

# **LONDON** RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP

## **Tactical Co-ordination Protocol (TCP)**

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**OFFICIAL**

## London Resilience Partnership Tactical Co-ordination Protocol

Lead organisation for document: Metropolitan Police Service.

Organisations participating in the review and maintenance of the TCP:

- British Transport Police (BTP)
- City of London Police (CoLP)
- Environment Agency
- Greater London Authority (GLA)
- His Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG)
- London Ambulance Service (LAS)
- London Fire Brigade (LFB)
- London Local Authorities
- London Resilience Group (LRG)
- Metropolitan Police Service
- Military, Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)
- NHS England and NHS Improvement (London)
- UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)
- Transport for London (TfL)
- Voluntary Sector

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## LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities, and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

Version Control		
Version	Date	Change
0.1	14 May 2022	Draft version submitted to the London Resilience Programme Board (LRPB) on 19 May 2022 and the London Resilience Forum on 23 June 2022.
0.2	14 Oct 2022	Minor formatting and administrative amendments prior to publication.
1.0	20 Oct 2022	Final version for publication to the London Resilience Partnership. Minor formatting and administrative amendments.

## Introduction

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This document provides information about the London Resilience Partnership's approach to incidents requiring a partnership response, major incidents, and outlines additional support available to respond to specific incidents. It is designed to assist practitioners in the planning, training, and exercising stages of preparing for emergencies, and to provide a reference document for use during incidents.

The aim of the Tactical Co-ordination Protocol is to provide options to strengthen London's capability to co-ordinate at the tactical level, and to ensure that London Resilience Partnership organisations can deliver an effective, co-ordinated, multi-agency response. It is intended to work in conjunction with the London Strategic Co-ordination Protocol and the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Principles. More information on the Strategic and Operational response can be found in those documents.

The circumstances of each incident are different, and a flexible approach should be taken to the application of this guidance together with relevant national doctrine and relevant localised frameworks.

The information is structured around the five key JESIP principles for a joint response to an incident.

The principles for joint working should be used during all phases of an incident, whether spontaneous or pre-planned and regardless of scale. They support the development of a multi-agency response and provide structure during the response to all incidents. The principles can also be applied during the recovery phase. Tactical Commanders should have a good understanding of the JESIP principles and the content of this document.

This document conforms to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) 'Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework, Edition Three, 2021'.

## Contents

<b>VERSION CONTROL .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>1. DEFINITION AND DECLARATION OF MAJOR INCIDENTS .....</b>	<b>6</b>
1.1 DEFINITION OF A MAJOR INCIDENT .....	6
1.2 DECLARATION OF A MAJOR INCIDENT .....	6
1.3 STAND DOWN AND HANDOVER TO RECOVERY .....	6
<b>2. PURPOSE AND ROLE OF A TACTICAL CO-ORDINATING GROUP (TCG) .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>3. ESTABLISHING A TACTICAL CO-ORDINATING GROUP (TCG) .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>4. JESIP PRINCIPLES IN PRACTICE .....</b>	<b>10</b>
4.1 COMMUNICATE .....	10
4.2 CO-LOCATE .....	12
4.3 CO-ORDINATE .....	13
4.4 JOINT UNDERSTANDING OF RISK .....	16
4.5 SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS .....	17
<b>5. JOINT DECISION MODEL .....</b>	<b>19</b>
5.1 WORKING TOGETHER, SAVING LIVES, REDUCING HARM .....	19
5.2 GATHER INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE .....	20
5.3 ASSESS THREAT AND RISK AND DEVELOP A WORKING STRATEGY .....	20
5.4 CONSIDER POWERS, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES .....	20
5.5 IDENTIFY OPTIONS AND CONTINGENCIES .....	20
5.6 TAKE ACTION AND REVIEW .....	21
<b>6. RESOURCES AND SUPPORT AVAILABLE .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>7. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS .....</b>	<b>23</b>
7.1 RECORD KEEPING .....	23
7.2 DEBRIEFING .....	23
<b>8. STAGES OF A MAJOR INCIDENT .....</b>	<b>23</b>
8.1 INITIAL RESPONSE PHASE .....	24
8.2 CONSOLIDATION PHASE .....	24
8.3 RECOVERY PHASE .....	24
8.4 RESTORATION OF NORMALITY .....	24
<b>9. CO-ORDINATING GROUPS .....</b>	<b>25</b>
9.1 STRATEGIC CO-ORDINATING GROUP .....	25
9.2 RECOVERY CO-ORDINATING GROUP .....	25
9.3 HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE STEERING GROUP .....	25
9.4 LONDON RESILIENCE COMMUNICATION GROUP (LRCG) .....	26
9.5 LOCAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP GROUP (LSPG) .....	26
<b>10. ANNEXES .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>ANNEX A: TACTICAL CO-ORDINATING GROUP (TCG) TEMPLATE AGENDA .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>ANNEX B: LONDON RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORKS .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>ANNEX C: TACTICAL ADVISORS .....</b>	<b>28</b>

## 1. Definition and Declaration of Major Incidents

### 1.1 Definition of a Major Incident

A major incident is defined in national Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) doctrine as:

*“An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more of the emergency responder agencies.”*

An “emergency responder agency” applies to all Category 1 and 2 responders (see Section 3) as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.

A major incident is beyond the scope of business as usual operations and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment, or national security.

It may involve only a single-agency response, but is likely to require a multi-agency response, even if that is in the form of multi-agency support to the lead responder.

### 1.2 Declaration of a Major Incident

A major incident may be declared by one or more responder agency if the above definition is met. Once an agency has declared a major incident, it must be communicated to other agencies by the appropriate mechanism in the M/ETHANE format. The M/ETHANE message must contain the time of declaration, details of the declaring agency and clear rationale for the declaration.

In London, a declaration of a major incident for one agency does not necessarily mean that other partners will be required to implement special arrangements. Rather, each agency will review all declared major incidents and their potential consequences in order to provide an appropriate, proportionate, and scalable response in accordance with their own procedures.

The decision to declare a major incident should ordinarily be made in local and operational context. There is no precise threshold or trigger.

Even where it is anticipated the major incident will be stood down quickly, the M/ETHANE message is still a valuable tool and therefore it must follow the initial declaration on every occasion. The major incident stand-down decision, and supporting rationale, should be recorded and passed to control rooms to cascade to all organisations notified of the initial major incident declaration.

