was a strong majority who perceived that the threat from hate crime was increasing rather than decreasing.

29% of participants had experienced or witnessed hate crime in London over the last 12 months.

61% of Londoners think that the threat from hate crime is increasing with only 6% thinking that it is decreasing.

*Commissioned research*

We also know that hate crime remains heavily under-reported. Many participants spoke to the Programme about a reluctance to report hate crime often due to the perception that nothing would be done about it.

152 out of the 227 participants had been victims of hate crime within the last 2 years.

*ATM - Community led engagement*

Not only is the perpetration of hate crime a potential measure of the prevalence of extremism within society, but it also is a great destroyer of feelings of security, identity and belonging. Participants spoke of the ability for effective integration work to be totally undermined by the experience of an instance of hate crime on an individual, a friend or family member or indeed a member of a person's perceived community.

"Hate crime committed against an individual can leave that person feeling vulnerable, angry, isolated and like they do not belong. This can also reverberate across whole communities."

*Sajda Mughal, Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Success in challenging the scourge of hate crime is therefore intrinsically linked to the ability to build a strong sense of security, identity and belonging in London.

City Hall will continue to lead on work challenging hate crime and has already committed £1.1 million to fund specialist services for victims of hate crime over the next two years, including extending our provision of Hate Crime Victims' Advocates to offer specialist and targeted advocacy for high risk victims of hate crime throughout the criminal justice process, and to reduce repeat victimisation. These services have supported over 400 victims of hate crime in 2018.

In addition, City Hall has provided funding to support specialist case work support for victims of anti-Semitic hate crime and LGBT+ hate crime and have supported several further services through our Victims' Services and Capacity Building Grant programme.

City Hall will continue to lead the London Hate Crime Board, chaired by the Victim's Commissioner, Claire Waxman, which oversees strategic partnership work, the strategic plan and operational activity relating to hate crime in the police and increased transparency of delivery through the publication of our new hate crime dashboard.<sup>20</sup>

City Hall will continue to support the National Hate Crime Awareness Week<sup>21</sup> and previously has provided resources for over 80 community events across London. City Hall will also continue the work of the multi-agency Online Hate Crime Hub<sup>22</sup> the first of its kind in Europe - to improve the investigative response to, and victim outcomes in cases of online hate crime in London. The Hub has dealt with nearly 1000 cases, and because of the work of the Hub, victims have been offered specialist services, with around half taking up the offer of specialist support.

Participants spoke to the Programme about the importance of strengthening the law around abusive and offensive online communications where it was noted that there are significant challenges in securing successful prosecutions.

In November 2018 the Law Commission published its Scoping Report on Abusive and Offensive Online Communications<sup>23</sup> which called for reform and consolidation of existing criminal laws dealing with offensive and abusive communications online; a specific review considering how the law can more effectively protect victims who are subject to a campaign of online harassment; and a review of how effectively the criminal law protects personal privacy online.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should implement the Law Commission's recommendations on reforming the laws related to Abusive and Offensive Online Communications.

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20. Mayor of London Office for Policing and Crime, 2017, Hate Crime Dashboard <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/crime%20/hate-crime-dashboard>

21. National Hate Crime Awareness Week, 2012, Home, <https://nationalhcaaw.uk/>

22. Mayor of London, 2017, Mayor launches new unit to tackle online hate crime, <https://www.london.gov.uk/press-releases/mayoral/mayor-launches-unit-to-tackle-online-hate-crime>

23. Law society Scoping Report on Abusive and Offensive Online Communications, <https://www.lawcom.gov.uk/abusive-and-offensive-online-communications/>

### **The importance of internet safety in an increasingly digital world**

There is no doubt that the internet has brought huge benefits to society. The world is a more connected place, interactions are easily accessible and there is an almost infinite availability of information at the click of a button. However, the internet has not brought universal benefits and there are challenges which society must look to mitigate ranging from financial crime to exploitation.

Extremists have recognised the power of the internet to promote their vile and hateful messages and have used this as a key tool to reach out to people.

Parents, education practitioners and youth workers told the Programme that more and more, young people use online services to digest information and news, moving away from traditional media outlets or the authorities. Therefore, supporting the strengthening of resilience to online extremism was key.

The Programme found evidence of good initiatives delivered in schools to build online resilience in young people, but these were not uniformly available.

The importance of strengthening online resilience building with parents, many of whom have significantly lower levels of digital literacy, was also regularly raised with the Programme. There were examples of small-scale programmes being delivered in London to do this (sometimes most effectively through schools themselves) but the reach of these were noted as being much too limited.

City Hall welcomes the Department of Education's decision to include online safety content in compulsory health education lessons where "pupils will be taught about: online safety, including the dangers of talking to strangers online, respecting others when posting online, and what to do if they come across discomfiting material."<sup>24</sup> However participants agreed that more must be done to strengthen resilience in what is ever increasingly becoming a digital generation to mitigate the heavy utilisation of the internet by extremists.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should invest more to support teachers to deliver important work with young people to create resilience to online harm, where possible including parents.

24. Tes, 2019, DfE lays out plans for compulsory health lessons, <https://www.tes.com/news/dfelays-out-plans-compulsory-health-lessons>

## 6. ENCOURAGING COMMUNITIES TO STAND UP TO EXTREMISMS



### **Key findings**

- Communities and civil society recognise the risk of extremism and see challenging it as a key priority for London.
- Communities and civil society repeatedly want to play a greater role in standing up to extremism. However, they often lack resources, support and information.
- There is a distinct lack of opportunities and platforms to discuss and debate the dangers of extremism or issues which are utilised by extremists to promote their cause. This is a barrier to individuals understanding these issues, hearing both sides of the debate and playing a more active role in standing up to extremists.
- There is a lack of coordination and synchronisation of the voices opposing extremism which is often a barrier to encouraging others to stand up to extremism.
- Hearing the voices and experiences of victims of terror and hate is a powerful way to encourage people to stand up to extremism.

### **Overarching ambition**

- Give communities the support, resources and information they need to effectively stand up to extremism.

## Countering violent extremism is a priority for Londoners

Many Londoners see violent extremism as a real threat to London and Londoners, and countering it as a priority.

More Londoners see terrorism as a top four most important issue facing London than jobs and the economy, transport, antisocial behaviour and health.

*Commissioned research*

## To most effectively counter extremism, communities must be part of the solution

Participants agreed that to most effectively challenge extremism, all in society have a role to play from the government (at all levels) and the police through to civil society and communities themselves.

Londoners see the following as having responsibility for preventing the spread of extremism, hate and terrorism in London:

- Police (68%)
- National government (62%)
- Local authorities (55%)
- Mayor of London (54%)
- Faith groups (54%)
- Schools and universities (51%),
- Communities (50%)
- Community groups (47%)
- Public (41%).

*Commissioned research*

"All parts of society – citizens, local businesses, schools, community centres, places of worship – have an important role to play in challenging hateful ideas and City Hall is in a unique position to galvanize the partnerships needed to stem the tide of polarisation, mistrust and ultimately violence."

*Sasha Havlicek, CEO Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

## Communities and civil society want to play a bigger role in standing up to extremism but need support, resources and information

Not only was there a recognition that extremism is a serious threat to London and Londoners but there was also widespread agreement by participants that community leaders and community groups are well placed to make a difference and moreover have a strong desire to stand up to extremism if given the support and resources required.

Many participants regularly spoke of a lack of information and particularly resource as a barrier to becoming more active in standing up to extremism.

"Ultimately, the challenge of extremism is best understood and tackled in a hyper local way by the communities that suffer its proliferation. But in order for that response to be effective, communities need to be given the tools and resource to stand up to extremism and this includes access to data, information, funding, communication and technology support, as well as investment in new forms of leadership."

*Sasha Havlicek, CEO Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Many community groups told the Programme that currently the opportunities for support and particularly funding was inconsistent and often inaccessible. This has hindered communities from participating more in standing up to extremism. The funding sources available were often seen as restrictive, with overly complicated application processes and criteria which often made small organisations ineligible. There was widespread agreement that more money should be invested in grass roots bottom up delivery which was seen by many as having the best reach and traction in communities.

"Empowering communities and grassroots community organisations to play a bigger role in countering extremism is absolutely crucial in tackling this issue. Grass roots organisations have the relationships and links with communities that no other has."

*Sajda Mughal Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Whilst the Programme encountered examples of good work being delivered through Government funding (including Prevent funding) the Programme also encountered organisations who would simply refuse to accept funding from the Government or most notably Prevent. This was in the main due to perceived reputational issues associated with accepting this funding. Several thought this was a missed opportunity as many of these organisations are well placed to deliver work which would reduce the risk of radicalisation but also stand up to extremism and encourage others to speak out against vile ideologies.

"Prevent has a very difficult reputation, it is seen as spying – the trustees, directors, all have been resistant to prevent funding."

*Youth group  
CVE team engagement*

Participants continually identified gaps in current delivery either due to a lack of appropriate funding streams, or because of a reluctance for some organisations to accept Government and particularly Prevent funding.

Many suggested that City Hall could play a role in getting the support and resources to those that can best deliver work that stands up to extremism and empowers and encourages others to speak out against hate and intolerance.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

City Hall to deliver a small grants programme (which stands aside from existing Government countering extremism strategies) to civil society groups delivering projects which directly counter extremism, offer positive alternatives to vile ideologies and encourage others to stand up to hate and intolerance.

The Government should follow City Hall's lead and go further, investing more into vital grass roots, bottom up delivery.

### The importance of creating opportunities to learn about and discuss extremism and the issues used by extremists to promote their hateful narratives

Many participants spoke of the lack of opportunities to discuss extremism as well as the complex local, national and international issues used by extremists to promote their hateful narratives.

"Extremists are always seeking opportunities to utilise issues which matter the most to people, so they can promote their views."

*Academic  
CVE team engagement*

The Programme was told that the lack of opportunities to do this in a safe way could sometimes result in people gravitating to discuss and learn more about these issues in areas which too often are echo chambers of one perspective, promote misinformation, lack critical challenge or the other side of the argument and, worst still, sometimes create the fertile conditions in which radicalisation can flourish.

There was a strong consensus that facilitating opportunities to discuss extremism and learn more about the issues used by extremists to promote their narratives would build capacity in people to stand up and challenge extremists and counter the false narrative used by extremists around these complex and challenging issues.



In the Small Steps community led engagement work, many participants felt that there were not enough opportunities to discuss and debate the issues of most importance to them which often included challenging and complex topics such as immigration and Brexit but also high-profile contemporary issues such as youth violence and grooming gangs. Importantly these were noted as being exactly the issues which are used by right-wing extremists to promote their messages and draw people into their hateful ideologies.

“People don’t start out as extremists, there has to be a door opened, an issue that they are worried about to make them look for an answer. In many cases, the far-right understand people are angry and offer them a simple answer. That answer won’t work, but it sounds appealing.”

***Nigel Bromage***

*Founder Small Steps and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Many spoke of their desire to discuss these issues and participants, including Small Steps practitioners themselves, felt that if such opportunities were available then these could include debate and most importantly challenge of what often included negative stereotypical views and false narratives. Moreover, giving people the counter narrative to the extremist argument would also build capacity in them to stand up and challenge extremism themselves.

However, in the absence of opportunities for discussion on these topics, marginalised individuals were often getting their information and discussion from questionable sources and in some instances outright extremist individuals and organisations.

Participants reinforced to the Programme that women are often impacted by extremism, including in different ways to men. They can often be victims of hate crime, groomed into travel to war zones where their rights and mobility can be severely compromised or, radicalised into violent action. Many told the Programme that more needs to be done to give women the support they need to speak out against extremism.

The Programme met with several women community leaders who commanded traction, respect and most importantly trust within their local communities (by both men and women). To amplify their reach, they must be given resources and information. Participants spoke to the Programme about how mothers, sisters, daughters, wives and partners are well placed within the family home to speak out against extremism but require the support and information to do so.

"I know first-hand from my experience engaging with women daily that the role of family is critical in countering violent extremism. Educating mothers about the internet and the kind of violent extremist content that can be found online is vital as they can build strong counter-narratives, share those with their children and throughout their communities – being aware of the issue of extremism and having frank conversations early on is extremely powerful in shaping hearts and minds."

*Sajda Mughal Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

The Programme was also told that the voice of young people is too often discounted. This is despite young people often being negatively affected by extremism whether that be through being a victim of hate, intolerance or violence or through manipulation and exploitation towards extremism.

The Programme worked with several internal and external partners to deliver learning on extremism and related issues to young people and to enable their views to be heard. Through giving young people the ability to understand more and participate in conversations on extremism, many were empowered to become active participants in challenging hateful and violent ideologies.

"I did not know that Nazis still existed in Britain. That is very scary, but it is important that young people are told about these things, so we can tell more people how bad their views are."

*Young person  
CVE team facilitated engagement*

Whilst participants of the Programme agreed that views which promote hate and violence should not be countenanced, there should be more opportunities for legitimate debate and discussion on extremism and the complex issues used by extremists so that capacity can be built in individuals to actively rebut this.

The Programme found some good examples of platforms created for safe learning on extremism and debate and discussion on the issues used by extremists, but these were few and far between. This important work should be increased throughout London.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should increase resource for programmes which create platforms for learning about the dangers of extremism, as well as debate, discussion, information provision and challenge around the complex issues used by extremists, with a particular focus on women and young people.

## Supporting schools to encourage young people to stand up to extremists

Many participants felt that there is an opportunity to encourage the standing up to extremism in schools and commented that there were multiple opportunities in the learning environment to do this whether it be through citizenship, fundamental values work or even some of the stark lessons history has taught us about the dangers of hate, intolerance and extremism.

59% of Londoners think that education programmes in schools are an effective way of reducing the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

Furthermore, the Programme found evidence that young people feel responsible for standing up to extremism and want to play a bigger role.

The Programme also found evidence of good examples where learning on the dangers of extremism was facilitated in schools. Practitioners felt this reduced the risk of young people being exploited by extremists, but also built capacity and empowered them to actively stand up to hate and intolerance.

## Case study: Votes for Schools

The Programme collaborated with colleagues at Votes for Schools,<sup>25</sup> an organisation which was created to give all young people a better knowledge of current affairs and get them voting.

The Programme assisted Votes for Schools with the creation of a classroom product on extremism and school pupils across the country had their say on whether they have a responsibility to tackle extremism.

Results showed that most secondary pupils felt that they had a responsibility to tackle extremism.

**10,128** secondary school pupils were asked: Do you have a responsibility to help tackle extremism?  
**57.6% yes, 42.4% no.**

The ability for primary aged children to become involved in an age appropriate way was also explored with an overwhelming majority responding that they are well placed to help tackle extremism.

**7,900** primary school pupils were asked: Do you think you can help tackle extremism?  
**83.7% yes, 16.3% no**

25. Votes for Schools, 2019, About Us, <https://www.votesforschools.com/>

## Case study: Equaliteach

EqualiTeach works with pupils across London aged seven and upwards, in a variety of educational settings including primary and secondary schools, special schools, pupil referral units, young offender institutions and colleges. EqualiTeach deliver Prevent activity which aims to build young peoples' resilience to the violent and hateful narratives pushed by terrorist organisations in order to groom vulnerable people to their causes but also gives young people the knowledge and skills to challenge these narratives themselves.

The THINK! workshop is aimed at improving the understanding and critical thinking skills of primary school pupils, so

that they can reject extremist narratives. As part of this, children take part in learner-led, interactive activities that challenge them to consider the way that different groups are portrayed and reject stereotypes and hate. They also learn steps to protect themselves from believing false information. Second Thoughts workshops for secondary school pupils provide a more advanced version, encouraging participants to consider their world views, understand the origins of divisions and discrimination, and helping to build their resilience to prejudice, hatred and extremism whilst supporting them to pro-actively counter these narratives.

However, the Programme also found much evidence of a lack of activity in this space. Education practitioners told the Programme that some colleagues lack confidence in creating platforms for discussion on complex issues and felt uncomfortable speaking about extremism. Many set out that more support is needed to build capacity and confidence to do this.

The Programme engaged a significant number of young people who had limited knowledge on extremism, terrorism and radicalisation. Many set out that they thought more should be done in schools to talk about these issues as young people should be made aware of them but moreover need to be supported so that they can fulfil an important role in standing up to extremism.

Others spoke of resourcing being an issue. Some of the education delivery that had the best feedback from participants cost significant amounts to host and although some schools had some of this delivery funded by local authority Prevent teams, many others had not had the same opportunity.

Those schools in Prevent priority areas often noted the helpfulness of their local Prevent Education Officers (PEO) in delivering or facilitating programmes which reduce the risk of radicalisation but moreover, build capacity in empowering young people to actively counter hate and intolerance. However, those schools situated in non-priority Prevent areas were without access to this support.

"Our local PEO is fantastic, always available to advise us and has also given the school access to some amazing programme delivery."

*Headteacher  
CVE team engagement*

### RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government should invest more through schools into resourcing which explores the dangers of extremism with young people.

The Government should better use local authority Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) so that they can offer support to educational institutions situated outside the priority areas they serve.

## The role of faith communities

The Programme engaged with a wide array of religious leaders across all the major faiths in London. There was a recognition, albeit a sorrowful one, that some extremists look to convey hateful, intolerant and sometimes violent ideas through false and warped religious messaging.

Multi-faith participants sought to strongly underscore that the very best placed to counter this manifestation of extremist propaganda are religious communities themselves but that they require support and resources to do this.

The Programme was signposted to some good examples of religious leaders directly challenging extremism.

In response to the rise of DAESH and its successful campaign to persuade thousands of people from around the world to join the terrorist group in Syria and Iraq, imams came together to create online platforms such as Imams Online and an online magazine, Haqiqah where the false theological arguments made by DAESH could be deconstructed and rebutted by legitimate Islamic scholars.<sup>26</sup>

“The frontline for imams in the 21st century is not the pulpit, it is online, on social media, on YouTube, on Twitter.”

*Shaukat Warraich Founder Imams Online – Specialist Adviser*

In 2016 after right-wing extremist group Britain First had been delivering so-called ‘mosque incursions’ and ‘Christian patrols’ where they handed out highly inflammatory anti-Islam literature, churches across Christian denominations came together to condemn this activity.<sup>27</sup>

However, faith leaders constantly told the Programme that a lack of support and resources were a barrier to amplifying this important work.

The Programme met with faith leaders who spoke of not having enough support to create platforms for legitimate debate and learning. Some spoke of fearing discussion on legitimate, but often misunderstood religious principles, over concerns of these being wrongly conflated as promoting extremism. Many also commented that they feared talking about complex local, national and international issues or criticising Government policy as they again felt this risked them being labelled as extremist.

Moreover, many felt that the best way to inoculate individuals from manipulation and exploitation to extremism promoted falsely through religion and additionally empower them to actively counter these narratives was increased religious awareness.

Many examples were cited evidencing the limited religious knowledge of terrorists. Participants spoke of reports setting out that many DAESH recruits had a poor knowledge of Islam<sup>28</sup> and others described an over representation of converts to religion being exploited by extremists due to their lack of religious knowledge.

“Religious literacy among young people within faith communities should be improved, in order to “crowd out” extremist ideology. They need to be equipped with the tools and knowledge to challenge propaganda and counter extremist and hate-filled narratives.””

*Faith Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

The Programme was told that when legitimate religious practitioners felt unable to deliver information, discussion or debate on legitimate religious topics, extremism or the complex local, national and international issues used by extremists, there was great risk that inquisitive and sometimes vulnerable minds could gravitate to dangerous outlets for advice and learning on these issues.

Participants noted that faith institutions were the safest places for the exploration of legitimate religious discussion where faith leaders could counter the narrative of those extremists who falsely use religion to justify or encourage violence and hate. Moreover, this would again build capacity in individuals to become active rebutters of the use of religion to promote hate and violence.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should deliver resources to amplify the voice of faith communities who are often best placed and most effective at rebutting extremists who are promoting hate, intolerance and violence through false and warped religious messaging.

26. The Guardian, 2015, Imam network launches site to counter Isis propaganda,

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/imam-network-website-counter-isis-propaganda-haqiqah>

27. Christian Today, 2016, Britain First condemned by UK Churches,

<https://www.christiantoday.com/article/britain-first-condemned-by-uk-churches/78170.htm>

28. The Independent, 2017, Isis: UN Study finds foreign fighters in Syrian 'lack basic understanding of Islam',

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/isis-islamic-state-foreign-fighters-syria-recruits-lack-basic-understanding-of-islam-radicalisation-a7877706.html>

### The need for coordination and synchronisation of those standing up to extremists

The Programme found evidence that more in society would be willing to stand up to extremists if there was better coordination or synchronisation of those voices already doing so, which would give strength in numbers to those opposing extremism.

Half of all Londoners think that having more people in society openly challenging extremism, hate and terrorism would make people more confident in standing up and challenging these things.

*Commissioned research*

There was a perception that not enough people were speaking out against extremism, it wasn't being done in a joined-up way and that those that did show leadership and speak out against extremism were often faced with vile abuse.

Many spoke to the Programme of a fear of standing out if they challenged extremism and the perceived vulnerability associated with being targeted by extremists.

"Standing up to extremism puts people in the firing line. Silence, however, is not the answer to extremism, community unity and education is."

**Nigel Bromage** Founder,  
Small Steps and Specialist Adviser

A lack of willingness to challenge online extremism was also evident. With participants again stating that they feared reprisals and abuse.

Only 6% of Londoners would respond online challenging online extremist material if they encountered it.

*Commissioned research*

Participants spoke with the Programme about the need to consider the creation of a 'London commitment' which individuals and organisations could sign up to. This would show strength in numbers and act as a reference point allowing others to call out and stand up to extremism.

### RECOMMENDATION

City Hall to explore delivering a 'London commitment' against hate, intolerance and extremism which could be supported by individuals and organisations and adopted throughout the capital.



## Providing communities with the information they need

Participants also spoke of the need to provide transparent and up to date information on the current extremism picture in their local areas as a way of encouraging more activity.

Many stakeholders spoke of an inability to brief out the information they are given by the authorities due to security classification and felt that if communities were aware of the risk, more would become involved.

"If we were allowed to speak about the threat in the local area with our communities this would encourage more people to get involved."

*LA elected member  
CVE team engagement*

36% of Londoners think that having better awareness of the issues would make people more confident in standing up and challenging extremism.

*Commissioned research*

Some stakeholders spoke of an improvement in the collation of information from multi-agency partners and analysis of risk as part of the regular Counter Terrorism Local Profile (CTLP)<sup>29</sup> analytical document creation process.

However, participants conveyed that this information is still not disseminated effectively to stakeholders and civil society partners who might be well placed to react to the analysis by playing a bigger role in standing up to extremism.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the Government should provide regular shareable briefings for stakeholders and community members on the threat and risk from extremism in London.

26. Home Office, 2012, Counter-terrorism local profiles (CTLPs)

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-local-profiles-ctlps>

## The power of the voice of victims

The Programme found that the voices of victims of hate or terror are incredibly powerful and can play a role in encouraging others to stand up to extremism.

The Programme heard from the experience of victims of terrorist attacks through survivor charities. Whilst it is not possible to comprehend the full extent of the pain and anguish experienced by survivors of extremism, hearing from them is an incredibly motivating factor for others to resolve to do more to ensure that these tragedies are not repeated.

The Programme also heard from victims of hate crime and those organisations invested in reducing hate crime in London. Participants felt that if more people understood the effect on victims of extremism and hate, more would be motivated into becoming more active in challenging extremism.

More than 1 in 4 Londoners felt that people might be more confident in standing up and challenging extremism, hate and terrorism if they had a better awareness of the effect of these things on victims.

*Commissioned research*

## Case study:

### Ahmad Nawaz session with Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Cadets

The Programme worked with Ahmad Nawaz, a survivor of terrorism and now a counter hate advocate and ambassador for peace and education. Ahmad spoke to Police Cadets in London about his experience and the importance of countering hate and taking advantage of the education opportunities available in the UK.

Ahmad survived a horrific attack on his school in Pakistan in which his brother and 150 classmates and teachers were tragically murdered. Ahmad escaped only with injury after playing dead. He was transported to Birmingham to receive treatment on his badly damaged arm and now lives there with his family. He is an education and peace adviser and gives talks in schools including warning peers of the dangers of radicalisation.<sup>30</sup>

Many attendees at the event spoke of how motivated they were by Ahmad's sad story, his bravery and the importance of the work he is now invested in.

30. Twitter, 2015, Ahmad Nawaz, <https://twitter.com/ahmadnawazaps?lang=en>

“After hearing Ahmad Nawaz speak, I am going to talk to my school about what more we can do to speak out against hatred.”

*Police cadet  
CVE team engagement*

Some victims of terrorism spoke critically of the support, or lack of support, that they received from the authorities and many highlighted that this provision needs to improve if victims are to be supported in becoming survivors.

The Programme understands that the process for every victim is different, and their journey from victim to survivor should be delicately and sensitively supported. This is not a call for every victim to speak about their experience but a call to better support those who wish to be active participants.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Government should ensure that victims of hate and terrorism are not let down by the support they receive and that their entitlements within the Victim’s Code are met.

The Government should ensure that resources are put forward to consider how to better use the voice of victims and survivors who want to play an active role in countering hate, intolerance and extremism.

## 7. SAFEGUARDING VULNERABLE LONDONERS FROM RADICALISATION



## Key findings

- There is widespread agreement that vulnerable people need safeguarding from extremism and radicalisation.
- Similarly, most Londoners agree that the authorities have a role to play and a responsibility to safeguard vulnerable people from extremism.
- Many participants saw grooming as a key cause of an individual becoming involved or carrying out violent extremism both in online and offline instances of radicalisation.
- Many agreed that there would often be opportunities to intervene to protect someone vulnerable to radicalisation and saw this as an effective way of reducing the risk of vulnerable individuals being exploited.
- Most Londoners would like to talk to the authorities if they were worried about someone being vulnerable to radicalisation but, many don't know when to do this or how to get help.
- There have been good examples of the Government's Prevent strategy succeeding in safeguarding people from radicalisation.
- There have also been examples of Prevent failures which highlights that improvements are needed.
- There is significant scepticism, mistrust and opposition to the Prevent strategy within some communities, across sections of academia and within some practitioner cohorts. This includes legitimate concerns about historical and current shortcomings and failures, highlighting the need for improvements.
- Some scepticism, mistrust and opposition appear to stem from misinformation promoted by groups opposed to Prevent, who seek to sow discontent in current delivery sometimes through the peddling of false claims.
- Exiting an individual from criminal activity, particularly gangs, can increase vulnerability to further exploitation and manipulation towards extremism.
- There are potential links between misogyny, including violence against women and girls, and involvement in extremism.
- More needs to be understood about the complex relationship between mental health and radicalisation.

## Overarching ambition

- Raise general awareness around the risk of radicalisation and where help and support can be sought from.
- Improve counter radicalisation delivery and invest in engagement with sceptical and opposed cohorts who fear or mistrust existing delivery.

### **Vulnerable individuals need safeguarding**

Whilst success in strengthening communities from extremism and encouraging more to stand up and challenge hate and intolerance were seen as effective long-term solutions, it was widely recognised that there will always be instances of vulnerable people being exploited, manipulated or as many who participated in the Programme put it “groomed” into extremism.

The Programme therefore focused on the importance of safeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation as a key theme, ensuring adequate safety nets are put in place to identify and intervene in the potential exploitation and manipulation of vulnerable people by extremists.

With the continued spread of hateful ideologies, increasing volumes of extremist material online and potential growing polarisation across society, participants agreed that it is of paramount importance that communities, frontline practitioners and the authorities are equipped to safeguard vulnerable people from radicalisation.

### **Protecting vulnerable people from exploitation**

Participants across the engagement strands were unanimous in their belief that many things can make someone vulnerable and that there are sadly people in society that look for these vulnerabilities to exploit people towards harm and crime. Furthermore, it was also agreed that radicalisation was indeed an exploitation that vulnerable people should be safeguarded from and that protecting people from radicalisation should sit firmly within safeguarding work.

“We realise what is going on with people being brainwashed into terrorism and we agree that vulnerable people should be protected.”

*Faith leader  
CVE team engagement*

It was universally agreed upon that simply having vulnerabilities does **not** automatically result in exploitation towards any harm or crime, including radicalisation but that having vulnerabilities can upon occasion, increase the likelihood of potential exploitation, particularly in the absence of protective factors.

It was very clear that participants considered that there was no one vulnerability or set of vulnerabilities that would constitute a specific predisposition to radicalisation but that radicalisers could prey upon a wide array of personal vulnerability drivers including but not limited to:

Lack of sense  
of belonging

Identity crisis

Isolation

Lack of  
self esteem

Lack of  
confidence

Mental health  
challenges

Substance  
addiction

Learning  
disability

Lack of  
education

Victim of bullying  
or racism

Poor role models,  
peer pressure &  
negative influence

Dysfunctional  
families

Links to criminality  
of gang involvement

Grievance

Economic  
challenges including  
unemployment

## Radicalisation is often a grooming process

Many participants spoke of the radicalisation process as similar (or the same) as grooming processes that relate to other forms of harm and crime such as child sexual exploitation or exploitation into gangs or organised crime.

43% of Londoners think that an influential influencer (groomer) causes an individual to become involved in carrying out or promoting terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

“Radicalisation is grooming, people get recruited (groomed) to become involved with extremism. It’s that simple and the quicker we all understand that the more we will be able to tackle it.”

**Nigel Bromage** Founder,  
Small Steps and Specialist Adviser

Participants expressed that this grooming process can take place physically or, as many participants stated, can occur virtually including online.

Many expressed a view that key individuals are becoming as important or as some put it, more important than key ideologies. Others expressed that it was possible for a vulnerable person to be groomed into violent extremism without ever having to interact with that person physically or virtually.

In the case of the perpetrator of the Finsbury Park attack, he was said to have become radicalised in just three to four weeks. Evidence from devices he used show him reading posts by the former English Defence League (EDL) founder Steven Yaxley Lennon, right-wing group Britain First and other extremists.<sup>31</sup>

Others used the example of an Al Qaeda ideologue, who was killed in 2011 but whose lectures encouraging, and legitimising violence are still often noted as being motivating factors in many instances of foiled and perpetrated violent extremism plots.<sup>32</sup>

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31. The Independent, 2018, Darren Osborne: How Finsbury Park terror attacker became 'obsessed' with Muslims in less than a month, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/darren-osborne-finsbury-park-attack-who-is-tommy-robinson-muslim-internet-britain-first-a8190316.html>

32. BBC News, 2018, Khalid Ali: Plumber turned bomb-maker who planned London attack <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-44570128>



## Authorities working with communities to safeguard vulnerable people

Many participants set out that it would be preferable if vulnerability to extremism could be identified and mitigated entirely within families and communities themselves. However, when reflecting upon the level of perpetrated and foiled violent extremist activity, it was widely agreed that the authorities should play a role in keeping vulnerable people safe and that to do this most effectively, the authorities and communities must work together.

“Communities are best placed to safeguard the vulnerable from radicalisation, but I accept that in some cases the authorities will need to be involved.”

*Faith leader  
CVE team engagement*

## Opportunities to intervene

Radicalisation was considered a process by many. It was felt that this was a process which could manifest both rapidly, with police warning that extremist online material could drive people to carry out terror attacks within hours, or over long periods of time.<sup>33</sup>

Throughout this process most participants agreed that there would often be potential opportunities to intervene, and that these should be taken advantage of.

54% of Londoners see interventions for individuals at risk of manipulation towards extremism and terrorism as an effective way to reduce the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

It was noted that opportunities to identify concerns or intervene can manifest in multiple scenarios including at home, in the workplace, or at other times. This means that to most effectively identify these opportunities, all in society can play a role in safeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation.

33. The Independent, 2018, Finsbury Park attack: Terrorists could launch atrocities 'within hours of reading extremism material' online, police warn, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/finsbury-park-attack-trial-darren-osborne-online-radicalisation-terror-far-right-material-internet-a8190196.html>

## Engaging three cohorts in London

The Programme could broadly segment Londoners into three cohorts.

### i. The engaged and aware

This cohort describes those who are happy to engage with the authorities should they have a radicalisation related safeguarding concern, have a good awareness of how to spot the indicators of potential concern, where to seek help from and what that help will and won't consist of.

This cohort was primarily made up of public sector workers including social workers, teachers, health workers and police officers. This was in part unsurprising as much of this cohort are from sectors falling within the Prevent Duty<sup>34</sup> meaning that they should have had access to Prevent training.

"I've worked with Prevent and made a referral to it, which resulted in excellent support for the young person whom I was worried about."

*Teacher, CVE team engagement*

However, it is important to state that practitioners from these sectors were not always uniformly part of the engaged and aware cohort with a number that engaged the Programme continuing to be sceptical, have misunderstanding of, or be opposed to existing counter radicalisation strategy.

