An evaluation of the Diamond Initiative: year two findings

London
Criminal Justice Partnership
Co-ordinating London's criminal justice service

April 2011

Foreword

The Diamond Initiative, which became operational at the beginning of 2009, was an imaginative criminal justice policy innovation set up by the London Criminal Justice Partnership. It had at its heart two key features. First, in England and Wales short-term prisoners (those with sentences of less than twelve months) receive no statutory supervision on release, so Diamond offered them resettlement help that they would otherwise not have received. Second, studies of the geography of crime have consistently shown that deprived urban areas suffer disproportionately from criminal victimization, and they also contain among their residents a higher than average proportion of registered offenders. Focusing a fresh crime reduction initiative on deprived urban areas – as Diamond did – therefore makes good strategic sense.

But, as we pointed out in the Foreword to the Interim Research Report on the Diamond Initiative, crime reduction initiatives do not always work, and it is vital that they are rigorously researched. The London Criminal Justice Partnership is therefore to be congratulated, not only for its courage in setting up this new Initiative, but also for its determination to evaluate the initiative fully. That task has been undertaken by the Strategy, Research and Analysis Unit (SRAU) of the Metropolitan Police, supported by an independent Academic Reference Group (ARG) of which we have been the members.

At the time of the Interim Report, no definite conclusions could be drawn about the results of the Diamond Initiative, but there were a number of reasons for cautious optimism. It was of course right, in the interests of accountability and transparency, to state these reasons in the Interim Report. But we live in a complex world where crime issues are of great political interest, and a 24-hour media culture is voracious in its search for stories. So publication of the Interim Report had the effect of increasing the already high political profile of the Diamond Initiative. Under pressure from the media and others to declare Diamond an unqualified success, SRAU researchers and members of the ARG found themselves having resolutely to insist that the research was not yet completed, and that it would be inappropriate to act prematurely on interim results.

This Final Report on the results of the research justifies the earlier caution. After a very careful and thorough evaluation, SRAU researchers have concluded that the assessment of the crime-reductive potential of the Diamond Initiative must be less encouraging than appeared to be the case from the data available at the time of the Interim Report.

This report therefore carries within it the potential for a reverse danger from that of the Interim Report. Whereas the earlier report encouraged some to think in terms of unqualified success, the more disappointing results now presented may lead to careless talk of unqualified failure. Neither of these reactions is justified. In reality, the results are complex – reflecting the complexity of the real world – and they need careful interpretation to ensure that the right

conclusions are drawn from them. In particular, it is important to emphasise that the results presented in this report do not mean either that the Diamond Initiative was inappropriately mounted, or that the principles of what is often called 'integrated offender management' are undermined by the research.

The Ministry of Justice has recently been speaking about a 'rehabilitation revolution'. However, those who are familiar with the history of research evaluations into rehabilitative work with offenders – a history that now stretches back for half a century – tend to be uncomfortable with this kind of language. On the basis of this body of research work, several conclusions can be drawn with some certainty, but they lead to a policy stance of gradual reformism rather than revolution.

What are these conclusions? There are four. First, helping people to turn their backs on a life of crime is a slow and uncertain process. It is frequently a case of "two steps forward, one step back", because of the complexity of offenders' lives (including, very often, matters such as a lack of qualifications and work experience; drug and alcohol use; a tendency to revert to previous patterns of behaviour in a crisis, and so on). But second, and encouragingly, most people who become heavily involved in offending also eventually desist from crime – completely or largely – at some stage in their lives. Despite their criminal records, the evidence is clear that most of them do not wish to continue with a life of crime, and gradually start to turn away from it. Third, the most thorough research evaluations of treatment initiatives, when they show positive results, tend to report fairly small effects (in small-scale 'demonstration' projects run by trained specialists, stronger results are sometimes obtained, but it has proved very difficult to replicate such results when a similar programme is 'rolled out' on a larger scale). The main implication of these studies is that programmes of work with offenders can accelerate the desistance process, but viewed in the round, they tend to have only a modest impact. This is probably because the work of police, prison and probation officers are only one of many influences on offenders' lives. Hence, there are several useful tools in the rehabilitation armoury – but no 'silver bullets'. Fourth, rehabilitation programmes can easily become derailed, especially when they involve complex partnerships between several different agencies; the successful implementation of fresh and apparently promising approaches is a real challenge.

The Diamond Initiative put into practice a set of principles for which there is considerable empirical support. If (as is the case) most repeat offenders would, in adulthood, like to move away from crime, it makes obvious sense to try to support their aspirations by providing appropriate help in matters such as housing, employment, and drugs treatment. In developing such support packages, it is also obviously sensible for the police and probation services to work together, in close partnership with other relevant agencies such as housing departments and job centres. Additionally, there are very good strategic reasons to focus on providing such support to people leaving prison after short sentences: we know that such offenders tend to have extensive

criminal records, and a high headline reconviction rate, so this is a group for whom the biggest returns can be expected from a successful intervention.

Given all this, the Academic Reference Group that oversaw this evaluation were surprised by the principal finding of the SRAU research – that the extent and nature of known reoffending in the experimental group was very similar to that in a matched control group. How is one to make sense of this result? The first possibility is that the project had to move forward too far too quickly, and that the scheme did not have enough time to find its feet. There is indeed some supporting evidence of implementation problems. For example, the police were able to deploy resources to Diamond more rapidly than the probation service and other partners – a finding that is not uncommon with partnership projects – with the result that the 'prospectus' offered to early participants failed to deliver fully on its promises of multi-agency support. Moreover, as the report states, the Initiative never fully reconciled some working tensions between the police and other partners. A further (and related) possibility is that the timescales for measuring an impact were too short. We know that it takes time – and often many attempts – for people to change ingrained but self-destructive habits such as smoking, drinking, drug use and overwork. Offending is no different, and the processes of change do not always suit the timetables of organisations operating in a highly politicised environment, and looking for quick results.

The Academic Reference Group obviously asked itself whether the reasons for the lack of impact might lie in the research rather than the programme. For example, the main outcome measures, reconviction rates, might have been artificially inflated in the experimental group *precisely* because they were kept under closer surveillance by official agencies than the control group. Alternatively, the assumption that reconviction rates are closely related to reoffending rates may not hold up in the high-crime areas in which the Diamond Initiative was set. Possibly, too, the process of selecting a control group matched to the experimental one could have been flawed. These are certainly possibilities, but the Group's overall conclusion was that the evaluation was conducted to a higher than usual standard of rigour, and that the lack of effect, relative to the control group, is real rather than artefactual.

However, the report also contains a more positive set of findings that we think it is important to highlight. Diamond's support was offered on a *voluntary* basis to offenders serving sentences of imprisonment. They were in no way obliged to agree to the offer and in deciding whether to accept or not they were aware that many of those staffing the Initiative were police officers. Moreover, these were not neophyte offenders; on average, they had been in court and convicted on eleven separate occasions. Of course, some suspicions were expressed. But no fewer than 60% of those who received an offer of support from Diamond accepted it; and those who accepted tended to have a higher risk of reconviction and more social needs than those who did not. There can be no better testimony as to why this initiative was worth attempting, and why it

should now be built upon. To adapt a memorable saying of Samuel Beckett: 'No matter. Try again. Try better.'

What, then, are the main practical implications to draw from this evaluation? Perhaps the most important is that helping people to desist from crime involves a long-term commitment; if the police, probation service and their partners - or indeed the government - expect a return on their investment in the space of a year or less, they will very likely be disappointed. Second, the study has certainly demonstrated the feasibility of involving police officers in rehabilitative work with offenders; and we would expect the long term effects of joint working to be beneficial both for the police and for their partners in the probation service and elsewhere. Third, there is an obvious value in information-sharing across custody and community settings, yet also some serious challenges in making this happen as smoothly as it should.

Although the headline results of this report will disappoint staff on the Diamond Initiative, there is nothing here that calls into question the principle of multi-agency teams designed to plan and deliver social provision that is inclusive of and helpful to offenders. There is a great deal in this report that may help the Metropolitan Police, the London Probation Service and their partners make this vision a reality in the future. They are to be congratulated for their investment in this Initiative and this evaluation – and the SRAU are to be congratulated on the rigour with which the evaluation has been completed.

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Thanks to the staff at the LCJP, in particular the DI central team who have been supportive at all stages of the research

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Thanks to all Diamond project teams and Local Authorities for their support of the programme and the research over the two years.

Please cite as: Dawson, Stanko, Higgins and Rehman (2011). An evaluation of the Diamond Initiative: year two findings. London. Metropolitan Police Service; London Criminal Justice Partnership.

A large print version is available on request.

An evaluation of the Diamond Initiative: year two findings

The Diamond Initiative set out to pilot *Justice Reinvestment* principles and an integrated approach to managing short-sentence offenders, in some of London's most challenging areas. This comprehensive evaluation of *implementation* and *impact* holds relevant insights for practitioners and policy makers in London and beyond. It describes an initiative, hampered in the early stages by implementation issues, which matured in terms of multi-agency delivery but never fully reconciled 'working tensions' between the police and other partners. It experienced some success in engaging with offenders through a voluntary model but may not have adequately aligned the support provided with offenders' needs. These insights provide context to the finding that no impact was detected in terms of reduced reoffending as a result of the initiative, although indications of more positive outcomes for particular sub-groups warrant further follow-up.

The Diamond Initiative - evaluation results and learning

In 2008/09 there was a compelling case for testing a *Justice Reinvestment* model of offender management within London. Drawing on the *'million dollar blocks'*[1] concept and an emerging consensus on the benefits of multi-agency collaboration, the London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP) - working with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), London Probation and six Local Authorities developed the Diamond Initiative (DI), a multi-agency offender management scheme aimed at breaking the cycle of reoffending among problematic groups of offenders in some of London's most challenging locations.

Although the political and economic context altered during the two-year pilot period, this only served to increase the urgency of the search for effective alternatives to custody and the unsustainable increase in demand on the Criminal Justice System. With Integrated Offender Management (IOM) approaches taking root across the UK and with the Coalition Government's *Rehabilitation Revolution* set to catalyse innovation in service delivery, insights into how cost-efficient offender management can contribute to reducing crime and demand on Criminal Justice are keenly sought.

[1] See Tucker and Cadora, 2003

Method

This report presents the findings of a robust evaluation of the Diamond Initiative carried out by the MPS Strategy, Research and Analysis Unit (SRAU). It sets out to investigate both the *implementation* and the *impact* of the DI, drawing on a range of methodologies including:

1) Four waves of on-line staff surveys designed to capture the changing views of practitioners over the course of the scheme.

2) Two waves of qualitative staff-interviews to dig deeper into implementation issues and capture key learning from a representative sample of multi-agency staff.

3) Two phases of qualitative offender-interviews, to reflect the experiences of those participating in the scheme.

4) A quasi-experimental study of reoffending, using data from the Police National Computer (PNC) to compare the offending behaviour of Diamond referrals to a well matched control group, over a one-year period.

5) A cost-benefit analysis of the DI, comparing the economic benefits generated by the scheme, in terms of the cost of crimes averted, against the set-up and running costs of programme.

Key Findings

Process evaluation

Implementation developed and matured over the course of the pilot. Teams experienced initial problems in recruiting and retaining sufficient and suitable staff, securing appropriate accommodation, equipment and IT and adjusting to new ways of working. Although problems persisted in certain areas, overall implementation improved over the course of the pilot.

Multi-agency working also took time to develop. In particular, links with local housing and drugs intervention services strengthened during the programme, however questions remain as to whether the network of services brought together by Diamond adequately addressed the challenging and complex needs of the client group.

Working across agency boundaries also brought challenges, best conceptualised as 'working tensions' between police and other partners. While the police brought dynamism to the initiative, some officers struggled to adapt to a role with a supportive rather than supervisory focus and although police

personnel often reflected positively on working in a new way, their inexperience in areas like case management led some to question the appropriateness of the police-led model.

Although the referral process used had significant flaws (highlighting issues with the flow of information between prison and the community) teams were relatively successful at engaging with offenders. Most of those offered Diamond assistance agreed to participate, and those who engaged tended to be toward the more problematic end of the offending scale. This indicates strong, need-driven demand for the services offered by Diamond and that the appeal was not substantially undermined by offenders' initial apprehensions about getting involved with the police. Despite this, project case-loads tended to be lighter than had been anticipated. Practitioners were clear on the benefits of starting the engagement process early, while offenders were still in prison.

In line with the desistance literature, the offenders interviewed frequently expressed the desire to change their lives and to stop offending; it was also clear that since prison, many felt their lives had improved and saw Diamond as integral to this transformation.

Impact evaluation

The reoffending rate of the Diamond referral group was found to be significantly below the (61.1%) national reoffending rate for short term prisoners. This should be understood in terms of pre-existing differences between the Diamond group and the national sample and not as an impact of the initiative; Diamond referrals had less prolific offending histories and lower predicted reoffending rates than the national average. It was also observed that a substantial proportion of Diamond referrals were born outside of the UK (44%); this group were found to commit fewer offences (both historically and during the follow-up year) - and are likely to make up a larger proportion of the Diamond group than the national sample.

An Intention to Treat (ITT) design was used to compare the offending behaviour of a cohort of less-than-12-month sentence offenders, referred to Diamond during the first nine-months of the programme, against a well matched control group of similar offenders drawn from the similar, matched parts of London.

Over a 12-month follow up period, no significant difference was found between the reoffending rate of the Diamond referral group and the control group; 42.4% of the

Diamond referral group and 41.6% of the control group committed a criminal offence (which subsequently resulted in a conviction at court), during the year after they were released from prison.

A deeper, more nuanced examination of crime data similarly revealed no differences in terms of the speed of reoffending, the number of offences committed or the seriousness of those offences. A second test for impact, comparing Diamond *participants* (as opposed to *referrals*) with a suitable control group, produced similar findings.

Although small base sizes and other factors dictate that findings should be treated cautiously, there are some indications of more positive outcomes from Diamond, for instance:

- Diamond referrals with a recent history of violent and disorderly offending tended to reoffend less *within these offence types* than the control group.
- Those who achieved 'outcomes' related to *finance, benefits and debt* through Diamond, show promising reoffending results across a range of measures.
- A cohort of those referred to the scheme during a slightly later implementation phase (when many of the delivery improvements described above had taken effect) show encouraging early indications of a more positive impact on reoffending.

In the light of the above findings it is unsurprising that no economic return on investment was detected in terms of the cost to society of crimes averted.

The Diamond evaluation presents substantial learning for offender management within and beyond London and the results are relevant for practitioners, academics and policy makers. The results should lay down an important evidence-based marker in terms of designing and evaluating an offender management initiative.

The results of the evaluation do not demonstrate that Diamond has failed as a concept; instead careful consideration is required as to why the results are not as expected. Time should be spent examining the learning generated through the research to ensure that the next phase of offender management is as effective as it can be.

Key learning from the Diamond Initiative evaluation

The evidence assessed in this evaluation lends itself to a range of key learning points which are likely to be relevant to practitioners and policy makers working across offender management in London and beyond.

Implementation learning

Recruitment and staffing levels were a consistent challenge. Coordinating recruitment protocols is likely to be crucial when forming interdisciplinary teams. Staff attitudes, motivation and 'buy-in' directly affects implementation; seconding reluctant staff to offender management roles should be avoided.

Effective staff training, using continuous feedback for monitoring success, should be a core part of any offender management.

An effective case management and referral system should be in place at the outset with only minor amendments subsequently made.

Despite initial problems, implementation matured over the course of the programme. Any future-roll out should anticipate and make contingency plans to address early implementation issues (e.g. equipment, buildings, staffing, IT systems).

The mix of help offered may not have been effectively matched to client need. Provision should be designed based on local analysis of the needs of the client group, but anticipation of standard problems, based on previous research should be built in at the planning stage. Unmet client need is as much a strategic problem as it is a practical problem.

Staff reported positively on the practice of engaging with offenders in prison. Given the evident problems with the flow of information between custody and community and the importance of the first weeks and months following release, an effective link-up with local prisons is a key to success.

The challenge of how to increase participant numbers was felt throughout the DI; the scale of provision needs to be matched to the likely supply of eligible clients for the defined catchment area. The original focus on key wards was found to be restrictive in practice.

Although teams generally worked well across disciplinary boundaries, tensions between the police and other agencies linked to different 'working cultures' were never fully reconciled. There is still work required to establish an integrated approach.

Pilot initiatives suffer from uncertainty. Staff feel this uncertainty. Strategies and contingencies for the end of an initiative should be considered in programme delivery.

Impact learning

The process of identifying and engaging with potential participants was severely hampered by the working of the referral system. Improving the flow of information between custody and community is likely to be crucial for delivering effective offender management.