In London, the decision to declare a major incident may also be made at a strategic or tactical level (e.g. for pan-London incidents or those without a specified incident ground).

### 1.3 Stand Down and Handover to Recovery

Prior to stand down or handover following a major incident, the on-scene incident commanders should satisfy themselves that:

- The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.
- Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.

If required, a handover of any ongoing actions or issues has been undertaken with the relevant local authority or other agency.

A joint decision to stand down a major incident declaration should then be made at the highest level of multi-agency co-ordination in place at that time (i.e. at the Forward Command Post, the Tactical Co-ordinating Group, or the Strategic Co-ordinating Group). The major incident stand-down decision and supporting rationale should be recorded and passed to control rooms to cascade to all organisations that were notified of the initial major incident declaration.

Following the conclusion of the emergency response phase, formal handover to the Recovery Co-ordinating Group should take place (if one is required or has been established). For further information on the process, see the Recovery Phase in Part B Section 6 of this document or the LRP Recovery Co-ordination Framework.

## 2. Purpose and Role of a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)

In the initial stages of an incident, first responders are responsible for tactics. Once the scale and nature of an incident is known, responding agencies will establish internal command structures and appoint a Tactical Commander for their organisation.

Tactical Commanders are responsible for interpreting strategic direction where strategic level command is in place, and developing and Co-ordinating single agency tactical plans.

The role of the Tactical Commander is to protect life, property, and the environment by ensuring that rapid and effective actions that save lives and reduce harm are implemented through a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG).

The location of Tactical Commanders may vary between agencies, but they should be located where they can most effectively undertake their responsibilities and should remain detached from the immediate response activities. There will be occasions when tactical co-ordination is best-achieved remote from the scene, such as in multiple simultaneous incidents or where a command structure is already in place for a pre-planned event / operation e.g. a major incident during a sporting event.

A TCG may be convened where multi-agency co-ordination would be beneficial or required in order to support tactical commanders in:

- Interpreting the strategy and strategic direction set by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)
- Developing tactical level plans to deliver multi-agency activity
- Co-ordinating activities and assets between all agencies to respond to the demands of the incident
- Resolving multi-agency issues that have been escalated as they could not be resolved at the operational level
- Resolving issues in relation to multi-agency working at a tactical level
- Identifying multi-agency issues that cannot be resolved at the tactical level and require escalation to the SCG
- Making recommendations to the SCG

In order to undertake and achieve the above tasks, the TCG should work collectively to:

- Establish an effective communication network that promotes situational awareness to influence incident specific multi-agency briefings
- Establish shared situational awareness between the responder organisations at the tactical level, and promote effective decision making using the JDM
- Develop and agree the overall joint intent, regularly assessing and sharing the information and intelligence available
- Understand how ever-changing threats and hazards affect each organisation, and work with multi-agency colleagues to develop a joint understanding of risk. Put in place appropriate mitigation and management arrangements to continually monitor and respond to the changing nature of emergencies for the organisation
- Ensure that statutory responsibilities are met for health, safety, human rights, data protection and welfare of people during the incident
- Address the longer-term priorities in the recovery of affected communities through restoration of essential services
- Warn and inform the public by providing accurate and timely information to communities using appropriate media and social media channels
- Where one is in place, provide updates to the Strategic Co-ordination Group

- Ensure that all tactical decisions made, and the rationale behind them, are documented in a decision log, ensuring that a clear audit trail exists for all multi-agency debriefs and future multi-agency learning
- Make debriefing facilities available, and debrief the operational commander, ensuring any issues that have affected interoperability are shared using Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) Online.

Collectively, this is in support of working together, saving lives, and reducing harm.

Representatives attending the TCG should be decision makers for their organisation and be suitably trained to undertake a command role. They should have the authority to participate in multi-agency decisions relating to tactical co-ordination.

A TCG can operate without an SCG, but may require one to form depending on the nature and scale of the incident.

Through different phases of the incident, a TCG may not require any sitting SCG to meet regularly, set strategic direction or make further decisions.




## 3. Establishing a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG)

There are different options for establishing a TCG:

- At the request of a Tactical Commander of any responding agency (where required to support on-scene co-ordination, share information, or manage wider impacts)
- As a result of a decision made on the appropriate level of co-ordination at the tri-partite call
- As a result of a decision made to establish one by a sitting Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

When a request or decision to activate a TCG is made in any of the above circumstances, appointed Tactical Commanders should gather to form one.



## 4. JESIP Principles in Practice

### 4.1 Communicate

Communication at a major incident is key to ensuring an effective joint response and aids the development of shared situational awareness. The following must be adhered to:

- When any agency declares a major incident, they must communicate this to all other Category 1 and relevant/impacted Category 2 responders as soon as possible.
- Upon the declaration of a major incident, clear lines of communication must be established between control rooms of emergency services.
- A single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.
- A M/ETHANE message must be shared as soon as possible by the agency declaring the major incident.

#### 4.1.1 M/ETHANE

The M/ETHANE mnemonic is an established format for responders and control rooms to share information related to a major incident.

A message in the M/ETHANE format must be sent from the scene to the control room, who should then share it with relevant responder organisations as soon as possible to ensure that joint situational awareness is quickly established. Each responder agency should submit their own M/ETHANE message to their control room to build shared situational awareness.

<b>M</b>	<b>MAJOR INCIDENT</b>	Has a major incident been declared? (Yes/No – If 'No', then complete ETHANE message)	Include the date and time of any declaration.
<b>E</b>	<b>EXACT LOCATION</b>	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.
<b>T</b>	<b>TYPE OF INCIDENT</b>	What kind of incident is it?	For example, flooding, fire, utility failure or disease outbreak.
<b>H</b>	<b>HAZARDS</b>	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	Consider the likelihood of a hazard and the potential severity of any impact.
<b>A</b>	<b>ACCESS</b>	What are the best routes for access and egress?	Include information on inaccessible routes and rendezvous points (RVPs). Remember that services need to be able to leave the scene as well as access it.
<b>N</b>	<b>NUMBER OF CASUALTIES</b>	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?	Use an agreed classification system such as PI; P2; P3 and dead.
<b>E</b>	<b>EMERGENCY SERVICES</b>	Which, and how many, emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are already on-scene?	Consider whether the assets of wider emergency responders, such as local authorities or the voluntary sector, may be required.