It is also not correct to say that only public sector workers fell into this category. The Programme encountered civil society practitioners, community members and academics who also were engaged and aware.

We have an excellent relationship with the local Prevent team and feel confident in asking for help from them."

*Community leader,  
CVE team engagement*

The engaged and aware cohort were the smallest encountered across all strands of the Programme's engagement and most of the civil society practitioners, community members and several academics the Programme encountered fell into the latter two categories.

Participants agreed that it is important to continue to keep this cohort engaged and therefore vital to keep training materials up to date, relevant and regularly refreshed. The Programme heard that participants at Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) sessions were often told that it was good practice to refresh training every 12-18 months, particularly if frontline workers. However, many said that upon returning they had received the same training with the same examples and case studies showing that this product needs an urgent update or more likely an entire overhaul.

34. Department for Education, 2015, The Prevent duty, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf)

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should revise, and update future iterations of Prevent strategy training products to ensure that those already engaged and aware remain so.

#### ii. The engaged, unopposed but unaware

This cohort reflects those that are engaged enough with the authorities and supportive enough of the principles of current strategies to wish to make a radicalisation related safeguarding referral but lack awareness on the current risk, how to spot the indicators of concern, where to seek help from and what that help might or might not do. The Programme found that most Londoners fall into this category.

66% of Londoners would tell the Police, and 27% would tell the local authority, if they thought a person might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation to extremism or terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

Although most Londoners are willing to engage the authorities on radicalisation related issues, the Programme found the majority do not know how to seek help.

64% of Londoners would not know how to seek help from the authorities if they were worried about an individual being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism or terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

"If I suspected something I genuinely wouldn't know who I'm supposed to report this to."

*Consultation response*

The Programme also found evidence that there was a general lack of awareness within most Londoners around how much help is available to protect individuals who might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism.

Over half of Londoners think there is not much or no support available to protect individuals who might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

## Case Study: The Channel Programme

The Channel programme is the intervention programme which sits alongside the Prevent strategy and “is a multi-agency approach to identify and provide support to individuals who are at risk of being drawn into terrorism”.<sup>35</sup>

Each local authority area is legally required to host a Channel Panel and each panel can draw down funding to provide individual tailor made bespoke interventions (often through mentoring) for individuals deemed to require this upon assessment.

Participants who were familiar with Channel agreed that it offers considerable support, yet, most of the participants that the Programme engaged with were simply not aware of this scheme. There was also evidence within this cohort of a lack of understanding on how to identify concerns relating to radicalisation.

Only 24% of Londoners felt confident that they could spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation towards extremism and terrorism. In comparison 41% of Londoners felt confident in being able to spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation towards gangs and criminality.

*Commissioned research*

“Communities need to be able to spot the signs of vulnerability which extremists look for, and understand what they should do if they are concerned. The more people who can do this the better and the safer we all will be.”

**Nigel Bromage** Founder,  
Small Steps and Specialist Adviser

The engaged, unopposed but unaware cohort was by far the largest cohort encountered. Within this cohort participants felt that there are enormous opportunities to increase the buy-in from a significant portion of society, simply through raising awareness. Participants told the Programme that more needed to be done to provide general awareness aimed at all those in society, so that in the rare instances that someone could raise a concern, these opportunities are taken advantage of.

35. Home Office. 2012, Channel Guidance <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/channel-guidance>

"The way to access the appropriate authorities to counter these threats should be a lot more obvious."

*Consultation response*

The Programme was told about attempts to raise awareness in the past, but found that a fresh approach is needed as these have simply not reached most Londoners and participants agreed that more needed to be done to raise awareness.

Only 13% of Londoners had seen materials (campaigns/posters/literature) which highlighted where to seek help from (if you were worried about an individual being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism or terrorism).

*Commissioned research*

Many participants spoke of the police's Action Counters Terrorism (ACT)<sup>36</sup> campaign and its success in creating a mindfulness around suspicious activity that could relate to the planning or perpetration of a potential terrorist attack. Particularly the See it, Say it, Sorted<sup>37</sup> strap line was noted by many as being catchy enough to embed itself into people's conscious and was thought to have encouraged more members of the public to raise concerns with the authorities.

However, participants felt that there should be more done to promote awareness around the importance of safeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation along with the promotion of the support and help available. It was thought that this would increase public participation in presenting safeguarding referrals to the authorities.

### RECOMMENDATION

The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ (NCTPHQ) should deliver a new bespoke campaign relating to vulnerability to radicalisation, signposting where help and support can be sought and reassuring communities about the lack of negative ramifications of a referral in this respect.

Participants suggested that this campaign should be clearly distinct from previous campaigns which relate to suspicious and ultimately often criminal activity as it was thought to be unhelpful to blur the reporting of potential criminal and non-criminal concerns.

Some of the biggest barriers that were raised around community reporting to the Programme was the potential to criminalise or stigmatise those being referred alongside a concern that a referral would lead to getting someone into trouble rather than helping them access support.

36. Counter Terrorism Policing, 2019, Action Counters Terrorism, <https://act.campaign.gov.uk/>

37. British Transport Police, 2016, New National Rail campaign starts today: "See It, Say It, Sorted" [https://www.btp.police.uk/latest\\_news/see\\_it\\_say\\_it\\_sorted\\_new\\_natio.aspx](https://www.btp.police.uk/latest_news/see_it_say_it_sorted_new_natio.aspx)

"There is a fear that making a referral will lead to criminalising young people."

*ATM, Community led engagement*

The Programme was told that by highlighting anonymity and reassuring concerns around perceptions of potential negative repercussions of being referred (such as underlining that there is no criminal sanction or record associated with the Channel process) would go a long way in encouraging broader buy-in and engagement.

Of those who would not report potential signs of concern to the police (34% of those who participated in research), 19% said they wouldn't because they believe the process wouldn't be anonymous and 26% said they wouldn't because they would fear negative repercussions on the person they were worried about.

*Commissioned research*

Participants stated that using unhelpful language – such as promoting the Counter Terrorism Hotline as a portal for contacting the authorities in relation to non-criminal safeguarding concerns – was unconstructive, as reporting a concern that related to terrorist planning or perpetration must be clearly distinct to that of a concern relating to safeguarding.

## RECOMMENDATION

The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ (NCTPHQ) should create a new phonenumber and online portal for referring safeguarding concerns. This should very clearly set out that it relates primarily to safeguarding concerns rather than criminality.

Many participants of the Programme felt that focusing on radicalisation through a safeguarding lens was a helpful way to buy-in additional community referrals. Several participants associated safeguarding strongly with the social services provision of local authorities and therefore thought that promoting local authorities' role in safeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation was important in underscoring a natural alignment to traditional safeguarding.

"Many people who become radicalised have at some point been vulnerable and have been easy prey for those who seek to manipulate them to do harm. There is no more fundamental role for local authorities than safeguarding the vulnerable."

***Councillor Clare Coghill***

*Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
and Specialist Adviser  
to the CVE Programme*

However, two issues emerged in this respect. Firstly, the Programme's research evidence again showed a lack of awareness around local authorities' role in protecting vulnerable people from radicalisation.

Only 27% of Londoners would tell the local authority if they thought a person might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation to extremism or terrorism. Of the remaining 63% of Londoners who wouldn't tell the local authority, 38% of this cohort wouldn't because they didn't think that the local authority was involved in countering extremism and terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

Secondly, several participants expressed concern about navigating differing local authority safeguarding pathways. Many spoke of not knowing how to seek help from the local authority.

The Programme spoke with local authorities and found that there was not a uniform way of accepting radicalisation related safeguarding referrals across London with some encouraging referral to the Multi- Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH)<sup>38</sup> and others using bespoke entry processes.

This challenge was compounded by Londoners' lives often crossing the invisible barriers that divide local authority areas. It was not uncommon for participants to live in one borough, have their children attend school in another still and work somewhere else.

## Case Study: The Policy Institute – Accessing Prevent in London

At the request of the Mayor's CVE Programme, The Policy Institute, King's College London<sup>39</sup> held a workshop on improving mechanisms for accessing Prevent in March 2019. This session brought together key stakeholders and practitioners working in or with Prevent to explore the challenges and barriers faced by all service users (both practitioner and communities) in accessing Prevent. The aim was to understand how Prevent could be made easier and simpler to access by understanding the challenges that service users, including the general public, face when considering whether to make referrals, as well as to reflect on how these challenges might be mitigated.

Full briefing note available at [Annex 6](#).

The session found that, "Prevent has created an intricate and complex ecosystem that is hard to navigate, potentially deterring people from referring to it" and "Mechanisms for accessing Prevent in London need to be simplified."

38. Home Office and The Rt Hon Norman Baker, 2014, *Working together to safeguard children: Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs*, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/working-together-to-safeguard-children-multi-agency-safeguarding-hubs>

39. The Policy Institute, Kings College London, 2019, <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government should fund a pan-London campaign which promotes the role local authorities play in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from radicalisation, including highlighting referral pathways.

The Government should deliver advice to local authorities on adopting a uniform way to accept radicalisation related safeguarding referrals and where possible simplify referral pathways.

“There was a general lack of awareness of government strategies to tackle extremism. Participants were either ignorant of Prevent or poorly informed about it. Where there was awareness, there was a general negative perception of it.”

*Faiths Forum for London –  
Community led engagement*

Securities Minister, Ben Wallace MP, said in a recent debate in the House of Commons that he recognises “that in some communities there is a stigma attached to Prevent and that people do not necessarily trust parts of it, but in other communities some people do.”<sup>40</sup>

Participants agreed that any counter radicalisation strategy will not be fully effective if significant portions of communities (including those targeted by violent extremists) not only lack trust in existing counter radicalisation strategy but fear it, due to perceptions of being problematised and targeted.

Participants noted that it is important to separate those who are sceptical and mistrustful of Prevent from those who are deeply opposed. The Programme found evidence that with enough engagement and reassurance of concerns, alongside strategy improvements, the former’s position is potentially moveable, and it is possible to increase buy-in and engagement.

### iii. The disengaged, sceptical, mistrustful and opposed

This cohort speaks to those who currently would not engage with the authorities, in the main due to feeling sceptical and mistrustful of existing counter radicalisation strategy but in smaller volumes also those who are actively opposed to it.

Evidence of this cohort came out very strongly in the Programme’s own engagement and the community led work delivered on City Hall’s behalf. This cohort was much smaller than the engaged, unopposed but unaware cohort but larger than the engaged and aware cohort.

40. UK Parliament, House of Commons Hansard, 2017, Prevent Strategy

<https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2017-02-01/debates/B8BE87F9-7E2E-46C5-9E11-DDAD5897E949/>

[PreventStrategy](#)



However, participants thought that those deeply opposed would likely be unmoveable in their positions.

The Programme found that some of the scepticism and mistrustfulness was based on clear failings in the early delivery of Prevent alongside more recent examples of shortcomings.

However, in others, this could often be driven by a lack of information on existing strategy. For example, some of those the Programme engaged who had concerns about existing delivery, spoke of the strategy solely focussing on Muslim communities. When the Programme team were able to offer evidence of the considerable work around right-wing extremism within existing delivery, these individuals were often more supportive.

The Programme heard that alongside improvements to delivery, the most effective way of fostering better trust and rapport within sceptical and mistrustful cohorts was thought to be through face to face engagement. Many of the disengaged cohort had never had the opportunity to speak with practitioners delivering existing strategy. Where positive views had been fostered this was often noted to be the result of good face to face outreach and engagement.

The Tower Hamlets Prevent Manager, Simon Smith, spoke to the media about the importance of quality engagement when speaking about an initiative to train people to spot the signs of radicalisation. He said, "The reason there is mystery surrounding Prevent is because people don't talk about it. We don't have that communication. We don't engage with the public and we need to."<sup>41</sup>

Participants considered that a continued lack of investment and activity in this area is likely to result in deeper disengagement and increased opposition.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should give adequate resources to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver significant face to face engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts who fear or are suspicious of Prevent delivery.

41. Evening Standard, 2019, GPs' Receptionists and council workers among hundreds being trained to spot signs of radicalisation, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/gps-receptionists-and-council-workers-among-hundreds-being-trained-to-spot-signs-of-radicalisation-a4113941.html>

The Programme was invited to attend a Prevent Advisory Group (PAG) meeting in Kensington and Chelsea (K&C). These meetings bring together faith, civil society and community leads to discuss local Prevent delivery, brief attendees on local threat, discuss co-design and collaborative opportunities for programmes which reduce local risk and act as a challenge and scrutiny group for local delivery.

Attendees at the PAG expressed to the Programme that many had initially been disengaged, sceptical and mistrustful and sometimes actively opposed to Prevent but that through attending meetings had changed their views and become actively engaged. This change of position was attributed to the local Prevent team being transparent about their work, offering insight to training and programme delivery, setting out a willingness to change and improve local delivery and reaching out to community partners to co-design and collaborate on programme work. This group also allowed concerns to be fed through the local Prevent team to central government, something that was noted as reducing feelings of marginalisation and encouraging participation. Some members still had reservations about national delivery but spoke in overwhelmingly positive terms about local delivery.

### **Case Study: Kensington & Chelsea Prevent Advisory Group (PAG)**

At the forefront of the K&C Prevent team's community engagement work is the Prevent Advisory Group (PAG), a monthly forum which draws local community organisations and faith groups to discuss Prevent delivery locally, in addition to other pressing concerns. From a somewhat frosty start, where participants raised concerns about Prevent spying on communities, the PAG has developed into a vital network of community partners who work in collaboration with the Prevent Coordinator to deliver projects locally.

There are few, if any, parts of the Prevent team's work that have not been changed by engagement with the Prevent Advisory Group. For example, in line with community suggestions, the Prevent team have organised bespoke sessions and activities for parents and young people in local youth clubs. Ultimately PAG is an advisory group. By sharing their thoughts, PAG has dramatically improved the effectiveness of local Prevent delivery.

"Local authority Prevent Boards should ensure that communities feel legitimately represented."

*Faiths Forum for London –  
Community led engagement*

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should adequately resource all local authorities to have a local Prevent Advisory Group.

Many of the disengaged cohort that participated in the Programme and who had attended counter radicalisation training were critical of this training and felt that products needed an urgent update.

The Programme heard uneasiness by participants around advice given by authorities on how to spot the indicators of concern that someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation or being radicalised. Participants felt that in some advice documents and training, often these simply described normative behaviour which many people will likely exhibit at one point or another such as, identity issues, change of friend networks, more secretive online activity and an increased or decreased interest in religion.

Whilst the Programme agrees that these are issues which can possibly manifest in vulnerability which extremists and other groomers might seek to exploit, there should be advice that, unaccompanied by any additional evidence of extremism concern, such as possessing extremist material, making extremist comments or associating with extremists, these in isolation are *not* indicators of radicalisation.

Participants agreed that this needs to be made clearer in any training product to avoid unsensible and disproportionate referrals which were often thought to stem from negative stereotypes and unconscious bias and which were noted as being a key driver of disengagement.

The Programme was told of several anecdotal instances where seemingly unsensible referrals had been made to the authorities often with the inference that these had been based on unconscious biases particularly around the Muslim community.

"I have seen Prevent referrals that relate to Muslims praying in the park. These were all clearly well-intentioned but do show that sometimes people don't really understand the issue and what Prevent is trying to do".

*Local authority  
safeguarding practitioner  
CVE team engagement*

Prevent practitioners were quick to tell the Programme that they would rather people raised unsensible concerns with them so that they could identify where training and development needs were required and could upskill understanding with the referrers. However, other participants spoke of the potentially deeply stigmatising factor on the individual being referred in unsensible and moreover unfair circumstances.

Of the total number of people referred to Prevent (7,318) in 2017/18, 42% received no further action, 40% were referred to other safeguarding services and 18% were discussed at a Channel Panel.<sup>42</sup> Some participants noted the high rate of no further action cases, stating that this was evidence that understanding on what does and does not constitute a referral could be improved, whilst Prevent practitioners stated that these proportions were in line with other safeguarding themes and were evidence of effective checks and balances in the process.

Ultimately, participants accepted that well-intentioned but misplaced referrals would be made in any safeguarding process, but more must be done to ensure that understanding and awareness is raised, busting stereotypes and unconscious bias and most importantly doing everything possible to ensure individuals are not stigmatised by the process.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should ensure that future iterations of Prevent training products better set out what does and does not constitute a referral. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.

Participants also had concerns about the quality of training delivery and some stated that they felt that too high a number of people had been accredited to deliver the training, many of whom appear to have become accredited with limited scrutiny on their suitability to deliver.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should invest more in the training of those learning to deliver future iterations of Prevent awareness products and deploy a strong accreditation process to ensure high quality delivery.

The Programme encountered individuals and organisations who were deeply opposed to existing delivery. Much of this opposition was based on legitimate concerns about shortcomings and failure of historical and current delivery.

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42. Home Office, 2018, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2017-to-march-2018>

However, some concern was based on misunderstanding and participants spoke to the Programme of a small cohort who are in deep active opposition to Prevent and were accused, by some, of spreading misinformation. Examples were presented where some of these groups had been alleged to be spreading seemingly false narratives and inaccurate case studies.

Many of those who were sceptical and mistrustful of Prevent did set out to the Programme that they often receive their information on current Prevent delivery through this small but deeply opposed cohort and the Programme recognises that while there clearly have been previous shortcomings and failings and that reasonable concerns continue to be made about current delivery, some concerns appear to stem from misinformation promoted by these cohorts to undermine Prevent.

Participants signposted the Programme to a recent article where it was reported that one organisation had been asked by the police to remove “deliberately misleading” material.<sup>43</sup>

Others cited anecdotal or media-based examples of unsensible or disproportionate activity that was attributed to Prevent which, when followed up by the Programme with the authorities, were claimed to be false or significantly misrepresented.

Where misinformation exists, it should be incumbent on the authorities to very quickly, clearly and transparently counter that misinformation. Participants agreed that if this alleged misinformation continues to primarily go unchallenged, there will naturally be mistrust and fear of Prevent.

Currently, many felt that there was not enough of a direct countering of these stories by the authorities.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government and the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should be stronger, speedier, louder and more transparent in countering any inaccurate allegations, media stories or case studies peddled by individuals and organisations that are looking to sow discontent around Prevent delivery.

43. The Telegraph, 2018, Cage asked to remove video over claims woman's delivery room was 'raided' after giving birth, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/09/29/cage-asked-remove-video-claims-raided-giving-birth/>

It was clear that while some of the sceptical and mistrustful cohort were potentially moveable into a more engaged perspective, some clearly were very unlikely to ever engage the authorities. This was sometimes due to a deep mistrustfulness in the authorities more generally, rather than specific concerns with counter radicalisation policy.

However, in these instances, the Programme found that individuals were still well placed to spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation or being radicalised and although these individuals were often unlikely to tell the authorities, they were likely to tell someone.

Only 2% of Londoners wouldn't tell anyone if they thought a person might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation to extremism or terrorism. 33% of Londoners would tell a friend or family member, 17% would tell an employer or colleague, 15% would tell a community worker, 10% would tell a faith leader and 8% would tell a community member.

*Commissioned research*

Participants considered that more focus should be placed on delivering training to frontline practitioners or trusted grass roots community members who are not situated in the sectors which are governed by the statutory Prevent Duty but who are supportive of engaging the authorities on safeguarding matters. This could include civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school workers and faith leaders.

Participants did not feel that this should be a legal duty as this would likely create more resistance and in any case the Programme found that significantly high numbers of non-statutory service practitioners and community leaders were absolutely committed to safeguarding vulnerable people.

Participants thought that to awaken this cohort to active participation in safeguarding people from radicalisation would simply require the resourcing of good quality training and information through outreach and engagement.

This would build capacity in individuals to identify radicalisation related safeguarding concerns themselves but also increase their ability to make referrals to the authorities on behalf of those who ordinarily would not be willing to do so.

**RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should adequately reresource the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver increased engagement and radicalisation safeguarding awareness work with key individuals and organisations within grass roots communities such as civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school staff and faith leaders.

### **Full and Frank assessment of existing counter extremism delivery across London**

The Programme was asked to undertake a full and frank assessment of existing countering violent extremism delivery including the work of the Government's Prevent strategy in London.

The Programme allowed participants to direct it to the areas of existing counter extremism delivery that was most important to them. Invariably this led to discussions on the Prevent strategy with few participants having an awareness of the Government's Counter-Extremism Strategy,<sup>44</sup> a stand-alone strategy published by Government in 2015 which also delivers operational work to counter extremism. As such the Programme focused on Prevent in relation to the full and frank assessment.

The Programme found much evidence of Prevent success, hearing examples of good work in safeguarding vulnerable people from radicalisation.

### **Case Study**

A 16-year-old girl with relatives who had travelled to conflict zones in Syria was identified to police after publicly saying she wanted to travel on social media. She was accepted into the Channel programme and agreed to engage in the support provided, including several sessions with a mentor.

Her risk of travel was deemed so great that a Family Court Order was taken out to confiscate her passport and prevent travel. Following this intervention, the girl returned to education and exited the Channel programme having had her vulnerability reduced.

44. Home Office, 2015, Counter-Extremism Strategy <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-extremism-strategy>



## Case study

A 16-year-old male was referred to Prevent by their secondary-school safeguarding lead after making extremist and violent comments in class and on social-media, which included possession of Islamophobic materials and indications of support for right-wing extremist groups including the English Defence League. The young man was reviewed by the local authority's multi-agency Channel Panel who assessed him to be highly vulnerable to being radicalised and recruited into right-wing terrorism and requiring sustained support.

Over the course of more than two years, a wide-ranging package of safeguarding support was put in place for the individual, which included regular engagement with a specialist Intervention Provider who – himself being a reformed former member of a violent right-wing group – was able to gradually unpick and challenge the false narratives used to groom and recruit people into support for right-wing extremism and terrorism.

There have also of course been Prevent failings. For example, the Parsons Green bomber’s case was discussed by a Channel Panel, set up to assess his risk of being drawn into terrorism less than a fortnight before he planted a bomb on a tube train.

A Home Office inquiry in March 2018 found that no formal written plan was put in place during the 15 months that he was subject to the intervention programme.<sup>45</sup>

Participants recognised that no safeguarding strategy can totally mitigate the risk, but other anecdotal examples of unsensible and disproportionate safeguarding activity were raised with the Programme.

Participants agreed that Prevent will only be fully successful if London’s diverse array of communities have trust in it and view it as a strategy which seeks to safeguard them.

“Prevent’s inherent failures arise from its inability to win over the hearts and minds of the very community it intends to serve”.

**Sajda Mughal**  
*Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

The Programme found that while Prevent was effective in reassuring some communities, it has and continues to drive fear in others. The Programme encountered many who feel alienated by Prevent.

Participants highlighted that there remains a reticence from communities to report concerns to the authorities.

The Home Office’s own statistics show that Prevent strategy referrals to the authorities from ‘community’ or ‘friends and family’ designations are relatively low and have remained low for the last three years. Participants agreed that there were multiple barriers restricting the volume of community and friends and family referrals. There was strong agreement that this is an area which should be focused on to improve and renew safeguarding activity.

YEAR	% REFERRALS <sup>46</sup>	
	from communities	from friends and family
<b>2015/16</b>	5% (398)	3% (267)
<b>2016/17</b>	4%(226)	4% (250)
<b>2017/18</b>	4% (292)	3% (212)

45. The Guardian, 2018, Anti-terror panel discussed Parsons Green bomber's case before attack, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jun/18/anti-terror-panel-discussed-parsons-green-bomber-ahmed-hassan-case-before-attack>

46. Home Office, 2018, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2017-to-march-2018>

It was noted by some that Prevent has made steps to improve transparency, but many participants continued to criticise Prevent for a perceived lack of transparency.

“We simply don’t know if Prevent works because we are given no helpful data from the Government. Without this how can we say if this is a programme which is successful.”

*Academic  
CVE team engagement*

There was also criticism about the transparency of Prevent projects. Some participants criticised a lack of openness about the projects. Many were noted as not overtly promoting their affiliation to Prevent. Others spoke about a lack of evidence of the success of Prevent programme work noting a recent Times article which stated that a leaked central government Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) report commissioned by the Home Office noted 95% of the de-radicalisation programmes it reviewed were ineffective.<sup>47</sup>

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should improve transparency by including evaluations of Prevent projects, evidencing those that are most effective so that they can be replicated and amplified.

Some participants noted that there is a strong lack of uniformity of delivery of Prevent work describing that the quantity and quality of London Prevent delivery was somewhat of a postcode lottery. In part, when explored, this was often mapped out to those areas that are funded and those that are not, but the Programme also found disparities between funded areas themselves.

Participants also noted that they felt that effective delivery was not being replicated and that in too many instances Prevent looked very different from borough to borough.

“You basically have 33 authorities in London delivering Prevent differently.”

*Local authority officer  
CVE team engagement*

Participants recognised that whilst differences between boroughs would upon occasion require different delivery priorities, that too often delivery in London appeared to represent a patchwork quilt.

47. The Sunday Times, 2017, Most programmes to stop radicalisation are failing

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/most-programmes-to-stop-radicalisation-are-failing-0bwh9pbtd>

Many participants noted that as Prevent delivery has existed for some time there should be a closer uniformity of delivery and a broader replication of good practice.

"I thought the whole point of delivering an array of projects over many years was to evaluate the most effective and replicate this."

*Academic  
CVE team engagement*

Central Government stakeholders told the Programme that they are deploying a peer review initiative which they hope will create broader uniformity and increased good practice delivery within local authorities. This was welcomed but more must be done to ensure that delivery that is effective is shared and replicated in London.

"Peer reviews have been delivered successfully throughout the country and benefit not just the authority being reviewed but also the peers who will always learn from the experience.

All London authorities would benefit from this process to ensure we are sharing best practice."

***Councillor Clare Coghill***  
*Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
and Specialist Adviser to  
the CVE Programme*

Furthermore, in identifying potential gaps and barriers to existing countering radicalisation delivery in London and working in partnership to amplify good practice, City Hall must be included in this work and feedback on findings should be presented at the London CONTEST board.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should present London peer review findings at the London CONTEST board and present a plan for all London authorities to have completed a recent peer review.

Some local authority officers representing boroughs who are not funded to deliver Prevent work, spoke to the Programme about a difficulty in maintaining high quality delivery with no funding. Some echoed earlier sentiments in this report that extremists do not recognise the invisible barriers that separate local authority areas and strongly advocated the need for support.

"Our ability to deliver on our statutory Prevent functions is a stretch when we receive no funding from the Home Office, particularly as we neighbour boroughs that do receive funding and ascertain that our risk is therefore reasonably high."

*Local authority officer  
CVE team engagement*

In a recent interview with the Local Government Chronicle,<sup>48</sup> Martin Esom, Chief Executive of Waltham Forest Council and previous Chair of the London Prevent Board said that the current funding model for local authority Prevent delivery does not account for the broader nature of the potential threat.

“I have always talked about the problem of having priority and non-priority boroughs in London based on some formula... [which means] certain local authorities get money and they don't give other local authorities money...How can one borough be risky and the next borough not considering the dynamic flow in London?”

The Programme was told about existing sub-regional delivery models in East London where local authorities could use resourcing more efficiently, sharing officers, services and projects which ordinarily might not be warranted to support one single borough only. Participants felt that an enhanced sub-regional delivery model in London was worthy of consideration.

48. Local Government Chronicle, 2019, Martin Esom: Changes to Prevent were not well executed <https://www.lgcplus.com/services/community-cohesion/martin-esom-changes-to-prevent-were-not-well-executed/7028435.article>

49. Local Government Chronicle, 2018, Idea Exchange: How East London boroughs have joined forces against terrorism <https://www.lgcplus.com/idea-exchange/idea-exchange-how-east-london-boroughs-joined-to-tackle-terrorism/7023067.article>

## Case Study: East London Cluster

In East London, Barking & Dagenham, Hackney, Havering, Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest local authorities have collaborated to amplify and strengthen existing borough-based work. The new approach will add to and complement the support already provided by harnessing the benefits of broader-scale intervention. By bringing together seven boroughs the East London Cluster can better harness the expertise of staff as well as bring together partnerships that frequently don't fit the boundaries of a single local authority. This collaboration has devised a pilot programme in partnership with the Home Office to improve sharing of intelligence, resources and best practice.<sup>49</sup>

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government should ensure that every borough in London receives some funding to deliver countering violent extremism activity.

The Government should continue to evaluate the success of the East London Cluster work and consider the benefits of further sub-regional delivery in London. A report on the success of this initiative should be presented to the London CONTEST Board.

Many participants spoke to the Programme about a lack of pan-London programme delivery. Much countering violent extremism project activity funded by central government is delivered through local authorities who develop their own project portfolios based on local risk. This allows for programmes which reflect hyper-local risk. However, this doesn't necessarily react to cross-border or pan-London challenges.

Participants stated that as some risks can be London-wide, programmes which can span local authority areas should be delivered. Many considered City Hall as well placed to fulfil this role.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should provide additional funding for the commissioning of pan-London countering violent extremism work through City Hall.

The Programme also found that it is now difficult to speak about the Prevent strategy as one single entity as it now does so many things. Prevent delivers community strengthening programmes, individual specific safeguarding work, disruption of extremist activity work, increased sharing of information between local authorities, the police and security services and now de-radicalisation of extremists through the Desistance and Disengagement programme.<sup>50</sup> It is important to differentiate this work as someone might disagree with one element but support another.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should clearly set out the different elements of Prevent delivery, potentially categorising these components if necessary and helpful.

Many participants also regularly conflated Prevent with wider Counter Terrorism activity, often citing armed police arrests as being associated to Prevent strategy delivery. Participants agreed that as these things are clearly outside the remit and legal powers of Prevent, it would be sensible to clearly lay out what the strategy does and does not do.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should ensure that the limitations and scope of Prevent activity is clearly set out reinforcing what does and does not happen as part of the safeguarding process and what activities are and are not part of Prevent delivery. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.

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50. Home Office and The Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2018, *Securing the future: counter-terrorism strategy published*, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/securing-the-future-counter-terrorism-strategy-published>

Some participants spoke about how the introduction of the Prevent Duty was perceived to have stifled debate and discussion on complex issues rather than create platforms for this. Others told the Programme that those critical of existing delivery including Prevent, were often too scared to raise their concerns for fear of being labelled extremist.

“Experience also suggests that whilst young people have concerns about existing counter-extremism delivery (most notably Prevent) they are reluctant to voice these for fear of being falsely identified as extremists.”

*Faiths Forum for London –  
Community led engagement.*

Many commented on their perception that Prevent has stifled debate and discussion, particularly in education settings. The Programme was told by Prevent practitioners that if this had happened then it was an unintended consequence of the Duty which clearly sets out in its guidance that the duty “is not intended to stop pupils debating controversial issues and on the contrary, schools should provide a safe space in which children, young people and staff can understand the risks associated with terrorism and develop the knowledge and skills to be able to challenge extremist arguments.”<sup>51</sup>

Whilst all agreed that it was necessary to create barriers to the promotion of violent extremism or hateful sentiment in education establishments including higher education, the unnecessary stifling of legitimate discussion and debate was a theme that was raised several times. Participants were keen that more is done to ensure that legitimate debate and discussion is not suppressed.

In some areas the Programme found that the Prevent Duty had encouraged debate and in others found strongly held perceptions that it had appeared to stifle it. It is therefore vital to learn from what is working in London and replicate good practice. This will require clear improvement in the way the strategic objectives of Prevent are communicated to educational institutions.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should do more to ensure that debate and discussion is not being unnecessarily stifled in educational institutions, including higher education.

The Programme welcomed the recent announcement of an independent review of Prevent.<sup>52</sup> It is clear from the engagement of this Programme that a review is badly needed.

51. Department for Education, 2015, Protecting children from radicalisation: the prevent duty <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/protecting-children-from-radicalisation-the-prevent-duty>

52. Home Office, 2019, Government announces independent review of Prevent, <https://homeofficemedia.blog.gov.uk/2019/01/22/government-announces-independent-review-of-prevent/>

"The independent review of Prevent is a good opportunity for all concerns raised by public and partners to be addressed."

*Policy Institute workshop  
CVE engagement*

The Programme recognises the efforts that Prevent has made in recent years to be more transparent and boost grassroots community engagement, but as many participants of the Programme stated, what is needed is a strategy that encourages more communities to report concerns to the police and local authorities and whilst mistrust exists in some corners, Prevent will never be as effective as it could be. Participants spoke of the recruitment of a credible individual to lead the review as key whilst also commenting that against the backdrop of increased violent extremist activity, urgent improvements simply could not and should not wait for a lengthy review process.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Government should ensure that the independent review of Prevent is fully transparent, wide reaching and led by someone who commands trust and respect across London's diverse communities.

The Independent Review must consider the important findings of this report.