60% of offenders offered the scheme agreed to participate; this indicates substantial demand for resettlement help and support. Moreover, those who accepted support were at greater risk of reoffending and presented more needs than those who refused, therefore the demand for help appears to be need-driven. The voluntary model for offering help appears suited to engaging the most problematic offenders.

No difference has been found between the Diamond referral group and the matched control in terms of the proportion who reoffended, the speed at which they reoffended, the number of offences they committed or the seriousness of those offences. The two groups of offenders exhibited highly similar offending careers, which continued to be comparable after prison release, despite the fact that the evaluation group were referred to the Diamond Initiative. Therefore, no indication of a positive impact of the Diamond Initiative on offending has been detected.

The role of implementation issues in this should be considered. Any offender management initiative should consider the most robust practical means of assessing impact and use this to drive improvement.

The level of reoffending within the Diamond referral group was below that of the national less-than-12-month sentence cohort. This should be understood in terms of differences in the make-up of the referral group compared with the national sample. This suggests the need for regional / local benchmarking in order to provide a framework for assessing the differences and effectiveness of local offender management approaches.

Those who reoffend tend to do so quickly after prison release; this indicates a '**window of opportunity'** for supportive engagement immediately following (or commencing before) prison release.

There are tentative indications that those referred to Diamond later in the pilot, might have achieved better reoffending outcomes. Further analysis, over a longer follow-up period would be required to draw firm conclusions; however if this is sustained in the next analysis, the lesson that early implementation issues should be carefully programme managed, will be clear.

Some differences in success were observed and are worthy of more research when the numbers of clients enable more robust statistical analysis. In particular, there are tentative indications that the Diamond approach may have had a positive impact on violent / disorderly offending and that help to address debt and personal financial issues may be linked with reduced reoffending.

Given that no overall impact on offending has been found it is unsurprising that no economic benefit, in terms the cost of crimes averted, has been detected. Cost efficient offender management must be scaled to the size of the target population and target resources effectively, for instance by using risk assessment tools (such as **OGRS**), to achieve standardised and potentially impactive selection.

Chapter 1: Introduction

This report presents the findings of a two-year evaluation of the London Diamond Initiative (DI). It presents insights into both the implementation and the impact of the DI - a multi-agency offender management approach aimed at reducing reoffending among key groups of offenders in some of London's most challenging areas. The report sets out to capture the learning generated over the course of the scheme and to contribute to the evidence-base available for policy makers and practitioners to develop and deliver effective offender management within London and beyond[2].

Background to the London Diamond Initiative

In terms of background, in 2008/09 there was a compelling case for developing a *Justice Reinvestment* model of offender management within London. Is there an economic case for a shift of resources from central budgets to needy geographic sites, in order to reduce crime and the consequent demand on the Criminal Justice System? This approach draws on the *'Million Dollar Blocks'* concept developed in the USA, where it was shown that large sums of public money were routinely spent on cycling and recycling offenders from certain residential areas into the Criminal Justice System without notable benefit to the community. It has been argued that by channelling some of these funds away from the prison system to organisations working with offenders in these communities - recidivism, the demand on the Criminal Justice System and the harmful effects of crime in these areas could be simultaneously reduced (Tucker & Cadora, 2003).

Concurrent with these developments, offender management programmes in the UK (such as the Prolific and other Priority Offender scheme and the Integrated Offender Management approach) are increasingly demonstrating the value of information sharing and multi-agency co-operation in effective and cost-efficient offender management. With these principles in mind, the London Criminal Justice Partnership (LCJP) and the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) sought to develop the Diamond Initiative as a test-case for Justice Reinvestment principles in the London context, by bringing together the MPS (and in particular harnessing the maturing Safer Neighbourhoods (SN) model),

[2] Year one interim findings which can be found at http://lcjb.cjsonline.gov.uk/area23/library/Diamond Initiative/Diamond Initiative.pdf.

London Probation Service, Local Authorities and key local agencies, with the aspiration of reducing reoffending in the client group and consequently generating substantial savings within the Criminal Justice System.

The twin unique selling points of the Diamond approach were the emphasis on needy geographic areas (e.g. certain London wards) and the focus on the less-than-12-month sentence group of offenders. In line with 'Million Dollar Blocks' principles, the LCJP targeted the DI at particular wards within six London boroughs (Croydon, Hackney, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham and Southwark) which, analysis showed, presented particular challenges for criminal justice agencies in terms of high custody returns. Within these localities, Diamond teams were established and tasked with addressing less-than-12-month sentence offenders returning to the community as their principal client group. This group - often seen as the perennial thorn in the Criminal Justice System - exhibit high rates of reoffending (and consequently generate high costs to the public purse) and lack a statutory offender management response. Diamond therefore sought to target a 'problem' offender group in 'problem' locations, encouraging and supporting desistance from crime where it was most needed and consequently maximising reductions in offending and associated financial benefits.

In addition to addressing the less-than-12-month group, Diamond teams also sought to test the concept of 'supported compliance' by working with those sentenced to Community Payback Orders within the catchment areas. The LCJP's performance data indicate some success and positive learning from this approach including a 20% improvement in compliance rates over a six month period. While acknowledging the promise of supported compliance this evaluation primarily focuses on the principal less-than-12-month-sentence target group.

During the course of the Diamond pilot, the political and economic climate in which it operated altered substantially. In January 2010, for instance, the House of Commons Justice Committee stressed that in a time of recession, funding and resources to all elements of the criminal justice system agencies must be cut, and in light of this, new ways of dealing with offenders and offending behaviour should be examined - many eyes

have consequently turned to the Diamond Initiative as a test of a new way of working with offenders in a challenging financial climate.

An overview of the Diamond Initiative:

- Built on a compelling case for a 'Justice Reinvestment' model in London.
- A two year progressive offender management initiative focussed within six London boroughs.
- A focus on areas with high concentrations of offenders returning from custody.
- Principally targeted at the less-than-12-month sentence release group, with a wider target group including those on Community Payback Orders.
- Delivering services through a combination of criminal justice agencies (police, probation and prison) and resources from a wider range of stakeholders (particularly local authorities, health and third sector organisations).
- A voluntary, needs based offer of support and assistance for offenders.

The MPS Strategy, Research and Analysis Unit (SRAU)[3] were tasked by the LCJP/MPS to conduct a two-year evaluation of the Diamond Initiative. The evaluation has two main elements: firstly, to explore the process and *implementation* of the DI; and secondly to examine the *impact* of the scheme, both on crime and wider financial efficiencies.

Promising interim results were published last year, although in terms of crime impact the year-one report concluded that *'the absence of a matched control group and a short follow up time preclude firm conclusions around the impact of the initiative at the present time'*. Otherwise, substantial learning was generated in relation to both the less-than-12-month sentence client group and the implementation of offender management initiatives. For example:

- The key target group on Diamond were shown to have relatively extensive criminal careers - with an average of 23 convictions and 12 conviction occasions.

[3] The SRAU is a member of the Government Social Research (GSR) group, and offers independent evaluation and research to drive improvement.

- Multi-agency staff considered working on the Diamond Initiative to be a positive experience and a new way of working due to the emphasis on rehabilitation: in particular this was viewed as a departure from traditional police culture.
- Diamond Initiative offenders reflected positively on their experience of the initiative providing examples of benefits such as not committing crime, assistance with their needs and finding stability and structure in their lives.

This report builds on the learning from the year-one evaluation and presents conclusions in terms of the implementation process, impact on reoffending and value for money whilst also raising the implications, both methodological and practical for offender management initiatives. Before doing so however, it is necessary to lay the foundations by exploring the context in which the initiative has operated and summarising what is known about effectively reducing reoffending as part of an offender management programme.

Setting the scene - the challenge of the prison population in England and Wales

The prison population in England and Wales is, per head of population, the highest in Western Europe and the fourth highest in the world. Currently over 85,000 prisoners reside in the 137 prisons in England and Wales (HM Prison Service, 2011). Between June 1995 and June 2010 there has been a rise of 66% in the prison population, with tougher sentences (such as Indeterminate Sentences for Public Protection (IPP)), more serious offences coming before the courts, and legislative and policy changes cited as contributory causes (Ministry of Justice, 2009).

An increasing prison population has associated costs. There has been an increase in central spending on prisons and offender management from £2.6 billion in 1996/1997 to £4.6 billion in 2009/2010 and accommodating short term prisoners costs the tax-payer £286 million a year (Audit Commission, 2010). During 2007/2008, the cost of dealing with the re-conviction of offenders was estimated at between £9.5 and £13 billion, most of which was spent dealing with those who had previous short-term sentences (Audit Commission, 2010).

Official statistics reveal that most offenders enter prison on short-term sentences. Every year more than 60,000 adults receive a custodial sentence of less than 12 months; this group account for nine per cent of the overall prison population, but make up some sixty-five per cent of all those sentenced to immediate imprisonment. On release the less-than-12-month sentence group receive no statutory probation supervision, no dedicated provision for welfare and resettlement needs (The Social Exclusion Unit, 2002) and sixty percent reoffend within one year (Ministry of Justice, 2010a). Given this high level of reoffending, there is a growing consensus that prisons alone cannot provide the solution to the economic consequences and challenges of offending outlined above. Innovative work needs to investigate whether support and supervision of short-term sentence offenders in the community, may hold the key to reducing offending behaviour and breaking criminal lifestyles, in turn cutting the prison population and bringing a saving to the economy (Prison Reform Trust, 2010).

Getting to the crux of the problem: what is known about reducing re-offending?

There is a wealth of research that has sought to examine either the development of desistance or criminal careers (Bottoms et al*.,* 2004; Farrington, 1997; Weaver & McNeill, 2007; see Farrall et al., 2011 for an overview). This research can provide essential insights and direction on bringing about behavioural change within an offender management approach.

Criminal careers can be examined in two ways: at a cross-sectional level *(e.g. as a snapshot of all offences and all offenders at a given time*) or longitudinal level *(e.g. following a set group over their lifetime)*. Whichever technique is adopted, the key observations are similar. Typically, individuals begin offending in early adolescence, peak in late adolescence/young adulthood and then gradually reduce, with a typical cessation before the age of 30 (Bottoms & Shapland, 2011; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 2009).

While age and other static factors (e.g. criminal history) are clearly important in understanding criminal behaviour and desistance, and have been used to generate

accurate predictive models such as OGRS[4] - these static factors by their nature, cannot be altered and thus are of less value in terms of practical offender management. Importantly, research highlights how **contextual**, **situational** and **motivational** factors also play an important role in the management of offenders. This is because such issues, typically known as dynamic risk factors, can be actively addressed with the aspiration to bring about behaviour change.

Table 1 provides a basic overview of the factors associated with offending, illustrating the range of issues at the heart of the re-offending debate. It has been demonstrated that offenders often have numerous problems / needs and those with a complex needs-set are the ones that are most likely to re-offend (McGuire, 2002; Stewart, 2008). These needs have also been evidence based and used in the development of the Offender Assessment System (OASys) - the risk assessment tool used by the prison and probation service. OASys promotes individualised sentence plans matched to risk and addressed to dynamic (i.e. changeable) needs.

Reporting on the Sheffield Longitudinal study[5] Bottoms and Shapland (2011) highlight that even within a highly criminal sample, offenders reported an apparently sincere desire to desist from crime. Although this aspiration was often not fully accomplished, instead smaller steps (i.e. reduced frequency of offending / periods of abstinence) were frequently apparent. This indicates that desistance can be a gradual process, often impacted by 'significant obstacles' including external factors (such as financial problems) and psychological factors such as self-efficacy, a lack of empathy and the emotional pull of offending.

This raises the important point of the offenders *'motivation to change'* which is particularly relevant to Diamond given the voluntary nature of the scheme. We know from previous research that offenders who complete an initiative generally achieve better outcomes than those that drop-out or do not start. One explanation of this is those offenders that 'complete' have enhanced motivations to change their criminal lifestyle (Day & Howells,

[4] The Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS) is a regression based model for predicting likelihood of resanction based on static factors such as age, gender and criminal history. It has been used by probation and prisons in the UK since the late 1990s.
[5] The Sheffield Desistance study interviewed offenders born in either 1982,1983,1984 over four points in time convicted on at least two separate occasions (Bottoms and Shapland, 2011).

2002; Hollin, 2008). On a therapeutic level there is learning on understanding and improving motivation to change; including the importance of staff training and motivational interviewing to promote life change (see McMurran 2002 for an overview). However, many questions remain to be addressed, for example, *what is motivation to change? How can it be measured? Are there acceptable levels before entering behavioural change programmes?* Indeed, Weaver and McNeill (2007) stress the value in being realistic when attempting to address criminal behaviour within criminal justice settings, noting that *'the criminal careers of reoffenders can't be switched off like a tap; it takes time to change entrenched behaviours and the problems that underlie them'.*

In terms of reducing offending behaviour, beside the research into criminal behaviour previously discussed, there is a substantial body of research that demonstrates that the actual design and implementation of an initiative can play a substantial role. The *'what works'* principles (McGuire, 2000) are an established evidence-based method of working with offenders, that demonstrate that programmes work best in reducing re-offending when certain key principles are met. This has been shown in relation to sex offender, drug treatment, education and accommodation programmes (Aos et al., 2006; Lipsey, 1995; National Institute of Drug Abuse, 2003). The 'what works principles' would expect a programme to:

- be based on a robust model/theory with a underpinning rationale;
- include risk classification;
- target and respond directly to offender needs;
- ensure treatment is skills-orientated, based on cognitive behavioural techniques; and
- have programme integrity.

This issue of programme integrity warrants further examination here - initiatives with *'integrity'* set out a planned series of activities and are delivered over a specific timeline to selected individuals. A programme with integrity ensures that the intervention or treatment is delivered **exactly as intended**. This would likely be supported by clear training, guidance documents, manuals, monitoring instruments, and in many cases would involve both pre-assessment work (i.e. enhance offender motivation) and post programme work

(i.e. follow up / reviews). How the programme is ***designed*** and ***delivered*** affects the type of results obtained and initiatives without integrity do substantially worse than those with strong programme integrity (Barnoski, 2004; Coulter, 2010).

Table 1: Key research on offender needs and crime

A past criminal history Past convictions, custodial sentences and arrests have been found to be predictive of future offending (Copas et al., 1994; Kurlychek et al., 2004; Spivak & Damphousse, 2006). Associated to this are biological/genetic theories of crime (Mednick et al., 1987).	**Housing** Living in suitable accommodation following prison release appears to be a protective factor against reoffending (Social Exclusion Unit, 2002). Conversely, having no fixed abode, living in a high crime area or estate, and frequent address changes are identified as risk factors for reoffending (Morton, 2009; Raynor et al., 2000).
Education and employment A lack of education and employment have been identified as important factors in reoffending (Gendreau et al., 1996; Hollin & Palmer, 2006). This is also associated with school exclusion (Raynor et al., 2000), dropout (Farrington, 1990); poor literacy and numeracy skills (Baker, 2002). Employment related programmes have demonstrated positive results (Lipsey, 1995; Sampson & Laub, 1993).	**Financial management** Whist a lack of finances may be the by-product of unemployment, there is evidence to further suggest that poor financial management also contributes to reoffending (Nilsson, 2003). Offenders in the Sheffield desistance study reported a lack of money as the most important obstacle to 'going straight' (Bottoms & Shapland, 2011)
Relationships Positive relationships appear to play a strong role in desistance from crime - for example within childhood (poor parenting, abuse, family criminality) (Farrington, 2002; Gendreau et al., 1996; Rutter et al., 1998). Adult relationships and receiving family visits when in custody also reduces offending, with clear links to social networks (King et al., 2007; Niven & Stewart, 2005; Sampson & Laub, 1993).	**A criminal lifestyle / thinking** Youth delinquent or adult pro-criminal associates are strongly associated to future offending (Gendreau et al., 1996; Raynor et al., 2000). Associated here are pro-criminal attitudes and recidivism (Baker, 2002; Palmer & Hollin, 2004).
Mental health and personality issues Prisoners experience increased levels of mental health problems (Herbst & Gunn, 1991; Sawyer & Lart, 1996). There is some evidence that certain types may be predictive of recidivism (Bonta et al., 1998). In addition impulsivity, risk-taking, lack of self control and a need for excitement have all been identified as important (Baker, 2002; Raynor et al., 2000; Rutter et al., 1998).	**Substance misuse** There is considerable research indicating that drug misuse is a strong predictor for recidivism of offending (Raynor et al., 2000; Spohn & Holleran, 2002), and in particular acquisitive crimes (Oldfield, 1996). The relationship regarding alcohol is less clear, although still relevant (Oldfield, 1996; Rutter et al., 1998).