## 4.1.2 Emergency Services Inter-Control Room (ESICTRL)

The ESICTRL talkgroup is a multi-agency interoperability talkgroup, continuously monitored by the control rooms of BTP, CoLP, MPS, LAS and LFB.

The talkgroup is intended to enable fast time information sharing between those agencies in certain conditions, including when any agency declares a major incident.

The declaration of, and information relating to, any major incident **must** include a M/ETHANE message.

The use of the ESICTRL talkgroup does not negate the need or use of the tri-service phone call.

## 4.1.3 Tri-Service Phone Call

- A tri-service phone call is an agreed method of communication between the control rooms of the police, fire & rescue, and ambulance services. It may be extended to BTP, CoLP and HM Coastguard if necessary.
- It is instigated when certain conditions are met, including the declaration of a major incident. It provides an early joint operating picture and assists in the interoperability of the emergency services in attendance.
- Any of the police, ambulance, or fire & rescue services can initiate the tri-service call. When any service is notified of a major incident, they must inform the MPS control room of the incident and request initiation of the tri-service call.
- The notification will initially be made on the ESICTRL talkgroup while the tri-service call is set up.
- The MPS will be the default chair of the call. Details of all attendees will be noted for recording purposes.
- The call will continue until agencies agree it is no longer required, but the following conditions must be met:
  - Shared situational awareness has been achieved.
  - A jointly written and agreed M/ETHANE message has been circulated and received.

## 4.1.4 Tripartite Call

In the event of an agency having knowledge of a potential disruptive, Major Incident or Emergency<sup>1</sup>, they will convene a strategic level tripartite call between the notifying/declaring agency, London Resilience Group, and the MPS.

It enables the London Resilience Partnership to decide on the appropriate pre-agreed level of co-ordination in response, including if it is necessary to activate a Tactical or Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG).

It is separate to the tri-service phone call (which takes place between emergency services control rooms) and is described in section 4.1.3 above.

In London there are three pre-agreed levels of co-ordination beyond the on-scene response to an incident. These levels are documented in the 'Co-ordinate' section below.

## 4.1.5 Notifying Agencies without Access to ESICTRL

Where a direct link between CAD (or On-Call) and an agency's systems exists (e.g. Coastguard and EXP/MCA) they should be notified by an electronic message clearly stating that a major incident has been declared, provided with the remainder of the M/ETHANE message, and informed that the tri-service call is being established.

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<sup>1</sup> Civil Contingencies Act 2004 definition of "emergency".

The London Local Authority, or Authorities, where the incident has occurred should be notified via the emergency contact number listed in the Borough Profiles, and a M/ETHANE message should be provided. This will facilitate the deployment of a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) to the scene where appropriate, and activate the local authority's emergency response arrangements. Local authority tactical level representation at the TCG should be requested through the LALO (if deployed) or through the emergency contact number listed in the Borough Profiles.

Other relevant agencies that may be involved in the direct response to the incident, or who may be required to attend the TCG should be contacted and notified through the numbers published in the London Resilience Contacts directory.

Slow time notification to the wider partnership of all Category 1 and 2 responders can be made via a secure web-based multi-agency data sharing tool called the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS). This can also be used to generate a common operating picture (COP). However, LSAS is not continuously monitored and should not be used for operational communications.

#### 4.1.6 Interoperability Talkgroups

A number of multi-agency interoperability talkgroups are accessible to all Airwave handsets and they can be used by incident commanders to share information to support decision making, reduce risk and increase safety.

These talkgroups are not subject to constant monitoring and **do not** replace the requirement for on-scene operational co-ordination meetings.

If one is required, it will need to be initiated via the following process:

- Following declaration of a major incident, an incident commander from one of the responding agencies can request an interoperability channel be established. This request must be made via their own agency control room.
- The control room receiving the request will notify the MPS, who will select and staff an appropriate talkgroup (considering accessibility from responding agencies).
- The talkgroup information should then be shared with responding agencies as appropriate and incident commanders or representatives should begin to monitor and utilise this channel.

## 4.2 Co-locate

An incident in London could see local, regional and national agencies involved in the response.

A Tactical Co-ordinating Group should co-locate at an appropriate and agreed location as soon as practicable.

Organisations may deploy a suitable representative with delegated authority to co-locate or attend TCGs and act on their agency's behalf in place of the designated tactical commander e.g. NILOs, LFB GT Officer, or Chief of Staff.

### 4.2.1 In Person – At or near incident scene

The location should be suitable for holding effective meetings. When choosing a site at or near the scene, consideration should be given to ensuring appropriate technical facilities and space for administrative functions are available.

For a declared Major Incident, LFB deploy a command unit vehicle with dedicated conference facilities to host on scene co-ordination meetings or Tactical Co-ordinating Groups.

### 4.2.2 In Person - Remote from incident scene

A TCG may co-locate in person remote from the scene. This may be necessary for incidents with multiple sites, or no specified incident ground (e.g. flooding or severe weather incidents).

A TCG could be hosted in suitable facilities provided by any responding agency.

The MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) may be activated to support the Police response to a major incident and can be used to host a TCG.

**In person options should include the provision of dial in facilities where possible to ensure that agencies who are not able to be present in person can still attend.**

#### **4.2.3 Virtual – Remote from scene**

New technologies and lessons from recent incidents have demonstrated that command can be exercised effectively remotely, but physical co-location should remain a consideration, especially on-scene.

Remote co-location may be necessary for incidents involving national or regional agencies who may not be able to attend meetings in person, and may be beneficial in the initial stages of an incident when meetings are time sensitive, and some agencies may not have had the opportunity to travel to the scene.

### **4.3 Co-ordinate**

#### **4.3.1 Levels of Partnership Co-ordination**

In London there are three pre-agreed levels of co-ordination beyond the on-scene response to an incident. These are as follows:

Level 1: Monitor and Information Sharing

- Monitor the situation and share information with selected partners via email / use of the London Situational Awareness System as required (Business As Usual).

Level 2: Partnership conferences (virtual)

- London Resilience Group (LRG) will chair and facilitate Partnership teleconferences as required for the purpose of briefing and information sharing between partnership organisations. Where there is a lead response organisation better suited to chairing the meeting, this will be arranged between that organisation and LRG.