## Community participation

Some participants told the programme that they had adopted a position of total disengagement with Prevent delivery and practitioners, refusing to participate in programme delivery or engage with stakeholders. Whilst many participants recognised the right to express legitimate concerns over previous and current delivery, others set out that total disengagement was often unhelpful as this meant that concerns were not raised and opportunities for improved delivery missed.

"I was told by trustees that I can't interact with Prevent or attend the local advisory group. This is a shame because although I am against Prevent, I would like to challenge them and hear what they have to say."

*Community project lead  
CVE team engagement*

Participants felt that those who have legitimate concerns with the Prevent strategy should engage with local stakeholders to suggest improvements around local delivery rather than simply disengage completely.



## Community responsibility

Participants agreed that whilst family and friends or other community members are not always best placed to spot the indicators that someone might be being manipulated or exploited towards extremism, they are often uniquely placed to notice warning signs.

Participants agreed that it was the responsibility of all in society to work with the authorities to safeguard vulnerable individuals from radicalisation and support the authorities in reducing the risk to society of violent extremism. There was also agreement that it is the role of the authorities to make this as easy as possible but also to ensure that strategies are sensible, proportionate and not stigmatising of entire ethnic religious or cultural groups.

Participants recognised that referring a friend or family member to the authorities was always going to be an incredibly hard thing to do. Nonetheless, the Programme heard many examples of heart-breaking missed opportunities where warning signs were present, and the authorities not engaged.

"I knew that something was wrong, and my son was getting involved in extremism. I asked an elder in my community if I should tell the police and they advised me not to as it would get my son in trouble. Soon after, my son secretly travelled to Syria where he was killed."

*Mother – CVE engagement*

Participants told the Programme that mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters can be uniquely placed to identify the signs that someone might be being manipulated and exploited towards extremism. Therefore, it is important for families to be given awareness of what the indicators of concern might be, how help can be sought and what that help and support does and does not consist of.

## Case Study: Web Guardians

JAN Trust's long standing Web Guardians programme supports women and mothers to prevent and tackle online and offline extremism.

Mothers are upskilled in digital literacy and empowered to understand the dangers extremism poses online.

They are equipped with the tools, skills and education to protect their children and their communities. Web Guardians is a holistic programme which builds resilience to extremism in hard to reach communities.<sup>52a</sup>

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should increase community radicalisation awareness raising work with a particular focus on families, where possible in collaboration with schools in order to reach parents.

### The importance of neighbourhood policing and schools officers

Throughout the Programme, participants spoke of the importance of face to face contact with the authorities in terms of building the trust and rapport needed to have the confidence to develop better relationships.

Something that was mentioned regularly to the Programme was the reduction in designated neighbourhood police officers which participants commented had resulted in a lack of interaction between the police and grass roots communities. This interaction was noted by many as being of paramount importance in building the trust in the authorities needed to raise concerns.

The Mayor has successfully delivered on his promise to put the capital's communities at the heart of his policing strategy, with at least two dedicated PCs and a dedicated Police Community Support Officer now in place in every London neighbourhood.

<sup>52a</sup>. Jan Trust, 2019, Web Guardians, <https://jantrust.org/>

The Mayor's plan for additional dedicated ward officers, who both know and are known by the community, was his first step in helping re-establish real neighbourhood policing after he took office in summer 2016. 529 new dedicated ward officers have been appointed and are now helping to police London neighbourhoods, with additional dedicated officers on patrol in some areas according to local need. The Mayor believes these local officers are the eyes and ears of our police and security services and have a crucial role in keeping our city safe.

Participants also stated that police engagement with schools is also hugely important and the Mayor is working to increase Safer Schools Officer numbers.

However, the Metropolitan Police Service continues to face unprecedented pressures, dealing with rising and more complex crime in the face of funding cuts by the Government. Participants of the Programme agreed that policing cuts should be reversed, and more police resources returned to the streets, interacting with communities.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should reverse policing cuts which have resulted in fewer frontline officers, including neighbourhood and schools officers.

### Training frontline police officers

Whilst cuts to policing have caused a reduction in police numbers, participants recognised that the police still have many officers working in frontline roles. These officers are well placed to identify signs of concern and refer into colleagues for safeguarding consideration. Some participants told the Programme that radicalisation training for frontline officers could be enhanced.

Participants recognised the enormous and ever-increasing remit of the police and accepted the competing demands for training opportunities across multiple policing and safeguarding areas. However, many felt that the issue of radicalisation was worthy of increased consideration around training provision.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should ensure that sufficient training on spotting the indicators of vulnerability to extremism is delivered to all frontline officers.

## Employers and a duty of care to safeguard their staff

Participants noted that all employers should have a role to play in safeguarding their staff from all harms including radicalisation. The Programme heard examples of good collaboration between the police and employers in responding to suspicious or hostile activity in relation to terrorism but not safeguarding from radicalisation.

Participants noted that having employer's awareness raised around extremism issues would allow them to play a more prominent role in safeguarding employees from radicalisation. Participants also felt that some people would be willing to tell an employer or a colleague about a safeguarding concern and in these instances employers should know how to contact the authorities or where to get help and support from.

17% of Londoners would tell their employer or a colleague if they thought that a person might be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation to extremism or terrorism.

*Commissioned research*

### RECOMMENDATION

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should support employers in keeping their employees safe from manipulation and exploitation towards extremism by providing advice and training.

## Hate crime perpetration and links to extremism

Participants agreed that the relationship between hate crime perpetrations and extremist ideologies was an important but complex area.

Many spoke of a recognition that not all hate crimes could be directly linked to the promotion of current extremist ideologies. However, there were some manifestations of hate crime which might give clear warning that an individual could have been influenced by an extremist ideology. In these instances, it would be sensible to consider if the perpetrator might need an intervention to divert them away from extremism.

In respect to instances where the links to an extremist ideology appear strong, participants stated that there should be consideration to referring that individual to the Channel programme.<sup>53</sup>

Police colleagues told the Programme that the Metropolitan Police Service's central hate crime team reviews daily every hate crime flagged and works closely with counter-terrorism officers to share intelligence of any form of extremism.

53. Home Office, 2017, *The Channel Programme* <https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/the-channel-programme>

"There has been an increased correlation between incidents of terrorism and hate crimes. There is great potential to consider the rise of hate crime as a proxy measure of extremism. Identifying and geo-locating incidents of hate and extremist motivated discrimination both online and offline and correlating this with a broad range of global and local trends can provide communities and city hall with critical datasets and insights that can be utilised for prevention purposes. These forms of data and evidence-based approaches are critical to improving the effectiveness and cost efficiency of responses."

**Sasha Havlicek** *CEO Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

### **The crime and gangs / radicalisation nexus**

Many participants of the Programme spoke of the potential links between criminality and radicalisation. Certainly, several terrorism offenders have had previous links to criminality and it is of little surprise that violent extremist organisations seek to win support from those already willing to perpetrate violence or raise funds illegitimately.

Many spoke of the similarities in the way both extremists and criminal gangs look to exploit and manipulate people into harmful activities. Participants also set out that whilst it is crucial that all in society seek to support the withdrawal of individuals from criminal gang networks, there should be greater awareness to the vulnerability that exiting a gang can create in terms of potential exposure to further exploitation into extremism. This included the loss of a (clearly negative) friends' network, the potential of diminishing economic (primarily employment) opportunities as well as the possibility of being shunned by one's community.

"A person from this community who has come out of prison would be shunned by the community. One of the ways to redeem themselves might be to become more religious but extremists are looking to potentially exploit this and take advantage of their isolation and lack of religious knowledge."

*Anti-Tribalism Movement  
Community led engagement*

### Case study: Building Resilience and Awareness to Violent Extremism (BRAVE) workshops<sup>54</sup>

The Programme attended a BRAVE workshop at a further education college in North London. This session was delivered in a partnership between Connect Futures and the St Giles Trust. BRAVE seeks to communicate several key messages identifying the similarities between gang involvement, extremism and radicalisation. It helps young people gain greater awareness of the realities and issues surrounding gang involvement, drugs, violence, extremism and radicalisation, and learn about strategies to help avoid the risk of becoming involved in these activities. The session looks at how and why the perpetrators recruit young people, and what they can do to stay safe. Young people leave the sessions understanding the exploitative recruitment processes used by gangs/violent extremists and the catastrophic dangers involved with joining gangs/ violent extremist groups. Most importantly, though, they walk away with real tools to avoid recruitment and exploitation.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government must ensure close collaboration between probation, rehabilitation services, ending youth violence work and radicalisation safeguarding strategies.

54. St Giles Trust and Connect Futures, 2018, Building Resilience Against Violence and Extremism (BRAVE), <https://www.connectfutures.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/NO-COST-BRAVE-training-for-young-people-.pdf>

55. The Independent, 2018, Westminster attack inquest: Khalid Masood's mother 'feared he would kill' because of extreme violence and crime <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/westminster-attack-khalid-masood-mother-terrorism-extreme-violence-crime-a8545436.html>

56. BBC News, 2017, Manchester attack: 22 dead and 59 hurt in suicide bombing <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-manchester-40010124>

## Misogyny, violence against women and girls, and participation in extremism

The Programme engaged stakeholders across Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) work strands and participants spoke about the overlap between misogynistic tendencies, including violence, and participation in extremism.

Evidence was presented to the Programme of multiple instances of terrorist perpetrators having alleged histories of misogynistic tendencies including examples of violence. This included, but was not limited to, the perpetrator of the Westminster Bridge attack who was noted by police as having a history of being a domestic abuser<sup>55</sup> and the suicide bomber at the Manchester Arena<sup>56</sup> who killed 22 and injured many more, having been noted as once punching a woman for wearing a short skirt.<sup>57</sup> Joan Smith, co-chair of the Mayor's VAWG board commented after allegations of one of the perpetrators of the London Bridge attack having abused his wife, that "He has thus become the latest addition to a list of men whose extreme acts of violence towards strangers were preceded by attacks on women in a less public sphere".<sup>58</sup>

Nazir Afzal OBE, former Chief Crown Prosecutor has said that "the first victim of a terrorist is the woman in his home."<sup>59</sup> Other participants spoke of "toxic masculinity" which had potentially enticed males to join DAESH in Syria and Iraq who were permitting, amongst other vile human rights abuses, the rape and sexual enslavement of female captives.<sup>60</sup>

Whilst safeguarding practitioners universally agreed that misogyny, including violence, could not be used as a foolproof pre-cursor to radicalisation, they did agree that this could be a potential warning sign, particularly if accompanied by other indicators. Moreover, they warned of the dangers of exposure of young men to misogynistic attitudes and violence against women and girls, citing this as a potential red flag for possible later radicalisation and criminality. Others spoke of domestic violence and dysfunctional families regularly showing up in Channel Panel cases.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should commission research into the overlap between misogyny, including violence against women and girls, and vulnerability to and participation in extremism.

57. The Guardian, 2017, How Manchester bomber Salman Abedi was radicalised by his links in Libya <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/may/28/salman-abedi-manchester-arena-bomber-radicalisation>

58. The Guardian, 2017, The seeds of terrorism are often sown in the home – with domestic violence <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/10/seeds-terrorism-sown-home-domestic-violence-islamic-state>

59. The Sunday Times, 2017, We need a police force that is fit for purpose <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/we-need-a-police-force-that-is-fit-for-purpose-3zpr26vrb>

60. The Guardian, 2018, I was an Isis sex slave. I tell my story because it is the best weapon I have <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/oct/06/nadia-murad-isis-sex-slave-nobel-peace-prize>

## Mental ill-health and radicalisation

The Programme worked extensively with organisations invested in mental health provision including NHS England, Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG's), NHS Trusts, Foundation Trusts and the Prevent Liaison and Diversion Hubs. Participants agreed that mental ill-health - alongside other issues sometimes wrongly associated with mental ill-health such as autism and learning difficulties - are potential vulnerabilities which extremists might seek to exploit.

However, mental health practitioners told the Programme that there is a real risk that in overplaying potential links between mental ill-health and radicalisation, society runs the risk of becoming too simplistic in our approach to countering radicalisation. Moreover, it risks further stigmatising an already deeply stigmatised issue.

Practitioners told the Programme that there is limited evidential research which supports claims that those who are suffering mental ill-health are more likely to be radicalised, or that those who are being radicalised have undiagnosed mental ill-health.

Mental health charity Mind state that 1 in 4 people in the UK experience a mental health issue each year,<sup>61</sup> so it would be no surprise to find mental ill-health represented similarly highly across any sub group in society.

Moreover, as many participants consider grooming to be part of the radicalisation process and groomers seek vulnerabilities in people to exploit, again it would seem natural for groomers to look to take advantage of those suffering mental ill-health. However, participants broadly agreed that more research is needed before sweeping links can be made in terms of the connectivity between mental health and radicalisation.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should commission more research into exploring any relationship between radicalisation and mental-ill health.

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61. Mind, 2013, mental health facts and statistics, <https://www.mind.org.uk/information-support/types-of-mental-health-problems/statistics-and-facts-about-mental-health/how-common-are-mental-health-problems/#.Xle6tyL7QXE>



## How to contact the police if you are worried that someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation or being radicalised

If you have concerns that someone is vulnerable to or being radicalised then you can report any suspicious behaviour and activity online to the police in confidence at [gov.uk/ACT](https://www.gov.uk/ACT) or call **101**. In an emergency you should always call **999**.

The website *Let's Talk About It* <https://www.ltai.info/> hosts helpful information about how and where communities can seek support when they are worried that individuals might be being radicalised.

The website covers potential signs of radicalisation, information about the referral process and Channel as well as other organisations and resources that can help.

## 8. STOPPING THE SPREAD OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGIES



## Key findings

- Many Londoners experienced or witnessed extremist or terrorist sentiment over the last 12 months.
- The internet is a key tool used by extremists to promote their vile ideologies.
- Illegal violent extremist content is continually posted online.
- Intolerant, hateful but potentially legal content is regularly posted online without moderation or removal.
- Extremists also repeatedly use the internet to fundraise.
- The vast majority of Londoners do not know how to refer potentially illegal and hateful content for consideration to removal.
- Proscription is a positive tool and the recent banning of National Action and Hizballah was welcomed.
- However, proscription is not a universal solution to stopping extremist activity with some proscribed groups noted as still being active (often under new names).
- Many Londoners are concerned about perceived governance gaps across 'out of school' settings including home-schooling arrangements which could be exploited by extremists and other harmful influencers.
- Radicalisation in prisons remains a key concern for many.
- Some media outlets are extending the reach of extremists by publishing extremist material.


## Overarching ambition

- Reduce the ability for those who wish to promote violence, hate and intolerance across the internet.
- Raise awareness amongst the public on how to refer illegal or hateful online material for consideration for removal by the police or tech companies.

## A role for everyone

Participants agreed that more needs to be done to root out and stop those who are spreading vile ideologies and promoting terror. Again, participants saw this as the responsibility of all in society, expressing that everyone has a role to play in working together to contest the space within which extremists seek to operate.

**Figure 1: Who is responsible for preventing the spread of extremism, hate and terrorism in London?** *Commissioned research*



“Only by working together, united by a common goal, can we safeguard vulnerable communities and stop the spread of extremist ideologies.”

**Nigel Bromage**

*Founder Small Steps and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

## High prevalence of expressions of extremist and terrorist sentiment

The Programme found evidence of high levels of Londoners experiencing or witnessing extremist or terrorist sentiment within society.

25% of Londoners experienced or witnessed views promoting, endorsing or supporting extremism over the last 12 months.

17% of Londoners experienced or witnessed views promoting, endorsing or supporting acts of terrorism over the last 12 months.

*Commissioned research*

## Extremists using the internet to promote their vile ideologies

Whilst participants spoke to the Programme about physical examples of radicalisation, many noted the internet as the key tool in which extremists promote their vile ideologies.

Participants spoke of the ability for extremists to use the internet to radicalise individuals without needing to meet them. This included examples of influential groomers using the internet to manipulate and exploit vulnerable people towards extremism but also instances where extremist material created opportunities for self-radicalisation.

"You don't have to directly tell anyone to go and commit violence, but you can inspire by inflammatory propaganda. It's not about a street presence any more: the real focus is on the internet – social media and other forums."

**Nigel Bromage**

*Founder Small Steps and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Many spoke to the Programme about the danger of individuals becoming rapidly emerged in echo chambers which support only one view. In these people can quickly find themselves surrounded by others who hold similarly warped opinions and where there is little critical challenge or opposing view.

"It seems to me that groups of people can become trapped in a 'bubble' of self-reinforcing messages online."

*CVE Consultation*

## Stronger regulation of the internet

There was a strong consensus that more needs to be done by the Government and tech companies to ensure that online platforms are not used to promote violent extremism or advice useful to terrorists.

While many participants thought that the Government should consider stronger regulation of the internet around violent extremist content, others regularly couched this with concerns that this should not unduly undermine important freedoms.

In April 2019, the Government set out its intention to deliver a new statutory duty of care. This will legally oblige tech firms to protect their users by compelling them to take reasonable and proportionate steps to stop and prevent harmful material, which will include but will not be limited to terrorist content.

The Home Secretary, Sajid Javid set out that under this duty, tech companies will be expected to take active steps to stop users accessing vile material such as terrorist content. This new duty will be enforced by an independent regulator which will be backed up with a suite of tough enforcement powers.<sup>62</sup>

The Programme welcomes the Government's Online Harms White Paper and consideration to delivering important regulation and accountability to the tech sector. Many participants see this as a reasonable duty of care to their users and to society.

Participants accepted that sadly there seemed to be an almost endless supply of illegal violent extremist material being posted to the internet, and that efforts to remove this material quickly and effectively needed to dramatically improve.

"Removing online terrorist content is like whack-a-mole, for every piece removed, new content pops up."

*CVE practitioner  
CVE team engagement*

Participants stated that tech companies have a huge role to play here and recognised that some progress is being made. Facebook was noted as removing 1.5million copies of the Christchurch attack videos within the first 24 hours of the aftermath of the attack alone.<sup>63</sup>

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62. Home Office and The Rt Hon Sajid Javid, 2019, Home Secretary launches online harms White Paper <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-launches-online-harms-white-paper>

63The Guardian, 2019, Facebook removed 1.5m videos of New Zealand terror attack in first 24 hours <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/17/facebook-removed-15m-videos-new-zealand-terror-attack>

However, participants made it clear that the speed in which material is removed is vital as within only a few minutes of being posted, tech companies can lose the ability to control that data thanks to downloads and screengrabs.

“If tech companies can use algorithms to identify my shopping trends then they must be able to do more to remove terrorist content online.”

*Community member  
CVE team engagement*

### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government must do more to ensure that tech companies are not allowing illegal violent extremist material or advice useful to terrorists on their online platforms.

## The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit

Some participants spoke of the important work being delivered by the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU).

The Programme found that there was a strong willingness for Londoners to refer potentially illegal content to the authorities but that too many people were unaware of the work of the CTIRU and did not know how to refer content.

38% of Londoners would contact the police if they encountered online materials promoting, supporting or glorifying terrorism.

Only 15% of Londoners would know how to get online extremist material taken down.

*Commissioned research*

### RECOMMENDATION

The National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should amplify the good work of the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) by delivering a campaign which signposts members of the public on where to report potentially illegal extremist content.

64. National Police Chief Council, 2018, Counter Terrorism Policing urging public to ACT against online extremism <https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/counter-terrorism-police-urge-public-to-act-against-online-extremism>

## Case Study: Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU)

The CTIRU is the specialist police unit, hosted within the Metropolitan Police Service's Counter Terrorism Command, which deals with online terrorist material. It was created in 2010 and up to April 2018 had secured the removal of over 300,000 pieces of terrorist material and provided key evidence and information in over 200 counter terrorism investigations.

In previous years the CTIRU has been focused on getting terrorist content removed from the internet. But as their work and relationship with internet providers has developed to a point where more and more of the material is being removed automatically by the content providers themselves, the unit has been able to shift focus towards investigations.<sup>64</sup>



## Hateful and intolerant content

Participants recognised the great benefits tech companies and the internet have provided but also were clear of the challenges these brought in relation to harmful activity which included hateful and intolerant content which although did not cross the criminal threshold, did still deliver harm to society.

Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu stated in a recent open letter that "Society needs to look carefully at itself. We cannot simply hide behind the mantra of freedom of speech. That freedom is not an absolute right, it is not the freedom to cause harm – that is why our hate speech legislation exists."<sup>65</sup>

The importance of freedom of speech was continuously raised but always with the recognition that unlimited freedom of speech is not an absolute right.

Many participants told the Programme that more should be done by tech companies to ensure that discourse should be within the same standards of social norms that would be expected in physical interactions.

"The Internet now allows people to write and state things they would never dream to say in person. We need to stop and think about how society can better educate and show that words online are equal or worse to words said in person. The "safety" of hiding behind a keyboard needs to be addressed through campaigns and marketing."

*CVE consultation*

There was recognition that tech companies have delivered positive steps forward in this respect. Participants referenced the removal of Britain First's Facebook page in 2018 for violation of its community standards policy<sup>66</sup> and the recent decision of Facebook and Instagram to follow Twitter's lead and ban Stephen Yaxley Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) from their platforms due to violations against its rules that ban public calls for violence against people based on protected characteristics, rules that ban supporting or appearing with organised hate groups, and policies that prevent people from using the site to bully others.<sup>67</sup>

65. Counter Terrorism Policing, 2019, Open Letter from Neil Basu to deny terrorists a voice

<https://www.counterterrorism.police.uk/acso-neil-basu-issues-open-letter-about-reporting-of-terrorism/>

66. BBC News, 2018, Facebook bans Britain First pages, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-43398417>

67. <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/feb/26/tommy-robinson-banned-from-facebook-and-instagram>

However, challenges still clearly remain. Ex-MPS Police Assistant Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley criticised the use of algorithms by internet search engines saying it is a disgrace a jailed radical preacher ranks top for search term "British Muslim spokesman". Sir Mark said: "These algorithms are designed to push us towards contentious material because that feeds their bottom line of advertising revenues, by pushing readers to extremist material. Sir Mark said the scale and pace of all social-media firms' attempts to deal with the problem were "completely insufficient".<sup>68</sup>

The Home Affairs Select Committee grilled executives from YouTube, Twitter and Facebook in April 2019 over the amount of hate speech on their platforms. Yvette Cooper, who chairs the committee, was particularly angry at the amount of right-wing extremist content recommended to her on YouTube, questioning why the algorithms did that and whether they could be changed.<sup>69</sup>

Participants felt the majority of online platforms have community standards policies, service user agreements or equality and diversity policies which could be used effectively to block hateful and intolerant content. However, participants were not confident that many online platforms effectively moderated content and usage, based on these policies.

It was also recognised that some platforms have either been created, or adapted to facilitate, hateful and intolerant (but often legal) content and this is an area where those platforms in question will likely be unwilling to moderate this.

Participants also regularly raised the prevalence of extremists using online platforms and tech companies to fundraise. Again, good practice was recognised with the decision by PayPal to disallow Stephen Yaxley Lennon use of their service to collect funds due to failure to adhere to user guidelines<sup>70</sup>. However, participants set out other instances where those who promote division, hate and intolerance continuously use online collections.

A new report by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) has shone a spotlight on the critical role fundraising plays for extremists to spread their hateful messages. Author Tom Keatinge said that the extreme right-wing was openly benefiting from crowdfunding and "deep-pocketed donors across the ocean". The report states that "Finance plays an important role in enhancing the promotional activity of extreme right-wing groups, from creating propaganda to organising marches and events to maintaining websites supporting and promoting extremist literature and exchanges of ideas."<sup>71</sup>

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68. The Guardian, 2019, Tommy Robinson banned from Facebook and Instagram

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-48068912>

69. BBC News, 2019, 'Extremist' Google algorithms concern ex-police chief

<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-48068912>

Many participants felt that more diligence was needed to disrupt this activity particularly when significant income streams can be generated.

### RECOMMENDATION

Tech companies should do more to ensure that their platforms and tools are not used to promote hate and intolerance or fundraise for extremists.

### Encouraging the public to report content to tech companies

40% of Londoners would contact the internet service provider (YouTube, Facebook, Twitter etc...) if they encountered online extremism material.

Only 15% of Londoners would know how to get online extremist material taken down.

*Commissioned research*

The Programme found that many Londoners would be willing to contact tech companies if they encountered extremist material online. However, many participants simply did not know how to do this.

Participants thought that there should be heavy promotion of the way to flag hateful, intolerant and potentially extremist material to tech companies on their platforms for consideration to removal based on inappropriate content or breach of service user agreements. Participants thought that it was not always clear how to do this and others complained that flagged material had resulted in no response.

### RECOMMENDATION

Tech companies should better promote the ways in which people can flag hateful and intolerant content on their platforms, including that which is potentially legal but outside of the terms and conditions of their user agreements.

70. BBC News, 2018, PayPal stops handling payments for Tommy Robinson, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-46139193>

71. The Independent, 2019, How crowdfunding helps far-right extremism spread round the world, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/far-right-extremism-crowdfunding-tommy-robinson-a8937311.html>

## Tech companies referring individuals to the authorities

Participants also thought that tech companies should make referrals to the authorities of those who are being removed from their platforms due to extremism related concerns such as the uploading of extremist content. This would allow the authorities to consider prosecution but also safeguarding opportunities.

“When someone is banned from social media for promoting or supporting violence, that platform should be duty bound to inform the police.”

*Think tank – CVE team engagement*

At a Home Affairs Select Committee in April 2019 MPs asked the three social media firms, Twitter, Facebook and Google, how they responded when they found users who were sharing propaganda. All three said they would give information on users to police only if there was “an imminent threat of risk to life”. Ex-MPS Police Assistant Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley told the media that the firms needed to do more to pass on any information they had about terrorist material being shared on their platforms.<sup>72</sup>

### RECOMMENDATION

Tech companies should consider how to refer details of those banned from their platforms to the police.

## Re-direction to counter narrative

Participants spoke of the importance of tech companies supporting countering extremism efforts by re-directing users to counter narrative but set out that more needs to be done.

Examples given to the Programme included initiatives which re-direct (through ‘up-surfacing’ of search findings) users searching problematic topics to counter narrative which busts the propaganda of extremists. A particular example given to the Programme was around those searching for the term “Holocaust denial” which instead of being directed to often anti-Semitic sites, would be re-directed to counter narrative sites which rebut extremist propaganda.

Participants felt that more should be done by Government to work with tech companies to ensure searches for problematic terms relating to hate, intolerance and particularly violent extremism, would be re-directed to counter narrative content.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should work with tech companies to ensure that problematic searches result in re-directs to counter narrative.

72. BBC News, 2019, ‘Extremist’ Google algorithms concern ex-police chief <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-48068912>

## Proscription of violent extremist groups and their supporters

The Programme heard much support for the banning of groups who are avowedly violent or groups that support or endorse violent activity.

Participants noted that previously there had been concern that no right-wing violent extremist groups had been proscribed but welcomed the decision by the Government to ban the avowedly neo-Nazi white supremacist group National Action in December 2016 after an assessment that it was 'concerned in terrorism'.<sup>73</sup>

Many participants also welcomed the police pursuing a number of charges relating to alleged membership of National Action<sup>74</sup> and there was strong support across London for tougher laws to tackle terrorists.

Participants also welcomed the banning of Hizballah in February 2019<sup>75</sup> after long-standing calls from the Mayor for the entire organisation to be banned as the political wing of the organisation could no longer be separated from the military wing (which had previously been proscribed).

"National Action needed banning, the extreme right wing needed a line drawing in the sand, to show them that embracing violent Nazism is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. While proscription means organisations reorganise, rebrand and reduce in size, they still continue. The answer is to continue the pressure."

*Nigel Bromage Founder Small Steps and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

However, participants told the Programme that proscription is not a universal solution to stopping the activity of groups who endorse violent extremism. Many cited the example of the extremist group al-Muhajiroun who were banned by the Government in 2006 but who have constantly tried to evade the law by re-emerging under new names including Islam4UK and Muslims Against Crusades.<sup>76</sup> Stakeholders and community members spoke with the Programme about concerns that this group would re-emerge once again, particularly considering the leader of the organisation has recently been released from prison.<sup>77</sup>

73. Home Office and Rt Hon Amber Rudd MP, 2016, National Action become first extreme right-wing group to be banned in UK <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/national-action-becomes-first-extreme-right-wing-group-to-be-banned-in-uk>

74. ITV News, 2018, National Action Leader Christopher Lythgoe jailed for eight years, <https://www.itv.com/news/2018-07-18/national-action-leader-christopher-lythgoe-jailed-for-eight-years/>

75. Home Office and Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2019, Hizballah to be banned alongside other terrorist organisations, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/hizballah-to-be-banned-alongside-other-terrorist-organisations>

76. The Independent, 2019, UK's 'most dangerous extremist group' regenerating after terrorist prisoners released, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/terror-islamists-uk-anjem-choudary-al-muhajiroun-prison-release-a8781826.html>

77. BBC News, 2018, Anjem Choudhary: Radical preacher released from prison, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45911160>

The leader of National Action is also alleged to have said in the aftermath of the proscription of that group that the membership would simply have to “just shed one skin for another”<sup>78</sup> and the authorities have now further proscribed its aliases Scottish Dawn and the Anti-Socialist Anti-Capitalist Action group.<sup>79</sup>

Local authority elected members, officers and community leaders spoke to the Programme about the importance of being kept informed by the authorities on the latest attempts by proscribed groups to re-mobilise so that they can support the authorities in ensuring that these individuals and organisations are disrupted.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should provide regular updates to local authorities and community partners on the activity of proscribed group activists particularly the forming of new groups.

### **Desistance and disengagement**

Whilst many agreed that they would like to see tougher laws to stop people becoming terrorists, there was strong opinion that where there are those who have been convicted of terrorism or are known to hold extremist views, attempts should be made to deradicalise them.

The Government’s counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST was refreshed in June 2018 and pledged to expand a Desistance and Disengagement programme developed for individuals who have engaged in terrorism to disengage and reintegrate safely back into society. This can include people in prison, or recently released from prison for terrorist-related offences, as well as people who have returned from Syria or Iraq whom are suspected of supporting DAESH or other Al Qaeda inspired groups.<sup>80</sup>

There was broad support for this initiative although participants set out clearly that this would be a challenging undertaking, with some of the most hard-core extremists thought to be unlikely to easily succumb to ideological change.

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78. The Guardian, 2019, Man who plotted MP’s murder avoids retrial for National Action membership, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/apr/02/man-who-plotted-mps-avoids-retrial-for-national-action-membership>

79. Home Office and The Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2018, Home Secretary announces new counter-terrorism strategy, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-announces-new-counter-terrorism-strategy>

80. The Guardian, 2019, Number of people in jail for terrorism offences falls for first time since 2013, <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/mar/07/number-of-people-in-jail-britain-for-terror-offences-falls-for-first-time-since-2013>

Participants were also strongly minded that this work should be very clearly separated from the early-intervention safeguarding work that is delivered by Prevent. Many thought it would be unfair and potentially stigmatizing to put an individual potentially vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation towards extremism under the same spotlight as a terrorist offender. This would also be counterproductive to building better trust and rapport within communities.

“The difference between safeguarding someone from radicalisation and deradicalising an individual with acute violent extremist tendencies should be clearly separated to avoid stigmas and alienation.”

*Intervention provider  
CVE team engagement*

Participants also felt that because of the deeply difficult nature of the work, desistance and disengagement activity would likely cost much more than the more traditional diversionary safeguarding activity associated with Prevent. Participants were very clear that this work should be funded by a separate and additional budget to that of the existing resource for standard Prevent safeguarding work which should not see its resources reduced.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should ensure that the important work of the Desistance and Disengagement programme (DDP) continues, but, that it is clearly distinguished from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding work and funded with additional monies.

### **3,000 'subjects of interest' and 20,000 who have previously been investigated but may still pose a threat**

In June 2018, Home Secretary, Sajid Javid delivered a speech in which he set out that "our security and intelligence agencies are, right now, handling over 500 live operations, they have 3,000 'subjects of interest. And there are a further 20,000 people who have previously been investigated, so they may still pose a threat."<sup>81</sup>

These high numbers which have been widely reported by the media for some time were mentioned regularly by participants who set out that the authorities must do more to risk assess the 20,000 people who have been previously investigated.

In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017 Lord Anderson was asked to write a report to identify potential improvements. The importance of sharing intelligence better at a local level was set out strongly in the report. Several pilot Multi-Agency Centre projects are already running to improve information sharing between the security services and local multi-agency partners, including in London.<sup>82</sup> Lord Anderson's report states that "this approach to managing the risk in communities posed by individuals linked to violent extremism can succeed where a more active, intrusive investigation might not".

