# Community Preparedness
## Report 2019

**First Edition**

CTPN
COUNTER TERRORISM
PREPAREDNESS NETWORK

# About Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network

## What we do
CTPN brings together strategic leaders, practitioners and academics to inform city-level policies and practices that build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism.

## Why we do it
The threat from terrorism has not diminished, rather it has become more complex. Cities that develop strategic arrangements and explore policy design and implementation in an integrated manner can use this as a lever in developing resilience against terrorism.

## How we do it
CTPN promotes dialogue, the sharing of practices and experiences, and provides a means of developing new approaches to counter-terrorism, as well as the strategic preparedness and response arrangements of cities in this context.

## About us in numbers

**6**
Member cities

**12**
Resilience leaders

**7**
Academic partners

**7**
Independent experts

## Member cities


Barcelona


Greater Manchester


©GLA
London


© Jean-Baptiste Gurliat
Paris


Rotterdam


Stockholm

**Welcome to CTPN's
first edition report on
Community Preparedness.**

**In this report you will learn
about exciting and innovative
initiatives from cities across
the globe, and be presented
with strategic recommendations
to consider for your own city.**

# Executive Summary

The complex and changing nature of terrorism requires innovative and collaborative solutions at a city-level. Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN) enables cities to work together across borders to counter terrorism through the holistic lens of preparedness and resilience.

As a part of this, five first edition reports have been developed by CTPN to dive into pertinent areas of counter terrorism. They examine current counter terrorism initiatives from across the globe, delve into academic discussions, share learning and analysis, and offer strategic leaders and policy-makers recommendations that aim to build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism.

This report focuses on the challenge of radicalisation and has identified the following key findings:

Develop ways to **benchmark and measure** the success of community preparedness initiatives

Convene a **Community Resilience Steering Group** at the city level to develop holistic community preparedness programs

**Deliver public awareness campaigns** to inform and prepare communities

**Identify, develop and strengthen partnerships** among the public, private and third sector

Consider the introduction of **public first aid training programs** and volunteering schemes

Consider creating coordinated **online Preparedness Hubs**

Support **multi-agency** working

# Initiatives from across the globe

## Barcelona

Emotional Management Resource Workshops

## Greater Manchester

We Love Manchester

## London

'Run. Hide. Tell' Campaign

'30 Days, 30 Ways'

The We Stand Together Movement

#London is Open

West End Security Group

Octopus Community Network

## International

Online Preparedness Hub

International Federation of the Red Cross Apps

## Paris

First Aid Trainig

## Stockholm

#OpenStockholm

Enhanced Cooperation

## Methodology

To produce this report, we engaged with academics, subject matter experts and practitioners in London and internationally, sent out a survey to CTPN cities, and undertook a literature review.

Interviews

Literature review

Surveys

Introduction

# Global policies aimed at mitigating the risks of emergencies and disasters to cities and countries have highlighted that individuals and communities have key responsibilities and roles in reducing risk and promoting coping capacity, especially in the face of terrorism.[1]

Strengthening local preparedness at the individual and community level is an essential element of effective response and recovery to terrorist attacks. This report identifies mechanisms for preparing communities to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks. Greater awareness and understanding of these community-preparedness mechanisms will inform a holistic, collaborative approach to enhancing the resilience of communities to terrorism.

The European Commission defines preparedness[2] as "measures taken by governments, organisations, communities or individuals to prepare for, and mitigate the impact of, natural or man-made disasters". Preparedness is a means of ensuring that the best possible state of readiness is achieved in the face of risk, threat and future uncertainty. Although counter terrorism is the primary context for this report, preparedness activities are in some cases generally applicable for an all-hazards approach, broadening to other risks such as flooding or transport incidents.

Preparedness programmes are designed to enhance emergency-response arrangements, and

to mitigate the short and long-term impacts of extreme events. Preparedness activities can take many forms, already constitute a part of daily life, and can be deployed effectively before, during and after extreme events in order to reduce the negative impacts on communities and individuals. Blood banks exist to prepare for casualties or patients who may suffer blood loss and require transfusions, reducing the risk of haemorrhage-related mortality. Shelters exist in many forms, for abandoned animals, victims of domestic abuse or those who are homeless. Such examples demonstrate how preparedness measures are already implemented and entrenched in societies to mitigate risks and the consequences of common societal challenges.