Key learning: **Many of the problems faced by offenders can be anticipated, based on previous research, and can be built into provision at the planning stage.**

The evolution of offender management

The recent Green Paper's proposals (Ministry of Justice, 2010a) go some way to addressing current issues relating to the search for alternatives to custody (such as offender management, Community Payback and restorative justice) and reducing demand on the Criminal Justice System.

The localism agenda covers aspects of offender management. The idea is to get local people involved and participating in what will affect them, for example communities are being consulted on what work those on Community Payback Orders should be doing in their communities. The rationale for the increased use of community sentences includes retaining offenders' contact with social capital, maintaining stable housing, and building bridges to increase the chance of re-integration into the community. By working with offenders in a local area, public services can come together to help prevent and reduce the risks of re-offending (Allen & Stern, 2007).

It is also the case that previous offender management initiatives such as the Prolific and Other Priority Offender Scheme (PPO) and Drugs Interventions Programmes (DIP) continue to yield positive findings (see Dawson & Cuppleditch, 2007; Home Office, 2010; Skodbo et al., 2007). These programmes are however becoming increasingly subsumed within a broader Integrated Offender Management (IOM) approach, which is an attempt to bring the efficiencies of multi-agency working, across and beyond local public sector agencies, to wider problem offender groups, as defined by local priorities. The recent Green Paper positions IOM as the principal model for managing and rehabilitating persistent offenders and importantly, envisages a key role for the police in delivering reductions in offending - it states *"The contribution of the police is critical, working in partnership to identify, manage and control known offenders. Many of the skills needed for good policing have also proved well suited to help manage offenders into a law abiding and disciplined way of life, and to provide reassurance to victims that cutting crime remains an overriding priority".* (Ministry of Justice, 2010a).

This brings us to the Diamond Initiative, a multi-agency model, with a strong police component, which has been conceptualised as London's IOM approach and is the only current IOM initiative with a robust and published evaluation that has sought to examine

the impact upon crime. DI is viewed therefore as the first test of a new way of working with offenders under an IOM banner.

While the future trajectory of IOM remains uncertain, in light of the *'Rehabilitation Revolution'* heralded in the Coalition Agreement (Cabinet Office, May 2010) and subsequent Green Paper, likely next steps will include the increased emphasis on service provision from outside of the public sector. 'Payment by results' mechanisms are being developed to promote outcomes-based commissioning, and with the first such scheme launched in Peterborough in 2010, the favoured model of voluntary and community sector service delivery, with initial funding and investment risk shouldered by social impact investors, presents an intriguing framework for the future of offender management. One implication of particular note is the need for accurate measurement of outcomes to indicate whether finances should be paid, emphasising the need for initiatives to be able to accurately demonstrate performance, but also the need for robust research and evaluation to drive improvement and increased effectiveness.

Summary

The growing prison population and high costs of crime emphasise the need to invest in the rehabilitation of offenders. There is a research base which can inform efforts to reduce reoffending and provide lessons about the type of initiative that is likely to have a positive influence on crime. This accords with the new government's desire to push towards non-custodial offender management and, in effect, the Diamond Initiative has unknowingly found itself as the first high profile test of this new Integrated Offender Management; and one that has the potential to generate significant savings within a group of offenders that place a high demand on the CJS.

Chapter 2: Methodology

There is a substantial debate within the literature as to what is acceptable in the methodological design of a crime reduction initiative evaluation (See Dawson & Williams, 2009; Harper & Chitty, 2005; Hollin, 2008; Maguire & Raynor, 2006; Sherman et al., 1997). At the heart of the debate is a balance between quality versus pragmatism in evaluation. That is - should researchers be instructed to attempt *'gold standard'* Randomised Control Trials or control groups, and if not, how much of a compromise in rigour is acceptable before confidence in the results is diminished? This is further complicated as local programmes would most likely not have access to large sample sizes or the technical expertise to develop accurate control groups. The Diamond Evaluation should be seen in this light, a demonstration that a locally based initiative can yield a robust and technically accomplished evaluation.

The MPS Strategy, Research and Analysis Unit have adopted an approach which used a variety of research methods to evaluate the Diamond Initiative (see figure 1 for an overview of the evaluation). The research has spanned the entire two-year life-cycle of the DI and has employed various techniques to capture change over the course of the programme, something many evaluations do not examine; this allows insights into improvements in implementation over time by using a triangulation of methods approach. Overall the evaluation sought to examine the *process* and *impact* of the DI. Further detail on the methods used is provided below.

Figure 1: evaluation timeline



1. Online staff survey

Staff feedback enabled the research team to capture the learning around the planning and delivery the Diamond Initiative at various points over the two-year project. An anonymous online staff survey was conducted four times over the course of the evaluation: twice in the first year (wave 1 in March 2009; wave 2 during December 2009), and twice in 2010 (wave 3 June 2010; wave 4 December 2010). The surveys aimed to capture perceptions and experiences of staff in relation to a number of key aspects of their role such as partnership working, staffing and practical issues over the duration of the programme. Near the end the DI pilot, the final survey incorporated questions which aimed to document staff views on key lessons learned and opinions on the future of offender management on their borough.

A consistently strong response rate was achieved throughout the research. Wave 1 achieved a total of 51 completed responses (a 67% response rate); wave 2 achieved 67 responses (a 94% completion rate), wave 3 achieved 64 responses (89% response rate), and wave 4 achieved 66 responses (97% response rate; see table 2 for the numbers of

responses). The research team were unable to survey any members of staff who had left the DI team.

Table 2: Staff survey responses by borough (2009-2010)

Borough	Wave 1 (March 2009)	Wave 2 (Dec 2009)	Wave 3 (May 2010)	Wave 4 (Nov 2010)
Croydon	7	11	10	9
Hackney	7	11	8	11
Lambeth	6	9	11	11
Lewisham	11	11	9	9
Newham	10	13	13	13
Southwark	10	11	10	13
Unspecified	-	1	3	-
Total	51	67	64	66

2. Staff interviews

The staff surveys were complemented by interviews, which provided further context to aspects captured in the surveys. MVA, a market research company, commissioned by the SRAU, carried out 36 one-to-one semi-structured interviews with Diamond staff, from across the six boroughs, in each year. Interview schedules were developed to expand on a variety of issues raised in the first waves of staff surveys and to provide further context and insights into staff experiences of setting up and delivering the DI programme. The fieldwork was conducted in August 2009 and again in September and October 2010, with a focus on capturing change and learning over the course of the DI.

A good mix of staff was achieved - the sample of staff selected for the interviews represented a range of job functions and included both strategic and operational staff from all six boroughs, along with Central Team members, as detailed in table 3.

Table 3: Staff interviewed, by role (2009-2010)

Role title	Year One (2009)	Year Two (2010)
Police Sergeant	6	6
Police Constable	8	6
Police Community Support Officer	5	5
Probation Officer	6	6
Local Authority staff	5	7
Strategic Leads	6	6
Total	36	36

3. Offender interviews

The evaluation aimed to capture the perceptions and experiences of offenders engaged on the DI. This enables the evaluation to understand what motivates users to be involved in the DI, what their perceptions and experiences are about the DI and how their needs are being met. Offenders were nominated by the teams and interviewed in October 2009, and again in July 2010. Fifty-eight face-to-face semi-structured interviews were carried out with DI offenders across the six DI boroughs over the two years. See table 4 for a breakdown by borough.

Table 4: Offenders interviewed by borough (2009-2010)

Borough	Offenders interviewed (2009)	Offenders interviewed (2010)
Croydon	6	5
Hackney	3	4
Lambeth	4	5
Lewisham	6	6
Newham	5	5
Southwark	5	4
Total	29	29

The interviewees consisted of 49 males and 9 females. A total of 33 were White and 25 were from Black and minority ethnic groups; reflecting the demography of the parts of London covered, the diversity of both groups, in terms of nationality and country of birth, was notable. The ages of those interviewed in 2009 varied from 21 to 59, with a mean of 38. Those in 2010 varied from 21 years of age to 55, with an average age of 35.

The criminal history of the offenders interviewed varied (with an average of 20 previous offences, (range 1 – 72) in year one and an average of 30 previous offences (range 1-133) in year 2). DI teams arranged and 'selected' participant interviews and therefore the evaluation team was only able to interview offenders who were currently engaged with the scheme, not those who had declined, dropped-out or been removed from the DI.

4. PNC[6] analysis

In order to investigate the impact of the DI on crime, a quasi-experimental approach was used to compare the PNC-recorded offending of a cohort of 368 Diamond referrals, during a one-year period after prison release, against a statistically matched control group of offenders drawn from similar London wards.

[6] The Police National Computer (PNC) records information relating to individuals for the use of the police and law enforcement, including details of all criminal convictions received.

This approach has allowed for comparisons to be made in terms of the binary 'proven reoffending rate' as well as more nuanced comparisons of survival rates, number of offences committed and offence seriousness.

In addition, a second control group, matched to Diamond's *active participants* has also been generated to explore impact. A detailed discussion of the approach taken, the matching processes used to generate the control groups and the reoffending measures employed is presented in chapter 4 and in appendices 1 and 9.

5. Economic impact

MVA Consultancy were contracted to carry out a cost/benefit analysis of the Diamond Initiative. Using PNC data and a model based on Home Office research, the cost of crimes committed by the Diamond referral cohort during the year following prison release was calculated and compared to that of the control group. The costed-benefit of the Diamond Initiative in terms of crimes averted (i.e. the difference between the costed crime of the referral and control groups) was then compared against the cost of delivering the Diamond Initiative. Further methodological detail is provided in chapter 4.

Chapter 3: The process of delivering the Diamond Initiative - insights into implementation

This section presents the challenges and learning relating to the set-up and continued implementation of the DI and, where appropriate, attempts to illustrate improvements over time. We know that these implementation issues are key to delivering programme integrity and the effects of these on outcomes should not be underestimated. This section is organised around the following topics:

1) Initial set up and how the DI matured over time.
2) Multi-agency working and meeting offender need.
3) The challenge of engaging with offenders.
4) Working across organisational cultures.
5) The offender's experience of Diamond.
6) Gearing down and looking forward.

1) Initial set up and how the DI matured over time

One of the strengths of the methodology employed was the ability to track progress and staff perceptions over the course of the DI. This section will explore the initial set-up and implementation of the DI alongside any improvements identified over time, to examine whether and how the scheme has matured over the two year pilot period.

Staffing the Diamond Initiative

The majority of the staff members surveyed in wave 4 (69%) had been in their role for over a year, with 85% having been in their position for at least six-months. This means that a large number of the views expressed in the survey were based on solid experience of working on Diamond. Staff expressed the feeling that team building was hindered at the beginning due to different agencies mobilising staff at different speeds. To illustrate, whilst police staff could be deployed rapidly (within a week); probation and local authorities required job descriptions and formal recruitment was necessary.

In the first-year report, an important issue arose in that police staff described how they were '*volunteered'* or '*posted'* into DI roles, which could impact on motivation and 'buy-in' to the Diamond ethos. Results from the second year indicate that this '*posting'* issue had in the main been rectified. In wave 4, 85% of staff had stated they had joined DI through their own volition. None-the-less there were still cases where police recruitment was problematic; standard police deployment practices, which can tend to see officers as interchangeable resources, are perhaps not best suited to filling roles that require specific personal qualities, motivation and openness to new approaches.

Two groups where most staff attrition was noted were police constables and Local Authority staff. Police constables due to the issues described above, and Local Authority staff due to the perception that they did not always have adequate skills to work in the teams. Team staff levels improved throughout the scheme (see figure 2), but the majority still described their teams as not fully staffed. So much so, that in Wave 4 less than 30% of staff perceived their team to be up to strength. This staffing issue in itself may have implications for effective implementation and therefore programme integrity.

Figure 2: ***Is your DI team fully staffed?***



Finally, as reported in the year-one report, there continued to be staff discussions during year two as to the balance of police and probation staff on the DI and who is more *appropriate* to lead such an offender management scheme. This issue will be revisited later in the chapter, where the split between working cultures will be examined in more detail.

Key learning: **Recruitment and staffing levels were a consistent challenge. Coordinating recruitment protocols is likely to be crucial when forming interdisciplinary teams. Staff attitudes, motivation and 'buy-in' directly affects implementation; seconding reluctant staff to offender management roles should be avoided.**

Training and developmental learning

At the beginning of the DI in early 2009, one week training courses were delivered to all six DI teams: over the course of the DI this morphed into a two-day training scheme delivered on demand. Comparing the staff survey responses over the scheme, it is clear that staff became far more confident in their understanding of their DI role (**45%** wave 1, to **76%** wave 4). Similarly, when asked about training, over the course of the scheme, staff were more positive that training enabled them to do their job effectively (see figure 3) - although a minority of staff still believed improvements could be made. Areas highlighted where additional training would be beneficial were predominantly practical in nature, such as housing processes and the law, dealing with victims, mental health, drugs treatment information, and offender communication strategies.

Figure 3: ***To what extent do you agree that you have received sufficient training to do your job on the DI team effectively?***



An interesting cultural divide appeared in consideration of the training - between probation and Local Authority resettlement officers, who tended to focus on offender needs, compared to some police officers (and PCSOs), whose focus was more on Justice Reinvestment and a different approach to using criminal justice resources. Several respondents felt that police personnel were coming into the DI with less offender management experience. This gap needs to be adequately addressed in the training provided.

> *'The police staff have no experience of this type of work and they are given almost no training. I feel that this is unfair on them and they do flounder for some months at the start'.* (DI staff member)

Interviews with police officers revealed that some thought they had no need for specific training, as a lot of what they needed to know was seen as '*common sense'*; this is perhaps reflective of cultural differences, for instance while probation officers tend to value their professional training and qualifications the emphasis within the police is perhaps more on experience and on-the-job learning. To illustrate, one police respondent said that motivational interviewing training was '*fun'* but he has not used it since.

None-the-less, nearly all (91%) of staff survey respondents at wave 4 reported that they had learnt something new whilst working on the DI. Reflecting on the contrast with their previous experiences in Safer Neighbourhoods and enforcement roles, many police personnel noted that their attitude towards offenders had changed and they had developed a greater understanding of offending behaviour, were more open-minded and less judgemental. This builds upon the year-one results where staff often highlighted the generally positive experience of being part the DI. This is an important point to focus on, and one that may sow the seeds for enhanced offender engagement in the future careers of those police officers that participated in DI.

> *'Offenders do face challenges. Obstacles are put in their way (when they shouldn't be)… I am more open-minded. I am a better officer being involved in this project'.* (Police, DI staff member)

Key learning: **Effective staff training, using continuous feedback for monitoring success, should be a core part of any offender management.**

Accommodation: getting the right space

Lack of access to computing facilities, desk space, suitable office accommodation and cars were cited throughout the DI as barriers to smooth running of the scheme - although to a lesser degree in year-two than year-one. Furthermore, co-location of staff in team accommodation was once again identified as a key facilitator for delivering DI services, sharing information, and multi-agency working. This perceived benefit of co-location echoes previous offender management evaluations (Dawson, 2007). However, staff continued to report that there was a lack of adequate space to meet or interview their clients. To illustrate, one team was not allowed to bring offenders into their local authority owned premises as this was *'against house rules'*. To interview clients, the staff would use nearby cafés, which raised questions about client confidentiality and public safety. Other teams based within police stations had to see clients within interview rooms. This was seen by staff as increasing the possibilities of disengagement of offenders with the teams as they may not appreciate going to a police station, engaging with the police or wanting to re-visit any feelings of being in a police interview room.

IT systems

IT-related issues caused staff frustrations throughout the first year of the implementation, in particular with the LISARRT system - the bespoke system used by teams to monitor referrals from prison and record activities, outcomes and case-notes relating to service users. Indeed, staff often used paper records until LISARRT was fully operational. The second year interviews appear to indicate that staff were far more comfortable with the LISARRT system. However, there remained criticism, such as slow running, time consuming to complete, hard to navigate through and a difficulty understanding some of the terms used in the system. Interviews with the Central DI Strategic Team revealed that they continuously sought to improve LISARRT to meet the needs of the DI teams, (and to a lesser extent, of the evaluation). Whilst this was appreciated by staff, the feeling was that much greater user input, earlier on, could have led to a more rapid development and use of LISARRT.

Key learning: **An effective case management and referral system should be in place at the outset with only minor amendments subsequently made.**

Overall, despite initial problems, implementation matured over the course of the programme. Any future-roll out should anticipate and make contingency plans to address early implementation issues (e.g. equipment, buildings, staffing, IT systems).

2) Multi-agency working and meeting offender need

As outlined in the introduction, the assessment and the meeting of offender need is essential within offender management to enable desistance from crime. As such, a key question for the Diamond Initiative should be whether offender needs were effectively met, because if not, obtaining a positive impact upon crime will be very difficult. Staff were broadly positive when asked whether they thought resources were matched to offender need during their work with offenders - with a clear improvement being seen over the scheme, albeit with a minor drop in wave 4 (see figure 4).