Participants recognised the need to deliver this important work and welcomed broader information sharing. However, many set out concerns that this work should be clearly distinct to future iterations of Prevent delivery. This was due to the methodological approach of receiving information from the security services deviating so clearly from well-established safeguarding procedures which aim to secure referrals from frontline practitioners and community members. Conflation of the two methodologies were thought to potentially cloud the long-standing claim by the authorities that Prevent is safeguarding and not spying.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Government should share the evaluation of the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilot with the London CONTEST board, ensuring that the voice and experience of local authorities are represented in decisions to continue this work and that it is clearly distinct from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding delivery.

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81. Home Office and The Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP, 2018, Home Secretary announces new counter-terrorism strategy, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/home-secretary-announces-new-counter-terrorism-strategy>

82. Home Office, 2017, Attacks in London and Manchester between March and June 2017,

<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/attacks-in-london-and-manchester-between-march-and-june-2017>



## Governance of out-of-school settings

Many participants spoke with the Programme about the case of an individual who was attempting to radicalise children in an after-school club in East London by role-playing terrorist attacks during classes. This led to discussions about the lack of regulation around out-of-school settings which was regarded as potentially causing increased vulnerability to multiple forms of harm and abuse, including radicalisation.

Out-of-school settings which are defined by the Department for Education as any institution which provides tuition, training, instruction, or activities to children in England without their parents' or carers' supervision that is not a: School, College, or 16-19 academy; or Provider caring for children under 8 years old which is registered with Ofsted or a childminder agency were noted by many participants to lack fit-for-purpose regulation and oversight.<sup>83</sup>

"The importance of having good safeguarding & governance in supplementary education is of paramount importance."

**Shaukat Warraich**

*CEO Faith Associates and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Whilst participants would often set out that most out-of-school settings were likely to be perfectly safe environments for children, they did highlight that a potential governance gap could be exploited by extremists.

"I worry about parents who hold extreme views that keep their children out of school to avoid interaction with others, exposure to different ideas and the safeguarding mindfulness of teachers."

*Teacher, CVE team engagement*

Children's Commissioner Anne Longfield recently said the number of children being educated outside of mainstream schools had "sky-rocketed", adding: "It is vitally important that we know that all children are safe and that they are receiving the education they deserve to help them to succeed in life."<sup>84</sup>

83. Out-of-school settings: voluntary safeguarding code of practice Government

[https://consult.education.gov.uk/regulatory-framework-unit/out-of-school-settings-voluntary-safeguarding-code/supporting\\_documents/Outofschool%20settingsvoluntary%20safeguarding%20code%20of%20practice.pdf](https://consult.education.gov.uk/regulatory-framework-unit/out-of-school-settings-voluntary-safeguarding-code/supporting_documents/Outofschool%20settingsvoluntary%20safeguarding%20code%20of%20practice.pdf)

84. Evening Standard, 2019, Home-school register will help keep vulnerable children safe, says DfE,

<https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/home-school-register-department-for-education-children-vanishing-a4106761.html>

The Government set out proposals in April 2019 which will track the status of children who aren't educated in schools.<sup>85</sup> The Programme welcomes the Government's recent decision to consult on delivering a compulsory register of home-schooled children which would include all those not attending a state or registered private school. However, many stakeholders told the Programme that this would have to be followed up with resources and powers for local authorities to effectively administer this.

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should support the delivery of any home-schooled register by adequately resourcing local authorities to administer this whilst also ensuring that local authorities have the requisite powers needed.

85. DfE plans compulsory register of home-schooled children

<https://schoolsweek.co.uk/dfе-plans-compulsory-register-of-home-schooled-children/>

86. The Guardian, 2017, 'Three musketeers' convicted of plotting terrorist attack,

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/aug/02/three-musketeers-convicted-of-plotting-terrorist-attack>

### Radicalisation in prisons

Although there was limited opportunity to explore this area in more detail, several participants did raise concerns about the prevalence of extremism and radicalisation in prisons. Some spoke to the Programme about prisoners with already extremist mindsets having their views hardened, sometimes into violent extremism. In 2017 four Midlands men found guilty of planning to use a pipe bomb and meat cleaver against police or military targets, were said to have hardened their views in prison.<sup>86</sup>

Others have talked about a broader spread of extremism including the radicalisation of prisoners who were not thought to hold extremist views when entering prison.

"In prison there are extremists preying on vulnerable prisoners spreading their ideology and I see little evidence of prison staff being supported to deal with this."

*Think tank, CVE team engagement*

### RECOMMENDATION

The Government should commission further research to understand the prevalence of extremism within prisons alongside evaluation of those measures currently deployed to stop extremist ideologies being promoted within prisons.

### **The importance of the use of language and balanced media reporting**

Many participants spoke to the Programme about the importance of the language used in relation to countering extremism work and most specifically in the way in which the media report news stories. There were complaints that violent attacks thought to be perpetrated by individuals from ethnic minority groups were quickly designated as potential terrorist incidents by the media but not when the perpetrators were white. Several complained about their view that media representation of Muslims is often overly negative and could be fuelling anti-Muslim sentiment and right-wing extremism.

“Participants, including non-Muslim participants, overwhelmingly felt that Muslims are constantly politicised and problematised.”

*Faiths Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should create good practice guidance for the reporting of extremism related stories to ensure that this is balanced and not unintentionally giving support to extremist sentiment.

### **The importance of not spreading extremist sentiment or 'glorifying' violent extremists when reporting on terrorism**

Participants spoke to the Programme of the importance of mainstream media not spreading the sentiment of extremists or 'glorifying' violent extremists when reporting on terrorism. Examples cited initially included the murder of 92 people in Norway<sup>87</sup> by a white supremacist in which media outlets ran excerpts of the terrorist's manifesto but also the murder of Lee Rigby<sup>88</sup> in which the media ran videos of one of the perpetrators making a speech to camera.

Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu criticised media outlets which uploaded the "manifesto" of the gunman in the Christchurch terror attack. "The same media companies who have lambasted social media platforms for not acting fast enough to remove extremist content are simultaneously publishing uncensored Daesh [Islamic State] propaganda on their websites or make the rambling 'manifestos' of crazed killers available for download.

The reality is that every terrorist we have dealt with has sought inspiration from the propaganda of others, and when they can't find it on Facebook, YouTube, Telegram or Twitter they only have to turn on the TV, read the paper or go to one of a myriad of mainstream media websites struggling to compete with those platforms. A piece of extremist propaganda might reach tens of thousands of people naturally through their own channels or networks, but the moment a national newspaper publishes it in full then it has a potential reach of tens of millions. We must recognise this as harmful to our society and security."<sup>89</sup>

Participants agreed that the media should not publish extremist propaganda as this extends its reach and is, to an extent, doing the work of extremists for them.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should, as part of a good practice guide, advise that media outlets do everything in their power to prevent the publication of extremist propaganda.

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87. The Guardian, 2011, Norway attacks: at least 92 killed in Oslo and Utoya island, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks>

88. BBC News, 2014, Lee Rigby Verdict, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22644057>

89. The Guardian, 2019, Newspapers help radicalise far right, says UK anti-terror chief, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/mar/20/newspapers-help-radicalise-far-right-uk-anti-terror-chief-neil-basu>

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### **The importance of focusing on the victims of terrorism and not the perpetrators.**

Several participants paid tribute to the New Zealand authorities for their handling of the aftermath of the Christchurch attacks, particularly around not naming the attacker and instead focussing on the victims of the atrocity.

“Terrorists often crave attention and so fame and notoriety is what they want. They should not be given additional infamy over their actions by the media.”

*Academic, CVE team engagement*

Whilst participants noted that upon occasion (such as the police seeking more information about a suspect) it was quite right to name potential terrorists, that where possible they should not be given any further limelight or attention and instead focus should be on the victims.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should, as part of the good practice guide, do more to encourage the media not to give terrorists the limelight and instead to place greater emphasis on their victims.

## How to refer violent extremist content to the police

The internet is an attractive place for extremists to post graphic or violent material which can support and glorify terrorism in many ways.

Everyone has a role to play in working together to make the internet a safer place, which is why the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) was set up to examine content and work with internet companies to remove material that is illegal and violates terms of usage.

Communities can report content such as, but not limited to, the following:

- Speeches or essays calling for racial or religious violence
  - Videos of violence with messages in praise of terrorists
  - Postings inciting people to commit acts of terrorism or violent extremism
  - Messages intended to stir up hatred against any religious or ethnic group
  - Bomb-making instructions
  - Advice on how to obtain or make weapons

Any member of the public can report the information via a simple referral form which can be found here

<https://www.report-terrorist-material.homeoffice.gov.uk/report>



## 9. CITY HALL LEADERSHIP, COORDINATION AND COLLABORATION TO KEEP LONDONERS SAFE FROM EXTREMISM





## Key findings

- Many Londoners look to the Mayor and City Hall for leadership in this policy area.
- City Hall is uniquely placed to support strategic oversight of countering extremism delivery in London through identifying gaps, barriers and good practice.
- City Hall is well suited to deliver bespoke tailor-made countering violent extremism awareness raising through its commissioned service providers and existing networks.
- Currently there are too few good practice sharing and peer to peer learning opportunities across multiple stakeholder and community themes.
- Countering violent extremism delivery outside of London is vitally important in keeping Londoners safe as many attacks originating outside of London target the capital.
- There is also good practice outside of London which could be replicated, particularly in cities across the UK but also within international cities.
- There is relatively little by way of private funding streams or in-kind support offers from the private sector or philanthropy in relation to countering extremism.
- Public / private sector partnerships offer significant innovative opportunity in relation to countering extremism, opening potential new areas of delivery and extending reach.

## Overarching ambition

- To identify potential gaps and barriers to existing countering extremism delivery in London and ensure that current strategies are engaging with London's diverse communities while avoiding stigmatising entire ethnic, religious or cultural groups.
- Ensure that local, national and international good practice is shared and replicated across London whilst also creating increased opportunities for peer to peer learning and problem solving.
- To create strong and long-lasting public and private sector countering extremism partnerships where resources and the reach of countering extremism delivery are strengthened and amplified.

## Providing leadership

Participants noted that keeping Londoners safe is the Mayor's top priority. The Mayor and City Hall will continue to offer leadership in all areas which relate to the safety and security of London.

Many of the community participants of the Programme stated that they look to the Mayor and City Hall for leadership and welcomed the Mayor's decision to deliver a countering violent extremism programme whilst urging City Hall to have a continued role within this important policy area beyond the delivery of the Programme's report.

Stakeholders also recognised the increased reach the Mayor and City Hall can have into communities across the capital.

"It is through the leadership being shown by the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, that we can empower Londoners to speak out against extremist views and ideologies that left unchallenged lead to violence on the streets of the capital."

***Councillor Clare Coghill***  
*Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
 and Specialist Adviser  
 to the CVE Programme*

## Case Study: London CONTEST Board

City Hall runs a London CONTEST board which was created in 2014 in collaboration with London Councils. The aim of the London CONTEST board is to provide a strategic lead in addressing London's threat, risks and vulnerabilities in relation to counter-terrorism. The board looks across the CONTEST strategy, encompassing Protect, Prepare, Pursue and Prevent.

City Hall will continue to convene central government, local authorities, police, education, health and other public sector partners who will continue to meet at a strategic level through the London CONTEST Board to identify pan-London risks, barriers to delivery and share good practice.

## **A London wide approach to countering violent extremism**

City Hall is uniquely placed as a pan-London organisation to speak to a pan-London audience.

Many participants told the Programme that because of London's remarkable population size, diversity and high number of local authority areas, it was crucial that countering extremism delivery in London was bespoke to the capital. Participants also stated that City Hall is uniquely placed to identify potential gaps and barriers to existing delivery in the capital and ensure that there is more tailored countering extremism work across London.

## **Additional investment**

The Mayor has already significantly invested in this area, including the £45 million Young Londoners Fund.<sup>90</sup>

The Mayor invested £400,000 in this CVE Programme and will continue his leadership in countering violent extremism work with a new investment totalling more than £1 million for the 19/20 financial year.

This will include:

- A new City Hall CVE Programme
- A small grants programme for civil society groups delivering projects which counter extremism and offer positive alternatives to hateful ideologies
- Counter radicalisation awareness learning for City Hall commissioned services
- Counter extremism awareness raising through City Hall and partner networks
- The convening of pan-London thematic good practice sessions and
- Potential future research.

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90. Mayor of London, 2018, Mayor's Young Londoners Fund

<https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/education-and-youth/young-londoners/mayors-young-londoners-fund>

## Hearing the views of Londoners

There is much evidence that many of those who are wary of engagement with the authorities on extremism related issues are happy to engage with City Hall.

Many suggested that City Hall could be a helpful conduit for hearing, considering and communicating the views of Londoners who ordinarily would not be involved in the conversations, to central Government and other stakeholders.

The Mayor's CVE team will continue to hear the views of Londoners beyond the conclusion of this Programme. This will include by piloting the creation and management of a London Prevent Advisory Group that will report into the London CONTEST board.

Participants thought that this group should be made up of well-connected civil society leaders who would be able to represent the experience and sentiment of grass roots communities in relation to existing delivery as well as take information away and disseminate this back through their own local networks.

"City Hall should lead the way and create a community advisory board that supports City Hall activity in countering violent extremism. This board could be made up of diverse and credible voices from across London."

*Faiths Forum for London  
Community led engagement*

## RECOMMENDATION

City Hall to pilot the creation and management of a London Prevent Advisory Group which will report into the London CONTEST board.

## Supporting existing commissioned services to safeguard vulnerable people

Participants were complimentary of City Hall's investment in programmes which aim to improve opportunities for Londoners and many of the organisations delivering this work participated with the Programme.

Participants recognised that pathways towards harmful activities are not pre-determined to one specific harm and therefore it was preferable to ensure that there is adequate safeguarding awareness across all cohorts delivering work with Londoners, particularly those who are vulnerable.

"When working with a vulnerable group, it is often a case of who the first charismatic groomer they encounter is, rather than to think about which specific harm they should be safeguarded from."

*PRU practitioner  
CVE team engagement*

**RECOMMENDATION**

City Hall should consider offering wide-ranging safeguarding awareness support to all commissioned services delivering work with vulnerable people to ensure they are well placed to protect people from being drawn into harmful activities

Participants of the facilitated learning events delivered by the Programme stated that they should be replicated across other groups as they gave participants awareness of the risk of extremism and radicalisation as well as information on what options are available that offer help and support. As these were delivered in a neutral way, participants noted that these sessions did not receive the same negative connotations sometimes apportioned to official Government training products.

“Participants gained a good insight into what support is available and now understand how to access help if needed.”

*Young person network  
CVE team facilitated engagement*

When set out that any City Hall team is unlikely to be staffed to satisfy the potential demand for this, many participants felt that the awareness raising sessions could be community group led as this would engender a greater buy-in and would hold better traction with civil society groups.

**RECOMMENDATION**

City Hall should offer free, high quality, bespoke, tailor-made countering radicalisation awareness sessions to all commissioned service providers working with vulnerable Londoners, including advice on how to access help and support should they be concerned someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation.

### **Working through existing networks**

Some of the participants of the Programme were engaged through collaborations with existing City Hall networks such as the Young Londoners Participation Network (YLPN) or external networks like the Police Cadets. At some of these sessions the Programme was able to work with external organisations and institutions to offer high quality interactive learning sessions for these participants. These were very popular and helped to improve awareness and understanding around violent extremism as well as building capacity in individuals and empowering them to become active participants in standing up to extremism.

Many of the organisations the Programme worked with spoke of a willingness to use their existing networks to host countering extremism awareness raising sessions, but spoke of barriers in relation to the cost that would be apportioned to the provision of high-quality delivery. Participants recognised the opportunity that the significant existing networks across City Hall and through partners created for the introduction of high-quality countering extremism awareness raising.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

City Hall to work with existing networks and partners to offer free, high quality, engaging and interactive countering extremism sessions through their existing cohorts.

### **Working with the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU)**

Announced by the Mayor in September 2018, the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) is bringing together specialists from health, police, local authorities, probation and community organisations to tackle violent crime and the underlying causes of violent crime.

The Mayor believes that violence is preventable. The VRU is taking a fundamentally different approach to violence reduction – one where the public sector institutions and communities that make up London act together to help cut violence.

A number of Londoners already have some of the tools they need to tackle violence and its root causes – but many need additional support to help put their time, expertise or skills to best use.

The job of the VRU will be to help unlock that potential – by sharing information with Londoners and all partners about what works in spotting the early signs of what might lead to criminal behaviour and focusing attention and resources on what makes a difference.

Participants spoke of their support for the VRU and a public health approach to tackling violence. Many spoke of the similarities in terms of the unit's objectives and what more could be done to renew and improve efforts to counter extremism.

Many participants, particularly stakeholders, noted that the VRU will be working through stakeholders and cohorts that could also be well placed to support countering extremism work and that whilst knife crime and violence clearly were often thought to be the top priorities for London, consideration to working collaboratively across the VRU and CVE teams should be made to ensure the most effective delivery.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

City Hall to ensure close collaboration between the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) and City Hall CVE delivery.

#### **Good practice exists but needs to be replicated**

Participants recognised the critical importance of identifying good practice and sharing this.

"The importance of sharing good practice and creating peer to peer learning opportunities is vital in helping to spread the load and building authentic and practical solutions."

***Shaukat Warraich***

*CEO Faith Associates and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

Participants spoke with the Programme about examples of good practice in relation to existing countering extremism delivery in London. This included good practice across work streams which counter the broad array of harms driven by extremism.

#### **A lack of good practice sharing and peer to peer learning opportunities**

Participants told the Programme that there are simply too few good practice sharing and peer to peer learning opportunities. This was a theme that was replicated across stakeholder cohorts.

Many participants referred to existing delivery as being too 'top down'. Whilst participants recognised that it was upon occasion necessary to have expert policy area input and potentially a direction of travel set by central government, more resources should be apportioned to a 'bottom up' approach allowing grass roots communities and practitioners to shape policy delivery locally based on exposure to good practice.

Through some of the thematic roundtables convened by City Hall, practitioners shared good practice with others and peers were able to impart experiences of delivery challenges and how they overcame them to their peers. These sessions evidenced the value of bringing people together.

It was clear from these exchanges alongside a strong steer from participants, that the most effective way to impart advice and problem solve issues is through good practice sharing and peer to peer learning.

"Teachers want to hear from other teachers about their experiences, the challenges they faced and how they overcame these".

*Teacher, CVE team engagement*

Many participants felt that City Hall would be an excellent convening point for good practice sharing and peer to peer learning. Participants spoke of City Hall as a trusted focal point for bringing people together in London.

"Cities play a leading role in building social capital, empowering communities and are in a unique position to convene a broad array of actors critical to solving the challenges that underpin extremism. Every sector and every citizen have a role to play and City Hall can play a pivotal role in spurring the partnerships needed to have a sustainable impact on this problem."

*Sasha Havlicek CEO Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*



## Case study: Mosque Leaders and Multi-Faith Safety and Security conferences

In the aftermath of tragic attacks in New Zealand, the Mayor, working in partnership with Faith Associates,<sup>91</sup> invited over 300 mosque leaders from across London to attend a Safety and Security conference at City Hall designed to help mosques keep their worshippers, staff and buildings safe in the run up to Ramadan. This was noted as the largest gathering of mosque leaders outside a faith institution ever in London.

After dreadful attacks on churches in Sri Lanka, the Mayor, working in partnership with Faith Associates and the Faiths Forum for London,<sup>92</sup> invited over 150 multi-faith community leaders to attend a Safety and Security conference at City Hall designed to allow attendees to disseminate the advice out further through their local networks.

Speakers at both events included senior police officers, designing out crime experts as well as peer led content from the Community Safety Trust<sup>93</sup> (an organisation that protects Jewish worshippers and infrastructure). The sessions delivered practical advice that attendees could use to improve safety and security for their premises and worshippers to mitigate risk.

*“The Mayor supporting the Safety and Security conferences was pivotal in reassuring faith communities across London.*

*Convening and speaking to many of the attendees reaffirmed my understanding that political leadership is required in addressing the concerns people have from extremism and terrorism.”*

**Shaukat Warraich**, CEO Faith Associates and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme

91. Faith Associates, 2004, About Us, <http://faithassociates.co.uk/>

92. Faiths Forum for London, About Us, <http://faithsforum.com/>

93. Community Security Trust (CST), About CST, <https://cst.org.uk/>

Practitioners from both the public and civil society sectors spoke to the Programme of being priced out of attending the few good practice sharing events of which they were aware. Many participants spoke of being invited to events with helpful speakers and interesting inputs but that this often cost significant amounts to attend, simply taking them out of reach of public and civil society organisations who are facing difficult financial circumstances.

Irrespective of funding, participants commented that it may always be more efficient and effective to put good practice sharing and capacity building events on centrally.

Many spoke of City Hall continuing the legacy of the CVE Programme by offering free opportunities for London stakeholder and community cohorts to convene and learn more about the issues, hear good practice advice and benefit from peer to peer learning.

### RECOMMENDATION

City Hall to become a hub of good practice sharing and a platform for peer to peer learning across pan-London practitioners and community groups, hosting up to 4 free pan-London thematic sessions before the end of March 2020.

### The importance of looking beyond London

As was noted by participants of the Programme, many of the perpetrators of violent extremism plots in London are not from the city. Examples can be shown, from the 7/7 attacks in 2005<sup>94</sup> to the Finsbury Park attack in 2017,<sup>95</sup> of individuals and groups travelling into London to perpetrate violent extremist attacks. Participants therefore recognised the need for London institutions, practitioners and authorities to work with and support countering extremism delivery outside of London as in many respects these institutions and practitioners are working hard to safeguard London and Londoners.

“London is a target for many extremists, because it is the capital, they feel they need to be seen to be active in the city.”

**Nigel Bromage**

*Founder Small Steps and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme*

The Programme also encountered evidence of good practice outside of London, including in UK and international cities. Participants strongly advocated that there should be continued collaborations with, and learning from, other cities.

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94. BBC News, 2015, 7 July bombings: What happened that day? <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33253598>

95. Wales Online, 2018, How Cardiff loner Darren Osborne went from sofa surfer to Finsbury Park mosque killer in weeks, <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/how-cardiff-loner-darren-osborne-14234935>

## Case Study: Strong Cities UK Conference

City Hall worked with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (and their Strong Cities Network), Birmingham City Council, Luton Council, Leicester Council and Manchester City Council to deliver a Strong Cities UK Conference in October 2018.

This two-day conference facilitated national and international knowledge-sharing on building strong cities with a specific focus on integration, preventing and countering violent crime and radicalisation.

The conference shared a wide range of UK cities experiences in developing community-centric approaches to addressing radicalisation and extremism and building community resilience.

This also brought together local council leaders, policymakers and CVE practitioners from across the UK and internationally, to encourage collaboration, knowledge exchange and to foster partnerships across local authorities.

"The 7/7 bombers show us that we must take the threat of people travelling from outside our city to do harm to Londoners seriously. London authorities will always benefit from learning from those who work to counter violent extremism throughout the country and beyond."

***Councillor Clare Coghill***  
*Leader, Waltham Forest Council  
and Specialist Adviser to the CVE  
Programme*

### RECOMMENDATION

City Hall to continue to support London's role in the Strong Cities Network, newly formed Strong UK Cities Network and other potential city to city collaborations.

City Hall to collaborate with international city partners and the EU, including the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network.

## Enormous opportunity

London is one of the most prosperous cities in the world. It is home to multiple world leading technology companies and has cultural and sporting infrastructure which are the envy of the world.

Participants were often proud of London's technological, cultural and sporting infrastructure but many did state that more should be done to engage them to work together to counter extremism, hate and intolerance.

"To tackle the rise of hate crime, extremism and polarisation, we need all parts of our society contributing to a solution. We need cultural institutions, local businesses, sports centres and NGO's working within and alongside communities. The Mayor of London and City Hall are uniquely placed to bring this wide range of constituencies to the table for the first time and to engage them in investing in, and in mainstreaming, locally relevant responses to hate and extremism. In this way, the Mayor of London is in a unique position to empower local problem solving and communal pride across London's diverse population."

**Sasha Havlicek** CEO Institute for Strategic Dialogue and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme

## Evidence of the benefit of public / private partnerships, but more could be done

Participants noted that in other policy areas which also seek to counter harmful and criminal activities such as knife crime and gang activity, there had been examples of recent public / private sector partnerships. Participants told the Programme that currently there is relatively little by way of private funding streams or in-kind support offers from the private sector or philanthropy in relation to countering extremism. This was thought to be a missed opportunity in a city so rich with private sector, sporting and cultural infrastructure.

"Many civil society organisations like JAN Trust are well-established, have the expertise, and have deep connections with local communities. However, they do not have the support/funding to carry out their projects. The private sector has the ability to really engage with this and utilise their corporate social responsibility to fund front line civil society work with the appropriate expertise in this field."

**Sajda Mughal**  
Head of the Jan Trust and Specialist Adviser to the CVE Programme

Participants did highlight the successful private / civil society collaboration led by the Institute of Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and Google.org which delivered funds to civil society led counter hate and extremism projects across the UK.

### **Case Study: Mayor of London / Google / YouTube collaboration**

In December 2018 Google announced a £600,000 grant to tackle the rise of knife crime and end the glamorisation of violence online with YouTube and the Mayor of London. The fund will help charities dealing with the challenges of how young and at-risk people use social media and help with the process of identifying content glamorising violence and preventing it from reappearing. This initiative will support the training of more than 500 social and youth workers, teachers and other frontline professionals to deal with the challenges and opportunities of young people's use of social media.<sup>96</sup>

### **Case Study: Case study - Google.org and ISD Innovation Fund**

Google.org and ISD partnered to deliver a £1 million innovation fund to counter hate and extremism in the UK. The fund supports innovative projects, online and offline, that seek to disrupt, undermine, counter, or provide positive alternatives to hate and extremism.

The Innovation Fund is designed to support new educational approaches, unique community projects and cutting-edge technologies, laying the foundations for a more effective, innovative, and cohesive civil society response to hate and extremism in the future.<sup>97</sup>

96. Metro, 2018, YouTube gives £600,000 to target glamorisation of violence on social media, <https://metro.co.uk/2018/12/10/youtube-gives-600000-to-target-glamorisation-of-violence-on-social-media-8222762/>

97. Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2019, Innovation Fund <https://www.isdglobal.org/innovation-fund/>

However, many participants noted that while £1m worth of funding by Google.org was a helpful contribution, the private sector should have much more to offer such a critical policy area, which ultimately affects society significantly and could affect them in many ways.

Participants thought that the absence of significant investment from the private sector could be due to the considerable levels of current criticism levelled at existing government strategies including Prevent. Some thought that this created a reluctance from the private sector to get more involved in countering extremism work.

Many participants thought that City Hall could hold the key to encouraging greater collaboration with private, cultural and sporting sector partners. Participants also agreed that the private, cultural and sporting sector could potentially bring considerable expertise which could open new areas of countering extremism work and reach potential new audiences.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

City Hall to scope the potential opportunities for public / private sector countering extremism collaborations and if appropriate deliver a programme of work where private sector, cultural and sporting partners share resources and skills with public sector and civil society counter extremism stakeholders.



# 10. CONCLUSION





## Key findings

This report has put listening to Londoners at its heart, through the most comprehensive and in-depth engagement programme on countering violent extremism ever conducted in this or any other city.

The Programme has evidenced the complex challenges and scale of the threat to London and Londoners from extremism. It has shown the wide spectrum of harms driven by extremism and the importance of not viewing these harms in isolation. It has also evidenced that there is no one pathway into extremism and therefore mitigation must be broad and dynamic, utilising all potential capacity-building and intervention opportunities.

The Programme has shown that extremism cannot be countered solely through policing and security and that policy areas such as education, integration and community engagement have huge parts to play.

Through evidence-based policy, this Programme has set out clear areas for improved and renewed activity. It has separated the contents of this report into key areas but has demonstrated the overlapping nature of both the challenges of extremism and the solutions needed to reduce this risk.

By fulfilling the recommendations of this report:

- minority and marginalised communities can be strengthened against extremism by boosting integration and ensuring that all Londoners have the opportunity to fulfil their potential.
- communities, the greatest asset we have in our fight against extremism, can be provided with the support, information and resources they need to better confront and challenge hateful and vile ideologies.
- the public can be given the awareness they need on the dangers of radicalisation and where to get help and support from to allow them to play a bigger role in safeguarding vulnerable people.
- existing counter extremism delivery can be improved by learning from mistakes and boosting transparency so that diverse communities across the capital are reassured by, and supportive of, counter radicalisation work.
- more can be done to contest the online space with extremists, ensuring that their attempts to promote division, hate and violence are disrupted at every given opportunity.
- City Hall can become a local, national and international hub of good practice sharing, creating opportunities to learn from the experiences of others and improve delivery through peer to peer learning opportunities.

**Now it is incumbent on all in society, the Government, partner agencies, stakeholders and communities to come together alongside the Mayor of London and City Hall, to urgently deliver the recommendations in this report and truly make this a shared endeavour.**

# ANNEX 1

## Recommendations of this report: list and table



1. [The Government](#) must reverse cuts which have forced local authorities to reduce vital youth provision and community services.
2. [The Government](#) should invest more to fund activities which bring people from diverse backgrounds together for quality interactions and empower active participation from marginalised and under-represented groups, ensuring that those too often not involved can take part.
3. [The Government](#) should invest more to support schools to deliver high quality citizenship content to all young people.
4. [The Government](#) should adequately resource local authorities to tackle marginalisation and create platforms for engagement with communities, listening to concerns and providing information. This should include a focus on groups who have too often been left out of the conversation including disempowered women and young people.
5. [The Government](#) should reverse cuts to the Adult Education Budget (AEB) and invest serious funding through the proposed National ESOL Strategy to develop approaches to fill gaps in provision that can be mainstreamed through the AEB to better meet the needs of all learners. This should include consideration to supporting women with childcare responsibilities who face additional barriers to accessing suitable provision.
6. [The Government](#) should deliver a fundamental review into investment and resource deployment into communities that feel 'left behind', ensuring that all communities are able to share from the success of the city, can fully contribute and feel they belong.
7. [City Hall](#) to continue to encourage employers in London to do more to support opportunity and diversity in the work place by asking them to sign up to the Good Work Standard.
8. [The Government](#) should implement the Law Commission's recommendations on reforming the laws related to Abusive and Offensive Online Communications.
9. [The Government](#) should invest more to support teachers to deliver important work with young people to create resilience to online harm, where possible including parents.
10. [City Hall](#) to deliver a small grants programme (which stands aside from existing Government countering extremism strategies) to civil society groups delivering projects which directly counter extremism, offer positive alternatives to vile ideologies and encourage others to stand up to hate and intolerance.
11. [The Government](#) should follow City Hall's lead and go further, investing more into vital grass roots, bottom up delivery.

12. [The Government](#) should increase resource for programmes which create platforms for learning on extremism and debate, discussion, information provision and challenge around the complex issues used by extremists, with a particular focus on women and young people.
13. [The Government](#) should invest more through schools into resourcing which explores extremism with young people.
14. [The Government](#) should better use local authority Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) so that they can offer support to educational institutions situated outside the priority areas they serve.
15. [The Government](#) should deliver resources to amplify the voice of faith communities who are often best placed and most effective at rebutting extremists who are promoting hate, intolerance and violence through false and warped religious messaging.
16. [City Hall](#) to explore delivering a 'London commitment' against hate, intolerance and extremism which could be supported by individuals and organisations and adopted throughout the capital.
17. [The Metropolitan Police Service \(MPS\)](#) and the Government should provide regular shareable briefings for stakeholders and community members on the threat and risk from extremism in London.
18. [The Government](#) should ensure that victims of hate and terrorism are not let down by the support they receive and that their entitlements within the Victim's Code are met.
19. [The Government](#) should ensure that resources are put forward to consider how to better use the voice of victims and survivors who want to play an active role in countering hate, intolerance and extremism.
20. [The Government](#) should revise, and update future iterations of Prevent strategy training products to ensure that those already engaged and aware remain so.
21. [The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ \(NCTPHQ\)](#) should deliver a new bespoke campaign relating to vulnerability to radicalisation, signposting where help and support can be sought and reassuring communities about the lack of negative ramifications of a referral in this respect.
22. [The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ \(NCTPHQ\)](#) should create a new phoneline and online portal for referring safeguarding concerns. This should very clearly set out that it relates primarily to safeguarding concerns rather than criminality.
23. [The Government](#) should fund a pan-London campaign which promotes the role local authorities play in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from radicalisation, including highlighting referral pathways.