Level 3: Co-ordinating Groups

- Tactical Co-ordinating Group teleconference, physical or virtual meeting
- Strategic Co-ordinating Group teleconference, physical or virtual meeting

#### **4.3.2 Identifying the Lead Agency**


For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. Responding agencies, in consultation with each other, will assess the following factors:

- Type of incident
- Phase of the incident
- Requirement for specialist capabilities and investigation

The decision on which agency will take the lead should then be made and documented. This responsibility may be transferred by agreement, and the lead agency may change as the incident and response develops.

## 4.3.3 Levels of Command

There are three levels of multi-agency command that may be established in response to a major incident:



Agencies may set up their own internal command structures with differing terminology, but for an effective response, all agencies must work together at each level and participate in relevant co-ordinating groups.

Further information on strategic and tactical command can be found in the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) [Major Incident Principles](#) or in Section 4 of the [Strategic Co-ordination Protocol](#).

## 4.3.4 Tactical Co-ordinating Group

Regular meetings should take place between Tactical Commanders to ensure that any response is effectively co-ordinated. This will be mirrored at both Operational and Strategic levels of command.

### Chair

The TCG will be chaired by the lead response organisation (i.e. the same organisation as chair of the Strategic Co-ordinating Group), or by another organisation in agreement with the lead response organisation.

They should act as an impartial chair, and where possible, their organisation or sector should be represented separately on the TCG.

While best practice may be for the chairing organisation to be separately represented on the TCG, this can be difficult to achieve. For example, in response to a spontaneous incident that occurs in unsocial hours, organisations may not be able to immediately resource both roles. In addition, having multiple qualified or appropriate level representatives at a TCG or SCG may negatively impact depth and resilience of command for the lead organisation when responding to protracted incidents.

### Frequency

Once a decision has been made to hold a TCG, the first meeting must take place **at the earliest opportunity**, with regular meetings scheduled accordingly thereafter.

Meetings must be sufficiently far apart for organisations to discharge any actions arising at the previous meeting, but not too infrequent so as to cause a loss of shared situational awareness or joint understanding of risk.

Consideration should be given to the timing of any TCG meetings to ensure they are able to take account of the latest information from relevant sub-groups, and that the TCG chair and any other relevant representatives are able to provide information to the SCG.



## **Composition**

The composition of the TCG will depend on the nature of the incident but will typically mirror that of the SCG, including representatives of other SCG sub-groups where required. Other organisations may be invited to join the TCG as required (e.g. to support a specific task of relevance to that organisation).

Representatives attending the tactical co-ordination meetings should have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and deploy the resources of their respective agency.

## **Secretariat**

The TCG secretariat will be provided by the lead response organisation for the incident, in conjunction with other response organisations as agreed between them.

All meetings should be recorded. As a minimum, this must be a written record of joint actions, decisions and supporting rationale. This written record may be supplemented by audio or visual records of the full meeting where equipment is available.

Once completed, actions and decisions should be shared with those in attendance and any sitting TCG. Any recordings will be retained in accordance with legislation and each organisation's internal policies and procedures, as these may be subject to disclosure and review in the event of any inquiry. Tactical Commanders should also appoint a loggist to track single agency decisions, actions and supporting rationale, but this does not negate having an appropriate joint record of TCG meetings.

The provision of secretariat extends to notifying relevant agencies and circulating meeting invitations.

## **Engagement with the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)**

It is imperative that there is strong connectivity and sharing of information between the different tiers of command within each organisation, and between the multi-agency strategic and tactical (pan-London) Co-ordinating groups, and at FCPs.

This enables the strategic and tactical levels to be appraised of the situation at the incident scene in order to inform their decision making. It also enables informed direction to be set at the strategic level, tactical plans to be developed at the tactical level and then executed at the incident scene.

This connectivity should be achieved through sharing of information between multi-agency groups to ensure shared situational awareness, and within individual organisations command structures in order to discharge organisational responsibilities.

The TCG is subordinate to the SCG. The TCG chair will attend and report to SCG meetings. The chair can ask any other agency representative/s or relevant sub-group lead to attend with them if it would be of benefit to inform the SCG of specific information.

## **Engagement with Sub-Groups**

Sub-groups may be established to discharge specific functions (e.g. mass fatalities Co-ordinating group) or provide specialist advice (e.g. STAC). These will report into the SCG, or, where appropriate and necessary, directly into the TCG.

In order to carry out its work, the TCG will need to maintain effective links with other active SCG sub-groups.

Governance and taskings of those sub-groups remain the responsibility of the SCG, but the TCG and other SCG subgroups will share information and work bilaterally when required.

## **Engagement with Operational (On-Scene) Incident Commanders**

Regular meetings should take place between on-scene incident commanders to ensure any response is effectively co-ordinated. This will be mirrored at both Tactical and Strategic levels of command.

The lead agency at the scene will chair on-scene co-ordination meetings.

The chair of the on scene co-ordination meetings should attend the TCG to provide the latest joint M/ETHANE message and any other relevant updates.


The chair of the on-scene co-ordination meetings will pass on the TCG direction to the on-scene co-ordinating group.

This does not replace the requirement for single agency tactical commanders to communicate with their agency's on scene commander.

## Multi-sited Incidents or Incidents without Specified Incident Ground

When convening and running a TCG, consideration should be given to the nature of the incident and how this might affect tactical co-ordination. Some incidents may not have a specified incident scene, for example, pandemic influenza, whereas some may have multiple sites across a small or large geographical area, e.g. Severe weather or flooding.

For incidents with multiple scenes, there are likely to be multiple on-scene co-ordination meetings feeding into one central, pan-London TCG.



## 4.4 Joint Understanding of Risk

Different responder agencies may see, understand, and treat risks differently.

Each organisation should carry out their own risk assessments, then share the results so that they can plan control measures and contingencies together more effectively. Individual dynamic risk assessment findings may be used to develop any analytical risk assessment for the incident.

Commanders should build and maintain a common understanding of the full range of risks. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce, or be controlled by any decisions made or subsequent actions taken.



## 4.5 Shared Situational Awareness

Shared situational awareness is a common understanding of the circumstances, immediate consequences, and implications of the emergency, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of the responder organisations.