Figure 4: ***Do the resources aligned to the DI team match the needs of the offenders?***



To explore this in more detail, the evaluation obtained OASys data on 147 clients eligible for the DI within the first year of the scheme. Table 5 illustrates the OASys needs identified within the DI group[7]. The DI group present high levels of need across the board, with education, training and employability, lifestyles and associates, relationships and attitudes being the most frequent needs; demonstrating the complex nature of this client group. The on-line staff survey throughout each wave has asked about staff perceptions of the different kinds of support involved in the DI. Piecing these two data sets together can reveal insights into whether or not offender need was being met.

Table 5: Diamond client needs identified

	Eligible for DI
ETE (education, training employability)	74.1%
Lifestyle and Associates	70.7%
Relationships	65.3%
Attitudes	64.6%
Thinking and Behaviour	62.6%
Accommodation	54.4%
Drug Misuse	59.4%
Alcohol Misuse	27.9%
Finance	n/a
Emotional well-being	n/a
Average number of needs per offender	**4.8**

In terms of the services involved in Diamond, as demonstrated in Table 6, police and probation were (as expected) perceived to be centrally involved throughout the programme. This is comparable to year-one results. Outside of these, no other service was regularly perceived as being *consistently involved*, although the **local authority**, **housing** and a lesser degree **drugs misuse services** became more involved over time - something that should be seen as a real positive. It would appear that most services were

[7] DI offenders present higher needs in all areas except alcohol misuse when compared to the overall national 2008 sample - albeit such a comparison has limitations insights can still be developed. MOJ 2009: Compendium of research and analysis on the offender assessment system.

'involved when required' for example mental health, health and education (see appendix 12). As shown earlier these three services have a key role to play in addressing the problems facing persistent offenders.

One could argue that given the high proportion of needs identified via the OASys data in education, training and employability, thinking and behaviour, accommodation and drug misuse (amongst others) that this support should be **consistently involved in some way** in the Diamond Initiative in order to effectively meet need. To illustrate, it was only in wave four of the survey that housing was consistently involved at a reasonable level (67%), before this, the picture was very different. It is unlikely that this client need would have been effectively met in the early phase of Diamond. Staff also highlighted the need for greater links and involvement from mental health, immigration and benefit services.

> *'Housing is always an issue as we have very limited resources. Thus it is very difficult (if not impossible) for our clients to source private accommodation as they cannot raise a deposit. Few qualify for supported housing'.* (Staff member)

> *'It's difficult to access support from the local community mental health teams, particularly for dual diagnosis client'.* (Staff member)

Table 6: Staff perceptions of services involved in the Diamond over the course of the Initiative[8]

	% Consistently Involved			
	W1	**W2**	**W3**	**W4**
Police	98	97	97	97
Probation	84	97	91	86
Prison	28	18	16	26
Community Safety Partnership	4	9	9	10
Local Authority	45	60	70	70
Voluntary Groups	4	19	19	12
Housing	18	34	44	67
Education	2	15	14	5
Youth Offending Teams	0	2	3	0
Drug Intervention/ Drug Action Team	24	19	41	39
Mental health	2	2	11	9
Health	4	2	3	3

Furthermore, given the importance of the prison service within the Diamond Initiative - it should be noted that prison service involvement throughout the scheme appears piecemeal without real improvement over the course of the scheme (wave 1, 28% to wave 4, 26% consistently involved). This is an issue previous evaluations have identified as a major challenge within offender management (see Dawson 2007, in terms of prisons sharing information or offender release dates) - it would appear especially pertinent given the aims and clientele of the DI to foster better and more effective prison links.

Overall, there were improvements in multi-agency working over the duration of the scheme, although even in year-two it would appear that support gaps remained. The key question is whether the improvements identified would have been adequate to be able to effectively meet offender need. This is a question that may resonate when examining reoffending, given that the evidence base is clear that addressing need is a key ingredient in reducing crime.

[8] Those services in green indicate a good progression, whilst those which are amber could be improved. Red indicates a poor improvement on services which appear to be areas of need amongst the clients.

Key learning: **The mix of help offered may not have been effectively matched to client need. Provision should be designed based on local analysis of the needs of the client group, but anticipation of standard problems, based on previous research should be built in at the planning stage. Unmet client need is as much a strategic problem as it is a practical problem.**

3) The challenge of engaging with offenders

Before supportive intervention could be delivered, teams faced the challenge of identifying, locating and engaging with eligible offenders in their area.

As discussed later (chapter 4), the referral systems used by teams to target eligible offenders were often problematic and left teams with extensive and time consuming work in terms of researching and tracking down potential clients, searching databases, making enquiries with other agencies and making repeat visits to potential addresses - work which only sometimes resulted in the Diamond offer being made. Overall, throughout the initiative, case loads were generally felt by the teams to be lighter than expected, which had a number of implications. On the one hand, staff appreciated the time and resource this afforded to dedicate to clients on the books, on the other, teams felt a degree of pressure to get the numbers up, which in turn led to:

- Taking on referrals from other agencies (who tended to see Diamond as 'resource rich'), including difficult cases which they occasionally felt were 'palmed off' on them.
- Increasing further the amount of time and effort spent on researching and locating referrals, to make sure no potential clients got missed.
- Pressuring the initial Diamond model to expand to other wards and other groups of offenders - which on occasions, lead to some discomfort in teams, for instance in taking on sexual offenders from PPO teams.
- Perhaps, in some cases, leading to 'selling' the scheme to offenders at the expense of emphasising the behaviour change required on their part.

Owing to this pressure and because of the relatively prescriptive eligibility criteria, teams rarely reported disagreements over selection or de-selection decisions. As a voluntary scheme, one of the main challenges faced by teams was persuading offenders to engage. Overall (as discussed later), engagement rates were relatively encouraging, however it is clear that staff came across clients with a range of attitudes and motivations - from those apparently genuinely committed to changing their ways:

> *'They realise that they don't want to continue (down) the road they were on. They want change in their lives. Most of them are in their twenties and realise that where they were heading goes to nowhere'.* (Staff survey respondent W4)

> *'To be quite honest I was sick and tired of the way I was going, every sort of eight months. I was going into prison for six months. Doing six months there. Coming out. Going back to work and doing exactly the same thing. It is the cycle I just kept doing'.* (Offender)

To those with perhaps more self interested motivations:

> *'The majority are after what they can get from us, often not keeping their side of the agreement'.* (Staff survey respondent W4)

> *'I signed up to get re-housed and then start putting my life back together again…you know within a couple of months I was looking to colleges'.* (Diamond offender)

To those, perceived by teams as unready or unable to recognise the benefits of the offer made:

> *'Offenders with mental health and drugs issues often have problems that make it difficult to see that Diamond is a genuine chance to move forward in a good way'.* (Staff survey respondent W4)

It is clear that as a public service offer with a strong police element, Diamond raised suspicions among many offenders; this has the potential to suppress engagement rates and should be addressed in the work. Even offenders who engaged with the scheme reported initial apprehensions,

> *'I was a bit suspicious…they're coppers and, you know…they're trying to help you and I'm not used to coppers trying to help me, I'm used to 'em beating me up and chucking me in gaol… yeah I was a little bit suspicious'.* (Offender)

Although it is equally clear that through a gradual engagement process, the appeal of the support on offer and by Diamond staff demonstrating commitment and 'good faith' these apprehensions could be overcome:

> '[The Diamond caseworker] *came across as a person that really cares about that individual person…and maybe that's what it is I need, you know someone who seems genuine and genuinely wants to help…I felt I could talk to him you know and really feel comfortable'.* (Offender)

> *'At the time I didn't have any other option. I needed the support. I like the security of dealing with the police and being inside the law. I have a criminal record so now I need help to find jobs'.* (Offender)

Staff frequently reported that engaging offenders was facilitated by initial contact in prison, prior to release. This allowed team members to address suspicions and start to break down barriers at an early stage, made it more difficult for offenders to avoid contact and encouraged them to consider the future and begin to make plans for release; this is of particular note given the scope for greater prison involvement reported in the previous section.

'Attending legal visits within the HMP environment. This enables the Diamond team member to convince the individual (away from any distractions) of the wholesale benefits of engaging with Diamond. The prison environment provides a 'captive audience''. (Staff survey respondent, W4)

Key learning: **Staff reported positively on the practice of engaging with offenders in prison. Given the evident problems with the flow of information between custody and community and the importance of the first weeks and months following release, an effective link up with local prisons is a key to success.**

The challenge of increasing numbers was felt throughout the DI; the scale of provision needs to be matched to the likely supply of eligible clients for the defined catchment area. Diamond's (original) focus on certain wards was found to be restrictive.

4) Working across organisational cultures

One of the core themes to emerge from the staff survey and interviews was the challenge in effectively integrating police and non-police staff within the DI. This seems to have resulted in a number of working tensions or culture clashes, especially during the second year of the scheme.

The survey indicated that the majority of staff perceived that generally police and non-police worked together well, although even this saw a decrease over time and an increase in mixed responses toward the end of the programme (see figure 5). It was only when we were able to delve deeper that it becomes apparent that there were working tensions running through the scheme; these tensions reflect themselves in a number of areas.

Figure 5: ***To what extent do you agree that Police officers/PCSOs and non-police staff generally work well together?***



For the majority of staff (75% in wave 4) working on DI was what they expected; working with partners to support offenders. However, some police staff felt they had been *'mis-sold'* the DI and were expecting more enforcement activities as opposed to a predominantly supportive role. Some went further stating that, as a police officer, they felt they had *'their wings clipped'.* Some police officers also pointed out that they did not want to be seen as '*protecting'* the client, were sceptical of rehabilitation and were surprised that the offenders appeared to have more '*power'* than they would expect them to have within typical engagement with the police. Indeed, Police staff noted that some of their colleagues saw the DI as more *'social work'* and *'not real policing'.*

The police were seen as 'task orientated' and 'authoritarian', providing the 'get up and go' compared to the 'liberal' and 'laid back' nature of the probation and Local Authority staff, where there was also the perception (among police) that a series of meetings was required before carrying out a task.

> *'MPS officers and staff tend to have a robust approach to activity based working; with efforts to undertake tasks to achieve outcomes. Some of our professional partners do not display the same level of urgency'.* (Police staff)

As previously raised, the majority of staff perceived DI as a being police led, although many non-police staff questioned this over the duration of the programme. Interviews with the Central DI Strategic Team emphasised that the police numbers allowed for staff to be available if and when needed, providing an *'out of office hours'* service, that would not necessarily be provided by non-police staff. Partner agency staff felt the probation service would have been better placed to lead because of their skills and prior experience of working with these client groups, both of which were perceived to be lacking amongst police officers.

Another issue between staff that was never fully resolved was that of the police uniform. Many non-police staff, perceived that wearing of the police uniform, could alienate and anger clients, making trusting relationships harder to build.

> *'One of the PCs was working with a case … at the start, he met him in plain clothes, but then he started meeting him in uniform. And, he was okay with that, up until his family started saying, "Why are you working with a copper?" And then, from that stage, he's really withdrawn from working with the PC, but he will still work with me, so I think that's quite telling'.* (Probation staff)

One police staff member commented that the uniform is not routinely worn, except during compliance visits (for Community Payback offenders) or undertaking a task where it is deemed appropriate to be in uniform. Police staff did also comment that sometimes the uniform would be used to reinforce boundaries or if they suspect illegal behaviour of a client. This was not seen to be problematic by police staff. Interviews with the offenders indicated that the majority had no real issue with police staff wearing a uniform.

> *'When they get to know you, they don't see the uniform.'* (Police staff)

> *'…she's always in uniform… that's fine.'* (Offender)

In summary, it is apparent that there were some working/ cultural tensions across agencies within the DI - some non-police staff going as far as to argue that police officers should undergo an interview process which assesses their skills and experiences

necessary for the DI before joining the team. The feasibility of such interviews is not the issue here in itself, the consideration being that many staff felt that such action was required illustrating the unresolved divisions between staff working on the DI.

Key learning: **Although teams generally worked well across disciplinary boundaries, tensions linked working culture between the police and other agencies were never fully reconciled. There is still work required to establish an integrated approach.**

5) The offenders' experience of Diamond

Almost without exception, the Diamond service users interviewed reported positively on their experience of the scheme. It is important to note however, that these offenders were, by necessity, those who had agreed to participate in DI, had not 'dropped-out' and, in all likelihood, were those that teams (who facilitated access) felt were most suitable for interview. With this caveat acknowledged, it is encouraging to report that those interviewed frequently gave positive and optimistic recent life-narratives; charting a trajectory from the anxiety and stress of the period immediately after prison-release to a more stable and fulfilled current state and projecting toward future progress. In many cases offenders saw the support they received from Diamond as integral to this progression, as one interviewee noted;

> *'I don't know what would have happened if I hadn't come to Diamond team…they've turned my life around basically and for all I know I could be back inside now doing a very long stretch…now I'm about to…start voluntary work, my life possibly has a future'.* (Offender)

Some interviewees reported negative previous experiences of statutory and non-statutory support and contrasted this with Diamond's joined-up working and needs-based approach.

'…back then…I was offered help, you know, probation and that but…I think the help that was available wasn't really what I needed, wasn't specific to me and… the left hand didn't know what the right hand was doing. So I was really disillusioned with them, had no faith in them and just had an attitude of 'well… I'm gonna do things my way', you know?...and that always led me to using drugs and ending up back in prison'. (Offender)

The Diamond ethos was seen as collaborative and non-directive, with the voluntary model and the approach taken by Diamond caseworkers (Lead Liaison Officers (LLOs)) allowing participants to feel in control of addressing their own needs.

'*The big difference is probation; you are given (as)… a punishment not as something to help you. Whereas Diamond is voluntary, you are here because you want the help, no one is making you come here and I am actually getting the help that you need through Diamond, whereas probation you are in for five, ten minutes and you don't get the help you need, it is more a chore…here I can come and say right I have got a drink problem and they will sort that out…they will do anything for you whereas the other ones… you got to go there or you go to prison whereas here you either come here or you don't, it is entirely up to yourself'.* (Offender)

Respondents reflected particularly positively on the quality of the relationships developed with Lead Liaison Officers. It was frequently clear that caseworkers had won the trust of their clients by demonstrating commitment and remaining non-judgemental.

'…he'd kick me up the ass if I do anything wrong… but no he doesn't criticise me he just tells me where I'm going wrong…'cos I have a lot of things like my bad drug and alcohol issues since I was very young… (he) has known me quite a while, sometimes… he says, 'have you got enough food?'… he helped me out getting a hostel…they're not judgemental… they ain't gonna criticise me for what I've done in my past, everything is a clean slate and we start from now…(they) ain't gonna pick you up for what you've done in the past…' (Offender)

As noted elsewhere and reported in year one, Diamond offenders often reported apprehensions about getting involved in a scheme with strong police involvement. While some retained reservations, for others the change in attitude towards the police, as a result of the positive interactions with Diamond police officers was striking.

> '*These guys (Diamond) have given me a different outlook…I never would have phoned the police. Two weeks ago I rang them due to a disturbance outside of (my) flat. Because of Diamond I realise there is care there and they understand me and I can be honest with them - feel like they'll help me now and not get me into trouble'.* (Offender)

Overall, and in line with the desistance literature, it is evident that Diamond teams managed to engage with individuals who appear committed to life-change but who present a range of needs and face a variety of obstacles in doing so. It is clear that the support provided by Diamond teams, both practical and motivational, was appreciated by participants and that honest and trusting relationships had developed, sometimes from an apprehensive starting point. The extent to which these positive reactions correspond with measurable behaviour changes, in terms of reoffending rates, is explored in detail in chapter 4.

6) Gearing down and looking forward

From the outset, the DI had a two year life-span and was always due to reach completion April 2011. None-the-less staff, especially within wave 4 of the survey and the second year interviews, expressed real uncertainly about the future of DI and discussed that they had heard '*rumours'* about the next steps (or not) of the DI. This uncertainty would have appeared to have had a negative influence on staff morale.

> *'I feel that the level of morale within the team has deteriorated due to the uncertainty about the future of the project and the team not being given any answers. This has meant that a number of staff having left and others are looking to leave, thus affecting the atmosphere'.* (DI staff).

Wave four of the staff survey explicitly asked about team morale, as can be seen in figure 6, there was a fair distribution - although at least one third described their morale as low or very low at this point and a third a potentially apathetic 'neither high or low'.

Figure 6: ***How would you rate the current level of morale in your team? (Wave 4)***



Generally, Local Authority workers and probation staff expected to go back to their original employment - although often emphasising their preference of remaining on the DI if there was the possibility. Police staff feared that they may be '*placed'* somewhere else so many were already looking for attractive positions within the MPS.