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24. [The Government](#) should deliver advice to local authorities on adopting a uniform way to accept radicalisation related safeguarding referrals and where possible simplify referral pathways.
  25. [The Government](#) should give adequate resources to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver significant face to face engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts who fear or are suspicious of Prevent delivery.
  26. [The Government](#) should adequately resource all local authorities to have a local Prevent Advisory Group.
  27. [The Government](#) should ensure that future iterations of Prevent training products better set out what does and does not constitute a referral. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.
  28. [The Government](#) should invest more in the training of those learning to deliver future iterations of Prevent awareness products and deploy a strong accreditation process to ensure high quality delivery.
  29. [The Government](#) and the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should be stronger, speedier, louder and more transparent in countering any inaccurate allegations, media stories or case studies peddled by individuals and organisations that are looking to sow discontent around Prevent delivery.
  30. [The Government](#) should adequately resource the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver increased engagement and radicalisation safeguarding awareness work with key individuals and organisations within grass roots communities such as civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school staff and faith leaders.
  31. [The Government](#) should improve transparency by including evaluations of Prevent projects, evidencing those that are most effective so that they can be replicated and amplified.
  32. [The Government](#) should present London peer review findings at the London CONTEST board and present a plan for all London authorities to have completed a recent peer review.
  33. [The Government](#) should ensure that every borough in London receives some funding to deliver countering violent extremism activity.
  34. [The Government](#) should continue to evaluate the success of the East London Cluster work and consider the benefits of a sub-regional delivery model in London. A report on the success of this initiative should be presented to the London CONTEST Board.

35. [The Government](#) should provide additional funding for the commissioning of pan-London countering violent extremism work through City Hall.
36. [The Government](#) should clearly set out the different elements of Prevent delivery, potentially categorising these components if necessary and helpful.
37. [The Government](#) should ensure that the limitations and scope of Prevent activity is clearly set out reinforcing what does and does not happen as part of the safeguarding process and what activities are and are not part of Prevent delivery. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.
38. [The Government](#) should do more to ensure that debate and discussion is not being unnecessarily stifled in educational institutions, including higher education.
39. [The Government](#) should ensure that the independent review of Prevent is fully transparent, wide reaching and led by someone who commands trust and respect across London's diverse communities.
40. [The Independent Review of Prevent](#) must consider the important findings of this report.
41. [The Government](#) should increase community radicalisation awareness raising work with a particular focus on families, where possible in collaboration with schools in order to reach parents.
42. [The Government](#) should reverse policing cuts which have resulted in fewer frontline officers, including neighbourhood and schools' officers.
43. [The Metropolitan Police Service \(MPS\)](#) should ensure that sufficient training on spotting the indicators of vulnerability to extremism is delivered to all frontline officers.
44. [The Metropolitan Police Service \(MPS\)](#) should support employers in keeping their employees safe from manipulation and exploitation towards extremism by providing advice and training.
45. [The Government](#) must ensure close collaboration between probation, rehabilitation services, ending youth violence work and radicalisation safeguarding strategies.
46. [The Government](#) should commission research into the overlap between misogyny, including violence against women and girls, and vulnerability to and participation in extremism.
47. [The Government](#) should commission more research into exploring any relationship radicalisation and mental-ill health
48. [The Government](#) must do more to ensure that tech companies are not allowing illegal violent extremist material or advice useful to terrorists on their online platforms.

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49. [The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ \(NCTPHQ\)](#) should amplify the good work of the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) by delivering a campaign which signposts members of the public on where to report potentially illegal extremist content.
  50. [Tech companies](#) should do more to ensure that their platforms and tools are not used to promote hate and intolerance or fundraise for extremists.
  51. [Tech companies](#) should better promote the ways in which people can flag hateful and intolerant content on their platforms which is potentially legal but outside of the terms and conditions of their user agreements.
  52. [Tech companies](#) should consider how to refer details of people they ban from their platforms to the police.
  53. [The Government](#) should work with tech companies to ensure that problematic searches result in re-directs to counter narrative.
  54. [The Government](#) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should provide regular updates to local authorities and community partners on the activity of proscribed group activists particularly the forming of new groups.
  55. [The Government](#) should ensure that the important work of the Desistance and Disengagement programme (DDP) continues, but, that it is clearly distinguished from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding work and funded with additional monies.
  56. [The Government](#) should share the evaluation of the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilot with the London CONTEST board, ensuring that the voice and experience of local authorities are represented in decisions to continue this work and that it is clearly distinct from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding delivery.
  57. [The Government](#) should support the delivery of any home-schooled register by adequately resourcing local authorities to administer this whilst also ensuring that local authorities have the requisite powers needed.
  58. [The Government](#) should commission further research to understand the prevalence of extremism within prisons alongside evaluation of those measures currently deployed to stop extremist ideologies being promoted within prisons.
  59. [The Independent Press Standards Organisation \(IPSO\)](#) should create good practice guidance for the reporting of extremism related stories to ensure that this is balanced and not unintentionally giving support to extremist sentiment.

60. [The Independent Press Standards Organisation \(IPSO\)](#) should, as part of a good practice guide, advise that media outlets do everything in their power to prevent the publication of extremist propaganda.
61. [The Independent Press Standards Organisation \(IPSO\)](#) should, as part of the good practice guide, do more to encourage the media not to give terrorists the limelight and instead to place greater emphasis on their victims.
62. [City Hall](#) to pilot the creation and management of a London Prevent Advisory Group which will report into the London CONTEST board.
63. [City Hall](#) should consider offering wide-ranging safeguarding awareness support to all commissioned services delivering work with vulnerable people to ensure they are well placed to protect people from being drawn into harmful activities.
64. [City Hall](#) should offer free, high quality, bespoke, tailor-made countering violent extremism awareness sessions to all commissioned service providers working with vulnerable Londoners, including advice on how to access help and support should they be concerned someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation.
65. [City Hall](#) to work with existing networks and partners to offer free, high quality, engaging and interactive countering violent extremism sessions through their existing cohorts.
66. [City Hall](#) to ensure close collaboration between the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) and City Hall CVE delivery.
67. [City Hall](#) to become a hub of good practice sharing and a platform for peer to peer learning across pan-London practitioners and community groups, hosting up to 4 free pan-London thematic sessions before the end of March 2020.
68. [City Hall](#) to continue to support London's role in the Strong Cities Network, newly formed Strong UK Cities Network and other potential city to city collaborations.
69. [City Hall](#) to collaborate with international city partners and the EU, including the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network.
70. [City Hall](#) to scope the potential opportunities for public / private sector countering violent extremism collaborations and if appropriate deliver a programme of work where private sector, cultural and sporting partners share resources and skills with public sector and civil society counter extremism stakeholders.



Responsible body / bodies	No.	Recommendation	Strengthening	Encouraging	Safeguarding	Stopping
<b>Central Government</b>	<b>1</b>	The Government must reverse cuts which have forced local authorities to reduce vital youth provision and community services.	✓			
	<b>2</b>	The Government should invest more to fund activities which bring people from diverse backgrounds together for quality interactions and empower active participation from marginalised and under-represented groups, ensuring that those too often not involved can take part.	✓			
	<b>3</b>	The Government should invest more to support schools to deliver high quality citizenship content to all young people.	✓	✓		
	<b>4</b>	The Government should adequately resource local authorities to tackle marginalisation and create platforms for engagement with communities, listening to concerns and providing information. This should include a focus on groups who have too often been left out of the conversation including disempowered women and young people.	✓			
	<b>5</b>	The Government should reverse cuts to the Adult Education Budget (AEB) and invest serious funding through the proposed National ESOL Strategy to develop approaches to fill gaps in provision that can be mainstreamed through the AEB to better meet the needs of all learners. This should include consideration to supporting women with childcare responsibilities who face additional barriers to accessing suitable provision.	✓			
	<b>6</b>	The Government should deliver a fundamental review into investment and resource deployment into communities that feel 'left behind', ensuring that all communities are able to share from the success of the city, can fully contribute and feel they belong.	✓			
	<b>8</b>	The Government should implement the Law Commission's recommendations on reforming the laws related to Abusive and Offensive Online Communications.	✓			✓
	<b>9</b>	The Government should invest more to support teachers to deliver important work with young people to create resilience to online harm, where possible including parents.	✓		✓	✓
	<b>11</b>	The Government should follow City Hall's lead and go further, investing more into vital grass roots, bottom up delivery.	✓	✓		
	<b>12</b>	The Government should increase resource for programmes which create platforms for learning on extremism and debate, discussion, information provision and challenge around the complex issues used by extremists, with a particular focus on women and young people.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>13</b>	The Government should invest more through schools into resourcing which explores extremism with young people.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>14</b>	The Government should better use local authority Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) so that they can offer support to educational institutions situated outside the priority areas they serve.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>15</b>	The Government should deliver resources to amplify the voice of faith communities who are often best placed and most effective at rebutting extremists who are promoting hate, intolerance and violence through false and warped religious messaging.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>17</b>	The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the Government should provide regular shareable briefings for stakeholders and community members on the threat and risk from extremism in London		✓	✓	✓
	<b>18</b>	The Government should ensure that victims of hate and terrorism are not let down by the support they receive and that their entitlements within the Victim's Code are met.	✓			

19	<p>The Government should ensure that resources are put forward to consider how to better use the voice of victims and survivors who want to play an active role in countering hate, intolerance and extremism.</p>	✓	✓		
20	<p>The Government should revise, and update future iterations of Prevent strategy training products to ensure that those already engaged and aware remain so.</p>			✓	
23	<p>The Government should fund a pan-London campaign which promotes the role local authorities play in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from radicalisation, including highlighting referral pathways.</p>			✓	
24	<p>The Government should deliver advice to local authorities on adopting a uniform way to accept radicalisation related safeguarding referrals and where possible simplify referral pathways.</p>			✓	
25	<p>The Government should give adequate resources to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver significant face to face engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts who fear or are suspicious of Prevent delivery.</p>			✓	
26	<p>The Government should adequately resource all local authorities to have a local Prevent Advisory Group.</p>	✓	✓	✓	
27	<p>The Government should ensure that future iterations of Prevent training products better set out what does and does not constitute a referral. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.</p>			✓	
28	<p>The Government should invest more in the training of those learning to deliver future iterations of Prevent awareness products and deploy a strong accreditation process to ensure high quality delivery.</p>			✓	
29	<p>The Government and the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should be stronger, speedier, louder and more transparent in countering any inaccurate allegations, media stories or case studies peddled by individuals and organisations that are looking to sow discontent around Prevent delivery.</p>			✓	
30	<p>The Government Should adequately resource the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver increased engagement and radicalisation safeguarding awareness work with key individuals and organisations within grass roots communities such as civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school staff and faith leaders.</p>			✓	
31	<p>The Government should improve transparency by including evaluations of Prevent projects, evidencing those that are most effective so that they can be replicated and amplified.</p>	✓	✓	✓	
32	<p>The Government should present London peer review findings at the London CONTEST board and present a plan for all London authorities to have completed a recent peer review.</p>		✓	✓	
33	<p>The Government should ensure that every borough in London receives some funding to deliver countering violent extremism activity.</p>		✓	✓	
34	<p>The Government should continue to evaluate the success of the East London Cluster work and consider the benefits of a sub-regional delivery model in London. A report on the success of this initiative should be presented to the London CONTEST Board.</p>			✓	
35	<p>The Government should provide additional funding for the commissioning of pan-London countering violent extremism work through City Hall.</p>	✓	✓	✓	
36	<p>The Government should clearly set out the different elements of Prevent delivery, potentially categorising these components if necessary and helpful.</p>			✓	

<b>37</b>	The Government should ensure that the limitations and scope of Prevent activity is clearly set out reinforcing what does and does not happen as part of the safeguarding process and what activities are and are not part of Prevent delivery. This information should also be included clearly on a new public facing website.			✓	
<b>38</b>	The Government should do more to ensure that debate and discussion is not being unnecessarily stifled in educational institutions, including higher education.	✓			✓
<b>39</b>	The Government should ensure that the independent review of Prevent is fully transparent, wide reaching and led by someone who commands trust and respect across London's diverse communities.	✓		✓	✓
<b>41</b>	The Government should increase community radicalisation awareness raising work with a particular focus on families, where possible in collaboration with schools in order to reach parents.			✓	
<b>42</b>	The Government should reverse policing cuts which have resulted in fewer frontline officers, including neighbourhood and schools' officers.	✓		✓	✓
<b>45</b>	The Government must ensure close collaboration between probation, rehabilitation services, ending youth violence work and radicalisation safeguarding strategies.			✓	
<b>46</b>	The Government should commission research into the overlap between misogyny, including violence against women and girls, and vulnerability to and participation in extremism.			✓	
<b>47</b>	The Government should commission more research into exploring any relationship radicalisation and mental-ill health			✓	
<b>48</b>	The Government must do more to ensure that tech companies are not allowing illegal violent extremist material or advice useful to terrorists on their online platforms.			✓	✓
<b>53</b>	The Government should work with tech companies to ensure that problematic searches result in re-directs to counter narrative.			✓	✓
<b>54</b>	The Government and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should provide regular updates to local authorities and community partners on the activity of proscribed group activists particularly the forming of new groups.		✓		✓
<b>55</b>	The Government should ensure that the important work of the Desistance and Disengagement programme (DDP) continues, but, that it is clearly distinguished from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding work and funded with additional monies.			✓	✓
<b>56</b>	The Government should share the evaluation of the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilot with the London CONTEST board, ensuring that the voice and experience of local authorities are represented in decisions to continue this work and that it is clearly distinct from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding delivery.			✓	✓
<b>57</b>	The Government should support the delivery of any home-schooled register by adequately resourcing local authorities to administer this whilst also ensuring that local authorities have the requisite powers needed.			✓	✓
<b>58</b>	The Government should commission further research to understand the prevalence of extremism within prisons alongside evaluation of those measures currently deployed to stop extremist ideologies being promoted within prisons.			✓	✓

<b>Local Government</b>	<b>4</b>	The Government should adequately resource local authorities to tackle marginalisation and create platforms for engagement with communities, listening to concerns and providing information. This should include a focus on groups who have too often been left out of the conversation including disempowered women and young people.	✓			
	<b>12</b>	The Government should increase resource for programmes which create platforms for learning on extremism and debate, discussion, information provision and challenge around the complex issues used by extremists, with a particular focus on women and young people.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>14</b>	The Government should better use local authority Prevent Education Officers (PEOs) so that they can offer support to educational institutions situated outside the priority areas they serve.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>23</b>	The Government should fund a pan-London campaign which promotes the role local authorities play in safeguarding vulnerable individuals from radicalisation, including highlighting referral pathways.			✓	
	<b>24</b>	The Government should deliver advice to local authorities on adopting a uniform way to accept radicalisation related safeguarding referrals and where possible simplify referral pathways.			✓	
	<b>25</b>	The Government should give adequate resources to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver significant face to face engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts who fear or are suspicious of Prevent delivery.			✓	
	<b>26</b>	The Government should adequately resource all local authorities to have a local Prevent Advisory Group.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>30</b>	The Government Should adequately resource the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver increased engagement and radicalisation safeguarding awareness work with key individuals and organisations within grass roots communities such as civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school staff and faith leaders.			✓	
	<b>32</b>	The Government should present London peer review findings at the London CONTEST board and present a plan for all London authorities to have completed a recent peer review.		✓	✓	
	<b>33</b>	The Government should ensure that every borough in London receives some funding to deliver countering violent extremism activity.		✓	✓	
	<b>41</b>	The Government should increase community radicalisation awareness raising work with a particular focus on families, where possible in collaboration with schools in order to reach parents.		✓	✓	
	<b>45</b>	The Government must ensure close collaboration between probation, rehabilitation services, ending youth violence work and radicalisation safeguarding strategies.			✓	✓
	<b>56</b>	The Government should share the evaluation of the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) pilot with the London CONTEST board, ensuring that the voice and experience of local authorities are represented in decisions to continue this work and that it is clearly distinct from future iterations of Prevent strategy safeguarding delivery.			✓	✓
	<b>57</b>	The Government should support the delivery of any home-schooled register by adequately resourcing local authorities to administer this whilst also ensuring that local authorities have the requisite powers needed.			✓	✓

<b>City Hall</b>	<b>7</b>	City Hall to continue to encourage employers in London to do more to support opportunity and diversity in the work place by asking them to sign up to the Good Work Standard.	✓			
	<b>10</b>	City Hall to deliver a small grants programme (which stands aside from existing Government countering extremism strategies) to civil society groups delivering projects which directly counter extremism, offer positive alternatives to vile ideologies and encourage others to stand up to hate and intolerance.	✓	✓		
	<b>16</b>	City Hall to explore delivering a 'London commitment' against hate, intolerance and extremism which could be supported by individuals and organisations and adopted throughout the capital.	✓	✓		
	<b>35</b>	The Government should provide additional funding for the commissioning of pan-London countering violent extremism work through City Hall.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>62</b>	City Hall to pilot the creation and management of a London Prevent Advisory Group which will report into the London CONTEST board.	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<b>63</b>	City Hall should consider offering wide-ranging safeguarding awareness support to all commissioned services delivering work with vulnerable people to ensure they are well placed to protect people from being drawn into harmful activities.			✓	
	<b>64</b>	City Hall should offer free, high quality, bespoke, tailor-made countering violent extremism awareness sessions to all commissioned service providers working with vulnerable Londoners, including advice on how to access help and support should they be concerned someone might be vulnerable to radicalisation.			✓	
	<b>65</b>	City Hall to work with existing networks and partners to offer free, high quality, engaging and interactive countering violent extremism sessions through their existing cohorts.		✓	✓	
	<b>66</b>	City Hall to ensure close collaboration between the Violence Reduction Unit (VRU) and City Hall CVE delivery.	✓		✓	
	<b>67</b>	City Hall to become a hub of good practice sharing and a platform for peer to peer learning across pan-London practitioners and community groups, hosting up to 4 free pan-London thematic sessions before the end of March 2020.	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<b>68</b>	City Hall to continue to support London's role in the Strong Cities Network, newly formed Strong UK Cities Network and other potential city to city collaborations.	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<b>69</b>	City Hall to collaborate with international city partners and the EU, including the EU Radicalisation Awareness Network.	✓	✓	✓	✓
	<b>70</b>	City Hall to scope the potential opportunities for public / private sector countering violent extremism collaborations and if appropriate deliver a programme of work where private sector, cultural and sporting partners share resources and skills with public sector and civil society counter extremism stakeholders	✓	✓	✓	✓

<b>Metropolitan Police Service</b>	<b>17</b>	The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the Government should provide regular shareable briefings for stakeholders and community members on the threat and risk from extremism in London	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>25</b>	The Government should give adequate resources to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver significant face to face engagement with sceptical and mistrustful cohorts who fear or are suspicious of Prevent delivery.		✓		
	<b>30</b>	The Government should adequately resource the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and local authorities to deliver increased engagement and radicalisation safeguarding awareness work with key individuals and organisations within grass roots communities such as civil society practitioners, youth club workers, sports coaches, supplementary school staff and faith leaders.		✓		
	<b>42</b>	The Government should reverse policing cuts which have resulted in fewer frontline officers, including neighbourhood and schools' officers.	✓	✓	✓	
	<b>43</b>	The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should ensure that sufficient training on spotting the indicators of vulnerability to extremism is delivered to all frontline officers.		✓		
	<b>44</b>	The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should support employers in keeping their employees safe from manipulation and exploitation towards extremism by providing advice and training.		✓		
	<b>54</b>	The Government and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) should provide regular updates to local authorities and community partners on the activity of proscribed group activists particularly the forming of new groups.	✓		✓	
	<b>National Counter Terrorism Police HQ (NCTPHQ)</b>	<b>21</b>	The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ (NCTPHQ) should deliver a new bespoke campaign relating to vulnerability to radicalisation, signposting where help and support can be sought and reassuring communities about the lack of negative ramifications of a referral in this respect.		✓	
		<b>22</b>	The National Counter Terrorism Police HQ (NCTPHQ) should create a new phoneline and online portal for referring safeguarding concerns. This should very clearly set out that it relates primarily to safeguarding concerns rather than criminality.		✓	
		<b>29</b>	The Government and the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should be stronger, speedier, louder and more transparent in countering any inaccurate allegations, media stories or case studies peddled by individuals and organisations that are looking to sow discontent around Prevent delivery.		✓	
<b>49</b>		The National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) should amplify the good work of the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit (CTIRU) by delivering a campaign which signposts members of the public on where to report potentially illegal extremist content.		✓	✓	
<b>Independent Reviewer of Prevent</b>	<b>40</b>	The Independent Review must consider the important findings of this report.	✓	✓	✓	

<b>48</b>	The Government must do more to ensure that tech companies are not allowing illegal violent extremist material or advice useful to terrorists on their online platforms.			✓	✓
<b>50</b>	Tech companies should do more to ensure that their platforms and tools are not used to promote hate and intolerance or fundraise for extremists.			✓	✓
<b>51</b>	Tech companies should better promote the ways in which people can flag hateful and intolerant content on their platforms which is potentially legal but outside of the terms and conditions of their user agreements.	✓		✓	✓
<b>52</b>	Tech companies should consider how to refer details of people they ban from their platforms to the police.			✓	✓
<b>53</b>	The Government should work with tech companies to ensure that problematic searches result in re-directs to counter narrative.			✓	✓
<b>59</b>	The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should create good practice guidance for the reporting of extremism related stories to ensure that this is balanced and not unintentionally giving support to extremist sentiment.	✓		✓	✓
<b>60</b>	The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should, as part of a good practice guide, advise that media outlets do everything in their power to prevent the publication of extremist propaganda.			✓	✓
<b>61</b>	The Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO) should, as part of the good practice guide, do more to encourage the media not to give terrorists the limelight and instead to place greater emphasis on their victims			✓	✓
<b>3</b>	The Government should invest more to support schools to deliver high quality citizenship content to all young people.	✓		✓	
<b>4</b>	The Government should increase resource for programmes which create platforms for learning on extremism and debate, discussion, information provision and challenge around the complex issues used by extremists, with a particular focus on women and young people.	✓	✓	✓	
<b>9</b>	The Government should invest more to support teachers to deliver important work with young people to create resilience to online harm, where possible including parents.	✓		✓	✓
<b>13</b>	The Government should invest more through schools into resourcing which explores extremism with young people.	✓	✓	✓	
<b>38</b>	The Government should do more to ensure that debate and discussion is not being unnecessarily stifled in educational institutions, including higher education.	✓	✓	✓	
<b>41</b>	The Government should increase community radicalisation awareness raising work with a particular focus on families, where possible in collaboration with schools in order to reach parents.	✓	✓	✓	
<b>Tech Companies</b>					
<b>The Independent Press Standards Organisation</b>					
<b>Schools / Higher Education / Further Education</b>					

## ANNEX 2

# The Threat from Extremism





Extremism, hate crime, violent extremism and terrorism are terms which are sometimes used interchangeably but all deliver harm to society.

The threat from terrorism in the UK is assessed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the Security Service (MI5).<sup>1</sup>

Currently the threat is assessed against 'International terrorism' and 'Northern Ireland related terrorism'. In Great Britain, at the time of writing, the formal threat level currently from international terrorism, is SEVERE, meaning an attack is highly likely. The threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism is MODERATE, meaning an attack is possible but not likely.

International terrorism, according to MI5 refers to "terrorism that goes beyond national boundaries in terms of the methods used, the people that are targeted or the places from which the terrorists operate".<sup>2</sup>

Since the 1990s International terrorism has often been synonymous with so-called Islamist extremist groups who falsely promote violent ideology through warped religious theology and identity, historically Al Qaeda (AQ) and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Islamic State (IS) and DAESH.

The term Islamist extremism was disliked by participants of the Programme, particularly those from the Muslim community. Where possible, the Programme has used terms such as AQ-inspired or DAESH-related ideology.

Both these groups have suffered recent defeats in battlegrounds in foreign countries but continue to maintain an intention and capability to direct attacks in the UK (with London often a high priority and desirable target).

It is important to recognise that most terrorist attacks and foiled plots undertaken under the International terrorism categorisation in the UK have been planned and perpetrated by British residents. This made participants question whether the term "International terrorism" was the most appropriate.

In 2017 there were three terrorist attacks which brought tragedy to London which were motivated by International terrorism and more specifically inspired by DAESH related ideology.<sup>3</sup>

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1. HM Government, 2019, Terrorism and national emergencies, <https://www.gov.uk/terrorism-national-emergency>

2. MI5, 2019, International Terrorism, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/international-terrorism>

3. Sky News, 2017, Britain's year of terror: Timeline of attacks in 2017

<https://news.sky.com/story/britains-year-of-terror-timeline-of-attacks-in-2017-11036824>

On the 22nd March 2017 a 52-year-old man drove a car at pedestrians crossing Westminster Bridge, killing four people and injuring dozens more. After crashing his vehicle into railings close to Westminster Tube station, the perpetrator ran into Parliament Square and fatally stabbed police officer Keith Palmer.<sup>4</sup>

On 3rd June 2017 three men drove a van into pedestrians on London Bridge before getting out and running into Borough Market stabbing many. Eight people were killed and many more injured.<sup>5</sup>

On 15th September 2017 an 18-year-old man placed a homemade improvised explosive device on a busy Tube train which exploded in rush hour at Parsons Green station injuring 22 people.<sup>6</sup>

In May 2019, the Home Secretary Sajid Javid revealed that in the last two years there have been a further 19 plots foiled by the police and security services, 14 of which are noted to have been motivated by so called Islamist extremist ideology.<sup>7</sup>

There were also significant trials relating to Londoners who were found to be promoting International terrorism including:

In March 2018 a 25-year-old man was convicted of terrorism offences after showing DAESH propaganda to young children at a supplementary school and planning terrorist attacks in London. When interviewed, the children told police how he had made them role-play stabbing attacks on police officers.<sup>8</sup>

In August 2018 an 18-year-old became the youngest woman to be convicted of plotting a terror attack on British soil. Alongside her mother and sister who were jailed in June 2018, she was part of the UK's first all-female DAESH cell and had planned a terror attack in London after carrying out 'hostile' reconnaissance of landmarks and buying knives.<sup>9</sup>

Many attacks were also perpetrated abroad including on 21st April 2019 in Sri-Lanka where suicide bombers killed at least 253 people and injured some 500 more. The perpetrators targeted Christians worshipping on Easter Sunday and tourists at hotels. Evidence suggests that the attackers were linked to DAESH. British citizens were amongst those killed.<sup>10</sup>

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4. BBC News, 2018, Westminster terror attacks: Who were the victims? <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-39363933>

5. BBC News, 2019, London Bridge attack: What happened <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-40147164>

6. BBC News, 2017, Parsons Green bombing <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/topics/cwz4l24gel2t/parsons-green-bombing>

7. Sky News, 2019, UK security services foiled 19 major terror attacks over past two years, says Sajid Javid <https://news.sky.com/story/uk-security-services-foiled-19-major-terror-attacks-over-past-two-years-says-sajid-javid-11724717>

8. BBC News, 2018, Teacher who tried to build 'army of children' jailed <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43558383>

9. BBC News, 2018, Teenager Safaa Boular jailed for life over IS terror plot, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-45062647>

10. BBC News, 2019, Sri Lanka attacks: What we know about the Easter bombings <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-48010697>

In October 2017, the head of Mi5, Andrew Parker, spoke of the threat to the UK from International terrorism being "intense" and stating that there was "more terrorist activity coming at us, more quickly" and that it can also be "harder to detect". He spoke of there being over 500 live operations involving 3,000 individuals.<sup>11</sup> The Mi5 website states that there are "several thousand individuals in the UK who support violent extremism or are engaged in Islamist extremist activity".<sup>12</sup>

It is thought approximately 850 British citizens travelled to fight for or support violent extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. Most travellers are thought to be male, but this cohort included whole families (including young children) and many females, all across multiple age ranges and including individuals who were previously known to the police and security services and those who were not.<sup>13</sup>

The Security Minister, Ben Wallace said in a media interview in Feb 2019 that more than 400 people "of national security concern" are believed to have returned from conflicts in Syria and Iraq and that around 40 people "have been successfully prosecuted so far – either because of direct action they have carried out in Syria or, subsequent to coming back, linked to that foreign fighting".<sup>14</sup>

The nature of the terrorist threat emanating from Northern Ireland has changed significantly in recent years. After the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the threat from Northern Ireland related terrorism in mainland Britain abated from the heightened activity during 'the troubles' period spanning from the 1960's. However, not all violent extremist groups in Northern Ireland supported the peace process and some remain engaged in violence, actively seeking to perpetrate terrorism in Northern Ireland but also in mainland Britain (with London again a key target).<sup>15</sup>

Mindfulness to this threat was proven correct when in March 2019 the New IRA admitted to being responsible for sending letter bombs to addresses across the UK including in Heathrow, London City Airport and Waterloo station in London.<sup>16</sup>

However, due to the differing nature of organisational structures and tactics deployed by Northern Ireland related terrorist groups, the focus of this Programme was not primarily orientated around this theme as participants felt that the strategic aims of strengthening, encouraging, safeguarding and stopping were not the best fit for mitigating this risk. Participants' overwhelming thought that this was best led by the police and security services.

11. Sky News, 2017, Mi5 Boss Andrew Parker: UK Terror threat evolving at scale never seen before,

<https://news.sky.com/story/uk-terror-threat-evolving-at-unprecedented-level-mi5s-andrew-parker-says-11085432>

12. Mi5, 2019, International Terrorism, <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/international-terrorism>

13. BBC News, 2017, Who are Britain's jihadists, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32026985>

14. The Independent, 2019, Only one in 10 jihadis returning from Syria prosecuted, figures reveal,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/shamima-begum-isis-return-uk-syria-jihadis-terror-threat-prosecute-nationality-a8790991.html>

15. BBC News, 2014, 'IRA group' sent suspect to army offices, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-26229321>

16. The Telegraph, 2019, 'IRA' claim responsibility for letter bombs – but say they sent another one not yet found

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/03/12/ira-claim-responsibility-letter-bombs-say-sent-another-one/>

Domestic extremism according to Mi5 “mainly refers to individuals or groups that carry out criminal acts in pursuit of a larger agenda, such as right-wing extremists”. They may seek to change legislation or influence domestic policy and try to achieve this outside of the normal democratic process”.<sup>17</sup>

Because of the international nature of right-wing extremism, participants again questioned whether this was the most appropriate term.

The Programme found that there was not a universally agreed definition of right-wing extremism with some using the terms, far-right, anti-minority mobilisation, radical right and extreme-right-wing (related to the avowedly violent). The Programme used the term right-wing extremism to relate to the full spectrum of right-wing extremist ideology including anti-minority, anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, ‘non-violent’ street protest, ‘non-violent’ political movement, violent, white supremacist and neo-Nazi.

Right-wing terrorism is not a new phenomenon. 2019 sees the 20-year anniversary of nail bomb attacks on London’s immigrant and LGBT community by a neo-Nazi which killed three and injured many more.<sup>18</sup>

The Programme welcomed the decision to move the portfolio for domestic extremism from the police to the security services.<sup>19</sup> This was seen by participants as an important development as it was evidence of the recognition of the serious violent threat posed by right-wing extremism and therefore rightly put it into the same assessment framework as International and Northern Ireland related terrorism categorisations.

On the 16th June 2016, the threat of right-wing terrorism was catapulted into the public eye in Britain when a 53-year-old man murdered Jo Cox MP in West Yorkshire. The judge in the case set out that his actions had been influenced by white supremacist right-wing extremist ideology.<sup>20</sup>

On 19th June 2017, right-wing terrorism brought chaos to the streets of London when a 48-year-old man drove a van into pedestrians making their way from worship at a local Mosque in Finsbury Park, killing Makram Ali and injuring several others.<sup>21</sup>

International terrorist attacks were also perpetrated in recent times by right-wing extremists including:

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17. Mi5, 2019, What is terrorism? <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/terrorism>

18. Evening Standard, 2019, Nail bomb haunts 20 years on, says survivors of Brick Lane blast, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/nail-bomb-haunts-me-20-years-on-says-survivor-of-brick-lane-blast-a4127096.html>

19. The Guardian, 2018, MI5 to take over fight against rise of UK rightwing extremism <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/28/mi5-lead-battle-against-uk-rightwing-extremists-police-action>

20. The Guardian, 2016, Far-right terrorist Thomas Mair jailed for life for Jo Cox murder, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/nov/23/thomas-mair-found-guilty-of-jo-cox-murder>

21. BBC News, 2018, Darren Osborne guilty of Finsbury Park mosque murder, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-42910051>

On 15th March 2019, a right-wing extremist killed 50 men, women and children in attacks in separate Mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, the deadliest mass shooting ever in that country.<sup>22</sup> The perpetrator, a 28-year-old man, posted a series of videos and articles linked to right-wing extremism in Britain in the three days leading up to the attack on Friday.<sup>23</sup>

On April 27th, 2019, one person died, and others were injured after a shooting at a local synagogue in San Diego, USA. In an 'open letter' published online, the 19-year-old perpetrator declared motivation from the Christchurch attack as well as an attack on the Jewish community in Pittsburgh just 6 months earlier in which 11 were killed. The letter contained virulent anti-Semitism.<sup>24</sup>

Previous MPS Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley set out in February 2018 that "the right-wing terrorist threat is more significant and more challenging than perhaps public debate gives it credit for."<sup>25</sup>

Home Secretary, Sajid Javid revealed in May 2019 that a further 5 plots were foiled by the police and security services which are noted to have been motivated by right-wing extremist ideology.<sup>26</sup>

The number of people in prison in relation to right-wing terrorism offences increased nearly five times since the murder of Jo Cox. Twenty-eight convicted terrorists or suspects were being held for offences connected to right-wing extremism at the end of June 2018, compared to just six when the Labour MP was killed.<sup>27</sup>

The number of people referred to the UK's counter terrorism programme Prevent over concerns related to extreme right-wing activity jumped by 36% nationally in 2017/18.<sup>28</sup>

Senior counter-terrorism sources estimate that there are 100 violent neo-Nazis committed to instigating racial and religious war in Britain.<sup>29</sup>

22. BBC News, 2019, Christchurch Shootings: How the attacks unfolded, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-47582183>

23. Sky News, 2019, NZ terror suspect 'must have been influenced by British far right

<https://news.sky.com/story/nz-terror-suspect-must-have-been-influenced-by-british-far-right-11667808>

24. BBC News, 2019, San Diego synagogue shooting: Rabbi describes seeing attacked <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-48085514>.