Achieving shared situational awareness is essential for effective interoperability. When establishing shared situational awareness, Incident Commanders and control rooms should discuss the following points:

- Is it clear who the lead organisation is at this point? If so, who is it?
- What information and intelligence does each organisation hold at this point?
- What hazards and risks are known by each organisation at this point?
- What assets have been, or are being, deployed at this point and why?
- How will the required agencies continue communicating with each other?

Shared situational awareness will be developed and maintained by following the principles of co-locating, communicating, and co-operating at the scene (including On-Scene co-ordination meetings), and by ensuring that M/ETHANE messages are shared and updated in a timely fashion from the scene and between control rooms.

### 4.5.1 Generating and sharing a Common Operating Picture (COP)

A Common Operating Picture (COP) has been defined as a common overview of an incident that is created by assessing and fusing information from multiple sources, and is shared between appropriate command, control, and co-ordinating groups to support joint decision making.

It is critical on the build up to and during an incident that decision makers know what is happening and have one source of information to work with. Having the same 'picture' allows shared situational awareness in a complex and ever-changing incident.

In the early stages of an incident, a Situation Report (SitRep) may form the totality of the COP. This should be produced in the M/ETHANE format.

The source and format of the COP may vary as the incident progresses and as further information becomes available.

The potential sources and formats may be:

- A jointly agreed M/ETHANE message produced as a result of the tri-service call:
  - This may be utilised in the initial stages of an incident when agencies are beginning to respond and develop shared situational awareness.
  - This can be shared with the Tri-partite call to influence the agreed level of co-ordination.
- A M/ETHANE message submitted by lead agency from the on-scene co-ordination meeting. This may be delivered in person at the TCG and should also include the following:
  - What is happening now and what is being done about it?
  - What it means and what effects will it have?
  - What might happen next or in the future?
- The London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) can also be used to generate a Common Operating Picture. LSAS is a secure web-based multi-agency data sharing tool that can be used to generate a COP based on information submitted by emergency response organisations. The LSAS COP includes details of partner organisation strategies, situation and response assessments, and forward look / horizon scans. The M/ETHANE report should also be added to LSAS.

LSAS should be used alongside other means of sharing information to support situational awareness. LSAS is intended to support strategic co-ordination and will only usually be

activated when London strategic co-ordination arrangements are invoked. LSAS is not continuously monitored and should not be used for operational communications.

This provides the core functionality of a virtual Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC). For more complex and/or protracted incidents a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may activate a physical or virtual MAIC to lead on situational awareness.

- At the conclusion of a TCG the lead agency should produce an updated COP, considering any updates given by agencies and sub-groups at the meeting

Whenever a new COP has been established, this should be proactively shared with the SCG, TCG representatives, relevant agencies control rooms, and sub-groups. How this is established (from the above options) will impact the method through which it is shared, and who is responsible for sharing it.

## 5. Joint Decision Model

Incident commanders need to bring together available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make effective decisions. The joint decision model (JDM) assists this process.



*Joint Decision Model (JDM)*

### 5.1 Working Together, Saving Lives, Reducing Harm

The pentagon at the centre of the JDM reminds responders that all joint decisions should be made with reference to the overarching or primary aim of any response to an emergency – to save lives and reduce harm. This drives a people centred approach with a concern for public and responder wellbeing throughout the response.

This should be the most important consideration throughout the decision-making process.

## 5.2 Gather Information and Intelligence

At any incident, no single responder agency can appreciate all the relevant dimensions of an emergency straight away.

Information refers to all forms of information obtained, recorded, or processed (e.g. M/ETHANE messages).

A deeper and wider understanding will only come from meaningful communication between responder agencies, and responders should not assume that others will see or say things in the same way.

There may need to be a sustained effort to reach a common view of understanding of events, risks and implications.

Anyone providing sensitive information should also provide an understanding of how it can be used, shared, and stored.

## 5.3 Assess Threat and Risk, and Develop a Working Strategy

Responders should jointly assess the situation, including any specific threats, hazards, and the risk of harm. They should consider how risks may increase, reduce, or be controlled by any decisions made and subsequent actions taken.

At any incident, each responder agency will have a unique insight into those risks.

By sharing what they know, responders can establish a common operating picture (COP). This allows for informed decision making on deployments and the risk control measures required. Time critical tasks should not be delayed by this process.

When developing a working strategy responders should consider:

- **What** Are the aims and objectives?
- **Who by** Police, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service, other organisations?
- **When** Timescales, deadlines, and milestones?
- **Where** Locations?
- **Why** What is the rationale? Is it consistent with the overall strategic aims and objectives?
- **How** Will these tasks be achieved?

## 5.4 Consider Powers, Policies and Procedures

Decision making in an emergency will focus on achieving the desired outcomes. Various constraints and considerations will shape how this is achieved.

Powers, policies and procedures may affect how individual agencies operate and co-operate to achieve the agreed aims and objectives, which should reflect their statutory duties.

A common understanding of relevant powers, policies and procedures is essential to ensure that the activities of responder agencies compliment, rather than compromise each other.

## 5.5 Identify Options and Contingencies

Responders should work together to evaluate the range of options and contingencies. Options or courses of actions should consider:

- **Suitability:** Does it fit with the strategic direction?
- **Feasibility:** Can it be done with the available resources?
- **Acceptability:** Is it legal, morally defensible and justifiable?

Whichever options are chosen, it is essential responders are clear on what they need to carry out. Procedures for communicating any decision to defer, abort or initiate a specific tactic should also be clearly documented and shared.

Contingency arrangements should be put in place to address reasonably foreseeable events that may occur as a result of action taken or not taken.

## 5.6 Take Action and Review

Building shared situational awareness, setting direction, evaluating options, and making decisions all lead to taking the actions that are judged to be the most effective and efficient in resolving an emergency and returning to a new normality.

Actions and the subsequent outcomes should be regularly reviewed. As information or intelligence becomes available or changes during the incident, responders should use the JDM to inform their decision making until the incident is resolved.