It is fair to say that most staff and offenders were positive about the need for DI to continue in some manner and described many anecdotal benefits of the scheme, such as perceptions of reduced offending, accommodation, training and the provision of other support.

> *'Yes, thank you very much. It's fantastic and I hope that they keep, the government keep funding the project and I'd love it if people come and use it because I've been, I'd recommend it'.* (Offender)

> *'In my opinion those offenders who we have helped to find work or to get onto training courses have been less likely to re-offend as they are occupying their time and earning'*. (Police)

'This project has proved really useful to both offenders and the wider community and victims of crime. Something needs to be put in place to carry this work on'. (Local Authority staff)

Even though the scheme was viewed positively, it was generally accepted that the Comprehensive Spending Review had altered the overall landscape and that there would not be funding for the DI in the future - but were hopeful that the work they had conducted would not go to waste and that DI may survive in one shape or another.

'I don't think it will carry on as expensive as it is now, there is just not the money… but I hope that there is some sort of reduced team, maybe a couple of police, a couple of probation officers and just refer people on the things that could help them'. (Police staff)

A recurring theme at this point was the frustration that the central team had given local staff no indication as to whether the DI would continue and would have wanted greater levels of information. However, to be fair, the Central Team themselves were not in a position to be able to predict what the future was for the scheme given of considerable flux occurring throughout the public sector during the final months of the scheme.

Key learning: **Pilot initiatives suffer from uncertainty. Staff feel this uncertainty. Strategies and contingencies for the end of an initiative should be considered in programme delivery.**

Chapter 4: The impact of the Diamond Initiative - what do we know about reducing offending?

In the year-one evaluation we reported that 28% of Diamond referrals had reoffended within six-months of prison release. A tentative comparison was made against an historic sample of less-than-12-month sentence offenders from London[9], which suggested that fewer Diamond referrals had reoffended than might otherwise be expected. Whilst this appeared promising, the comparison group was historic so likely to be affected by overall crime trends.

In year-two we are able to examine the impact of the DI on offending with much more rigour, over a full year follow-up period, in more detail and in comparison to a robust and carefully matched control group. In addition to examining impact, this section provides wider insights from the *profile* of the referral group, assesses the *response to the voluntary offer*, and highlights potentially *promising target groups and approaches*.

Evaluating the impact of a local offender management initiative

Approach

In the absence of opportunities for randomisation, a quasi-experimental approach was considered the most robust feasible option for investigating the impact of the Diamond Initiative on offending (Dawson & Williams, 2009). Conviction data, drawn from the Police National Computer (PNC), has been used to compare the 'proven reoffending'[10] of an 'evaluation cohort' of less-than-12-month sentence offenders, referred to the Diamond Initiative during the first nine months of the pilot[11], against a well matched control group drawn from similar London wards.

[9] Those released in Q1 2002 and dealt with by the MPS.
[10] The Proven Reoffending rate is the proportion of the cohort for which PNC records one or more criminal offence, committed during the follow-up period, which resulted in a conviction at court.
[11] Diamond teams became operational between January and March 2009, cohort offenders have registration and release dates prior to 01/10/2009.

The Evaluation Cohort ('all those referred')

The Diamond Initiative was limited in its geographical coverage to a set of wards (13 at the outset) within six London boroughs. All offenders leaving prison, having served less-than-12-month sentences, and returning to live within these wards were eligible to receive the offer of Diamond assistance[12], these individuals were referred to local Diamond teams by prisons and given records on the LISARRT (case management) system. These offender records have been drawn together to form the 'evaluation cohort'. In order to allow for a full year follow-up period for reoffending to be monitored (plus additional time for offences to result in convictions), only those offenders with prison release dates prior to mid-October 2009 have been included in the cohort[13]; a total of 368 individuals.

The Control Cohort (or who are we comparing DI offenders to?)

In order to generate a robust comparison cohort (that, *in the absence of Diamond* could be expected to exhibit equivalent offending to the referral group), the evaluation set out to identify a group of offenders who *lived in the parts of London most similar to the Diamond wards* and who *would have been referred to Diamond* if it had been in operation in their area.

A borough and ward level matching process was used to ensure that, in addition to having served similar sentences, within a similar timeframe, the offenders selected for the control group also lived in the parts of London most similar, in theoretically relevant ways, to the Diamond pilot wards (a detailed description of the matching process is provided in appendix 1).

Once a control group had been compiled, the quality of the match was verified at an individual level. It is important to note that this approach is both theoretically rigorous[14] and that the composition of the control group generated is highly comparable to that of the evaluation cohort. In terms of demographics, offending history, risk and need, the

[12] Other eligibility criteria relating to primary management by other agencies, outstanding court cases for serious offending and deportation were also applied by the teams, after the initial referral.
[13] This follow up period allows for a minimum of 420 days to have elapsed between each offender being released from prison and the extraction of PNC data in mid December 2010 i.e. a full year follow up period (12 x 30 day months = 360 days), plus a further two months (60 days) to allow for some lag in offences resulting in recorded convictions. For some analyses a sub-cohort of those with 540 days (18 months) of available data has been used.
[14] Achieves a level 4 on the Maryland Scale.

groups are extremely well matched (see comparative statistics provided in appendix 4). OGRS3[15] predicts that 44% of the evaluation cohort and 43% of the control would be re-sanctioned within one year of release, providing a clear indication that (in the absence of Diamond) the two groups could be expected to exhibit similar levels of reoffending during the following-up year.

'Intention to treat' (ITT) (why compare the referral group?)

It is important to note that the evaluation cohort was formed from Diamond *referrals* not from programme participants; given that Diamond participation was voluntary (and that we know from previous research that willingness to participate can lead to more positive outcomes (Hollin et al., 2008)), forming the cohort from those referred (regardless of whether they agreed to participate or not) allows for motivational impacts on reoffending to be controlled for. Furthermore, while it is possible to form a comparison group of those who *would have been referred,* had the scheme been available in their area, it is not possible to determine which of those *would have agreed to participate* in the scheme, thus making it necessary to match at the referral stage in order to preserve the comparability of the match.

This 'intention to treat' (ITT) approach entails that not all of those included in the evaluation group will necessarily have received the 'treatment' (i.e. Diamond support) and therefore that any impact (on reoffending or other outcomes) may be 'diluted' amongst non-participant referrals within the cohort. This can be considered a sterner test of impact (i.e. did it have a measurable impact the *target population,* not just on those who took part? (Colledge et al.,1999)) and does not preclude further analysis on the participating sub-section of the cohort, as explored later in this chapter.

Referral outcomes

Analysis of LISARRT records reveals that fewer referrals (cohort members) actually received Diamond support than had been anticipated. In addition to those who accepted or refused Diamond support, a substantial proportion of the referral group (45%) never

[15] The Offender Group Reoffending Scale, version 3 is a predictor of re-offending based on age, gender and criminal history, its accuracy is validated and it is used widely in offender management. (Howard et al, 2009)

received the Diamond offer, either because they could not be located, or because, following research by the teams, they were deemed to be ineligible (a full breakdown of referral outcomes is included in appendix 5) - in light of these findings it is necessary to question whether adequate links were established between Diamond teams and their feeder prisons.

In terms of the viability of the voluntary Diamond offer, it is encouraging to note that **three in five** of those who did receive the offer of support, agreed to participate (this differs from the high acceptance rate quoted in year one and reflects improvements in recording within the LISARRT system allowing a more accurate analysis of referral outcomes).

Overall, only one in three of the evaluation cohort actually started on the Diamond Initiative and only about half of those 'completed' a period of engagement[16], without dropping-out or being removed from the scheme (see Figure 7 and appendix 5 for a full breakdown). Methodologically while lower than expected participation rates, within the cohort, may make impact more difficult to detect, it does not in itself undermine the validity of the quasi-experimental approach.

Figure 7: Evaluation cohort referral outcomes



Base: Evaluation Cohort 368 - (all referrals)

[16] Those in the 'completer / continuer' category had undergone a period of engagement with teams and had agreed for support to be scaled back, or were continuing on the scheme at the time of coding in October 2010.

Key Learning: **The process of identifying and engaging with potential participants was severely hampered by the working of the referral system. Improving the flow of information between custody and community is likely to be crucial for delivering effective offender management. 60% of those offered the scheme agreed to participate - this indicates substantial demand for resettlement help and support.**

Did the Diamond Initiative reduce reoffending?

In order to test the hypothesis that the Diamond Initiative reduced reoffending among those referred to the scheme, PNC data has been used to calculate 'proven reoffending' rates over a one-year period following prison release, for both the evaluation and control groups.

Comparing reoffending for the evaluation and control cohorts

For this comparison, an offender is deemed to have reoffended if PNC data shows that they committed an offence within one year (360 days) of release from prison, which resulted in a conviction at court within 14 months (420 days) of release. Technically, this method differs slightly from that used by the Ministry of Justice to calculate official reoffending rates for the national prison release cohort, where an 18-month conviction follow-up period is permitted[17]. Given the time-frame for this analysis, reducing the follow-up period to 14 months allows for a larger and better matched sample of offenders to be included in the analysis, and thus for a more robust comparison to be made[18].

Key result

Of the 368 offenders referred to Diamond (the evaluation cohort), **156 (42.4%)** reoffended within 12 months of release from prison. From the control group (similar offenders from

[17] Reoffending of adults: results from the 2008 cohort, England and Wales. Ministry of Justice Statistics bulletin. March 2010

[18] In line with standard practice, breach offences have been excluded from all calculations (however where the breach accompanies a conviction for a new offence, that offence can be counted as a re-offence).

similar localities), **136** out of 327 offenders **(41.6%)** reoffended within 12 months. **This is the headline finding of the Diamond evaluation and would appear to demonstrate that the DI had no impact on offending.**

Comparisons with national reoffending rates

The proven reoffending rate for the national (England and Wales) less-than-12-month sentence cohort is 61.1% (2008, quarter 1 prison releases), this has varied between 58.0% and 64.7% since 2000 (Ministry of Justice, 2010a). In order to compare the Diamond referral group against these national figures, **adjustments are required in order to align counting methods used** - most importantly the 'waiting-period' permitted for offences to result in convictions must be extended to 18 months (with the consequence of reducing the size of the evaluation cohort available for analysis)[19].

These adjustments produce a proven reoffending rate for the evaluation cohort of **47.0%**; which is significantly below the rate for the national cohort[20]. It is evident that the Diamond referral group (and the control) had substantially less extensive criminal histories than the national less-than-12-month cohort. On average Diamond referrals had been convicted of 20.7 previous offences (control - 20.4), the average for less-than-12-month-sentence offenders in male, local prisons is 48.0 previous offences (Ministry of Justice, 2010b).

The reasons why those less-than-12-month sentence offenders who reside in some of London's most problematic wards (and therefore form the evaluation and control groups in this study), have substantially shorter offending histories and lower reoffending rates than the national cohort, are not fully understood. One potentially relevant observation is that, reflecting the make-up of the population in these wards, 43.8% of the referral group (and 41.9% of the control) were born outside of the UK. While the equivalent proportion for the national, less-than-12-month cohort is not known, given that only 11% of the UK

[19] Extending conviction follow up period to 18 months and excluding deportees results in an '18-month evaluation cohort' of 217 offenders.

[20] Z=4.108, statistically significant at 99% confidence level - no equivalent measure is available for the control group as it is not possible to identify deportees within the control group

population are non-UK born[21], it is reasonable to assume that it is substantially below this level.

Our data (see appendix 6) suggests that non-UK-born offenders reoffend less and have fewer previous recorded offences than those born in the UK - in light of this, the fact that the Diamond cohort (and its ward matched equivalent) is likely to contain a greater proportion born overseas than the national cohort, may go some way to explain the differences in proven re-offending rates found in this study.

Key Learning: **The level of reoffending within the Diamond referral group was below that of the national less-than-12-month sentence cohort. This should be understood in terms of differences in the make-up of the referral group compared with the national sample. This suggests the need for regional / local benchmarking in order to provide a framework for assessing the differences and effectiveness of local offender management approaches.**

Close-up on crime - did the Diamond Initiative have any other effect on offending?

The proven reoffending rate, reported above, is a blunt measure of offending behaviour, it does not, for instance, take into account the amount of time offenders 'survived' before reoffending, the number of offences committed or the 'seriousness' or 'type' of those offences. This section delves deeper into the data to examine these more nuanced measures of reoffending.

'Survival' - how long did it take offenders to reoffend after prison release?

In order to allow valid comparisons to be made with national data, three, six, nine and 12 month reoffending rates have been calculated for the **18-month waiting period sub-cohorts** of the evaluation and control groups[22]. As can be seen in figure 8 (below), the

[21] Population by Country of Birth and Nationality (April 2009 to March 2010). Office of National Statistics

[22] In order to make like-for-like comparisons, deportees (who cannot be identified within the control group) have not been excluded. **Reoffending rates therefore differ slightly from those reported elsewhere**. Reoffending rates are

proportion of the referral and control groups who had reoffended after each period was generally consistent[23], providing no indication of a Diamond impact on the amount of time offenders remained 'offence-free'.

Figure 8: Proven reoffending after 3, 6, 9 and 12 months



Within all cohorts, **those who reoffended during the follow-up year were most likely to first do so soon after release** - for instance, 17.6% of the evaluation group first reoffended within three months of release compared with just 4.3% during months 10 to 12. Again, both the evaluation and control cohorts were markedly below national levels after each of the follow-up periods.

Key Learning: **Those who reoffend tend to do so quickly after prison release; this indicates a 'window of opportunity' for supportive engagement immediately following (or commencing before) prison release.**

The amount of reoffending

The (full) Diamond referral group committed a total of 556 offences during the one year follow-up period (excluding breaches) at an average of 1.5 offences each. The control group committed 446 offences - an average of 1.4 offences each. This difference is not statistically significant, indicating that the Diamond Initiative does not appear to have an

based on offences committed during that follow-up period, which resulted in a conviction within the period or within the subsequent six months.

[23] 4% difference between evaluation and control after 3 months - not statistically significant

impact on the number of offences committed by the referral cohort during the year following release.

The average number of offences committed by the two cohorts in each of the 12 months following, and 24 months prior to prison release, is shown in figure 9. The similarity of the offending pattern between the two groups, both before and after release is evident - reinforcing both the degree of similarity between the two groups and further illustrating the 'no-impact' finding.

Figure 9: Mean offences per month during two years prior to, and year following, prison release[24]



'Seriousness' of reoffending

Mason et al. (2007) provide a structure for categorising criminal offences into 10 'seriousness' groups based on the average severity of sentences handed down across England and Wales. Figure 10 shows the proportions of each cohort whose most serious offence, post-release, fell into each of five (combined) seriousness bands. As shown, the seriousness profile of the two groups' post-release offending is very similar, once again indicating no impact of Diamond referral.

[24] Greater monthly fluctuations for the control group may be a product of multi-counting.

Figure 10: Most serious post-release offence category



Base: All those who reoffended E=156, C=136

As shown, more than 40% of those who reoffended committed offences which fell into the 7th and 8th seriousness categories, these bands include crimes such as drug possession, common assault and shoplifting[25], providing insights into the kinds of issues offenders may be facing (e.g. substance abuse) but also illustrating the relatively 'low-level' nature of the groups' offending. Given that this type of offending tends to be less 'costly' than more serious crime there are implications for the cost-effectiveness of targeting resources at this group.

As can be seen in figure 11, the *change* in seriousness of offending (comparing periods before and after release), is also relatively comparable between the two groups. There is therefore no indication that referral to Diamond impacted on the severity of the offences committed.

[25] Examples of offences within each category are provided in appendix 8.

Figure 11: Seriousness of most serious offence post-release, compared to most serious offence in two years prior to release



Base: All those who reoffended E=156, C=136

Key Learning: **No difference has been found between the Diamond referral group and the matched control in terms of the proportion who reoffended, the speed at which they reoffended, the number of offences they committed or the seriousness of those offences. The two groups of offenders exhibited highly similar offending careers, which continued to be comparable after prison release, despite the fact that the evaluation group were referred to the Diamond Initiative.**

Reoffending by crime type

In order to investigate whether Diamond brought about a reduction in any *type of reoffending,* comparisons have been made between the sub-sections of the two cohorts that had committed offences, within various crime-type categories, during the two years prior to prison release.

Figure 12 shows the proportion of each previous offending-type subset that reoffended *within that offence category,* in the year following release. As illustrated, within the evaluation group, fewer recent violent offenders and those who had recently committed offences against property (criminal damage) reoffended, within those crime types, compared to the control. The reverse is true for recent acquisitive and drugs offenders, where more from the evaluation group reoffended. It should be noted however, that owing to the comparatively small base sizes none of these differences are statistically significant.