25. Reuters, 2018, Britain is facing serious far-right terrorism threat, says UK top officer

<https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-security/britain-is-facing-serious-far-right-terrorism-threat-says-top-uk-officer-idUKKCN1GA2K9>

26. Sky News, 2019, UK security services foiled 19 major terror attacks over past two year, says Sajid Javid,

<https://news.sky.com/story/uk-security-services-foiled-19-major-terror-attacks-over-past-two-years-says-sajid-javid-11724717>

27. The Guardian, 2018, Far-right terror detentions rise fivefold since Jo Cox murder

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/16/far-right-terror-detentions-rise-fivefold-since-jo-cox>

28. BBC News, 2018, Prevent scheme: Extreme right-wing referrals up by 36%, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-46556447>

29. The Guardian, 2018, MI5 to take over fight against rise of UK rightwing extremism

<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/oct/28/mi5-lead-battle-against-uk-rightwing-extremists-police-action>

On the 4th March 2018 a former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia were found seriously ill on a bench in Salisbury. In a nearby town two others become ill, Dawn Sturgess and her partner Charlie Rowley. Dawn Sturgess later died in hospital.

Police believe the Skripals were “targeted specifically” and are treating the case as attempted murder. The UK Government has accused the Russian Government of being behind the attack, alleging the incident to be a case of ‘state sponsored terrorism’.<sup>30</sup>

Whilst the Programme recognises the tragedy of this incident and that resources from the counter-terrorism command and beyond have had to be used to support this investigation, participants agreed that the core objectives of the CVE Programme do not lend well to the challenge of potential ‘state sponsored terrorism’ and as such the Programme has not focused on this issue.

Of course, extremism is not limited to supporters of terrorism or the avowedly violent. Other manifestations include ‘non-violent’ elements which drive harm to society by promoting separatism, segregation, isolation, hatred, intolerance and denial of rights.

Those promoting these ideologies are adept at treading the fine line between legal and illegal activity often successfully avoiding crossing the criminal threshold.

Non-violent religious extremists espouse supremacy over others who are different, sometimes wishing to limit the rights of others.

Manifestations in London have included campaigns to dissuade Muslim community members from adhering to the rule of law, participating in elections or engaging in careers in the police force. A long-standing non-violent extremist argument includes that someone cannot hold multiple identities, for example being British and Muslim.

Religious extremism can also encompass intra-community hate, intolerance and supremacy resulting in violent and non-violent activity. This includes sectarianism.

Other ideological manifestations in London have included the right-wing extremist organisation Britain First delivering provocative so-called ‘Christian Patrols’ outside of Mosques and within communities with a higher percentage of Muslim adherents across the UK including in London.<sup>31</sup>

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30. BBC News, 2018, Russian spy poisoning: What we know so far, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-43315636>

31. The Independent, 2015, Britain First ‘Christian Patrols’ return to east London in wake of Charlie Hebdo shootings, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-first-christian-patrols-return-to-east-london-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-shootings-9988329.html>

'Non-violent' right-wing extremism frequently focuses on presenting negative views on entire communities, often immigrants but most recently, repeatedly towards the Muslim community.

Right-wing extremist political groups have featured in the UK since the 1930's with the introduction of fascist, anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant and anti-multicultural movements. These movements have developed over time with parties such as the National Front (NF) and British National Party (BNP) opposing non-white immigration. Most recently there has been a focus on 'political' opposition to the supposed 'Islamification' of Europe / Britain with groups like Britain First emerging.

In the 2016 London Mayor election, Britain First leader Paul Golding received 31,372 first preference votes.<sup>32</sup> Paul Golding was later jailed for hate crimes against Muslims.<sup>33</sup> BNP candidate David Furness received 13,325 first preference votes.<sup>34</sup>

Right-wing extremism also manifests itself as street protest movements with the EDL holding several rallies in London since its emergence. Its former leader and founder Stephen Yaxley Lennon (also

known as Tommy Robinson), no longer affiliates with the EDL but continues to be active in London. Yaxley Lennon was recently banned from Facebook and Instagram for breaching their rules on hate speech and for allegedly making calls for violence against Muslims.<sup>35</sup>

Most recently, so-called identarian movements have sought to market themselves as the 'new right' of right-wing extremist politics. Generation Identity (GI) is one such identarian extremist group. GI, which was created in France and spread out across Europe, claims to represent "indigenous Europeans" and propagates the right-wing conspiracy theory that white people are becoming a minority in what it calls the "Great Replacement". GI has been noted to be active in London delivering publicity stunts and attending rallies.<sup>36</sup>

New figures released by the Home Office show that over 7,000 people were referred to the Government's Prevent programme between March 2017 and April 2018, and of those who were given support through Channel, 45% related to Islamist terrorism and 44% extreme right terrorism. Channel support is assigned to those considered to be most at risk of radicalisation.<sup>37</sup>

32. BBC News, 2016, London Elections 2016 London Mayor Results <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/london/results>

33. The Guardian, 2018, Britain First leaders jailed over anti-Muslim hate crimes

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/07/britain-first-leaders-convicted-of-anti-muslim-hate-crimes>

34. BBC News, 2016, London Elections 2016 London Mayor Results <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election/2016/london/results>

35. The Sunday Times, 2019, Tommy Robinson banned from Facebook and Instagram for Muslim hate speech

<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tommy-robinson-banned-from-facebook-and-instagram-for-muslim-hate-speech-q3bhs0pgz>

36. The Independent, 2018, White supremacist Generation Identity plan to hold a secret conference in London. Anti fascists aims to stop them,

<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/generation-identity-racist-white-supremacists-conference-london-antifascist-network-a8301851.html>

37. Home Office, 2018, Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2017-to-march-2018>

Whilst it was agreed that not all hate crime can be evidenced to be linked to extremist ideology, religiously aggravated hate crime has been noted as a proxy measure of extremism by Britain's top anti-terror officer, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu.<sup>38</sup>

In October 2018 it was reported that official figures show that there had been a surge in hate crime targeting people due to their religious beliefs, with the majority aimed at Muslims and Jewish people. Police in England and Wales said there was an increase of 40 per cent in 2017/18 compared to the previous year's figures, with 52 per cent aimed at Muslims.<sup>39</sup> In May 2018, official figures in London showed Islamophobic hate crimes increasing by a third from the previous year.<sup>40</sup>

Other manifestations of extremism exist across the ideological spectrum, including but not limited to, extreme left-wing ideology, extreme animal rights activism and other demonstrations of religious extremism.

Extremism is an extraordinarily fluid policy area and over time the extremist ideologies which are most prevalent in society have previously changed and will likely change again. New examples of potential violent extremism ideologies such as gender-based terrorism or mass attacks in schools should be kept under review by academics and stakeholders going forwards.

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38. The Independent, 2018, Terror investigations hit record high in UK as Islamists and far-right 'feed each other', police reveal, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/terror-attacks-uk-police-isis-islamist-far-right-extremists-investigations-a8599571.html>

39. Evening Standard, 2018, Surge in religious hate crime in UK as 64 per cent target Muslims and Jews, official figures show, <https://www.standard.co.uk/news/uk/surge-in-religious-hate-crimes-as-64-per-cent-target-muslims-and-jews-official-figures-show-a3962896.html>

40. The Guardian, 2018, Met figures reveal 'deeply troubling' rise in serious crime in London, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/15/met-figures-reveal-deeply-troubling-rise-in-serious-in-london>





## ANNEX 3

# Community led engagement reports







ANTI-TRIBALISM MOVEMENT

# Mayor's Countering Violent Extremism Engagement Report

## **The Mayor's Countering Violent Extremism Programme – Background**

The Mayor's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme aims to undertake an in-depth consultation with experts, local authorities, stakeholders, women's groups and all of the capital's communities.

It will work with specialist community engagement experts to ensure a full and frank assessment of existing counter-extremism delivery, which includes the work of the government's Prevent agenda in the capital.

The Anti-Tribalism Movement was successful in being granted £15,000 to undertake at arm's length engagement, conducted across London, for the Mayor's CVE programme. The grant was issued for the Anti-Tribalism Movement to engage with London's Black Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) communities.



### **Anti-Tribalism Movement Engagement on CVE**

The Anti-Tribalism Movement organised four community engagement events and roundtable discussions under this grant. These engagement events utilised the programmes overarching objectives to explore how BAME communities can be better engaged on countering violent extremism efforts. The engagement consultation reached across our networks and civil society organisations across the capital, pre-dominantly working with East African Community groups but engaging across different demographics including practitioners, young people, women, community organisations and communities with special needs such as the deaf society. Each engagement event/meeting lasted three hours and facilitated roundtable discussions to gain the community understanding/knowledge of the current countering violent extremism practices and challenges to gain their inputs on how to best counter violent extremism and hate crime across the capital.

In this community engagement report, we have simplified the information and data of the community engagements by adopting an infographics style presentation.

## Stakeholders and Communities this grant engaged and consulted

### Somali Deaf Society




## Current Countering Violent Extremism Practice

The engagement we undertook engaged with stakeholders from four primary cohorts; women, young people, practitioners and the deaf society. Below we have collated the key issues when it comes to engaging with existing CVE practice.



## Key Challenges Identified

The engagement undertaken highlighted a series of issues with the current CVE practice across London. Outlined below is a summary of the challenges.





## Quotes from our community engagement

**Young Participant-** *"I do not know much about Prevent or wider government CVE programme, but it seems Prevent is racially profiling Muslims, conducts surveillance on Muslims and failed to call white supremacy an extremism. Muslims will obviously be suspicious of such a policy"*

**Young Participant** *"At my local youth centre I was able to spend time with my friends to discuss issues such as gangs, identity, achievements, role models etc. But now there are no youth facilities around in my area and myself and peers spend too much time on Xbox, instagram or YouTube, and there are lot of bad people on those social media spaces"*

**Mother Participant-** *"If my son joins extremists groups, I wouldn't know anywhere to seek for help and the police will be a last option for me because I don't know if I will get into trouble"*

**Practitioner Participant-** *"The government has done some great work over the last few years, having said that, the HMG has to do more to win the hearts and minds of Muslim communities across the country as there are negative perceptions and understandings about the government's CVE intentions. It is also important to for the government to understand and adopt their programmes and approaches reflective of the diverse groups of Muslims in the UK and it is counterproductive to assume the Black Muslims and South Asian Muslim's challenges and needs are the same"*

**Practitioner Participant** *"It is a moral obligation for all us to counter violent extremism and I am glad to see City Hall is listening and engaging with us, asking our challenges and listening to our recommendations".*

## Case Study

Engaging with the Deaf Society gave us a unique insight and prospective of their challenges in terms of CVE as they potentially have more vulnerabilities for extremist groups to tap into. It was clear that this community needed more support and better awareness of their daily challenges to create resilience to extremists and there are not enough provisions that cater for their needs. Challenges shared by the deaf society include use the Internet to get support, and several them experienced exploitation aimed at them on the Internet by extremism groups and others. This shows that extremism groups are well ahead of targeting the most vulnerable members of society and we need to be alert to this and ensure that those vulnerable members of society are supported, both in social connections and shared values.

**Deaf Society-** *"We had an individual with extremist and decisive approach join our group and he divided our members and we eventually suspend him. But he took his extremist views to Facebook and members of our deaf society watch his materials and we want him to be stopped"*

**Action:** We have arranged a meeting between the Deaf Society and the local Prevent Team to determine potential actions and future collaborations. The local Prevent Team are already in the process of organising training for them.

## Hate Crime

In recent times, there has been a startling increase in Hate Crime in London. Mayor's office<sup>1</sup> reports an increase from 8,998 recorded incidents per year in December 2013 to 17,560 incidents per year in June 2017. Tell MAMA records a 500% increase<sup>2</sup> in daily reports after key trigger events such as Brexit and terrorist attacks in London.

During the community engagement consultation, we found a clear link between hate crime experienced by BAME communities and more specifically Muslim communities. BAME communities in London suffer high levels of hate crime based on race, religion, and migration status – incidents ranging from verbal abuse to physical assaults. There is severe under-reporting of hate crime by BAME communities, especially amongst Muslim Londoners. There is a pervasive lack of trust in institutional responses to hate crime.

There is a need to increase reporting of hate crime by increasing awareness of the rights of victims and their confidence in agencies and increase agencies' confidence in providing better responses to victims of hate crime.

Whilst the importance of victim support is recognised in the strategic priorities of the police and the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime, there is a shocking absence of specialist support services for victims of hate crime in London generally. Victim Support provides generic advice to victims of all crime but lacks specialist understanding of hate crime and StopHate UK provides only light-touch phone and online support.

If reporting is to be increased and trust between BAME victims and institutions sustainably built, a specialist service is needed to provide in-depth support to victims through the life of a case, empower victims to understand their rights and deal with future incidents, and improve agency responses through scrutiny and effective inter-agency working. This service must speak to the specific needs of communities, and its service provision must be based on specific barriers to reporting and engagement, which include language barriers, low trust in institutions, and cultural sensitivities.

152 out of the 227 engaged (66%), experienced hate crime personally over the last two years.



<sup>1</sup> <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/crime%20/hate-crime-dashboard>

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/jun/07/anti-muslim-hate-crimes-increase-fivefold-since-london-bridge-attacks>

## The Link Between Criminality and Extremism

An overriding theme with some of the demographics we engaged agreed that there is a potential link between criminality and extremism.

Anecdotally, it was shared that young men who are looking to abandon their criminality e.g. gang affiliation, drugs etc whilst in custody often seek to fill their lives with alternative support. This can come in the form of the search of theological answers in a quest to redeem themselves. Whilst ATM and the wider community recognises the role religions like Islam play in steering young people from criminal activities and providing them with a supportive mechanism, it also recognises and acknowledges that this need for redemption can be exploited by radicalisers and extremists.

This becomes a breeding ground for extremists to operate and spread their toxic brand of religion, manipulating the many vulnerabilities these young men face already, including a need to belong, socioeconomic factors, poor mental health, a need for community acceptance, and vulnerability to becoming victims of hate crimes. Extremist messaging, easy access and the ability to offer convincing answers to vulnerable young men leaving the judicial system resonates with these young men with limited religious knowledge and already at the fringes of society and their own communities.

Therefore, it is important to empower credible voices of religious backgrounds to support these young men and to offer them the true teachings of all religions, which includes Islam, and counter the delusional and misguided narratives of extremists who are out to brainwash and manipulate.

## Recommendations

The engagement undertaken by this grant has enabled us to summarise into the following key recommendations

**Training for parents to create awareness and resilience against extremism**



**Awareness raising: Available in the form of leaflets/toolkits for anyone seeking advice on countering violent extremist**

**Relevant stakeholders should consistently and accessibly engage with communities to build trust, longevity and sustainability**



**Culturally sensitive approach and services to communities to yield better outcomes**



**Local authorities, central government and the GLA should provide accessible provisions for victims of hate crimes.**





**Empower credible voices to counter extremism, and decisive ideologies, including: women, role models, positive influencers and civil societies**

**Vulnerable members of society, including Deaf members, should to be given additional support, as their vulnerabilities are complex and unique**



**All British-Muslims challenges and vulnerabilities are different and engagement and support should reflect on those needs rather than conducting a homogeneous approach.**

**Increase reporting of hate crime by increasing awareness of the rights of victims and their confidence in agencies.**



**Increase agencies' confidence in providing better responses to victims of hate crime and punishments for perpetrators of hate crimes.**

**Authorities should engage with social media platforms to be tough on extremists and hateful contents.**



# Perspective of Young Londoners on Countering Hate and Extremism in London

SUPPORTED BY

**MAYOR OF LONDON**



**INTEGRITY**<sub>UK</sub>

## Introduction

- ▶ The past few years have seen ongoing public debate in the United Kingdom about extremism and radicalisation, and how these relate to community integration, a sense of belonging, and local, national or transnational identity. Terrorist attacks linked to Daesh (so called 'Islamic State'; ISIS or ISIL), and the increasing number of arrests relating to right-wing proscribed groups, have added to the intensity of these debates and arguably led to an increasing polarisation of attitudes.
- ▶ In December 2017, the Mayor of London unveiled a new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme, to help understand violent extremism across the capital and to identify opportunities to better address it. The programme has three core objectives: to strengthen London's minority and marginalised communities; to safeguard the vulnerable; and to stop the spread of extremist ideologies.
- ▶ Faiths Forum for London, in partnership with Integrity UK, was supported through the CVE programme to listen to the views of young people aged 13 to 26 from London's many ethnic minority and faith communities, in particular those who feel marginalised or otherwise isolated, on matters relating to extremism, integration, feelings of 'Britishness' and being a Londoner. The aim was to understand the challenges that these young people face and to gain an insight into the solutions that inter-faith communities can offer themselves. A specific goal was to understand their views on the roots of, and pathways into, extremism and on how communities can build resilience against extremism. This included an assessment of the Government's Prevent programme.
- ▶ It was vital to engage with the next generation of Londoners because they are the future of our city. Young people from faith backgrounds often do not engage in public debate and are not always listened to. Previous attempts to gather their opinions have achieved limited success as they have been reluctant to speak openly about these issues to researchers employed by public authorities. Experience also suggests that whilst young people have concerns about existing counter-extremism delivery (most notably Prevent), they are reluctant to voice these for fear of being falsely identified as extremists. To overcome this barrier, we trained young peer researchers from faith backgrounds to lead the data collection process. Young people are more likely to have an honest discussion with someone that they can identify with. At the same time we ensured that the research teams contained individuals from more than one faith, so as to create exposure to those who are different.
- ▶ During November and December 2018, half-day listening events were held in places of worship, student groups and community centres around London. Participants told the researchers their views on extremism and on the actions of local and central government to tackle it. Connected themes that were also explored included life in London and the UK, identity, multiculturalism, relations with local/central government, hate crime and intolerance. Participants were invited to suggest ways in which public authorities could create more cohesive and resilient communities and more effectively mitigate the threat of extremism and rising hate crime.
- ▶ Altogether we facilitated 23 focus groups in 15 boroughs, with a total of 220 participants. Details of our methodology and the demographic characteristics of the participants are available on request.

## Summary of key themes expressed by participants

### This section summarises the key themes expressed by participants.

- ▶ 1. Trust in local and central authorities is a major factor. Local government was more trusted than central government but was often seen as equally ineffective. There was a general lack of confidence across all faith groups in the promotion of integration by both local and central government, and a perceived lack of representation of minorities in local and central government.
- ▶ 2. Among Muslim and Hindu participants there was a perceived rise in hate crime and intolerance since the London terror attacks. Jewish participants expressed mixed opinions on this issue, and followers of other faiths had experienced no change.
- ▶ 3. Islamist and right-wing extremism were seen as the most prevalent forms of extremism in London. Muslim and Jewish participants were more concerned about right-wing extremism than Islamist extremism. Hindus mentioned extremism directed at them by Muslims, and Shia and Ahmadi Muslim participants spoke of intra-community extremism issues including sectarianism.
- ▶ 4. In relation to Islamist extremism, there was a perceived lack of understanding among public authorities and the media of the relationships between Muslims from different traditions, nationalities and ethnicities. Participants, including non-Muslim participants, overwhelmingly felt that Muslims are constantly politicised and problematised.
- ▶ 5. The main causes of extremism identified by participants were socio-economic vulnerabilities, the effect of hate crime, lack of education, lack of mental health support, alienation and a lack of interaction between individuals and communities with those who are different, politics and foreign policy, and lack of a loving/supportive family.
- ▶ 6. Participants felt that rather than being an event, extremism/radicalisation was better understood as a gradual personal and political change. Solutions should therefore also be graduated over time: foreseeing initial grievances and working to remove barriers.
- ▶ 7. There was a general lack of awareness of government strategies to tackle extremism. Participants were either ignorant of Prevent or poorly informed about it. Where there was awareness, there was a general negative perception of it. Policies and government narratives were viewed as being racially influenced and it was believed that right-wing extremism is under-reported and not sufficiently addressed despite being seen as more prevalent than Islamist extremism.



## Recommendations

Recommendations are grouped around four strands: education and youth; improving interactions between communities; improving engagement by central and local government with faith communities; and specific counter-extremism programmes. Each set is preceded with a brief description of relevant themes that emerged from the focus groups. This is followed by a summary of the recommendations that have emerged from these themes. Finally the recommendations are explained in greater detail.

### A. Education and youth

#### *Themes*

- ▶ The current school curriculum does not adequately account for the ethnic, religious and cultural diversity that exists within London, and opportunities to improve understanding of different communities' faiths and cultures are limited. Understanding of different religions and cultures within schools should be improved through changes in curricula.
- ▶ 'Religious literacy' among young people within faith communities should be improved, in order to "crowd out" extremist ideology. They need to be equipped with the tools and knowledge to challenge propaganda and counter extremist and hate-filled narratives.
- ▶ Young people do not feel that they are engaged sufficiently with wider civil society, or that they can influence the decisions of local government and other statutory agencies. Active communication and engagement between the authorities and young people would help create transparency, build bridges and establish trust.

#### *Summary of recommendations*

- **Integrate intercommunal education into the school curriculum**
- **Build Critical Thinking skills among London's young people**
- **Strengthen youth leaders through civic society engagement**
- **Provide more avenues for young people to engage directly with public authorities**

## Recommendations in detail 1 - 4

### **Recommendation 1:**

#### *Integrate intercommunal education into the school curriculum*

- ▶ 1.1. Teaching designed to improve young people's understanding of the different communities in London, and the nuances within them, should be incorporated in the curriculum. This is best achieved through building a more comprehensive Citizenship module into the school curriculum, in which different cultures and religions are explored and discussed in depth.
- ▶ 1.2. Innovative strategies can be put in place to make sure that such an addition to the curriculum is interactive, engaging and goes beyond what is taught in standard Religious Education classes.
- ▶ 1.3. Organisations working with diverse communities and faith/ethnic groups should be involved in developing material.

### **Recommendation 2:**

#### *Build Critical Thinking skills among London's young people*

- ▶ 2.1. City Hall should empower academic and civil society bodies to expand the roll out of existing critical thinking programmes. This can be achieved by convening a meeting at which key organisations would be invited to develop programmes to ensure young Londoners are better equipped to deal with hate speech, fake news, far-right and extremist narratives.
- ▶ 2.2. City Hall and Central Government should also approach media companies and social-media firms to enhance 'digital literacy', so as to empower young people to recognise and evaluate fake news and other forms of inflammatory content they encounter online.
- ▶ 2.3. City Hall could consider providing support for critical thinking workshops to be set up and organised in schools, faith societies within universities and local community centres. These would empower and train young people in ways to deal with hate speech, fake news, far-right and extremist narratives.

### **Recommendation 3:**

#### *Strengthen youth leaders through civic society engagement*

- ▶ 3.1. Committed young people who are emerging as activists within their own faith communities should be trained to become effective community leaders in the future, through an 'emerging young leaders civic society development programme'.
- ▶ 3.2. One part of this could be a mentorship scheme led by City Hall. The Mayor of London is able to encourage civic society organisations, business leaders and leaders in public institutions to mentor young people.
- ▶ 3.3. The Mayor could play an active role in this himself as he can act as a role model for young people in minority communities.

### **Recommendation 4:**

#### *Provide more avenues for young people to engage directly with public authorities*

- ▶ 4.1. Serious thought should be given to the establishment of a representative body for young people in London, a 'London Youth Council'. Such a body would give a voice to young people from diverse London communities, especially groups who are often underrepresented such as those of Somali, Arabs and White working class background.
- ▶ 4.2. This London Youth Council would include representatives from every borough, and from all relevant statutory services. It would be backed directly by City Hall in order to ensure that its work is tangible and can be felt on the ground.
- ▶ 4.3. It would serve as a direct link between young people in London from various communities and City Hall; and would encourage young Londoners to become more active, thus fulfilling one of the four pillars outlined in the Mayor's Strategy for Social Integration.
- ▶ 4.4. More proactive use of social media and community youth centres should also be considered as a way to increase youth engagement.

## **B. Improving interactions between communities**

### ***Themes***

- ▶ Inter-faith activities should be encouraged and facilitated as an effective strategy to halt the rise of hate crime and extremism. Inter-faith activity can come in many forms, from traditional round-the-table dialogue between religious leaders to sports clubs, culture-based activities, school exchanges, skills training and youth mentoring schemes.
- ▶ Joint social action projects involving volunteers from more than one faith background can pave the way for greater understanding between people of different backgrounds. They play a significant role in countering the demonisation of certain communities, upon which right-wing and religious extremist groups capitalise to spread their ideology. Evidence, e.g. from the Near Neighbours programme, suggests that when communities collaborate, they are highly effective at building resilience to extremist narratives.
- ▶ Young people, on the whole, are willing to engage in inter-faith dialogue and activism but lack a medium through which to do so.
- ▶ There is a scarcity of 'neutral spaces' where faith groups can come together. When a particular faith community hosts activities, suspicion and shyness can stop other faith groups taking part.

### ***Summary of recommendations***

- **Strengthen inter-communal relations by creating neutral spaces for intercommunal activities, dialogue and cooperation.**
- **Support faith communities to engage in more inter - faith activities.**

### **Recommendations in detail 5 - 6**

#### ***Recommendation 5:***

*Strengthen inter-communal relations by creating neutral spaces for intercommunal activities, dialogue and cooperation*

- ▶ 5.1. Local authorities should be encouraged to offer neutral and shared working spaces where different civil society organisations and communities can gather on equal terms and discuss issues related to social cohesion and integration. These spaces can also enable civil society groups to collaborate and implement social action programmes.

- ▶ 5.2. City Hall is itself a ‘neutral space’ and could play a vital convening role for inter-faith activity. For instance, the Mayor could convene an annual conference bringing inter-faith and faith-based organisations together to highlight best practice in building understanding between communities and tackling issues around hate and extremism.

### **Recommendation 6:**

#### ***Support faith communities to engage in more inter-faith activities***

- ▶ 6.1. A programme might be put in place to train London’s faith-based organisations (places of worship, community groups, youth associations etc.) in inter-cultural and inter-religious awareness. Such a programme could pair groups from different faith communities together to work on joint projects.
- ▶ 6.2. Training could also be provided to community leaders in order to equip them with the expertise to organise intercommunal activities across different groups in London. This training should revolve around contemporary issues such as the rise of right-wing extremism in schools, universities and public spaces, Brexit and hate crime.
- ▶ 6.3. Central and local government should consider providing more core funding to local organisations, groups and individuals who seek to enhance relations between different communities. A micro-grant scheme could be developed within existing funding streams to support local community groups and activists in their efforts to improve social integration through inter-faith work.

## **C. Improving engagement by central and local government with faith communities**

### ***Themes***

- ▶ The extent to which central and local government engage effectively with local communities was constantly called into question. Connected with this is a broad perception that the authorities engage only with self-appointed spokespeople and faith leaders that fit a liberal, westernised image and not with legitimate representatives of various faith communities.
- ▶ By supporting and engaging with legitimate representatives of different London communities, regional government bodies will go a long way to establishing relationships with these communities and building trust between the government and citizen, especially in minority communities.
- ▶ The majority of religious and community leaders in London uphold and promote principles of co-existence and acceptance of people from other faiths. If these leaders were given the necessary support, they could discredit extremist voices and make them irrelevant.
- ▶ There is a need for greater representation of minority faiths in public institutions and the media in particular. There was a strong sense that Muslim voices in particular are not being heard in the media and that this causes misconceptions and negative portrayals of Muslims.

- ▶ Participants from BME backgrounds felt that local public institutions did not represent them or their interests. The distance between BME communities and local government and services such as police creates the space for mistrust. In turn this creates the ideal conditions for extremism to spread, and hinders the efforts of police and public authorities to tackle extremism and hate crime.
- ▶ The Mayor's decision to create a Social Integration Strategy is welcomed and seen as vital to improving social integration.

### **Summary of recommendations**

- **Promote the representation of credible voices**
- **Improve the quality of engagement**
- **Build upon the Mayor's Strategy for Social Integration to include provisions specifically targeted at faith groups**

### **Recommendations in detail 7-9**

#### **Recommendation 7:**

##### *Promote the representation of credible voices*

- ▶ 7.1. City Hall could work with the media (e.g. through the Religion Media Centre) and public institutions to promote the representation of credible voices from various communities.
- ▶ 7.2. Better use could be made of religious leaders as a unifying voice alongside the Mayor, for instance in responding to emergencies or commenting on the issues of the day.
- ▶ 7.3. Consider offering training in inter-cultural and inter-religious awareness to civil society organisations and businesses so that they are better able to identify legitimate voices.
- ▶ 7.4. Consider providing credible community leaders and young activists with training in media and strategic communications, thus equipping them to challenge extremist and divisive narratives.
- ▶ 7.5. Promote the perspectives of people of faith in mainstream media, and offer them an online and social media platform where their voices can be heard and amplified.

#### **Recommendation 8:**

##### *Improve the quality of engagement*

- ▶ 8.1. The Mayor could utilise his convening power to launch a public and private partnership resource hub to improve to enhance quality interactions and relations with different communities.

## **Recommendation 9:**

### ***Build upon the Mayor's Strategy for Social Integration***

- ▶ 9.1. While there are already programmes in line with the Mayor's Strategy for Social Integration, it is essential that City Hall builds upon this so as to ensure maximum effectiveness in promoting impactful social integration.
- ▶ 9.2. This can be done by providing more training to community leaders and activists on the Strategy for Social Integration so that they can implement the ideas set out in the report in their own local communities. This should include resilience to fake news.
- ▶ 9.3. These efforts will allow the Strategy for Social Integration to be both a civil society-led initiative as well as a regional authority-led initiative.
- ▶ 9.4. Such efforts will allow the Strategy to be seen as an initiative that is evolving in partnership between civil society and City Hall, rather than one that is imposed top-down.

## **D. Specific counter-extremism programme**

### ***Themes***

- ▶ Many in the Muslim community view the authorities with suspicion and feel they are unfairly targeted and scrutinised. The government's Prevent strategy was either unknown to research participants or was viewed very negatively; it was seen as too invasive and interfering, and it was felt that it could scare away potential community leaders from working closer with the government on counter-extremism.
- ▶ An independent review was urgently needed. This should look into the best ways to engage with younger people on counter-extremism matters and explore the ways that tools like social media could be employed to greater effect to engage with young people.
- ▶ The government must be more open when engaging with local communities and make an effort to dispel the perceived stigma against Muslim communities. It should work with more faith communities to deliver common aims rather than targeting one community.
- ▶ More positive perceptions of the government's strategy would encourage young people in London to engage more with it, thus improving its efficacy in confronting extremism in communities.

### ***Summary of recommendations***

- **There should be an independent review of the Government's Prevent strategy**
- **City Hall should consider developing a CVE and Prevent Engagement Forum**
- **Include young people in the conversation**

## **Recommendations in detail 10 -12**

### ***Recommendation 10:***

*There should be an independent review of the Government's Prevent strategy. [NB This has now been announced and is widely welcomed.]*

- ▶ 10.1. The review should be undertaken in full consultation with affected communities.
- ▶ 10.2. It should look into ways of improving public perception of the government's counter-extremism and counter-radicalisation approach. More positive perceptions would encourage young people in London to engage more with the strategy, thus improving its efficacy in confronting extremism in communities.
- ▶ 10.3. Local Authority Prevent Boards should ensure that communities feel legitimately represented. City Hall should lead the way and create a community advisory board that supports City Hall activity in countering violent extremism. This board could be made up of diverse and credible voices from across London.
- ▶ 10.4. The review should seek to clarify processes around safeguarding element, given the stigma that exists around child protection.