## 6. Resources and Support Available

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>Casualty Bureau</b>	<p>Police may establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all deceased, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. This could be by taking telephone or online enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident, or reviewing information submitted via the Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP).</p> <p>Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.</p> <p>The Casualty Bureau will not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.</p>	Metropolitan Police Service / City of London Police
<b>Major Incident Public Portal</b>	<p>The MIPP website can be used to obtain information from both public and police sources in the event of a major investigation (e.g. murder) or major incident.</p> <p>Where an incident requires the activation of Casualty Bureau, the public can use the MIPP to report the details of those they believe to be involved, and incident specific forms can be created to help capture information to assist the enquiry.</p> <p>Passcode protected MIPP forms allow Police to submit information such as details of survivors first accounts and other information. This includes Investigative Triage Forms for completion at Hospitals or Survivor Reception Centres (SuRCs). Where appropriate and necessary, partner agencies may assist members of the public in completing these forms as an alternative to being interviewed by a police officer.</p>	Metropolitan Police Service / City of London Police

<b>ECOSA and STAC</b>	<p>ECOSA is the mechanism to provide co-ordinated scientific advice to the responders at a scene. It is co-ordinated by the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) and includes Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) with other agencies included as required.</p> <p>ECOSA has been created to fulfil the requirement for the provision of immediate, co-ordinated and effective scientific advice to the police, fire and rescue service, ambulance service and public health responders across the UK, at what might be a CBRN(e) incident. This scientific advice will be provided up until the time a STAC is formed wherein ECOSA will then stand down and hand over to STAC.</p> <p>The role of the STAC is to ensure timely co-ordinated scientific, technical, environmental, and public health advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency.</p>	UKHSA
<b>Voluntary Sector</b>	<p>The voluntary sector has an important role to play in supporting statutory services, and each of the organisations involved in the voluntary sector is committed to providing the best possible support to the statutory services and the people of London.</p> <p>The voluntary sector can provide support in a number of generic and specific areas, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welfare services e.g. staffing of emergency centres</li> <li>• Psychosocial aftercare e.g. befriending and counselling</li> <li>• Advice and guidance on dealing with bereavement</li> <li>• Medical support e.g. support to the ambulance service, first aid posts</li> <li>• Search and rescue e.g. water search and rescue, animal rescue</li> <li>• Transport and escort e.g. transport of evacuees</li> <li>• Communications e.g. telephone/radio operators, interpreters</li> <li>• Administrative support at reception centres, Co-ordinating convergent volunteers</li> <li>• Financial services e.g. establishing and administering a disaster fund</li> <li>• Equipment and resources e.g. bedding, catering, ambulances, shelter, communications.</li> </ul> <p><i>For further information, please see the Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document.</i></p>	
<b>Debriefing</b>	<p>The College of Policing provide a National Structured Debrief Course to train staff to enable conscious analysis of decision making processes used in emergency response, evaluating experiences in order to inform future actions. There are a number of staff trained in debriefing within London Resilience Partnership organisations, who can be called upon to lead impartial debriefing sessions.</p>	College of Policing / London Resilience Partnership

## 7. Other Considerations

### 7.1 Record Keeping

Each agency should have processes in place to ensure appropriate records are kept during incidents, and that these records are collated and stored appropriately in case they are required for any subsequent investigations, inquests or inquiries.

### 7.2 Debriefing

It is important to capture lessons while events are fresh in the minds of those involved. For this reason, a joint 'hot debrief' should be held by Tactical Commanders as soon as practicable after the incident.

Formal multi-agency debriefs, arranged by the lead agency and undertaken by trained and impartial debriefers, may be held later, ideally within three weeks of the incident concluding. They should involve a full range of responders and control room staff to ensure lessons are identified and captured from every aspect of the response. This may be replicated across all levels of co-ordination as appropriate.


All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures. In London, multi-agency debriefs must be held with good practice and recommendations for learning shared with relevant agencies and Joint Organisational Learning.

## 8. Stages of a Major Incident

Most major incidents can be considered to have four stages:

- Initial response;
- Consolidation phase;
- Recovery phase; and
- Restoration of normality.

An investigation into the cause of the incident, together with the subsequent hearings, may be overlaid on one or more stages.





## 8.1 Initial Response Phase

Initially there will be a scalable response from relevant responder agencies. Relevant responders will vary depending on the nature of the incident.

While any member of a category 1 or 2 responder can declare a major incident, in practice, a joint decision is often made between the initial attending emergency services.

Communication in the initial stages is likely to be via the ESICTRL channel between control rooms, or by telephone with those who do not have access to ESICTRL.

## 8.2 Consolidation Phase

The consolidation phase will normally involve all of the emergency services in attendance as they progress the initial response phase. Additional agencies not present at the initial response may be invited to the operational or tactical co-ordination meetings to advise or respond based on their specific expertise and response capabilities (e.g. local authority structural engineers in the event of damaged buildings).

## 8.3 Recovery Phase

Recovery is an integral part of the emergency management process. It can be defined as: *'The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency'*. This process is distinct from, but will usually overlap with, the response phase (defined as *'the actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency'*).

The recovery process is typically local authority led. Local recovery arrangements can be triggered by a decision at a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), a Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG, see Section 9.5), or outside of an SCG at the request of a strategic partner, such as those locally (e.g. Council Gold) or otherwise (e.g. a utility company). Regional recovery arrangements can be triggered by a decision at a London SCG to form a London Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG), at the request of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG), or any SCG representative – based on an assessment that regional co-ordination, support or oversight will add benefit to local recovery actions.

An SCG or LSPG is not a pre-requisite to triggering and forming an RCG, although this is the most likely route.

The recovery process should begin during the initial response phase. If the incident requires a Recovery Co-ordination Group (RCG) this should be formed as soon as possible to influence the response strategy in terms of looking ahead to recovery arrangements.

Over time, the balance of the response will naturally lean more towards recovery. When the response phase ends, responsibility of co-ordinating strategic activity will be formally handed over to the RCG. This is likely to be chaired and led by a Local Authority.

See London Recovery Co-ordination Framework for further information.

## 8.4 Restoration of Normality

The Recovery Co-ordinating Group will continue to meet until there is no longer a need for regular multi-agency co-ordination. Local recovery groups and individual agencies can continue to address remaining issues, or they may be subsumed into existing work programs or governance structures.

It should be noted that recovery can be a long-term process that may continue for several months or years.



## 9. Co-ordinating Groups

### 9.1 Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG)

For incidents that are more significant a Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG) may be formed. Initially the group is likely to comprise emergency service, local authority, other Category 1 responders, and London Resilience Group strategic representatives, and other agencies as required.