It may be of note, that the types of offences in which the evaluation group performed 'better' than the control tended to cluster around 'disorderly' / or 'impulsive' types of offending (criminal damage, violence, public order and assaults on police[26]). This provides a tentative indication that Diamond may have had a positive effect on disrupting the types of behaviours that result in these types of violent / disorderly offending, although the mechanisms through which this may have occurred are not currently clear. Conversely the evaluation group performed worse within drug and theft offences.

Key Learning: **There is tentative evidence to suggest that the Diamond Initiative may have reduced the degree to which violent or 'disorderly' offenders reoffended within these crime types.**

[26] The 'Offences relating to Police, Courts and Prisons' category is principally made up of breach offences (within which reoffending was similar for the evaluation and control groups) and assaults on police, (where reoffending was lower for the evaluation group).

Figure 12: Percentage of offenders who had committed a recent previous offence within crime-type - that reoffended, within that crime-type, within one year of release



Checking for impact among Diamond participants

As discussed earlier, one limitation of the ITT approach is that any impact of the initiative on reoffending may be diluted by non-participants within the evaluation group. It is possible however to separate out those who actually engaged with Diamond teams and examine their characteristics and reoffending outcomes.

As shown in table 7, those who took part in Diamond (i.e. those 'engaged') actually had a higher reoffending rate than those who refused (or did not participate for other reasons)[27]. This does not imply however that Diamond had a negative effect on their offending behaviour. Analysis reveals that the engaged group were not a random selection of those referred to (or offered) Diamond, they had higher levels of recent previous offending, more identified (OASys) needs, and higher predicted reoffending (OGRS) than those who refused (see appendix 8). Actual reoffending among the participant group was accurately

[27] They also committed more offences and tended to commit offences in more serious offence categories - 'Engagers' committed an average of 2.1 offences in year following released compared with 1.7 for 'refusers'. 29.8% of 'engagers' committed a category 1 to 6 offence compared with 17.5% of 'refusers'.

predicted by OGRS, suggesting that nothing occurred during the follow-up year to alter the participant group's offending (either positively or negatively) from what would be expected for a group of this profile.

Figure 7: Actual and predicted reoffending by cohort sub-group

	Engaged	Refused	Not Eligible	Unable to locate	Full Evaluation Cohort
N	121	80	104	63	368
Proven reoffending (actual) %	50.4	40.0	32.7	46.0	42.4
Predicted reoffending %	49.5	45.7	35.6	46.2	44.2

Key Learning: **Those who accepted the offer of support were at greater risk of reoffending and presented more needs associated with criminal behaviour, than those who refused. The demand for resettlement support therefore appears to be need-driven and the voluntary model appears well suited to engaging the most problematic offenders.**

In designing the ITT approach it was anticipated that agreement to participate and reduced reoffending rates would correspond, based on underlying factors linked to offender motivation. Given that this assumption has not been borne out (voluntary participation was in fact linked to higher, not lower, reoffending rates) it is appropriate to supplement the results reported so far with a second test for impact, which compares the proven reoffending rate of scheme participants (only) against a control group matched at the offender-level (drawn from the original geographically matched control sample).

As described in detail in appendix 9, a new control group was formed by extracting the *most similar counterpart* for each Diamond participant, from within the original control sample.[28]

[28] on a range of criteria including age, OGRS score and criminal career

During the one year follow-up period **47.9%** of this new participant-matched control group reoffended compared with **50.4%** of Diamond participants. There is therefore no indication that Diamond participation had any impact on reoffending during the year following prison release. Both proportions were again accurately predicted by OGRS3.

Key Learning: **A second test for impact at the *participant* level supports the *referral* level findings, that the Diamond Initiative had no impact on reoffending.**

Insights into promising aspects of the Diamond Initiative

As a flexible and needs-based approach, Diamond provided a range of different types of assistance to a broad and diverse group of offenders. From the outset of the evaluation the intention was to examine impact in relation to this variation, by identifying any sub-groups of participants (defined either demographically or in terms of the types of 'outcomes' they achieved through Diamond) who exhibited particularly positive reoffending rates and might therefore be indicative of promising target groups or programme elements.

A series of methods have been used to identify sub-groups that may have been positively impacted by Diamond participation, including:

- Comparing actual against predicted reoffending rates for sub-groups of participants
- Comparing the actual reoffending rate of sub-groups with the reoffending rate of their 'most similar matched counterparts' from the control group.
- Comparing the average number of offences committed by sub-groups during the year following release with offending during the previous year.

Each of these approaches has its drawbacks, and across them all, analysis has been hampered by small base sizes resulting from lower than expected total participant numbers, however, using a 'triangulation approach', one group of participants shows consistent indications of reduced reoffending.

42 of the 121 Diamond participants had recorded **outcomes relating to *Finance, Debt and Benefits***, 17 of these (40.5%) reoffended during the follow-up year; this is 8.2% fewer than predicted by OGRS and 9.5% below the rate of their matched counterparts from the control group. As all participants had been convicted of offences leading to short prison sentences during the year before the follow-up period, it is unsurprising that the average number of recorded offences committed by all participants fell from an average of 3.8 during the year prior to release, to 2.1 during the follow-up year (see previous figure 9). Those with *Finance, Debt and Benefits* outcomes however had a larger reduction from 3.6 offences each during the previous years to 1.2 offences after release.

While these findings are consistently positive, the scale of the reductions and the base sizes are relatively modest and the indication of a positive impact on reoffending remains tentative. It is however of note that recent studies have also indicated the importance of financial barriers to desistance (Bottoms and Shapland, 2011) and the potential impact of practical assistance in this area should not be overlooked[29].

Key Learning: **Tentative but consistent indications of a positive impact of finance, benefits and debt assistance on reoffending were observed and are worthy of both further research and consideration in designing future provision.**

Did better implementation lead to better reoffending outcomes?

Owing to the constraints imposed by the timeframe for this research, impact analysis has (so far) been limited to a group of offenders referred to Diamond during the early months of the scheme, during which time, implementation issues (such as accommodation, IT and equipment) were being resolved and multi-agency working was still developing (as we saw in chapter 3). In order to investigate whether these improvements resulted in

[29] The most frequent types of Finance, Debt and Benefits outcomes achieved by the cohort were *Benefits Maximised* (31), *legally acceptable identification (obtained)* (11) and *Debt reduction scheme in place* (8).

more positive outcomes, a second cohort of referrals, with later prison release dates (during January, February and March 2010), has also been analysed.

As later referrals, it has only been possible to calculate a six-month proven reoffending rate for this group[30]. This shows that, of the 137 Diamond referrals released during this later period, 27 **(19.0%)** had reoffended within six-months of release. The equivalent six-month rate for the main referral cohort (pre-October 2009 releases) was **27.5%**[31], with the original control group at **24.2%**[32]**.** While it must be emphasised that there is no direct control for the later cohort, a comparable OGRS3 score of 0.46 suggests the groups compared here are broadly similar.

Comparing between sub-groups of the cohorts indicates that although lower rates were observed across the later referral group (including those who did not receive Diamond support) those engaged by Diamond showed the greatest reduction in the later cohort compared with main group[33]. While this is broadly supportive of an impact of Diamond engagement on reoffending during the later implementation phase, the fact that those who did not receive any DI assistance also showed marginally improved reoffending rates suggests that factors other than Diamond (such as general crime trends) may be contributing to the observed differences and this finding should therefore be treated with caution.

Key Learning: **There are tentative indications that those referred to Diamond later in the pilot, might have achieved better reoffending outcomes. Further analysis, over a longer follow-up period would be required to draw firm conclusions; however if this is sustained in the next analysis, the lesson that early implementation issues should be carefully programme managed, will be clear.**

[30] Offence with 180 days of release, conviction within 213 days
[31] The difference between the later cohort and the original evaluation cohort is statistically significant (One tail Z-test, Z=1.84)
[32] These are the proportions of the full evaluation and control cohorts who committed an offence within 180 days of release which resulted in a conviction within 213 days. They differ from those reported in figure 8, which are based on the proportion of the cohort for which a full 18 months of data are available and count offences committed within 180 days which resulted in a conviction within 360 days.
[33] Engaged portions of both groups had comparable OGRS3 scores - see appendix 12.

Economic Evaluation

Assessing the case for reinvestment

The Diamond Initiative set out to test the case for a shift in funding emphasis from 'back-end' criminal justice and custodial functions to community based intervention and prevention. If Diamond can be shown to have brought about a reduction in cost to the public purse (or to 'society'), and if this reduction were to outweigh the costs of implementing the scheme, then a clear economic argument for continuation and expansion, funded (at least in part) from savings in other parts of the criminal justice system, could be made. This was one of the key arguments underpinning Diamond (i.e. Justice Reinvestment).

As part of this evaluation, MVA Consultancy were contracted to produce an economic cost-benefit assessment of the Diamond Initiative, with the aim of assessing the extent to which money invested in Diamond provides an economic return in terms of the costs of crime averted.

In line with the guidance set out in the *H.M. Treasury Green Book* (H.M Treasury, 2003), MVA quantified the benefit of the Diamond Initiative in monetary terms. Using a cost of crime model based on Home Office Research (Dubourg et al., 2005), the cost of the crime committed by the referral cohort during the year following prison release was compared to that generated by the control group, representing the counterfactual costs that would have occurred in the absence of Diamond.

Based on an early cut of PNC data[34], MVA estimate that the 281 cohort members available for evaluation, committed crime costed at a total of £1,109,280 during the year following release from prison, at an average cost of £3,950 per offender. In comparison The 234 available control cohort members committed crime costed at £913,140 during the year following release, at an average cost of £3,900 per offender.

[34] PNC data run in September 2010, 281 evaluation and 234 control group members had completed 420 days since prison release

Given that no impact was found on the amount or seriousness of offending committed by the evaluation cohort compared with the control, it is unsurprising that no evidence has been found to indicate that the Diamond Initiative recouped any of the costs incurred in its work with the less-than-12-month sentence group, or that a redirection of funding from other Criminal Justice functions to a 'Diamond style' resettlement offer would be justified on financial grounds.

Targeting resettlement resources

Calculating the cost of crime for both the Evaluation Cohort and Control Group will always be difficult and a number of important caveats to these estimates are acknowledged by MVA:

- The model includes estimates of costs incurred by individuals and households and costs to the Criminal Justice system, there may however be additional, less easily quantified costs resulting from crime. For instance, neither cost of the fear of crime, nor of the impact of crime on indirect victims, witnesses or the families of victims, are factored into these calculations.
- The available research does not allow for each specific classification of crime committed by the cohorts, to be costed - to account for this, MVA have costed uncategorised crimes at 50% the cost of categorised crime, but acknowledge that this may under or over estimate the real value.
- The model does not take account of the cost of any undetected crime committed by the group.

While acknowledging the difficulties in accurately estimating the cost of crime, the implications of these estimates for any scheme which seeks to target resources at the less-than-12-month group must be considered. An average cost of crime in the region of £4,000 per less-than-12-month offender in the year following release, provides a challenging financial context for any intervention attempting to deliver an effective return on investment. For example, to recoup costs within one year, an investment of £1m would need to deliver a zero reoffending rate in a cohort of 250 less-than-12-month-sentence prison releases.

Diamond spent £11m over two years, (the majority of which is likely to have been directed toward the less-than-12-month sentence group) and in its first nine months was only able to work with 121 of this less-than-12-month group. Of course, it is not necessary for all benefits to be recouped within the first year for a scheme to be cost effective, however quite apart from questions of *how* to reduce reoffending, the (financial) scale of the problem (based on these estimates) and the likely costs of potential solutions appear to be difficult to reconcile. Furthermore, increasing the number of offenders that participated and limiting the time-intensive searching for offenders would also go some way to enable a more effective manner or working.

It is necessary to consider therefore, whether *blanket* targeting of the less-than-12-month-sentence group with resettlement assistance remains a viable option. More than half of the less-than-12-month offenders scrutinised in this study (and around 40% of those across England and Wales) did not reoffend within the year – any (additional) spending to attempt to prevent reoffending amongst this group would therefore (necessarily) have yielded a zero return[35]. Given that good tools exist to risk assess the likelihood of reoffending (OGRS3) and of more 'serious' (and expensive) reoffending (OASys), a smarter direction of resources towards those offenders most likely to reoffend and incur costs to society (within the less-than-12-month sentence group or more broadly) would appear essential to delivering more cost effective resettlement.

Key Learning: **Given that no impact on offending has been found, it is unsurprising that no economic benefit, in terms of cost of crimes averted, has been detected. Cost efficient offender management must be scaled to the size of the target population and target resources effectively, for instance by using risk assessment tools (such as OGRS) to achieve standardised selection.**

[35] In terms of crime prevented within the first year.

Chapter 5: Discussion

The current report describes the results from the SRAU evaluation of the Diamond Initiative - a two-year progressive offender management initiative that operated in six London boroughs. This section will present the key results of the evaluation, but also present the learning from the Diamond Initiative that can inform the development of any subsequent model of offender management in London (and beyond).

Even though there was a compelling case for a Justice Reinvestment model of offender management in London and many of the ingredients of successful schemes were built into Diamond (e.g. multi-agency working, co-location): the headline finding of the report is that there was no evidence of reduced reoffending. Comparing the Diamond cohort to a statistically matched control group of *similar people* in *similar areas,* revealed no differences in offending behaviour (basic reoffending, survival, amount or seriousness of offending) in the 12 months subsequent to prison release. As a finding this holds important implications for the Diamond Initiative. It should be stated that these results do not demonstrate that Diamond has failed as an approach, rather that careful consideration as to why the results are not as expected is required.

One possibility is that closer contact with the police, as a result of Diamond participation increased the likelihood of arrest and prosecution for offences that might otherwise have gone undetected and that this nullified any positive impact of the support received, within the reoffending data. While this type of effect has been suggested elsewhere (Hamilton, 2010) and cannot be ruled out, there is no clear evidence to support this and reflections on delivery issues are likely to generate more helpful insights.

The methodology implemented in the evaluation allowed a tracking of staff and offender views over the course of the initiative, and it is through this work that we can generate insights into the reasons Diamond may not have achieved better results. These can be summed up as implementation issues, meeting offender need at a local level and cultural tensions and will be addressed in turn.

Implementation issues: One of the key findings from chapter 3 was that the set-up and implementation of the scheme had to overcome a number of obstacles (e.g. IT, accommodation, training, staffing) and whilst these, in the main, improved with time, which was a real positive, such innovation requires time. The lack of transition time is likely to have had an influence on how effective staff were able to be and may have impacted on programme integrity. It is known, through previous research, that delivering without programme integrity can negatively influence any reported outcomes.

Meeting offender need at a local level: Whilst staff were generally positive about aligning resources to offender need and this was perceived to have improved over the course of the scheme, when offender needs (as measured by OASys) were examined next to local service involvement, one could argue that gaps were evident and more could have been done to effectively meet the needs of offenders. Many of the key agencies required and working within DI (such as housing, education, mental health, drugs treatment) were only involved *when required* as opposed to being *consistently* involved. It is possible that this may have influenced the ability of staff to be able to meet need effectively. This emphasises the need for strong coordination across multi-agency working as we know that omissions in this area will negatively influence the likely impact on re-offending.

Multi-agency working: Another key learning point form the scheme and one relevant for all Integrated Offender Management initiatives, was the cultural tension identified between police and non-police staff working on the DI. Although evident in year one, this became more pronounced within year two and was apparent within a number of areas such as understanding the aims of DI, training perceptions, views on the use of police uniform and organisational differences in working. A key question here is the role of the police in the management of offenders and whether the police are the most skilled or appropriate people to lead such initiatives. Non-police staff clearly felt police officers were not suitable to lead such an approach, yet there is a strong (52% of the public according to a recent tracker survey) public perception that police are expected to manage offenders on release (IPSOS MORI, 2011). The role of the different agencies within offender management is something that requires further consideration, ensuring that staff

skills and motivation are appropriate, along with work ensuring that organisational cultures do not clash.

None-the-less, as previously discussed there are signs that the approach did mature over the two year timeframe and there are **tentative results** indicating this may have led to better outcomes for year two clients. This should be the subject to further longitudinal analysis to test this finding. If these results are confirmed over a longer period, then this would echo with the research that shows strong implementation and programme integrity are essential in order to achieve desired objectives (Barnoski, 2002; Coulter, 2010).

Lessons from the Diamond Initiative

Outside of the above issues, there is a range of key learning identified through the Diamond evaluation that can inform discussions as to the next steps of offender management in London. These are:

1) There is a clear need for a robust referral, audit and performance tool in any offender management initiative. The LISARRT system encountered implementation difficulties and though it improved over time (to the benefit of DI staff and the SRAU researchers) difficulties were still encountered with the system towards the end of the DI. A system is required that systematically captures the clients, their needs, the ongoing activities and outcomes on a quick-time basis. This information should be used to benefit performance monitoring, decisions about offender support and any future evaluation. The PPO scheme operates the J-Track performance tool which seeks to combine crime data, demographics and needs records. This system might provide a starting point to stimulate discussions in the management of data.