### ***Recommendation 11:***

*City Hall should consider developing CVE and Prevent Engagement Forum*

- ▶ 11.1. City Hall is well placed to help discern and promote good practice around counter-extremism, by bringing together a wide range of stakeholders on a new CVE and Prevent Engagement Forum.
- ▶ 11.2. The Forum could include Prevent Leads, Community Coordinators, Community Safety leads, Community Practitioners, civil society organisations and community representatives to enhance the effectiveness of Government counter-extremism communications, safeguarding and the programme to counter hate and extremism.
- ▶ 11.3. Central Government needs to increase support for regional authorities like the Mayor of London's office which are well-placed to strategically support counter-extremism objectives, but also close enough to communities to enhance engagement.

### ***Recommendation 12:***

*Include young people in the conversation*

- ▶ 12.1. Discussions around counter-extremism (including CVE and Prevent) need to include young people in the conversation, to build trust and rapport and knowledge. Central Government in particular should make greater efforts to engage with young people, as well as to offer greater transparency.
- ▶ 12.2. Social media should be explored as an effective means of engagement with young people on counter-extremism issues.



## Conclusion

The broad range of youth voices reflected in this summary report gives a meaningful window into the perspectives on extremism among the various ethnic minority and religious communities of London. The term extremism has been in popular use in mainstream media and society especially since the large-scale terrorist attacks in the US and the UK in the 2000s. Extremism in London and beyond has had significantly negative consequences for society in terms of community relations, multiculturalism, tolerance and hate crime. This report sought to explore these themes by focusing specifically on youth perspectives. The research was conducted by a number of peer researchers and facilitators from FFL and Integrity UK.

The data acquired shows that the majority of participants felt dissatisfied or unaware of current government strategies countering extremism in London. In general, participants felt that the approach to counter-extremism was too securitised and unfairly targeted Muslims. Negative media coverage and government approaches were perceived to have inadvertently encouraged discrimination against Muslims and other minorities while being perceived to be largely ignoring right-wing extremism.

The participants showed little confidence in the approaches of local and central government with regard to the integration of minorities into London and UK society as a whole.

The focus groups proposed several solutions to the problem of extremism that involved “softer” strategies, including: enhancements to the education system to reflect London’s diverse society; promoting more inter-faith work and establishing neutral spaces for young people from all backgrounds to have quality interactions; promoting closer engagement between local government and local communities; improving the representation of minority groups in the media and at the political level; and improving the standard of leadership and organisational structure of community institutions.

It is hoped that future strategies for countering extremism in London take account of the perspectives of the young people who participated in the research and who have either witnessed their peers being susceptible to extremist narratives or who have found themselves drawn towards radicalisation. Alienation and a lack of sense of belonging were consistently cited as prominent problems that affect the mental health of those who are vulnerable to radicalisation; extremist groups provided young people in this category with the illusion of power and belonging.

The policy recommendations set out above aim to encourage healthier community relations and greater respect between the diverse ethnic minority and religious communities of London in order to strengthen young people’s sense of belonging to their localities and to help solve the existential and identity issues that are prevalent among many of the city’s young residents. It is hoped that the recommendations will provide a more solid and effective basis for countering the roots of extremism in London.



London it's time to talk

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## Introduction

Following our successful bid for the Mayor of London Countering Violent Extremism Engagement Grant, Small Steps began this initiative by researching areas where communities might be susceptible to far-right extremist messaging and influence across London.

Specialists in the field, Small Steps staff include former far-right activists and organisers who now use their unique, inside understanding to challenge and reduce the influence of extremist ideology to create safer communities for all.

Understanding how the far-right deploy recruitment tactics, we had a team of researchers look across London to understand where there was evidence of a prevalence of risk, and subsequently we deployed our engagement team to these areas to find out what the public really thought.

Using the campaign name **London – It's Time to Talk**, our teams hit the streets of London in November for a comprehensive community engagement phase which sort to find out what issues are most important to communities potentially 'at risk' of far-right extremism across several areas of London. Using non-traditional engagement methods, our teams placed themselves in areas identified through the day over the course of a week. This enabled our teams to reach a broad range of people from different age groups and backgrounds. Speaking to people on the street, at bus stops, tube stations, local shops, in parks and in and around other important community infrastructure. This allowed us to meet people going about their daily lives and speak to them about what really matters

### Project aims:

For communities to tackle far-right extremism and reduce its influence we need to understand why communities are disengaging with the authorities and mainstream society and looking to the far-right for answers. To help understand this, the project set out to find:

- 1. Areas where there has been evidence of far-right support/activity**
- 2. What issues matter most to 'at risk' people within these areas and how those themes match up to those issues used by the far-right to spread their recruitment messages**

Speaking to people at a local level, in areas identified through our research was crucial to understand what issues are most important to these communities and compare that to those issues used by the far-right to promote their own messages.

### How was this done?

The grant set out two key phases; research of areas and engagement from the team. To identify areas across London where there was some evidence of far-right support,


our researchers used open source information available online to map out key areas across London. All our research was completed through publicly available material.

**To identify areas for engagement we:**

- Used online research showing specific areas where there was historical or current evidence of far-right activity/support. This included- far right websites, public forums, different social media platforms and local election results.

Operating in cohorts of two, our teams then travelled to the areas identified to engage with people at local level Speaking to people in their own area, so they felt comfortable. The teams were clearly visible and provided people who spoke to us with an information leaflet which informed people what our work was about and where to contact us at a later stage should they wish.

**Clearly visible, what did we ask?**



**Simple questions – that matter**

Wanting people to feel relaxed, we initially asked questions about people’s views on the local area We then asked wider questions on national issues.

**Developing on previous projects and questions in other areas, here is an example of our questionnaire.**

- Q. Do you live or work locally?
- Q. What do you like about the local area?
- Q. What don't you like about the local area?
- Q. Is there anything that really bothers you locally?
- Q. Is there anything that concerns you nationally?



## **What did we discover from our initial research?**

Our initial open source research informed us that there were a considerable number of areas in London which we evidenced as having historical or current support/activity from the far-right. We sought to initially visit 13 areas.

## **What we found was a clear indication of how:**

1. Communities are feeling disengaged with mainstream society, politics and the authorities, but also,
2. Potentially successful the far-right movement has had been and continues to be at identifying issues which communities feel angry about, which they can then use to exploit and influence.

## **What areas have far right support/activity?**

We initially focused on areas where the far-right have continually stood in elections over a 20-year period, and then sourcing more recent evidence on known far-right websites, forums and social media pages, this open source information gave us significant insight.

Whilst political party names may have changed over time, i.e. National Front (NF), to British National Party (BNP), there now exists a splinter of smaller groups looking to influence electorates in more ways than just political participation. There has been a grassroots movement in communities, where community activity has re-commenced e.g. marching, intimidation of opposing views, and in some cases violence.

Operating with three specific arms to its movement, the far-right have political parties, street movements and now, direct actions groups like, National Action and many others.

## **Food for thought**

London like many other cities is changing. The population is diversifying, with new communities becoming part of London's growing tapestry of communities, cultures and religions. However, this diversification can sometimes be perceived to negatively impact longer-standing white British communities. This report considers this and wants to understand from these communities what impact this is having on their lives and whether this change could be perceived as a threat or cause grievances in other ways.

## **From our engagement, longer-standing white British communities sometimes feel threatened**

Many of those we engaged see change as negative and gave examples of simple things that cause frustration; including a change in a local butcher or the closing of a public house as having long lasting effects on their community. The closure of local grocery, butchers and public houses has left some white British communities feeling



there are limited places for the community to come together. Some said that they had lost contact with friends who had moved out of London (often themselves fearing rapid change) and this has led to problems of loneliness, disengagement, a fracturing of local communities, and making people feel angry.

This is the potential fertile ground for extremists who are looking to build on these feelings of frustration and grievance. If there is no input of the alternative argument, speaking about the positives of immigration and successful integration stories, there is the risk of creation of a vacuum where extremists seek to manipulate and provide a voice for these communities by recreating the sense of community which many communities feel has been lost.


### **The Changing Face of London**

The white British population across London in some areas is now a 'minority' community. The far-right continually use this population reduction to fuel fear and drive grievances exploiting feelings of resentment and frustration.

Our research suggests that marginalisation of the white British population means that consideration should be given to giving this community similar support that other minority groups benefit from. Not doing so could provide more opportunity for the far-right to increase their momentum, and with due consideration of equality, each community across London should be offered and treated the same.


### Map of London with white British population

The map displays the 33 Boroughs of London and their % of White British Ethnicity Population



The diagram below outlines the mechanisms and processes upon which the far-right moves into disengaged and disenfranchised communities.

### Stages of far-right community development



### Pan London National issues identified


Below is a summary of some of the key national issues raised by London's local communities.

Immigration	Mistrust of Govt	No-ones listening	Crime
<p><b>Increased</b></p> <p>Indigenous communities feel marginalised and that they are being replaced.</p> <p><b>SUGGESTION</b> Educate people on benefits of immigration i.e. NHS Use St George as a rallying point for people. Promote Inclusive patriotism</p>	<p><b>No Trust</b></p> <p>People feel politicians only care about themselves. Example given Brexit – Politicians not acting on peoples wishes.</p> <p><b>SUGGESTION</b> More public engagement Get communities involved in the system to create better societies &amp; build trust</p>	<p><b>Officials don't care</b></p> <p>People feel ignored and labelled racist if they complain. Feel politicians are anti British people</p> <p><b>SUGGESTION</b> Set up public engagement activities – Online, social media, public events – one every quarter. Call it Community Matters</p>	<p><b>Increased</b></p> <p>People felt this was down to immigration and also some people brought up race with regard to Knife crime,</p> <p><b>SUGGESTION</b> Highlight local crime figures, be honest, use schools to educate people on crime, use former gang members to deter young people.</p>




Where has it gone and how can we get it back?

These are the issues which could create an opportunity for the far-right to exploit or manipulate. Below is a infographic highlighting the prevalence of national in our engagement work in 13 London boroughs.





Issues listed here are ones that far-right organisations could seek to exploit as they fit into their recruitment campaigns offering simple solutions to complicated issues.

<p><b>LOCAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ASB – 25%</li> <li>• Public Services Reductions 7%</li> <li>• Community changing for the worse 7%</li> </ul> <p><b>NATIONAL</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brexit – 20%</li> <li>• ASB – 20%</li> <li>• Immigration – 13%</li> </ul>	<p><b>How could the far-right use these Issues</b></p> <p>The far-right collectively are strong advocates of being pro law &amp; order.</p> <p>They are pro-Brexit and often strongly against Immigration.</p> <p><b>Other main issue raised:</b></p> <p>Government/local authorities seen as ineffective and not listening</p>
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**What Now?**

The information obtained and outlined within this report provides rich data, including the local and national issues people are concerned about. Supported by publicly available information, this grant has highlighted the need for further research and engagement in this area.

Small Steps believes that this engagement is only a snapshot of the challenges across London. The aim of this report was to identify areas in London with evidence of far-right activity and the issues which could be used by far-right organisations to exploit the grievances of Londoners at risk of manipulation.

The Mayor’s Countering Violent Extremism programme now needs to consider how this information is actioned. London’s white British community is feeling marginalised, unheard and voiceless. It seems these concerns are heightened and Small Steps recommends that it is paramount an effort is made to engage the community to ensure they are included in the conversation. Engagement with these communities must seek to address people’s genuine concerns and not label people. However, this can also include offering the other side to the debate and providing counter narrative to the overly simplified and false solutions offered by the far-right.

There is a risk that engagement will be seen disingenuous, and engagement must demonstrate to communities that social integration and cohesion is important for all. Communities must feel their opinions are valued and be provided with opportunities to share their opinions and in some cases grievances.

### **Small Steps Recommendations:**

#### **Key local people need to be trained to:**

- Spot signs of far-right support and vulnerability. Training local community leaders will enable them to be empowered to engage with those potentially at risk and be able to offer them support whilst ensuring information is shared with safeguarding practitioners in a timely manner.
- Be confident to have difficult conversations with knowledge, skills and tools to tackle low level support for far-right extremist beliefs. Upskilling by individuals who have access to local networks are then able to tackle low level intolerance and hate which is often the start to the pathway of extremism. They can actively reduce the appeal of extremism and build strong community cohesion.

#### **Research development:**

- To highlight specific areas and groups that are active locally. Research into understanding which areas need more engagement will mean that any future work planned will be focused on the areas which require this support and in some cases intervention.
- To further highlight what issues local people are specifically concerned about so that the appropriate counter-narrative can be deployed. This can be delivered in schools, parent groups, community centres and via active social media platforms. The research will assist with maximising impact and delivering engagement in the areas that need it the most.

### **Giving white British Londoner's a voice:**

The white British community need to build an inclusive and representative voice. Currently, the only voices included in the media are those with a skewed narrative. This misrepresents the voice for London's white British population, these voices are manipulating people's concerns and frustrations by acting as the default representative for all white British communities.

If we create a platform for a more inclusive representative voice, then this will mean a rejection of the current voices that look to promote their own agendas and instead a promotion of active engagement into a mainstream society which is cohesive and integrated.

Using symbols like the English flag or the celebration of St George's Day should not be misused by the voices that look to skew the message but instead should be a source of pride and community. We must wrestle these back from the far-right.



## **The Next Step - Invest where it's needed:**

This report recommends that these issues are tackled with engagement and funding to develop local resources to reduce the appeal of the far-right. The first step is to build community cohesion across London, building tolerance of one another as a foundation for these conversations. A long-term investment and culture change will bring about respect for one another's diversities.

## **Importantly, the engagement must start now**

This report should highlight to stakeholders that the engagement and resilience building needs to start now. The far-right is a movement which has been active for many year's but in some respects is only just starting and seemingly builds momentum every day. The earlier individuals are trained to understand the signs and build confidence to deal with the conversations, the easier it will be for the community to safeguard themselves from these risks.

## **Engaging communities**

This engagement work has given us a snapshot into the views and concerns of London's communities, which importantly, has strong correlation with the issues which the far-right will look to exploit with relative ease. Underpinning all this is that communities need to have an outlet for their frustrations and grievances, and this report recommends upskilling individuals in the community to have knowledge and confidence to listen and provide a counter-narrative to the low-level intolerance and hate which is seen as the gateway to some far-right policies and groups.

Small Steps Community works to reduce extremism and our organisations history and experience understands this issue all too well. this engagement grant has provided an excellent start and our organisation continues to demonstrate interest in furthering this engagement work via the Local Authorities or pan London stakeholders in London.

## **Have a question or need help?**

Small Steps is always available to discuss your concerns.

To get in touch please email – [info@smallsteps.ltd](mailto:info@smallsteps.ltd).

### What the public thought about the engagement:

LONDON  
IT'S TIME TO TALK

**Community Feedback**

**Issues identified by people being open, honest and engaging**

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#### What people Thought

Empowered because they were being asked in their locality

*They understood things cant change overnight, but speaking about it made them feel their opinion was valued*

“Coming to where we live is great. too often councils do things online and people like me won't be heard, I hate computers”  
Female – 55-60

“This should have been done ages ago. Its great people's views will be going direct to those who need to know”  
Male – 35-40

“Honestly, while good, I'm not sure this will change anything, but the fact you are asking is a good step forward”  
Male – 50-55

“Just be honest with us. If things are wrong say, so and explain why things can't happen. Politicians have to trust people”  
Female- 25-30

“It's great this is being done, and that you are not judging people”  
Female – 40-45

“Brilliant idea, no names so people can be honest”  
Female – 25-30

“No-one is ever interested in what young people think, but you are. Just give us somewhere to discuss things and that will help people not judge”  
Male – 15-20

**What the staff thought about the engagement:**

LONDON  
IT'S TIME TO TALK

**Staff Feedback**

**Getting people to be open and honest was easier having opening light questions first**

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**What Staff Thought**

People didn't feel they were being labelled racist because we were non-judgmental.

**People liked being asked for an honest reply and not taking peoples details helped get honest answers**

“Being part of this has really opened my eyes. People need to be engaged more and listened to”

“What helped was having open questions to begin with, this made people feel comfortable and relaxed”

“I actually feel privileged to be involved in this. Something I never thought I would. This project has shown me how talking to people without having any pre- conceived ideas really works”

“People could tell we had a genuine interest and it wasn't just a publicity stunt”

“People really liked the fact we were in their communities talking to them at grassroots level”

## ANNEX 4

# Consultation results



The Mayor conducted a consultation on Countering Violent Extremism with Londoners between 2nd October - 13th November 2018. The consultation was conducted through Talk London, the GLA's online community engagement platform.

A total of 1451 responses were received.

Full details can be found at:

[www.london.gov.uk/talk-london/police-fire-safety/countering-violent-extremism](http://www.london.gov.uk/talk-london/police-fire-safety/countering-violent-extremism)

## **ANNEX 5**

### **Research findings**







# YouGov / MOPAC Survey Results

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London	
<b>Weighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>476</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>532</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>221</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>643</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>249</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>291</b>	<b>594</b>
<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>619</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>574</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>675</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>162</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>281</b>	<b>600</b>
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Which, if any, of the following do you think are the most important issues facing London at this time? Please tick up to four.

Knife crime	<b>60</b>	76	54	52	59	62	52	55	69	74	57	66	47	63	64	65	61	51	65
Housing	<b>59</b>	52	66	74	58	61	53	60	65	53	60	58	62	54	58	61	59	62	58
Brexit	<b>39</b>	28	47	52	37	41	34	44	31	33	42	35	45	42	36	40	39	43	38
Terrorism	<b>29</b>	45	19	19	27	32	28	25	31	43	27	32	20	31	35	32	23	23	32
Jobs and the economy	<b>28</b>	22	35	20	27	30	27	33	24	19	29	27	29	27	24	27	35	29	28
Air pollution	<b>27</b>	18	32	41	28	26	26	28	25	30	30	24	29	25	29	26	26	31	25
Transport	<b>26</b>	27	27	46	33	21	35	26	26	21	30	22	28	28	29	25	23	27	27
Antisocial behaviour	<b>25</b>	40	17	25	27	23	6	23	34	35	24	27	23	33	29	25	26	24	28
Health	<b>22</b>	19	26	19	20	24	20	20	27	27	20	25	25	24	18	22	26	23	22
Hate crime	<b>14</b>	9	19	7	13	15	16	14	12	16	13	16	14	13	9	14	13	14	12
Extremism	<b>13</b>	17	11	4	14	11	13	11	16	14	11	14	10	13	15	15	13	11	14
None of these	<b>1</b>	0	1	0	1	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
Don't know	<b>3</b>	2	1	0	4	3	7	4	1	3	3	4	3	1	4	2	3	3	3

Have you witnessed or experienced any of the following in the past 12 months in London?

Views promoting, endorsing or supporting extremism (views opposing values like democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty or the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs)

I have experienced and witnessed this	<b>7</b>	7	6	10	9	5	3	7	10	4	8	6	7	6	6	8	9	10	6
I have not experienced, but witnessed this	<b>18</b>	15	21	18	23	14	22	19	19	12	19	16	21	22	12	17	16	19	16
I have not experienced or witnessed this	<b>65</b>	68	65	67	58	72	60	64	63	78	66	65	64	61	73	67	64	64	68
Don't know	<b>8</b>	8	5	6	8	8	10	8	7	6	6	11	5	10	7	7	8	5	8
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	1	2	0	2	2	4	2	1	1	1	2	3	0	2	1	3	2	1

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
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<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Hate crime (crime that is motivated by hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity)**

I have experienced and witnessed this	<b>11</b>	11	12	9	13	9	5	13	14	5	8	14	9	11	8	13	15	12	10
I have not experienced, but witnessed this	<b>18</b>	14	21	13	19	17	29	18	16	11	18	18	13	24	10	17	15	14	16
I have not experienced or witnessed this	<b>64</b>	70	62	75	62	66	50	63	67	80	68	59	72	61	76	64	62	69	66
Don't know	<b>5</b>	6	3	2	4	7	10	6	3	3	5	6	4	4	6	6	6	4	6
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	0	2	1	2	1	7	1	0	1	1	2	2	1	1	0	2	1	1

**Views promoting, endorsing or supporting acts of terrorism**

I have experienced and witnessed this	<b>4</b>	4	3	5	5	2	1	4	4	4	4	3	3	5	3	4	5	3	4
I have not experienced, but witnessed this	<b>13</b>	12	15	8	17	10	21	14	9	10	14	13	12	16	6	15	11	14	11
I have not experienced or witnessed this	<b>75</b>	75	77	84	70	79	63	74	80	81	76	73	78	72	84	72	72	77	75
Don't know	<b>7</b>	8	4	2	6	7	12	7	5	3	5	9	4	7	6	7	9	4	8
Prefer not to say	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	1	2	3	1	1	3	1	2	2	0	1	1	2	1	1

**Do you think that the threat from the following is increasing or decreasing in London?**

**Extremism (views opposing values like democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty or the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs)**

It is increasing significantly	<b>24</b>	31	21	21	25	22	14	22	30	29	22	26	23	28	19	25	24	24	23
It is increasing slightly	<b>37</b>	37	40	50	38	37	35	37	40	38	39	35	34	37	44	33	40	33	39
<b>TOTAL INCREASING</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>63</b>
It is staying the same	<b>22</b>	19	25	17	23	21	27	22	22	18	22	22	23	20	17	24	23	22	21
It is decreasing slightly	<b>3</b>	1	3	6	3	3	5	3	2	3	2	4	1	5	3	5	1	3	3
It is decreasing significantly	<b>1</b>	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	1
<b>TOTAL DECREASING</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
Don't know	<b>13</b>	11	10	6	11	16	19	15	6	11	13	13	18	8	16	13	11	17	12

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	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
<b>Weighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	289	476	77	532	558	125	593	221	150	643	447	167	121	198	249	150	291	594
<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Hate crime (crime that is motivated by hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity)**

It is increasing significantly	23	22	27	12	22	24	17	23	25	23	19	28	19	30	17	25	21	21	23
It is increasing slightly	38	32	43	55	38	38	36	39	38	37	39	37	38	37	41	34	39	37	38
<b>TOTAL INCREASING</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>
It is staying the same	21	28	18	17	22	20	20	20	25	22	22	20	19	21	21	23	25	20	23
It is decreasing slightly	4	4	4	3	4	4	9	4	2	5	5	3	5	3	3	6	3	5	4
It is decreasing significantly	1	1	0	1	3	0	4	1	2	0	2	1	1	2	1	0	2	0	1
<b>TOTAL DECREASING</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
Don't know	12	13	8	13	11	13	15	13	9	12	13	12	19	6	17	12	10	17	12

**Terrorism**

It is increasing significantly	19	27	14	10	18	19	17	15	25	23	15	23	12	19	16	18	20	14	19
It is increasing slightly	26	27	26	34	25	27	23	26	25	29	29	22	26	23	32	23	25	24	27
<b>TOTAL INCREASING</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>46</b>
It is staying the same	34	34	39	33	34	34	25	36	35	31	35	32	35	39	31	38	34	37	35
It is decreasing slightly	8	3	10	11	10	7	18	8	6	5	8	9	8	10	5	7	9	9	7
It is decreasing significantly	1	1	1	1	2	1	0	2	0	1	2	1	3	2	0	2	2	2	1
<b>TOTAL DECREASING</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>
Don't know	12	8	10	11	12	12	17	13	8	10	12	12	16	7	16	12	10	14	12

**Which of the following, if anything, do you think causes an individual to become involved in carrying out or promoting terrorism? Please tick up to three.**

Religious fundamentalism	53	71	47	50	53	54	38	46	71	71	52	55	52	58	52	59	52	53	56
Influential influencer (groomer)	43	46	41	53	39	47	34	42	47	48	43	43	41	36	50	45	40	44	43
Isolation or lack of interactions with people who are different	27	23	33	34	28	27	32	27	28	25	30	24	27	25	28	25	22	26	25
Individual personality or behaviour flaws	23	25	20	30	19	27	18	22	25	30	24	21	24	21	25	19	26	21	24
Search for belonging	17	11	21	31	16	19	19	21	13	8	17	17	21	14	18	18	14	22	15
Political fundamentalism	17	18	18	19	19	15	11	15	25	21	17	18	17	19	19	20	17	21	17
Being a victim of racism or discrimination	16	11	18	18	14	17	18	18	9	12	14	17	12	17	12	13	17	12	15
Desire to have power over others	15	20	12	8	13	17	23	12	16	18	13	17	11	18	14	14	19	12	17
Government foreign policy	13	5	21	9	19	8	12	17	8	8	15	12	20	16	8	11	18	15	13
Poverty or deprivation	13	7	16	19	13	14	18	15	8	8	14	13	11	10	11	17	10	14	11
Government domestic policy	4	2	5	6	7	2	2	6	3	2	4	4	8	4	4	2	5	6	4
Other	2	1	3	0	3	1	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	0	2	4	2	2
None of the above	1	3	1	1	2	1	3	2	1	0	1	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	1
Don't know	9	10	8	2	10	9	14	10	7	8	10	8	11	11	10	9	7	10	9

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
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<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

What, if anything, do you think causes people to become separated or disengaged from society? Please tick the three that you think have the biggest impact.

A lack of willingness from some to integrate and interact with others	<b>45</b>	58	37	52	46	44	32	39	56	65	44	46	33	46	52	46	50	41	48
Lack of sense of belonging	<b>38</b>	33	42	55	36	40	37	38	42	33	42	33	46	32	41	34	30	38	36
Lack of quality interaction with people who are different	<b>36</b>	37	36	42	35	36	37	35	35	39	35	36	35	35	38	35	34	34	36
Lack of belief and confidence in statutory bodies (e.g. the government; police and authorities)	<b>33</b>	26	42	30	30	36	29	36	31	31	34	33	35	31	30	36	30	35	31
Poverty	<b>27</b>	16	35	24	26	29	36	31	20	17	31	23	28	28	24	29	19	29	24
Language barriers	<b>24</b>	31	22	22	25	24	24	21	27	34	24	25	22	23	23	24	29	22	25
Being a victim of crime or racism	<b>22</b>	14	26	18	19	24	26	24	18	13	20	24	22	25	11	18	20	19	18
Other [see Tab 1]	<b>5</b>	4	6	5	6	4	3	6	4	5	4	6	8	3	4	6	7	7	5
None of these	<b>2</b>	3	2	0	3	1	3	2	1	2	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	3	2
Don't know	<b>10</b>	11	6	7	9	10	12	10	8	10	9	10	11	10	13	9	9	10	10

How effective or ineffective do you think the below are in reducing the risk of people carrying out extremism, hate crime and terrorism?

Campaigns / projects countering extremist and terrorist propaganda

Very effective	<b>9</b>	8	10	3	10	8	15	9	7	6	8	11	4	11	4	10	13	5	10
Fairly effective	<b>31</b>	27	36	42	29	33	37	30	30	33	31	31	32	28	37	29	25	28	32
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>42</b>
Fairly ineffective	<b>27</b>	29	26	27	29	25	18	24	35	33	28	26	31	32	24	23	31	30	26
Very ineffective	<b>11</b>	12	9	14	14	8	9	12	12	7	11	11	9	12	12	12	12	13	11
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>37</b>
Don't know	<b>22</b>	24	19	14	18	25	20	24	17	21	22	22	24	17	22	25	20	25	21

Campaigns / projects promoting a positive alternative to extremist and terrorist propaganda

Very effective	<b>10</b>	6	11	11	10	9	11	11	6	8	8	12	5	8	5	14	10	7	10
Fairly effective	<b>31</b>	28	36	29	30	31	30	30	32	33	31	29	34	30	36	23	27	27	30
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>40</b>
Fairly ineffective	<b>26</b>	28	25	28	28	25	28	24	29	29	26	26	24	26	23	27	33	27	26
Very ineffective	<b>10</b>	13	7	11	11	9	10	10	13	8	10	11	10	14	8	9	12	11	10
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>36</b>
Don't know	<b>24</b>	26	20	21	21	26	20	26	20	23	24	22	27	22	27	27	19	28	23

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Strong, cohesive and integrated communities**

Very effective	30	21	38	41	29	31	32	33	24	25	33	26	28	27	26	30	31	31	27
Fairly effective	35	37	37	47	37	33	23	33	42	44	36	34	37	33	45	32	30	33	37
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>65</b>
Fairly ineffective	13	18	10	4	12	13	20	10	15	14	12	14	12	14	12	12	16	13	13
Very ineffective	6	8	5	2	8	4	5	7	6	5	5	8	6	7	4	6	9	7	6
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>19</b>
Don't know	16	16	12	6	13	18	20	17	13	12	14	18	16	18	14	19	14	17	16

**Strong role models in society**

Very effective	22	17	27	23	19	25	25	23	19	20	22	23	14	16	19	26	23	19	21
Fairly effective	37	35	38	60	40	35	29	35	43	42	40	34	49	37	45	32	28	42	36
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>57</b>
Fairly ineffective	17	22	15	9	18	15	19	15	16	20	17	17	18	21	12	16	22	16	18
Very ineffective	7	8	6	1	8	6	4	7	9	4	6	8	4	7	5	7	12	6	7
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>
Don't know	17	18	14	7	15	19	23	19	12	13	16	19	16	18	18	19	16	17	18

**Education programmes in schools**

Very effective	20	11	26	18	17	22	25	22	13	15	21	17	15	13	16	18	20	15	17
Fairly effective	40	37	42	54	40	39	34	40	40	43	40	39	43	39	41	42	37	42	40
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>
Fairly ineffective	16	23	12	15	16	16	16	12	23	21	15	17	18	24	19	15	16	17	18
Very ineffective	7	8	5	1	9	4	5	6	9	5	5	8	5	5	4	6	12	6	7
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>
Don't know	18	21	15	11	17	19	19	19	15	16	18	18	19	19	20	19	16	20	18

**Interventions for individuals at risk of manipulation towards extremism or terrorism**

Very effective	16	14	19	18	15	18	19	18	11	13	17	15	12	19	10	17	20	14	16
Fairly effective	38	34	39	54	40	36	40	37	40	36	40	35	46	29	39	37	27	39	35
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>51</b>
Fairly ineffective	17	21	15	11	18	16	17	14	22	22	16	19	15	23	21	13	19	15	19
Very ineffective	5	8	3	3	7	3	2	5	7	5	4	6	4	6	5	5	7	5	6
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>25</b>
Don't know	24	24	23	13	21	27	23	26	20	24	23	26	24	24	24	27	27	27	24

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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Awareness training for the public**

Very effective	10	5	14	5	10	9	12	12	7	4	9	11	6	6	5	13	10	8	9
Fairly effective	33	30	36	40	29	37	36	33	31	36	33	33	32	32	36	29	31	30	33
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>42</b>
Fairly ineffective	28	31	26	35	31	24	27	24	35	30	30	23	31	28	31	23	30	29	28
Very ineffective	9	13	6	7	13	6	8	9	10	8	8	11	9	13	7	10	12	11	9
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>37</b>
Don't know	20	21	18	13	17	23	18	22	18	21	19	22	21	21	21	25	17	22	21

**Tougher laws for tackling extremism**

Very effective	22	31	18	17	23	20	21	20	23	27	20	25	14	17	21	25	24	15	24
Fairly effective	28	28	30	24	26	29	29	27	27	30	27	28	28	25	32	25	29	25	29
<b>TOTAL EFFECTIVE</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>53</b>
Fairly ineffective	24	21	26	38	25	23	25	24	25	21	28	19	30	33	23	20	20	28	22
Very ineffective	10	7	11	14	12	8	8	10	11	9	10	10	8	10	11	9	14	10	10
<b>TOTAL INEFFECTIVE</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>33</b>
Don't know	17	14	15	8	13	20	18	18	13	13	16	18	21	14	14	20	13	21	15

**How much support, if any, do you think is available to protect individuals who might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism and terrorism?**

None	7	5	7	4	7	6	6	7	8	6	5	9	4	8	6	9	7	6	7
Not very much	47	45	47	61	48	45	45	42	53	55	47	46	44	45	47	45	43	44	45
<b>TOTAL NONE / NOT MUCH</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>52</b>
A fair amount	15	17	16	12	17	13	18	17	12	10	16	14	16	11	12	14	20	14	15
A lot	2	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	2	0	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
<b>TOTAL FAIR AMOUNT / A LOT</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>
Don't know	29	30	28	20	25	33	29	31	25	29	30	28	34	33	33	30	28	34	30

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
<b>Weighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	289	476	77	532	558	125	593	221	150	643	447	167	121	198	249	150	291	594
<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

How confident, if at all, would you say you feel about being able to spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards the following?