The role of the SCG is to co-ordinate the response at the strategic level; setting strategy, determining priorities, and making decisions to ensure:

- Shared situational awareness;
- A sufficiency of support and resources to the incident;
- The wider implications and impacts of the incident are considered;
- Statutory obligations are fulfilled (e.g. to 'warn and inform' the public);
- Suitable liaison with Central Government and other bodies.

The SCG will normally meet remote from the scene with suitable communications and meeting facilities, but may also meet by teleconference or virtual meeting.

If the circumstances require a prolonged and significant input from all agencies, it may be appropriate to convene full strategic representation from the London Resilience Partnership at a Strategic Co-ordination Centre (see [Strategic Co-ordination Protocol](#) for further information).

### 9.2 Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG)

The purpose of the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) is:

- The strategic decision-making body for the recovery phase, able to give the broad overview and represent each agencies interests and statutory responsibilities.
- Provides visible and strong leadership during the recovery phase.
- Takes advice from any established sub-groups, decides the strategy, and ensures implementation of the strategy and the rebuilding of public confidence.
- Ensures the co-ordination and delivery of consistent messages to the public and media.

See [Recovery Co-ordination Framework](#) for further information.

### 9.3 Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)

A Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG) may be established and led by the local authority to co-ordinate all humanitarian assistance activity.

A HASG will focus on providing direction to the overall humanitarian response, in line with the strategic direction from an SCG. In practice this will be:

- Understanding who has been affected and how, and what their needs are now, and how they may develop.
- Initiating actions to meet people's needs, and monitoring outcomes.
- Co-ordinating between agencies to provide a coherent response.
- Transitioning between phases.
- Ensuring appropriate communications are in place, as part of the wider multi-agency communications response to the incident.

All relevant agencies will be expected to be represented to ensure effective delivery of support and care to those affected by the emergency.

See [Humanitarian Assistance Framework](#) for further information.

## **9.4 London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)**

The London Resilience Communication Group brings together representatives from different organisations communications teams to plan for and co-ordinate the communication response to a major incident or significant event impacting on London.

The LRCG aims to co-ordinate strategic public communications in support of the emergency response, including statements to the media and establishing a media centre if required.

Any agency can notify their respective communications department who, where necessary, will activate the group.

See London Resilience Communication Group Framework for further information.

## **9.5 Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG)**

A Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG), formerly known as a local SCG, may be formed at the borough level where thought by local organisations to be required to provide a mechanism for strategic level engagement and information sharing. This may include local political engagement.

There will be no formal co-ordination or information sharing link between an LSPG and the Forward Command Post or Tactical Co-ordinating Group.

## 10. ANNEXES

### Annex A: Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) Template Agenda

- 1) Introductions (by exception and only where deemed necessary)
- 2) Any urgent business
  - a) Confirmation of decisions on urgent business
  - b) Adjourn as necessary to action urgent business
- 3) Gather information and intelligence (*The order of sub-points a, b, and c may vary depending on the stage of the incident*)
  - a) M/ETHANE report – briefing by lead response organisation
  - b) Additional updates / new information from those present
  - c) Updates on previous actions and from any sub-groups
- 4) Assess threats and risks (from M/ETHANE / any additional raised by those present)
- 5) Develop a working strategy
  - a) Consider powers, policies and procedures
  - b) Identify and evaluate options and contingencies
  - c) Confirm priorities, decisions, and agree actions to be taken
- 6) Information and advice to members of the public
- 7) Issues to raise to SCG
- 8) Updated Common Operating Picture (COP)
- 9) Agree next meeting time and if any additional representatives are required

## Annex B: London Resilience Partnership Frameworks

This annex provides a list of the London Resilience Partnership frameworks and guidance documents. The suite of documents is available on the London Prepared website [www.londonprepared.gov.uk](http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk) and on the ResilienceDirect (RD) extranet. Due to security considerations, some documents are classified as OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE and only available on ResilienceDirect or via Partnership organisation resilience teams.

### Generic capability documents

1. Strategic Co-ordination Protocol
2. Tactical Co-ordination Protocol
3. London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Principles.
4. London Resilience Communication Group Framework (only available on RD)
5. London Recovery Framework
6. Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document
7. London Local Authority Gold Arrangements (only available on RD)

### Specific capability documents

8. CBRN(e) Response Framework (only available on RD)
9. Excess Deaths Framework
10. Humanitarian Assistance Framework
11. Mass Casualty Framework
12. Mass Evacuation Framework
13. Mass Fatalities Framework
14. Mass Shelter Framework
15. Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Arrangements (only available on RD)
16. Structural Collapse, Site Management and Clearance Framework

### Risk specific documents

17. Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Emergency Plans (only available on RD)
18. Cyber Incident Response Framework
19. Drought Response Framework
20. Pandemic Influenza Framework
21. Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) Emergency Plan (only available on RD)
22. Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPPIR)
23. Emergency Plan (only available on RD)
24. Severe Weather & Natural Hazards Framework
25. Strategic Flood Response Framework

### Service disruption specific documents

26. Disruption to Telecommunications for Responders Plan (only available on RD)
27. Fuel Disruption Protocol (only available on RD)
28. Power Supply Disruption Framework
29. Water Supply Disruption Framework

## Annex C: Tactical Advisors

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>Public Order tactical advisor</b>	<p>Public order tactical advisers (POTACs) are nationally trained and accredited to provide pertinent advice based on the role performed by the commander. The decision and rationale for not using a POTAC during the planning and operational phase should be documented as part of a commander's decision-making audit trail.</p> <p>Although decision making rests with the commander, POTACs are responsible for providing appropriate, valid, and reasonable advice.</p>	Police
<b>Tactical Firearms Advisor</b>	<p>A Firearms tactical advisor may only provide tactical advice in respect of the tactics in which they are, or have been, occupationally competent and remain currently proficient.</p> <p>The role of a Firearms tactical advisor is to advise and not to make command decisions. The responsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisor, but the responsibility for the use of that advice rests with the commander.</p>	Police
<b>Pursuit Tactical Advisor</b>	<p>The pursuit tactical advisor must meet current tactical pursuit and containment training standards, and should have sufficient operational experience of pursuit situations to be able to dynamically interpret policy and advise a course of action for persons currently involved in a pursuit. Under no circumstances during a pre-planned pursuit operation should the tactical advisor be directly involved as a crew member in a pursuing vehicle. They should also not be the first line communicator or the managing control/communications room supervisor.</p> <p>During spontaneous pursuits, it is highly desirable to use a tactical advisor who is not directly involved as a crew member in a pursuing vehicle. They should also not be the first line communicator or the managing control/communications room supervisor. If however this is not possible, other tactical advisors may be considered. Forces should clearly identify persons deemed suitable to act as pursuit tactical advisors, and ensure there is 24-hour operational availability.</p> <p>Tactical advice may be provided in real-time as part of the communications loop, using personal force radio equipment or as part of the control/communications room based team managing the event.</p>	Police