2) Future offender management initiatives should use offending risk assessment measures (such as OGRS) to ensure that resource allocation is matched to offender need. It is to be noted that within DI, more than half of the less-than-12-month cohort did not *(and were predicted not to)* re-offend within the year. Given good tools do exist, a smarter direction of resources towards those offenders more likely to re-offend, would

seem a wise move - both in terms of reducing reoffending and in delivering cost-effectiveness. On a purely technical level, an initiative that used a risk assessment tool (i.e. OGRS) as the **only** selection criteria would also open up advanced methodological evaluation techniques such as the Regression Discontinuity Design[36] (Hahn, Todd & Van der Klaauw, 2001).

3) Those who reoffend, both in the Diamond and control group, tended to do so quickly after prison release; this suggests a real '**window of opportunity**' for supportive engagement immediately following (and even prior to) prison release. However, being able to effectively address this would require good multi-agency working and data sharing in particular with the prison service and smooth referral systems to ensure a joined up approach between custody and community. A recent report has identified improved information management and effective needs assessment as crucial to improving offender management in prisons (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection, 2011); the benefits of such improvements are likely to extend beyond release from custody.

4) One valuable finding resulting form the research is the high acceptance of the Diamond Offer by offenders. To illustrate, **three in five** offenders accepted the DI offer but these offenders were at a greater risk of re-offending and presented more needs associated with criminal behaviour than those who refused. There are parallels to be drawn here to the Sheffield Desistance Study (Bottoms & Shapland, 2011) where even a highly criminal sample reported the sincere desire to desist from crime. The demand for resettlement support therefore appears to be need-driven and the voluntary model appears well suited to engaging the most problematic offenders. However, such offender management needs to be tempered by the desistance research that demonstrates that even with this motivation, criminal behaviours are deeply entrenched in lifestyle and cannot just be turned off. As such it is essential to be able to influence positively an offender's motivation before and after entry into voluntary schemes. There needs to be a structured approach

[36] The Regression Discontinuity Design is a before and after, two group design that evaluates causal effects of an intervention. For the RDD to be a feasible approach, persons are required to be assigned to groups solely based on a cut-off score on a pre-programme method. The difference between groups is then measured as the discontinuity between treatment and control regression lines.

by teams, supported by evidence and training, to manage offender's motivation throughout their contact.

5) The finding that both the London cohorts were re-offending below the expected national less-than-12-month sentence cohort is of interest here. Current thinking indicates this can be understood in terms of differences in the make-up of the London groups compared with the national sample. The large proportion of non-UK born offenders within London (who exhibit different and less prolific offending profiles) is one potential explanatory factor. These findings suggest the need for regional / local benchmarking in order to provide a framework for assessing the effectiveness of local offender management approaches. This is a timely finding given the current discussions on a new re-offending measure that captures local issues (Ministry of Justice, 2011).

6) Diamond attempted to map 'million dollar blocks' thinking on to existing (Safer Neighbourhoods) ward level geographies. While it remains true that the effects of crime and deprivation are unevenly spread across London, London's wards are themselves often internally diverse with both challenging and more affluent areas. In practice the original geographic parameters were found to be restrictive; teams failed to see the rationale for rejecting needy and motivated potential clients from other parts of the borough while case loads were relatively light and over the course of the pilot geographic criteria were relaxed. While geographic clustering of offender populations has been demonstrated in the UK context (Allen et al., 2007), the experience of Diamond suggests that these may be insufficiently distinct to warrant an offender management approach that is restricted to a small geographic area. Managing persistent offenders may require a different geography, in contrast to the work of Weisburd et al. (2009) which suggests a geographical approach to managing crime.

There is no clear 'one size fits all' model available; it is (or needs to be) an approach where support is individually client based, and which offers challenge to longer term problems (fuelled by disadvantage, substance abuse, violence in the home and so forth). However, there are also insights into who may be most suitable for a Diamond approach to offender management. There are tentative indications that offenders with outcomes

linked to finance and debt may be linked to better than expected reoffending. Such a finding is consistent with previous research into offender need (Bottoms & Shapland, 2011).

The future of offender management

There is substantial momentum behind offender management both within the MPS and Government at present. One recommendation from the research would be to align any subsequent evolving approach to offender management in London to the current Government's model of Integrated Offending Management (see appendix 13 for a conceptualisation of DI and an IOM approach to offender management). The outcomes focus of IOM sits alongside the language of the Coalition Government in terms of crime prevention and demand reduction, but would also assist progress on the previously reported issues such as agency involvement and multi-agency working identified within Diamond.

This evolution should build on a multi-sector, multi-agency collaborative approach and seek to bring together many diverse policing and non-policing processes and activities (e.g. DI, PPO, MAPPA, DIP, MARAC processes; Safer Neighbourhoods and more) in order to align and identify the service gaps for managing offenders with a real potential to yield benefits - both economically and for reducing offending. Internally for the MPS, such an approach would be compatible with the MPS/London Anti-Violence Strategy and an intelligence led analysis of crime (a Victim Offender Location Time (VOLT) approach).

There is also the growing emphasis on 'payment by results' or a financial incentive model of demand reduction in criminal justice. As outlined in the 'Breaking the cycle' Green Paper it is likely that a number of London Boroughs (along with Greater Manchester) will act as a pilot to such a way of working. The objective of the pilot is to pay local statutory partners a proportion of the savings if they are successful in reducing demand for:

- Court cases and the associated legal aid costs for all sentences except those that result in a long prison sentence;

- Community orders and Suspended Sentence Orders; and
- Custodial sentences for less than 12 months.

The savings for the local statutory partners would be available to reinvest in further crime prevention activity at the local level by agreement of the relevant partners.

Such a model, whereby finances are provided either for a reduction in re-offending or wider demand on the CJS, poses challenges that would need to be addressed. For example, the need for a greater degree of coordination across agencies, ensuring a joint approach and a shared understanding of the relevant outcomes of such methods of working (Bowles, 2010), have generally resulted in staff attempting to *'cherry pick'* lower risk offenders (House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee, 2010). Such a manner of working will also likely require a better approach to prevention work (e.g. to reduce demand).

In addition, one of the ramifications for criminal justice in any financial incentive model would be the need for robust research when ultimately deciding upon payment awards. Evaluation is a complex and highly technical area. The Diamond evaluation could be seen as a touch-stone for any other local initiative seeking to examine impact upon crime, and to some degree demonstrates that local initiatives can be subject to a rigorous impact evaluation.

It could be argued that the methodology adopted in the DI evaluation was both innovative and original in respect to previous offender management evaluations (Culshaw, 2005; Dawson & Cuppleditch, 2007; Dawson, 2007; Skodbo et al., 2007). Not only has the current work been able to go beyond basic levels of reoffending into issues such as severity, survival, frequency and capture changing perceptions over the course of the DI - it has also been possible to conduct sub-group analysis of impact split by levels of engagement. These analyses clearly have to be caveated by the relatively small sample sizes, none-the-less, the aspiration was to go beyond what had been done before and provide a level of analytical depth not previously seen in offender management evaluations. To illustrate, the recent 2009 PPO refresh again cites strong evidence of

success (a 39% decrease in offending) but is not able to examine levels of engagement demonstrating the gaps in the analysis of offender management at a national level (Home Office, 2010).

Final thoughts on the evaluation

The short term custodial sentence offender group are churning through the criminal justice system at a high cost to society. The Diamond Initiative was a two-year progressive model of working with this group of offenders. This is the second published report based upon the SRAU evaluation of the Diamond Initiative. Whilst it is likely that there will be future reports following the Diamond cohort to understand the long term influence of the scheme - the current report should be seen as a major milestone in the evaluation of offender management programmes generating learning for policy makers, practitioners and researchers.

Whilst the headline finding of the report is that there was no evidence of reduced reoffending as a result of the Diamond Initiative within the original cohort - this does not demonstrate that Diamond has failed as an approach: such a conclusion would be erroneous. The report presents a complicated set of findings; the main ones are below:

- Qualitative findings in both years show that DI was highly regarded by offenders.
- Qualitative findings in both years strongly suggest a positive influence on offenders.
- The implementation had to overcome a number of obstacles (equipment, staffing, buildings, IT systems) which could be anticipated in the set-up of future offender management initiatives.
- One could argue that more could have been done to effectively meet the needs of offenders through consistently involved support agencies.
- Teams generally worked well across disciplinary boundaries, although tensions between police and other agencies were apparent and never fully reconciled.
- Year 1 findings suggested that those participating in DI had much lower 6-month reconviction rates than a (roughly matched) comparison group.

- Year 2 experimental and control groups were very well-matched, according to OGRS scores and demographic criteria.
- Only one in six of the experimental group (those originally thought to be eligible for DI) had sustained engagement with the programme.
- Overall the experimental and control groups had remarkably similar 1-year reconviction rates.
- Both experimental and control groups had much lower reconviction rates than a national cohort of prisoners serving under 12 months, perhaps reflecting the high proportion of people in each group who were born abroad.

In addition, there are insights that tackling an offenders' finance, debt and benefit needs may have been effective and that better implementation over the two years may have led to lower reoffending: such results will be the focus on continued longitudinal research to further explore the impact of the Diamond Initiative. This emphasises the key learning of meeting offender need and programme maturation.

From an evaluation point of view, the concept of maturation also raises the vital consideration of what can be called the *'point-zero'* of an initiative. This refers to the point by which an initiative was fully operational, as opposed to still being developed or merely announced. Evaluations have not taken this into account and the question for evaluation research is at which point to commence analysis so to avoid many of an initiative's teething problems so that we are only assessing the true effect of the programme. From a practical perspective this raises the interesting question as to when clients should be *'taken on'* to an initiative: if this is done too early within implementation there is the danger that clients will not receive an appropriate service.

Furthermore, there are real strategic and practical implications in the design and implementation of offender management programmes that have been generated from the research. It is important that the next phase of offender management within the Metropolitan Police Service does not start from a blank slate but rather builds upon the lessons and implications so to ensure an evidence-based, effective and targeted offender management model. These main such implications are:

1) The clear need for a robust referral, audit and performance tool for offender management initiatives;

2) The use of formal risk assessment measures (such as OGRS) to ensure that resource allocation is matched to offender need;

3) The identified '**window of opportunity**' that demonstrated that offenders offender quickly after prison release highlighting the need for timely engagement;

4) The relatively high acceptance of the Diamond offer by offenders demonstrates the initial willingness to attempt behavioural change.

5) The original geographic parameters of Diamond were found to be restrictive and the wider remit may be required.

From a research perspective the aspiration from the outset was to conduct an original and innovative evaluation that would stand up against the firmest of critiques. This has been achieved. The range of methods used, the capture of change over time and the remarkable strength of the counterfactual - all demonstrate the quality of the evaluation. Indeed, the evaluation should be viewed as a touch-stone for other local initiatives seeking to conduct evaluation and further demonstrates that local initiatives can be subject to rigorous evaluation. This latter point is crucial considering the move into payment by results, decentralisation and localism as initiated by the coalition Government.

Perhaps the final thought of the evaluation should lay with the offenders and the recognition that evaluating 'people change' programmes is really very hard. Offender's present complex and chaotic lives entrenched in social needs with long-term criminal routines and habits that are not easily changed. This needs to be acknowledged by both policy and research in the guise of realistic expectations when attempting to change criminal behaviour.

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Appendix 1:

Forming the control group - borough and ward level matching

In forming the main control group a two-stage matching process was used to identify the boroughs and wards within London which were best matched, in theoretically relevant ways, to each of the Diamond boroughs and wards. In stage one, each of the Diamond *boroughs* was compared against all other (non-Diamond) London boroughs in terms of:

- Population size
- BME population
- Drug crime level
- Acquisitive crime level
- Violent crime level
- Indices of deprivation
- Age of population (20-29 and 30-44)
- Size of population without education
- Number of prison releases

For each of the above variables, where the comparison borough was found to be comparable to the Diamond borough to within 1%, a score of 3 was applied; where the difference was between 1% and 3%, a score of 2 was given and where the difference was between 3% and 5%, a score of 1 was allocated; any greater difference received no score.

Summing across the criteria resulted in an overall score for each non-Diamond borough, which represented the strength of its match to the Diamond borough in question. The scored comparison boroughs were then ranked and the best (ten) matches for each Diamond borough, taken forward to the second stage of the process.

In the second stage, each Diamond *ward* was matched, using the same process, against every ward located within the best-matched boroughs for that Diamond ward's 'parent'

borough. In this way, it was possible to rank the best-matched London wards for each Diamond ward, taking into account both ward level and borough level characteristics (the results of the matching process are shown in appendices 2 and 3).

Once a set of best matched wards had been established, the control group was formed by identifying the equivalent group of offenders to the evaluation cohort (less-than-12-month sentence offenders, with similar prison release dates) who had release addresses within the matched wards. In order to identify a sufficient number of offenders, it was necessary to extend the number of best-matched wards for each Diamond ward, to six. In several cases a ward was found to fall within the best six matches for two (or more) Diamond wards, in these instances each offender resident in that ward was counted two (or more) times within the control group[37]. This resulted in the identification of 232 unique offenders which, when multi-counting rules are applied, formed a control cohort comprising 327 offender records.

[37] Multi-counting rules were agreed by the evaluation's academic reference group and allow for the context of each Diamond ward to be given equal weighted in forming the control.

Appendix 2:

Top 10 best matched boroughs, for each Diamond borough

Croydon	Score (max 30)
Ealing	23
Hillingdon	22
Hounslow	20
Bromley	18
Harrow	18
Redbridge	18
Brent	17
Haringey	17
Merton	17
Waltham Forest	17

Southwark	Score (max 30)
Lambeth	25
Hackney	23
Haringey	22
Lewisham	21
Brent	21
Hounslow	20
Ealing	18
Islington	18
Tower Hamlets	18
Greenwich	17
Waltham Forest	17
Newham	15
Croydon	14
Merton	14
Hillingdon	13

Lambeth	Score (max 30)
Southwark	25
Haringey	19
Hackney	18
Ealing	18
Brent	17
Camden	17
Islington	17
Tower Hamlets	17
Waltham Forest	17
Lewisham	16
Newham	16
Greenwich	16
Hammersmith and Fulham	16

Lewisham	Score (max 30)
Southwark	21
Haringey	20
Hounslow	20
Brent	19
Ealing	19
Waltham Forest	19
Redbridge	17
Lambeth	16
Barking and Dagenham	16
Greenwich	15
Islington	15
Hackney	14
Merton	14

Newham	Score (max 30)
Hackney	19
Greenwich	19
TowerHamlets	19
WalthamForest	19
Haringey	18
Hounslow	16
Lambeth	15
Southwark	15
Brent	15
Croydon	14
Bexley	14
Bromley	14
Enfield	14
Harrow	14

Hackney	Score (max 30)
Southwark	23
Greenwich	20
Newham	19
Waltham Forest	19
Lambeth	18
Haringey	17
Ealing	16
Islington	16
Tower Hamlets	16
Bexley	15
Brent	15
Lewisham	14
Croydon	13
Camden	13
Harrow	13

Appendix 3:

Top 6 best matched wards, for each original Diamond ward

Diamond Borough	Diamond Ward	Matched Ward
Croydon	Bensham Manor	Heston Central (Hounslow) Preston (Brent) Longthornton (Merton) Heston East (Hounslow) Roxbourne (Harrow) Chapel End (WalthamForest)
	Selhurst	Kensal Green (Brent) Marlborough (Harrow) Roxbourne (Harrow) Cann Hall (WalthamForest) Grove Green (WalthamForest) Lady Margaret (Ealing)
	Thornton Heath	Roxbourne (Harrow) Marlborough (Harrow) Roxeth (Harrow) Preston (Brent) Tottenham Hale (Haringey) Northumberland Park (Haringey)
	West Thornton	Seven Kings (Redbridge) Goodmayes (Redbridge) Heston West (Hounslow) Greenford Green (Ealing) Northolt Mandeville (Ealing) Harefield (Hillingdon)
Lewisham	Coldharbour	Camden Town with Primrose Hill (Camden) Thamesmead Moorings (Greenwich) Bruce Grove (Haringey) William Morris (WalthamForest) Hounslow West (Hounslow) Hornsey (Haringey)
Newham	Canning Town N	Woolwich Riverside (Greenwich) Roxeth (Harrow) Kenton East (Harrow) Bethnal Green North (TowerHamlets) East India and Lansbury (TowerHamlets) White Hart Lane (Haringey)
	Canning Town S	Upper Edmonton (Enfield) Noel Park (Haringey) White Hart Lane (Haringey) Turkey Street (Enfield) Leytonstone (WalthamForest) Valley (WalthamForest)
	Custom House	Upper Edmonton (Enfield) Kidbrooke with Hornfair (Greenwich) Ponders End (Enfield) Cray Valley East (Bromley) White Hart Lane (Haringey) Valley (WalthamForest)