**Child sexual exploitation**

Not confident at all	14	14	13	15	14	13	18	11	11	22	12	16	10	14	14	15	11	13	13
Not very confident	40	38	42	50	41	40	38	39	43	45	43	36	44	50	40	33	43	40	41
<b>TOTAL NOT CONFIDENT</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>54</b>
Fairly confident	23	26	25	20	21	25	17	23	31	17	22	24	21	12	28	25	23	24	22
Very confident	5	2	5	5	5	5	9	5	2	2	5	5	5	4	3	4	5	5	4
<b>TOTAL CONFIDENT</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>26</b>
Don't know	18	21	16	9	19	17	17	22	12	14	18	19	20	20	15	23	18	18	20

**Gangs and criminality**

Not confident at all	9	11	9	8	7	11	5	8	9	17	8	11	6	13	10	10	6	8	10
Not very confident	34	37	31	52	33	35	36	28	41	43	37	30	35	36	38	27	37	33	35
<b>TOTAL NOT CONFIDENT</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>44</b>
Fairly confident	32	29	36	28	33	31	30	36	28	23	31	33	33	27	30	33	32	33	30
Very confident	9	5	10	3	12	6	15	9	9	4	8	10	7	8	5	9	10	8	8
<b>TOTAL CONFIDENT</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>38</b>
Don't know	16	19	14	9	15	18	13	19	13	13	16	16	18	16	16	21	15	18	18

**Extremism and terrorism**

Not confident at all	15	13	15	14	14	15	17	12	15	21	13	17	9	17	13	15	14	12	14
Not very confident	43	50	41	57	41	45	40	40	48	53	47	37	40	49	51	37	40	41	44
<b>TOTAL NOT CONFIDENT</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>58</b>
Fairly confident	20	14	24	16	21	19	21	22	19	10	18	22	28	14	16	18	23	22	18
Very confident	4	2	5	2	6	2	7	4	6	1	4	4	3	2	3	5	5	4	4
<b>TOTAL CONFIDENT</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>22</b>
Don't know	19	22	16	11	18	19	15	23	13	15	18	20	21	18	17	25	19	21	20

**Modern slavery**

Not confident at all	14	14	14	18	11	16	13	12	13	23	13	14	11	14	14	15	11	14	13
Not very confident	43	43	44	54	43	44	43	40	49	48	46	40	41	49	50	38	44	42	45
<b>TOTAL NOT CONFIDENT</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>58</b>
Fairly confident	20	19	23	10	23	18	23	22	21	11	19	22	24	15	14	19	22	21	18
Very confident	4	1	4	6	4	3	4	4	4	2	4	4	3	2	5	3	4	4	4
<b>TOTAL CONFIDENT</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>22</b>
Don't know	19	23	15	11	19	19	17	22	13	16	18	20	20	20	16	24	19	19	21



Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Have you ever received training in spotting the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation towards extremism and terrorism?**

I have received training	<b>10</b>	9	13	9	11	10	8	11	13	5	11	9	8	6	8	16	11	10	10
I have never received training	<b>84</b>	88	83	86	81	86	80	82	82	93	83	85	84	89	85	80	83	83	84
Can't remember	<b>6</b>	3	4	5	8	4	12	6	5	2	6	6	8	5	7	4	6	6	6

**Would you like to receive training on how to spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism and terrorism?**

[This question was only asked to those who have never received training; n=914]

I would	<b>39</b>	28	46	34	36	41	59	41	35	20	40	36	32	40	35	36	37	31	38
I would not	<b>31</b>	39	23	37	37	25	16	30	36	37	33	28	38	35	32	28	35	34	33
Don't know	<b>31</b>	33	31	29	26	34	25	29	28	42	27	36	30	24	33	36	28	35	29

**Would you like to receive more training on how to spot the signs that someone might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism and terrorism?**

[This question was only asked to those who have received training; n=116]

I would	<b>52</b>	42	61	56	44	60	65	49	58	44	50	56	58	49	39	46	70	57	48
I would not	<b>30</b>	39	21	44	38	23	28	29	34	36	29	33	35	33	38	32	25	37	30
Don't know	<b>18</b>	20	18	0	18	17	7	23	8	20	21	11	7	19	22	22	5	7	22

**If you were worried about an individual being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism or terrorism, would you or would you not know how to seek support from the authorities?**

I would	<b>36</b>	35	38	31	37	35	35	36	41	29	35	37	30	33	32	38	41	32	36
I would not	<b>44</b>	45	46	54	42	46	41	44	44	50	47	40	49	45	44	43	44	48	43
Don't know	<b>20</b>	21	16	15	21	19	24	21	15	20	18	23	21	22	24	20	15	20	21

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
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	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
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<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Have you, or have you not seen any campaigns/posters/literature which highlights where to seek help from?

I have	13	11	15	8	14	12	17	14	13	3	12	14	14	12	4	11	16	13	10
I have not	74	81	73	81	72	77	65	71	79	89	75	73	72	78	84	74	74	72	78
Don't know	13	8	12	11	14	12	19	15	8	8	13	13	14	10	12	15	10	15	11

In each of the following situations, how likely or unlikely would you be to tell someone...?  
If you were concerned a person was vulnerable to child sexual exploitation

Very likely	48	44	51	47	46	50	48	48	53	43	47	50	46	42	47	48	46	44	48
Fairly likely	28	31	27	38	28	27	29	28	23	36	28	28	25	31	31	27	30	26	30
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>77</b>
Fairly unlikely	5	7	4	7	7	4	8	5	7	4	6	4	6	4	5	4	4	7	4
Very unlikely	3	2	3	1	3	3	0	3	2	3	2	3	2	4	3	3	5	2	4
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>
Don't know	13	14	13	6	13	14	12	13	15	13	14	12	15	19	11	16	14	18	13
Prefer not to say	3	3	3	2	3	2	4	4	1	2	2	3	6	0	3	2	2	4	2

If you were concerned a person was vulnerable to domestic abuse

Very likely	34	26	39	34	32	37	41	35	37	23	33	37	35	28	32	35	29	34	32
Fairly likely	36	38	36	46	36	37	34	36	33	42	39	33	32	35	36	36	42	34	37
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>69</b>
Fairly unlikely	10	15	7	10	12	8	8	9	11	14	9	11	4	12	13	10	12	8	11
Very unlikely	3	3	3	0	3	3	2	3	2	4	3	3	3	4	2	3	4	3	3
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>
Don't know	14	16	13	8	14	14	10	14	16	16	15	14	20	21	14	15	12	18	15
Prefer not to say	2	3	2	3	3	2	5	3	0	1	2	3	6	0	3	2	1	4	2

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
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	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**If you were concerned that someone was carrying a knife**

Very likely	<b>33</b>	34	34	24	31	35	22	31	44	35	31	36	24	34	33	38	34	31	34
Fairly likely	<b>32</b>	32	33	42	30	33	31	33	26	36	33	31	31	33	37	30	28	29	33
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>67</b>
Fairly unlikely	<b>13</b>	12	12	17	15	10	20	12	11	10	14	10	15	14	9	12	15	13	12
Very unlikely	<b>5</b>	3	5	3	6	3	9	5	2	4	4	5	6	2	4	3	9	5	4
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>
Don't know	<b>15</b>	17	15	14	14	17	13	15	17	14	15	15	20	17	15	16	13	19	15
Prefer not to say	<b>3</b>	3	3	0	4	2	5	4	0	2	3	3	5	1	2	2	2	3	2

**If you were concerned a person was vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation to extremism or terrorism**

Very likely	<b>31</b>	30	32	30	30	33	29	31	34	29	28	36	22	30	30	37	34	25	34
Fairly likely	<b>31</b>	31	32	42	30	32	32	31	29	36	33	29	32	38	30	28	33	32	31
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>65</b>
Fairly unlikely	<b>12</b>	12	12	14	15	9	10	12	14	10	13	9	15	9	14	10	10	14	10
Very unlikely	<b>4</b>	3	4	2	5	3	5	5	2	5	4	4	3	2	5	4	5	5	4
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>14</b>
Don't know	<b>19</b>	22	18	10	17	20	17	18	20	18	19	18	24	20	18	19	17	22	19
Prefer not to say	<b>3</b>	4	3	1	3	3	6	4	1	2	3	4	4	1	2	3	2	4	2

**If you were concerned that a person was vulnerable to modern slavery**

Very likely	<b>32</b>	28	34	31	31	33	31	31	40	25	31	35	27	26	31	36	34	29	33
Fairly likely	<b>34</b>	33	34	50	32	36	34	35	27	40	35	32	34	39	36	30	32	33	34
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>67</b>
Fairly unlikely	<b>11</b>	15	9	11	14	8	12	11	11	13	12	10	10	11	13	8	13	10	11
Very unlikely	<b>3</b>	2	4	0	3	3	4	4	2	2	4	3	2	4	2	5	3	4	3
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>
Don't know	<b>17</b>	19	16	5	16	17	15	16	20	16	16	18	20	20	16	18	16	20	17
Prefer not to say	<b>3</b>	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	0	3	2	4	7	0	2	3	1	5	2

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<b>Unweighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	288	440	87	471	619	121	574	224	171	675	415	162	122	207	239	151	281	600
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Which, if any, of the following would you tell if you thought a person might be vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation to extremism or terrorism? Please tick all that apply.

Police	<b>66</b>	76	61	75	66	66	60	62	72	77	64	69	60	66	63	72	66	62	68
A friend or family member	<b>33</b>	24	40	35	31	35	46	35	27	23	33	34	37	24	28	29	32	34	28
Local authority	<b>27</b>	24	24	35	25	28	28	28	25	23	24	30	20	21	25	28	26	23	25
Professional (Teacher or healthcare practitioner etc...)	<b>22</b>	23	22	23	17	27	28	20	24	23	21	24	15	25	23	23	18	20	22
Employer or colleague	<b>17</b>	13	18	21	15	18	15	18	18	9	17	16	14	16	13	14	18	13	16
Community worker	<b>15</b>	9	16	18	15	15	17	15	13	14	15	15	12	13	12	17	14	14	14
Faith leader	<b>10</b>	6	12	9	9	11	10	10	12	7	9	11	8	10	9	11	11	8	11
Community member	<b>8</b>	2	11	10	9	8	9	9	7	4	8	9	8	4	6	7	13	6	8
Someone else [see Tab 2]	<b>1</b>	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1	1	1	3	1	0	3	1	2
Don't know	<b>12</b>	10	13	11	11	13	10	13	12	11	13	10	11	21	14	11	13	12	14
I wouldn't tell anyone	<b>2</b>	2	2	1	2	2	5	1	4	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	3	3	2
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	2	2	0	3	1	3	3	0	2	2	2	5	0	3	1	1	3	1

In the previous question, you said you wouldn't tell anyone if you were concerned about someone being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism. Which two or three, if any, of the following are reasons for that? Please tick up to three.

[This question was only asked to those who said they wouldn't tell anyone; n=22]

Because I would fear negative repercussions on the person I was worried about	<b>22</b>	45	19	0	0	44	10	27	24	33	23	21	0	60	38	0	0	0	28
Because I don't believe action would be taken	<b>16</b>	10	25	0	10	22	0	27	12	39	23	7	21	60	0	29	0	26	13
Because I believe the process wouldn't be anonymous	<b>14</b>	17	26	0	4	23	25	0	14	17	4	28	9	0	0	47	0	26	0
Because I don't want to get involved in other people's affairs	<b>13</b>	28	6	0	4	21	10	0	10	50	15	10	9	0	38	0	0	6	15
Because I don't think it is serious enough to report	<b>13</b>	0	36	0	11	14	25	22	0	0	10	16	0	0	0	47	33	20	11
I don't know who the best person to tell is	<b>12</b>	28	0	0	0	24	0	0	22	33	13	10	17	0	38	0	0	12	15
I would fear negative repercussions on me or my community	<b>10</b>	17	16	0	11	9	0	22	14	0	10	11	0	0	0	0	33	0	11
Because it would be too much effort	<b>6</b>	0	16	0	11	0	0	22	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	33	0	11
Another reason [see Tab 3]	<b>12</b>	0	11	0	8	16	0	32	12	0	7	19	17	0	19	0	24	12	15
Don't know	<b>20</b>	32	13	0	23	18	9	0	52	0	23	16	20	40	43	0	15	13	30
Prefer not to say	<b>24</b>	13	15	100	48	0	55	19	0	28	26	21	42	0	0	24	29	29	16

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London	
<b>Weighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	289	476	77	532	558	125	593	221	150	643	447	167	121	198	249	150	291	594
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Thinking specifically about the police's role in protecting vulnerable people from all forms of harm... You said you wouldn't tell the police if you were concerned about someone being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism. Which of the following, if any, are the main reasons for that? Please tick up to three.

[This question was only asked to those who didn't select police when asked who they'd tell if they thought a person might be vulnerable; n=361]

I would fear negative repercussions on the person I was worried about	<b>26</b>	15	33	31	23	28	29	25	25	26	27	24	22	22	23	30	24	27	23
Because I don't believe action would be taken	<b>21</b>	26	21	23	21	21	16	22	18	28	21	22	20	25	21	13	25	20	20
I believe the process wouldn't be anonymous	<b>19</b>	17	22	12	20	18	17	18	21	25	18	21	18	18	21	23	6	16	19
I don't trust the police	<b>15</b>	9	19	4	15	15	20	16	9	11	14	17	14	8	9	21	17	16	13
I don't know how to contact them	<b>11</b>	11	12	24	7	15	11	10	12	16	15	5	15	10	7	10	19	15	10
I didn't think that the police were involved in non-criminal activity	<b>11</b>	8	9	27	10	12	6	11	15	11	11	11	7	12	13	14	13	14	11
I would fear negative repercussions on me or my community	<b>11</b>	11	11	15	7	15	13	10	12	12	13	8	15	9	9	7	10	12	9
I had a previous bad experience with the police	<b>6</b>	3	9	7	7	6	4	8	4	2	9	2	11	5	3	3	14	7	7
I don't think it is serious enough to report	<b>6</b>	2	6	15	6	5	5	6	6	0	6	4	8	2	4	3	4	7	3
Another reason [see Tab 4]	<b>8</b>	6	6	6	8	8	8	8	10	5	7	9	7	0	10	6	8	7	7
Don't know	<b>24</b>	28	21	13	23	25	24	23	27	25	20	29	21	36	20	29	25	21	28
Prefer not to say	<b>8</b>	15	6	5	12	5	15	8	6	4	8	9	12	0	15	1	8	8	8

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)	
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

Thinking specifically about local authority's role in protecting vulnerable people from all forms of harm... You said you wouldn't tell the local authority if you were concerned about someone being vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation towards extremism. Which of the following, if any, are the main reasons for that? Please tick up to three.

[This question was only asked to those who didn't select local authority when asked who they'd tell if they thought a person might be vulnerable; n=801]

I didn't think that the local authority was involved in countering extremism and terrorism	38	39	41	65	34	42	33	37	40	44	40	35	43	38	37	35	38	40	37
Because I don't believe action would be taken	34	43	28	37	36	32	28	27	44	52	31	38	39	37	30	38	25	37	33
I don't know how to contact them	24	18	29	32	21	27	30	26	17	20	28	18	30	18	20	24	23	29	21
I don't trust the local authority	16	21	12	17	21	11	13	14	21	20	16	16	14	13	18	19	15	16	16
I believe the process wouldn't be anonymous	14	18	12	10	13	15	8	12	16	24	12	17	10	21	16	11	15	9	16
I had a previous bad experience with the local authority	4	2	5	1	5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	5	1	4	5	6	7	3
I don't think it is serious enough to report	3	1	5	3	4	2	7	3	3	3	3	4	6	5	0	3	3	4	3
Another reason [see Tab 5]	6	5	7	5	5	7	2	6	6	8	6	6	6	2	8	5	7	7	6
Don't know	17	18	15	7	16	19	21	19	16	13	17	18	13	22	22	17	18	15	20
Prefer not to say	4	4	5	2	5	3	8	5	2	1	3	5	7	0	5	3	1	4	3

How likely or unlikely is it that you would contact the police if...?

You witnessed a violent robbery

Very likely	67	66	69	79	65	69	61	65	71	72	71	61	68	69	73	64	62	68	67
Fairly likely	18	19	21	16	18	18	18	18	17	18	16	21	15	18	13	22	22	16	19
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>87</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>86</b>
Fairly unlikely	2	3	2	0	3	2	0	3	3	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	4	2	3
Very unlikely	2	1	1	1	3	1	5	3	1	1	2	2	0	3	1	3	5	2	3
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>
Don't know	8	8	5	3	8	8	10	8	7	8	6	11	11	7	8	6	5	9	7
Prefer not to say	2	3	2	1	3	2	6	3	1	0	3	2	3	0	3	3	2	2	2

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
Fieldwork: 2nd - 5th October 2018

	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
	Total	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Male	Female	18-24	25-49	50-64	65+	ABC1	C2DE	Central	North	South	East	West	Inner London	Outer London
<b>Weighted Sample</b>	<b>1090</b>	289	476	77	532	558	125	593	221	150	643	447	167	121	198	249	150	291	594
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**You witnessed a hate crime (any crime that is motivated by hostility on the grounds of race, religion, sexual orientation, disability or transgender identity)**

Very likely	<b>40</b>	37	45	39	36	43	27	40	45	42	39	40	37	38	42	41	37	39	39
Fairly likely	<b>30</b>	28	32	34	30	30	30	30	26	36	29	31	31	33	26	31	33	31	30
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>70</b>
Fairly unlikely	<b>11</b>	14	9	16	12	10	13	11	11	8	13	8	14	9	10	10	7	11	10
Very unlikely	<b>4</b>	4	3	1	5	3	7	4	3	2	4	5	2	6	2	5	6	5	4
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>
Don't know	<b>13</b>	13	9	9	14	12	16	12	13	11	12	14	13	14	16	11	13	13	14
Prefer not to say	<b>3</b>	4	2	1	3	2	7	3	2	1	3	2	2	0	3	2	4	1	3

**You witnessed someone promoting, supporting or glorifying terrorism (please note that this does not include someone carrying out a terrorist act)**

Very likely	<b>36</b>	40	37	36	37	35	24	35	45	39	35	38	31	36	39	41	36	33	39
Fairly likely	<b>27</b>	28	27	32	26	28	22	27	23	39	27	28	30	30	25	27	26	29	27
<b>TOTAL LIKELY</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>66</b>
Fairly unlikely	<b>16</b>	14	16	21	16	17	27	18	13	7	18	14	18	15	12	15	19	19	14
Very unlikely	<b>4</b>	1	4	2	5	3	5	5	2	1	4	3	5	3	5	2	2	4	3
<b>TOTAL UNLIKELY</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18</b>
Don't know	<b>13</b>	12	13	7	12	14	13	13	15	13	12	14	14	14	16	13	13	14	14
Prefer not to say	<b>3</b>	4	2	1	5	2	9	3	1	0	4	2	3	3	3	2	3	2	3

**If you did decide to contact the police in respect to a hate crime or the promotion, support or glorification of terrorism, how would you prefer to do this?**

Over the phone	<b>29</b>	29	32	33	29	28	32	28	30	30	29	28	25	29	31	31	27	29	29
Over the phone (anonymously)	<b>21</b>	21	23	19	17	25	21	23	17	21	17	27	18	20	19	26	18	22	20
Online (anonymously)	<b>15</b>	12	16	16	15	14	15	17	13	8	16	12	19	15	10	13	18	15	14
Face to face	<b>13</b>	17	9	15	14	12	10	8	19	27	12	14	13	11	18	11	12	10	14
Online	<b>10</b>	10	10	8	10	11	7	12	11	6	14	6	12	14	9	10	9	12	10
In writing	<b>1</b>	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	2	0	1	1	2	1	1
Other <i>[see Tab 6]</i>	<b>1</b>	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	1
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	2	1	4	2	1	1	2	2	1	2	1	1	4	1	1	2	1	2
Don't know	<b>9</b>	8	6	5	10	8	14	9	6	7	8	10	10	7	11	8	8	9	9

Sample Size: 1090 London Adults  
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	Vote in 2017			Gender		Age				Social Grade		London Region (1)					London Region (2)		
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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**What do you think might make people more confident in standing up and challenging extremism, hate and terrorism? Please pick up to three.**

If there were more people in society openly challenging these things	<b>49</b>	51	49	62	48	50	40	46	57	60	49	49	46	46	47	50	53	47	49
If they had better awareness of the issues	<b>36</b>	27	42	37	35	36	42	35	32	38	35	37	30	37	31	35	38	32	35
If they had better awareness of the effects of these things on victims	<b>26</b>	23	29	21	27	26	27	26	27	27	21	33	20	26	20	26	23	22	24
If they had access to fact-based counter narratives to extremist arguments	<b>24</b>	16	28	35	24	23	30	24	21	21	25	22	27	19	22	23	26	27	22
If there were campaigns countering extremism which they could sign up to	<b>17</b>	13	20	15	15	19	12	17	20	17	16	19	19	15	15	17	19	18	16
Nothing is likely to make them more confident	<b>9</b>	11	8	10	7	10	9	8	9	13	9	9	10	11	10	8	10	10	10
Other [see Tab 7]	<b>4</b>	3	4	2	4	3	3	3	6	3	4	3	6	2	5	3	2	5	3
Don't know	<b>19</b>	22	14	15	19	18	17	21	15	18	18	19	20	21	19	24	16	21	20
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	2	2	1	3	1	6	2	1	1	2	2	2	0	3	1	0	2	1

**Would you or would you not know how to get extremist material online taken down?**

I would	<b>15</b>	12	18	14	17	13	13	17	13	9	15	15	14	18	12	19	17	18	15
I would not	<b>69</b>	72	68	81	64	73	63	63	75	84	71	65	73	75	71	63	69	66	71
Don't know	<b>16</b>	16	15	5	19	14	24	19	12	6	14	20	13	7	17	18	15	16	14

**What would you do, if anything, if you encountered the following? Please tick all that apply.**

**Hateful or intolerant content online**

Contact the internet service provider (YouTube; Facebook; Twitter etc...)	<b>42</b>	33	50	47	37	46	46	43	39	36	43	40	35	40	46	45	33	44	39
Contact the police	<b>24</b>	28	21	23	24	24	9	23	31	30	21	28	21	21	27	25	27	21	26
Tell a friend	<b>12</b>	7	15	12	8	15	17	11	11	9	11	12	11	11	9	10	12	12	10
Contact a third-party reporting centre	<b>11</b>	7	12	13	12	10	9	11	10	12	10	12	10	10	10	11	14	12	11
Respond online challenging the statement	<b>9</b>	3	9	20	11	7	10	10	9	3	8	10	9	6	9	9	8	8	9
Contact the local authority	<b>6</b>	4	7	4	7	6	4	8	7	2	5	8	2	6	3	9	9	5	7
Other	<b>2</b>	1	3	1	3	2	1	2	4	0	2	3	0	2	2	5	3	1	4
Nothing	<b>10</b>	12	7	14	13	7	9	11	8	9	11	8	13	16	6	8	10	11	10
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	3	2	2	3	1	5	2	1	2	3	1	3	0	2	1	5	2	2
Don't know	<b>18</b>	21	14	12	18	17	17	17	19	17	17	18	22	20	21	15	17	18	19



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	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%

**Materials promoting, supporting or glorifying terrorism online**

Contact the internet service provider (YouTube; Facebook: Twitter etc...)	<b>40</b>	31	49	42	37	43	42	43	37	32	42	37	39	40	42	40	34	43	37
Contact the police	<b>38</b>	43	35	44	39	36	20	37	45	45	34	43	35	37	39	40	40	36	40
Tell a friend	<b>12</b>	7	14	13	11	12	14	12	11	9	12	10	11	11	10	11	13	12	10
Contact a third-party reporting centre	<b>11</b>	7	12	16	11	11	12	10	12	11	10	12	10	12	10	11	11	10	11
Contact the local authority	<b>9</b>	4	11	8	9	9	10	10	9	5	8	12	4	6	7	11	18	7	10
Respond online challenging the statement	<b>6</b>	4	6	8	9	4	7	8	4	3	6	7	5	8	5	8	7	5	7
Other	<b>2</b>	2	2	1	3	2	2	2	3	1	2	2	0	2	2	4	5	1	3
Nothing	<b>7</b>	8	5	8	8	5	4	8	6	6	8	5	10	12	4	4	7	7	7
Prefer not to say	<b>2</b>	3	2	1	3	2	5	2	1	2	3	1	3	0	2	1	4	2	2
Don't know	<b>18</b>	19	15	14	17	18	21	17	18	14	17	19	22	18	18	18	14	20	17

**Which, if any, of the following do you think should be responsible for preventing the spread of extremism, hate and terrorism in London? Please tick all that apply.**

Police	<b>68</b>	71	69	68	64	72	62	66	74	73	68	68	59	70	69	70	61	61	69
National Government	<b>62</b>	61	62	71	61	63	60	60	68	62	64	59	61	67	63	59	54	60	61
Local Government	<b>55</b>	49	60	57	49	61	57	55	56	51	56	54	50	60	50	59	51	52	55
Faith groups	<b>54</b>	55	56	70	49	59	35	54	61	60	57	50	56	54	59	54	49	57	54
Mayor of London	<b>54</b>	57	53	61	52	56	48	51	61	62	56	51	52	53	54	53	51	51	54
Schools and universities	<b>51</b>	50	54	56	47	56	45	48	61	56	52	50	50	47	55	52	49	50	52
Communities	<b>50</b>	43	55	61	47	52	44	51	53	45	51	48	51	44	52	53	42	50	48
Community groups	<b>47</b>	45	50	65	44	51	34	46	55	51	50	43	50	47	51	45	42	47	47
Public	<b>41</b>	33	46	50	39	43	34	44	43	33	45	36	41	34	42	40	39	42	39
Charities	<b>22</b>	17	26	28	19	25	19	26	23	12	24	19	22	20	26	22	20	20	24
Business	<b>21</b>	15	25	20	18	23	18	24	20	13	23	18	21	20	20	21	17	20	20
Other [see Tab 8]	<b>2</b>	1	2	4	2	1	0	2	2	2	1	2	4	0	1	2	4	3	1
None of these	<b>2</b>	2	2	0	2	2	1	2	0	2	2	1	3	1	2	0	4	1	2
Don't know	<b>9</b>	8	7	9	9	10	17	9	7	7	8	11	12	9	12	7	9	10	10

*\*Any percentages calculated on bases fewer than 50 respondents do not represent a wide enough cross-section of the target population to be considered statistically reliable. These figures will be italicised.*

## **ANNEX 6**

# **Report of session with Policy Institute, King's College London**





# Accessing Prevent in London

## Briefing Note

Benedict Wilkinson and Armida van Rij

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At the request of The Mayor's Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC), [The Policy Institute](#), King's College London held a workshop on improving mechanisms for accessing Prevent in March 2019. We brought together key stakeholders and practitioners working in or with Prevent to explore the challenges and barriers faced by all service users (both practitioner and communities) in accessing Prevent. Our aim was to understand how we might make Prevent easier and simpler to access by understanding the challenges that service users, including the general public, face when considering whether to make referrals, as well as to reflect on how these challenges might be mitigated. This short briefing note summarises the findings from the workshop.

### **Prevent has created an intricate and complex ecosystem that is hard to navigate, potentially deterring people from referring into it**

There are a number of challenges in relation to accessing Prevent by both frontline service providers and communities. Recent research by MOPAC showed that nearly two thirds of respondents from London's communities do not know how to seek help from authorities when they are worried about an individual being vulnerable to radicalisation or extremism.

As many of the participants in our workshop attested, the Prevent ecosystem in London is deeply intricate and complex. It consists of numerous partner organisations (London's schools, GPs, hospitals, London Ambulance Service, the Police, Higher and Further Education establishments) as well as the 32 London Boroughs. The intricate and complex system is made more so by the fact that many Prevent partners have disparate processes for referring individuals into Prevent (e.g. through the Local Authority or the Police), and many London Boroughs handle the referral process differently (e.g. with different templates or through different safeguarding mechanisms).

Adding a further layer of complexity is that different cohorts of stakeholder's view Prevent in different ways. There is a sizeable proportion who would be willing to refer through Prevent but are not aware of Prevent or do not know how to, or are cautious of the effects that making a referral might have on themselves or the individual they are referring. There is a smaller proportion who are both willing to refer and sufficiently aware of Prevent's processes. There is a third cohort who are aware of Prevent, but who oppose Prevent largely because of its controversial brand. We recognise that there isn't a single solution to dealing with all of these different delineations. Instead, we focus on broad things that can be done to bring greater awareness of Prevent among communities and make the process more streamlined for practitioners.

When taken together, the complexity and intricacy of the system means that access to Prevent in London is patchy and inconsistent, dependent largely on the specific individuals, organisations and partner institutions in each given case.

### **The Independent review of Prevent is a good opportunity for all concerns raised by public and partners to be addressed**

The complex system will need concerted efforts from across both National and Local Government, and the forthcoming Review can provide a real stimulus to all partners to improve Prevent's image and brand in local communities and in partner organisations. Crucially, this should include a diverse group of stakeholders and ensure communities are part of these conversations and the review process. More can be done to show Prevent's successes in countering extremism in London and the UK's communities, but more work needs to be done on creating robust measures through which to evaluate Prevent. Specially, there needs to be more transparency around Prevent, and mandated organisations need to be able to access Prevent data for specific purposes.

### **Mechanisms for accessing Prevent in London need to be simplified**

At the London level, real effort is needed to simplify access to Prevent. Participants in the workshop were in agreement that Prevent needs 'a single front door' for referrals per Local Authority and, crucially, emphasised the need for this to be a Prevent-specific front door – that is, a referrals process owned and managed by Prevent experts with a sufficient degree of training. While the police is clearly also a front door for Prevent, we found broad agreement that because of the desire to use Prevent through a safeguarding lens, Local Authorities are best placed to own it, in a consistent way.

### **Creating a dedicated Prevent referral route would have a number of benefits:**

- It would ensure Prevent Referrals are consistently recorded across London, enabling intelligence gathering by relevant agencies to be coordinated and comprehensive
- It would provide confidence for referrers that their referrals 'get to where they should'; as things stand partners referring into the Multi Agency Safeguarding Hub rarely receive any notification about where such a referral has gone, nor whether it has even been actioned. A dedicated 'feedback loop' would provide continuous improvement to Prevent referral processes.
- It would encourage (and benefit from) a clearer, simpler and more standardised process, including forms and templates. In its current format, many partners have different forms and templates to fill out for each Local Authority.
- It would allow Police to monitor high risk referrals and, in line with the Prevent Service Agreement, allow them to make judgement calls about levels of risk posed by cases, and therefore about appropriate responses.
- There was some discussion on the use of Local Authority-owned Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) as many London Boroughs have configured it as access points, but many in the room agreed this has not yet fully been successful, and staff do not feel equipped enough to make these kinds of decisions.

**Clustering Prevent expertise across small numbers of Boroughs may put less pressure on already stretched resources, but more evidence is needed on the most effective and efficient ways of sharing expertise**

We recognise that creating a dedicated, expert point of access to Prevent may stretch the resources available to some Local Authorities, whose finances may be stretched. Although clustering of such Services has so far seen mixed successes, it may be a successful model for some collectives of Boroughs. Equally, following ambition to deliver radicalisation as a safeguarding responsibility within the Local Authority remit, it may be that specific activities and processes (e.g. Data Management) can be clustered and centralised in and across the Boroughs. In the absence of publicly available evaluations, more work needs to be done on the most effective mechanisms for sharing and coalescing of Prevent expertise. There are programmes that are currently being piloted in London, such as the East London Cluster, to test a joint borough response. Such programmes need to be independently evaluated to contribute to the evidence base on what works in this space.

**Finding new and more effective ways of engaging and communicating with all partners will be essential for Prevent's future success**

There was widespread agreement in our session that confidence in Prevent needs to be built both amongst those partners with a Statutory Prevent Duty as well as with the general public. There was real support for greater advocacy around the successes that Prevent has had, particularly if relevant authorities could share case studies of cases when Prevent has worked as designed to.

More broadly, participants suggested that whilst Prevent should have its own 'front door' within the Local Authority, much more could be done to emphasise the safeguarding element of Prevent. As participants pointed out, the Prevent Duty is largely constructed around a safeguarding approach; this needs to be far more clearly communicated and transparent to communities and partners, if trust is to be built.

A series of practical measures for building trust in Prevent:

- There was also support for establishing local confidential advice services would build public trust, potentially to be managed by a third-party such as a large third sector organisation that could act as informal/impartial referrers. This might be done through a Prevent Helpline, for example, offering impartial advice to Partners and to the Public on specific cases, without the need to for a formal referral. Such a helpline is a possibility, but this would require buy-in and trust from the public.
- There was support for the mock Channel Panels.