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>CBRN Tactical Advisor</b>	<p>A CBRN Tactical advisor will provide advice to CBRN Commanders; primarily at the Tactical and Operational Command levels, may on occasion be required to provide advice at the Strategic level on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The preparation and planning for CBRN deployments and the necessary multi-agency interaction such events require.</li> <li>• The safe deployment of Police resources in the event of a CBRN incident ensuring that safe systems of work are employed.</li> <li>• The capabilities and limitations of personnel and equipment's involved in any CBRN event.</li> <li>• The operational limitations, capabilities and issues raised by the nature of CBRN events.</li> </ul>	Police
<b>Airwave Communications Tactical Advisor</b>	<p>Qualified communications advisors, who cover all aspects of emergency services' operational communications and support the operational and/or tactical commander in the effective management of both pre-planned events and spontaneous incidents.</p>	Multiple
<b>Ambulance Tactical Advisor</b>	<p>The Standards for NHS Ambulance Service Command and Control describes the national expectations of the Tactical Advisor as:</p> <p>A Tactical Advisor is a member of staff who has the relevant depth of subject knowledge regarding Trust specialist and non-specialist capabilities and associated risks and the benefits of deploying / utilising such capabilities. The Tactical Advisor must be able to utilise that knowledge and provide concise advice to commanders regarding the risk and benefit of deploying Trust specialist and non-specialist capabilities during an incident response.</p> <p>However, the Tactical Advisor is both responsible and liable for the advice they provide. They must be credible and competent individuals. They must have an in depth, current knowledge of specialist capabilities including; Public Order, CBRN, USAR, SWAH, Confined Space, Water Rescue and Tactical Medicine Operations) and MTA. The Tactical Advisor must have in depth knowledge of the Trusts major incident response plan, and other relevant doctrine, policies and procedures. They must also have a good working knowledge of local partner agencies capabilities and that of the NHS.</p>	LAS

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>National Interagency Liaison Officer (NILO)</b>	<p>The role of the NILO is to provide commander support at all levels of command during CBRN(E) and Conventional terrorism incidents, including Marauding Terrorism, Major Incidents, Complex or protracted police led incidents, Spontaneous and planned serious public order. The NILO is able to provide advice to commanders and other agency partners on the capabilities of the specialist response within its own agency.</p> <p>The NILO has undertaken additional national multi-agency training to obtain further understanding of partner agencies specialist response capabilities, such as Police, Fire and Rescue, Military Special Forces and Military EOD. A NILO has additional security clearance to SC level to facilitate the sharing of classified information across partners and has a broader understanding of the current Counter Terrorism threat landscape and the wider political issues that affect the national Security Threat Level</p> <p>They can support pre-planned or spontaneous operations at strategic, tactical and operational levels, including facilitating interoperable working with partner agencies.</p>	Multiple
<b>Incident Support Officer</b>	<p>The Incident Support Officer is an Officer who has undertaken a level of training in all the aspects of the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) capabilities and has a thorough understanding of the Trust Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) response.</p> <p>The role of the ISO is complex and multi-faceted, dependent upon the incident. In general, the ISO will work with the Tactical Advisor to provide specialist advice to the incident command teams at all levels of command and to specialist teams while responding to calls where enhanced personal protective equipment is worn.</p> <p>However on complex incidents, such as Urban Search and Rescue incidents, the ISO may take command of a sector where there is high risk activity being undertaken by LAS staff.</p>	LAS
<b>Radiation Protection Supervisors</b>	<p>RPS have attended a National Training Course run by the UKHSA and the qualification is renewed every 3 years</p> <p>Fundamentally, the role of the RPS is to ensure the relevant local procedures are complied with in the workplace.</p> <p>The RPS responsibilities include;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advisory authority of operations or incidents involving radiation, to ensure work is being carried out in accordance with ambulance service procedures.</li> <li>• Being an initial point of contact within the ambulance service for basic radiation protection queries, and liaison with UKHSA where required</li> </ul>	LAS

# LONDON RESILIENCE

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>Senior Fire Safety Officer (SFSO)</b>	<p>Offer advice to the fire incident commander with regards to the fire safety provisions within a building, for example, smoke control systems.</p> <p>They will assess the fire safety standards in a building to determine if compliance is achieved.</p>	LFB
<b>Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection Officer (HMEPO)</b>	<p>Attend incidents involving hazardous materials and will assist the fire incident commander to ensure the appropriate operational &amp; decontamination procedures are implemented.</p>	LFB
<b>Bulk Media Advisor (BMA)</b>	<p>Advise the fire incident commander with regards to the provision of and tactics to be applied when using bulk firefighting media (water, firefighting foam and dry powder agents) at incidents.</p> <p>Advise as to the deployment of High Volume Pumps (HVP), Bulk Foam Units (BFU) and Hose Laying Units (HLU).</p> <p>They will liaise with water and sewerage undertakers regarding provision of water supplies and/or the control/removal of incident run-off or flood water from the incident ground.</p>	LFB
<b>Technical Rescue Advisor (TRA)</b>	<p>Advise the fire incident commander with regards to the deployment of specialist teams for rope operations, water rescue/flood operations and large animal rescue.</p>	LFB
<b>Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Advisor</b>	<p>Urban search and rescue specialise in locating and rescuing people from collapsed structures. The USAR advisor will assist and advise the fire incident commander to ensure the correct procedures are employed. Such actions may include:</p> <p>Deploying listening devices, lifting and moving large pieces of rubble, concrete, masonry and metal, Specialist search cameras, Props to shore unsafe structures to support search and rescue.</p>	LFB



For information, please contact:

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## **LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities, and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

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