Diamond Borough	Diamond Ward	Matched Ward
Southwark	Farraday	Harlesden (Brent) Feltham West (Hounslow) East India and Lansbury (TowerHamlets) Plumstead (Greenwich) Woolwich Common (Greenwich) Glyndon (Greenwich)
Lewisham	Evelyn	Woolwich Common (Greenwich) Bruce Grove (Haringey) Northumberland Park (Haringey) Norwood Green (Ealing) Cathall (WalthamForest) Abbey (BarkingandDagenham)
	New Cross	Cathall (WalthamForest) Tollington (Islington) Lavender Fields (Merton) Bruce Grove (Haringey) Kilburn (Brent) Woolwich Common (Greenwich)
Hackney	Leabridge	Cann Hall (WalthamForest) Tottenham Green (Haringey) Bruce Grove (Haringey) Kensal Green (Brent) Welsh Harp (Brent) Cathall (WalthamForest)
	Springfield	Greenford Broadway (Ealing) Cranford (Hounslow) Higham Hill (WalthamForest) St Pancras and Somers Town (Camden) Wealdstone (Harrow) Glyndon (Greenwich)

Appendix 4:

Evaluation cohort and control group comparison statistics

	420 Days of data available		540 Days of data available	
	Evaluation	**Control**	**Evaluation**	**Control**
Number	368	327	233	191
Gender				
% Female	13.9	15.9	13.7	17.8
% Male	86.1	84.1	86.3	82.2
Ethnicity				
% BME	50.0	47.1	50.2	48.2
% White	49.2	52.6	48.9	51.8
% Not known	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.0
% White	49.2	52.6	48.9	51.8
% Black	37.0	29.7	38.2	28.3
% Asian	4.6	10.7	4.3	14.1
% Other	4.6	3.7	4.3	3.1
% Mixed	3.8	3.1	3.4	2.6
% Not known	0.8	0.3	0.9	0.0
Age (at prison release)				
Mean	32.3	32.4	31.5	33.1
% 19 and below	4.1	3.4	4.7	1.6
% 20 to 24	20.7	16.5	21.9	14.7
% 25 to 29	21.2	23.5	21.5	30.4
% 30 to 34	14.9	24.5	16.3	19.9
% 35 to 39	16.6	11.3	15.9	9.4
% 40 to 44	12.0	9.5	11.6	11.5
% 45 to 49	5.2	6.1	4.7	6.3
% 50 and over	5.4	5.2	3.4	6.3
Place of Birth				
% UK born	55.2	57.8	49.8	57.1
% Non-UK born	43.8	41.9	48.5	42.4
% Not known	1.1	0.3	1.7	0.5
Length of Criminal Career				
Mean (years) - All	9.4	9.9	9.2	10.3
Mean (years) - UK born	13.4	14.0	13.9	14.0
Mean (years) - Non UK Born	4.5	4.2	4.7	5.4
Age at First Conviction				
Mean age (years old) - All	22.4	22.0	21.9	22.3
Mean age (years old) - UK born	18.5	18.6	17.5	19.1
Mean age (years old) - Non UK Born	27.3	26.7	26.1	26.6

	420 Days of data available		540 Days of data available	
	Evaluation	**Control**	**Evaluation**	**Control**
Predicted one year reoffending				
Mean OGRS3 score	0.44	0.43	0.44	0.43
% High risk	12.5	8.6	13.7	7.9
% Medium risk	51.1	55.4	49.8	58.6
% Low risk	33.2	30.3	33.0	29.3
Not available	3.3	5.8	3.4	4.2
Identified Needs (OASys)				
% OASys Available	59.2	48.3	56.7	46.6
Of which				
Mean number of identified needs	4.8	4.6	4.7	4.8
% Accomodation need	54.1	49.4	53.8	53.9
% ETE need	72.5	79.7	72.0	79.8
% Relationships need	63.3	52.5	64.4	58.4
% Lifestyle & Associations need	73.4	69.0	73.5	68.5
% Drugs need	57.3	54.4	56.8	62.9
% Alcohol need	28.4	29.7	26.5	33.7
% Thinking & Behaviour	62.4	57.0	62.9	52.8
% Attitudes	66.5	64.6	64.4	68.5

	420 Days of data available		540 Days of data available	
	Evaluation	**Control**	**Evaluation**	**Control**
Previous offences (excluding breach offences)				
Mean	20.7	20.2	20.4	22.8
Range	1 - 201	1 - 145	1 - 201	1 - 145
% 1 to 5 previous offences	29.3	25.4	30.5	25.7
% 6 to 10	18.8	19.0	21.5	16.2
% 11 to 20	18.5	25.1	15.5	27.2
% 21 to 50	23.1	19.3	23.6	16.2
% More than 50 previous offences	10.3	11.3	9.0	14.7
Mean offences in year prior to release (360 days)	3.4	3.2	3.2	3.4
Mean offences in two years prior to release (720 days)	5.2	5.3	4.9	5.6
Mean offences in five years prior to release (720 days)	9.2	9.2	8.8	9.8
Conviction Occasions				
Mean number of previous conviction occasions	11.4	10.7	11.2	11.6
Mean number of conviction occasions in two years (720 days) prior to release	3.1	3.0	2.9	3.1

Appendix 5:

Diamond referral outcomes

Diamond Offer		Referral Outcome		Referral Sub-Outcome	
Eligible / received offer	201 (54.6%)	Engaged (started)	121 (32.9%)	Completed (or continuing)	62 (16.8%)
				Dropped out	59 (10.0%)
		Refused	80 (21.7%)		
Ineligible / did not receive offer (reciept not confirmed)	167 (45.4%)	Not eligible	104 (28.3%)	Moved / resides outside DI area	40 (10.9%)
				Deported / awaiting deportation	28 (7.6%)
				Magaged by another agency	21 (5.7%)
				Outstanding case for serious offence / subsequent over-12-month sentence	10 (2.7%)
				Other	5 (1.4%)
		Unable to trace / contact	63 (17.1%)	Unable to trace	37 (10.1%)
				Contact attempted, unable to confirm residence / reciept of offer	26 (7.1%)

Appendix 6:

Reoffending and previous offending for UK born and non-UK born subsections of the Evaluation and control groups

	Proven Reoffending		Average number of previous offences	
	UK born	Non-UK born	UK born	Non-UK born
Evaluation Cohort	52.7%	30.4%	29.7	9.8
Control Group	49.7%	30.7%	27.2	10.5
Evaluation cohort - 'engaged group' (known to be in the UK)	55.0%	42.5%	29.4	14.2

The non-UK-born portion of the evaluation (and control) groups exhibit markedly different (and generally less prolific) offending characteristics to those born in the UK. On average those born overseas have about a third of the recorded previous offences of those born in the UK[38] and most importantly, fewer of those born outside of the UK reoffended during the year following release. This can be accounted for, in part, by deportations and voluntary departures from the UK amongst the overseas-born group, however, given that the difference between the groups is also evident among those 'engaged' by Diamond (and therefore known to be in the community), it is evident that other factors are also relevant. The data for this study do not enable this issue to be probed more fully.

[38] This may be due to portions of offending careers spent outside of the UK

Appendix 7:

Examples of categorised offences committed by the evaluation cohort post-release

Offence category	Example offences
1	*No category 1 offences (Murders) appear in criminal histories of any cohort member*
2	Robbery
	Sexual Assault
	Supplying class A drugs
3	Posession with intent to supply class B drugs
	Wounding
4	Assault occasioning ABH
	Burglary
5	Affray
	Taking motor vehicle without consent
	Theft from person
	Using racially threatening... words or behaviour
6	Assault on a constable
	Outraging public decency
	Driving while disqualified
	Theft from motor vehicle
7	Common assault
	Possessing controlled drug (class A)
	Shoplifting
8	Driving...with excess alcohol
	Possessing controlled drug (class C)
9	Being Drunk and Disorderly
	Using vehicle while uninsured
	Begging in public place
10	Travelling on railway without paying fare

Appendix 8:

Proportion of those offered Diamond who accepted by sub groups



Appendix 9:

Forming the participant matched control group

The participant-matched control group was extracted from the original, geographically matched group of offenders, according to the following procedure:

- For each Diamond participant, select all members of the original control group of the same gender
- Compare each of these against the Diamond participant in terms of:
  - Age
  - OGRS3 score
  - Length of criminal career
  - Age at first conviction
  - Number of previous offences
- For each of these criteria assign a score between 0 and 3, reflecting the level of similarity to the Diamond participant (as set out below)

Difference between Diamond participant and control group offender					
Age (years old)	OGRS Score	Length of criminal career (years)	Age at first conviction (years old)	No. of previous offences	**Score**
0 or 1	less than 0.03	0 or 1	0 or 1	0 or 2	3
2 or 3	0.03 to 0.06	2 or 3	2 or 3	3 to 5	2
4 or 5	0.06 to 0.09	4 or 5	4 or 5	6 to 9	1
more than 5	more than 0.09	more than 5	more than 5	more than 9	0

- Sum across the five criteria to produce a score representing the offender's overall similarity to the Diamond participant.
- Select the offender with the highest score as the *most similar counterpart* for that participant and add to the control group.
  - If two or more offenders have the same score, select the offender with the closest OGRS score to the Diamond participant[39].

[39] Duplication was permitted where two or more Diamond participants were matched to the same control group offender.

Appendix 10:

Diamond participants and participant-matched control group comparison statistics

	Diamond Participants	Offender Matched Control
Number	121	121
Gender		
% Female	11.6	11.6
% Male	88.4	88.4
Ethnicity		
% BME	42.1	44.6
% White	57.9	54.6
% Not known		
% White	57.9	54.6
% Black	33.1	24.8
% Asian	5.0	8.3
% Other	0.0	6.6
% Mixed	4.1	5.8
Age (at prison release)		
Mean	32.5	31.7
% 19 and below	0.8	1.7
% 20 to 24	21.5	20.7
% 25 to 29	26.4	27.3
% 30 to 34	12.4	18.2
% 35 to 39	16.5	13.2
% 40 to 44	10.7	9.1
% 45 to 49	5.8	6.6
% 50 and over	5.8	3.3
Place of Birth		
% UK born	66.1	65.3
% Non-UK born	33.1	34.7
% Not known	0.8	0.0
Length of Criminal Career		
Mean (years) - All	10.8	10.0
Mean (years) - UK born	13.0	13.3
Mean (years) - Non UK Born	6.5	3.9
Age at First Conviction		
Mean age (years old) - All	21.3	21.1
Mean age (years old) - UK born	19.8	18.4
Mean age (years old) - Non UK Born	24.4	26.3

	Diamond Participants	Offender Matched Control
Predicted one year reoffending		
Mean OGRS3 score	0.50	0.48
% High risk	12.4	9.1
% Medium risk	61.2	61.8
% Low risk	23.1	21.5
Not available	3.3	1.7
Identified Needs (OASys)		
% OASys Available	78.5	52.9
Of which		
Mean number of identified needs	5.1	5.1
% Accomodation need	61.1	49.1
% ETE need	76.8	77.2
% Relationships need	69.5	61.4
% Lifestyle & Associations need	71.6	82.5
% Drugs need	55.8	64.9
% Alcohol need	31.6	36.8
% Thinking & Behaviour	69.5	64.9
% Attitudes	70.5	68.4
Previous offences (excluding breach offences)		
Mean	24.2	21.8
Range	1 to 189	1 to 103
% 1 to 5 previous offences	18.2	17.4
% 6 to 10	19.0	19.8
% 11 to 20	24.0	24.8
% 21 to 50	26.4	27.3
% More than 50 previous offences	12.4	10.7
Mean offences in year prior to release (360 days)	3.8	3.3
Mean offences in two years prior to release (720 days)	6.2	5.0
Mean offences in five years prior to release (1800 days)	10.9	9.2
Conviction Occasions		
Mean number of previous conviction occasions	13.5	12.1
Mean number of conviction occasions in two years (720 days) prior to release	3.7	3.1

Appendix 11:

Main and Later cohort, six month and predicted reoffending by referral outcome group

Standardised six-month proven reoffending rate	Engaged (received Diamond)		Eligible not engaged (refused Diamond)		Not eligible / not traceable (did not receive offer)		Full cohort	
	Actual (6 month)	Predicted (year)	Actual (6 month)	Predicted (year)	Actual (6 month)	Predicted (year)	Actual (6 month)	Predicted (year)
Later cohort (Jan - Mar 2010)	**19.1%** **N=42**	47.6%	21.3% N=47	45.7%	16.7% N=48	46.1%	19.0% N=137	46.4%
Main cohort (pre mid Oct 2009)	**35.5%** **N=121**	49.5%	27.5% N=80	45.7%	21.6% N=167	39.5%	27.5% N=368	44.2%

Appendix 12:

Staff survey results (selected questions)

To what extent are the following partners involved in the DI on your borough?

	Consistently Involved				Involved when required				Not involved			
	W1	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4
Police	98%	97%	97%	97%	0%	3%	2%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%
Probation	84%	97%	91%	86%	8%	3%	8%	14%	6%	0%	0%	0%
Prison	28%	18%	16%	26%	67%	81%	78%	70%	4%	1%	2%	4%
Community Safety Partnership	4%	9%	9%	10%	53%	63%	78%	53%	41%	28%	9%	36%
Local Authority	45%	60%	70%	70%	49%	36%	28%	27%	4%	4%	0%	3%
Voluntary Groups	4%	19%	19%	12%	78%	81%	73%	86%	16%	0%	6%	2%
Housing	18%	34%	44%	67%	75%	61%	53%	33%	6%	4%	0%	0%
Education	2%	15%	14%	5%	82%	72%	78%	92%	14%	12%	3%	3%
Youth Offending Teams	0%	2%	3%	0%	57%	72%	66%	70%	41%	27%	27%	30%
Drug Intervention/ Drug Action Team	24%	19%	41%	39%	71%	76%	55%	61%	4%	3%	0%	0%
Mental health	2%	2%	11%	9%	82%	82%	75%	86%	14%	16%	9%	5%
Health	4%	2%	3%	3%	80%	90%	84%	89%	14%	9%	6%	8%

How confident are you that you understand your role on the DI?

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Very confident	45.1%	62.7%	60.9%	75.8%
Fairly confident	51.0%	32.8%	32.8%	24.2%
Not very confident	3.9%	3.0%	3.1%	0.0%
Not at all confident	0.0%	1.5%	0.5%	0.0%

To what extent do you agree that you have received sufficient training to do your job on the DI team effectively?

Was training sufficient?	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Strongly agree	6.0%	9.1%	17.7%	21.2%
Agree	40.0%	50.0%	38.7%	39.4%
Mixed views	44.0%	34.8%	30.6%	34.9%
Disagree	10.0%	4.5%	8.1%	3.0%
Strongly disagree	0.0%	1.5%	4.8%	1.5%

Is your DI team fully staffed?

	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Yes	7.8%	11.9%	10.9%	28.8%
No	88.2%	88.1%	87.5%	71.2%

Are all these staff dedicated to the DI team?

Are all staff dedicated?	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3	Wave 4
Yes	74.5%	83.6%	82.8%	63.6%
No	25.5%	16.4%	14.1%	36.4%

To what extent do you agree that you have received sufficient training to do your job on the DI team effectively?

Was training sufficient?	Wave 1	Wave 2	Wave 3
Strongly agree	6.0%	9.1%	17.7%
Agree	40.0%	50.0%	38.7%
Mixed views	44.0%	34.8%	30.6%
Disagree	10.0%	4.5%	8.1%
Strongly disagree	0.0%	1.5%	4.8%

How did you get involved in the DI?

How did you get involved in the DI?	W4
I applied / volunteered for the role	84.9%
I was posted onto Diamond	15.1%

Has working on the DI been what you expected?

Has working on the DI been what you expected?	W4
Yes	75%
No	25%

How would you rate the current level of morale in your team?

	W4
Very High	10.6%
High	18.2%
Neither high nor low	37.9%
Low	18.2%
Very low	15.1%

Has this changed over time?

	W4
Yes	77.3%
No	22.7%

Appendix 13:

Conceptual comparison of DI and an IOM approach

An IOM approach: Identifying and filling in the gaps in offender management



The Diamond Approach: Identifying and filling in the gaps in offender management



A smaller 'pool' of offenders (e.g. less than 12 months).

Agencies for referral purposes