In the realm of emergency management, preparedness activities become more complex because there are many stakeholders, including diverse communities, although this is not always well understood. At the individual and community level, people require knowledge, skills, motivation and support to engage consistently in preparedness programmes to enhance resilience.[3] To accomplish

this, preparedness programmes must include the identification of individual and collective strengths and assets at local, regional and national levels in order to access and use them during terrorist attacks.[4] Work is taking place worldwide, led by policy, local and city-level initiatives to enhance preparedness in communities and cities to deal with hazards, including those of a malicious nature.

> **Strengthening local preparedness at the individual and community level is an essential element of effective response and recovery to terrorist attacks.**

Many cities globally, and across Europe specifically, have experienced terrorist attacks in recent years, reaffirming the risk of terrorism. In light of this threat, it is imperative that the public, public services and policymakers understand the parts that they have to play in mitigating the consequences of such attacks. For example, where preventative action fails to stop a terrorist attack that uses chemicals on a local population, an example of a preparedness

measure would be decontamination units, procured in advance and with relevant staff given training on how to use such equipment. The measure itself does not prevent an attack, but it enhances the readiness of cities to deal with the consequences, with the aim of reducing injuries and fatalities.

Training is a crucial aspect of any preparedness programme, and is particularly beneficial to members of the public because it informs and enhances their ability to act in response to extreme events. For example, since 2015, the UK Royal National Lifeguard Institution (RNLI) water-safety campaign has worked to decrease accidental drownings by informing and preparing the public on what to do if they encounter difficulty when already in water. This couples a preventative measure to help reduce accidental fall-ins, with guidance designed to prepare people to help themselves before rescue boats arrive. Similarly, in a counter terrorism context, preparedness guidance enables members of the public to decrease the chance of exposure to a risk. For example, the UK "See It. Say It. Sorted." campaign is designed to encourage members of the public to report suspicious behaviour in crowded places. The US's "Run. Hide. Fight." and the UK's "Run. Hide. Tell." campaigns provide advice about protective behaviours that can help save lives during a marauding terrorist attack.

It is important to recognise that community preparedness is strongly linked to, and sometimes dependent on, national and city preparedness. Germany's Federal Agency for Technical Relief (Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk)[5] is a prime example of a preparedness initiative targeted at training, empowering and integrating community volunteers into formal response plans and procedures. The agency belongs to the Federal Ministry of the Interior but is notably made up of only 1% paid full-time staff; the other 99% is composed of trained volunteers

located across the country. To ensure diversity, recruitment drives are aimed at all communities, and evidence confirms that the consistent use of volunteers has led to increased community participation in dealing with emergencies. For example, the 2018 Meppen moorland wildfires in Germany saw more than 3,250 volunteers attending over a period of several weeks. This provided a significant increase in resource availability to tackle the severity of the fire.[6]

Hurricane Katrina is a prime example of preparedness shortfalls, where federal-level preparedness is widely acknowledged to have been grossly inadequate.[7] Despite strong warnings that the magnitudes of the hurricane were unprecedented, the official response was delayed to the point that many died and thousands were trapped in the city of New Orleans without aid. This had a detrimental impact on community engagement and communications. Residents became distrustful of the government and, as such, unwilling to follow advice.[8] Had there been greater support for community preparedness from the federal level, the communities in New Orleans could have been better used on the

ground, prior to the arrival of more state and federal responders.[9]

Hurricane Ivan in 2004 demonstrated how early community engagement can offset the adverse impacts of hazards. Even though Cuba took the brunt of the storm, no lives were lost there, whereas neighbouring countries suffered dozens of deaths.[10] Cuban citizens learn from a young age of the risks they face and the actions that they should take should they be exposed to danger.

Local communities are engaged and empowered to take initiative, frequently coming together to support one another and those who are vulnerable even before hurricanes hit, and owning the responsibility to secure and protect property when hurricane warnings are in place. This demonstrates that engagement has taken place on a community and individual level, and is indicative of the relationships that have been fostered between different response actors, who can subsequently trust each other to deliver on allocated tasks and responsibilities. This questions why some governments and communities appear to develop and engage with preparedness initiatives, while others do not.

It is evident that some cities, when faced with the threat of terrorism, are not fully prepared. For example, the response to the 2011 Oslo and Utøya Island terror attacks demonstrated a shortfall of human resources and issues with training that affected communication, decision-making and leadership during the response phase of these attacks, ultimately leading to more fatalities.[11] A lack of preparedness on a city level may stem from a lack of investment in preparedness programmes; a lack of advocacy at governmental level for such programmes; and uncertainty over whether programmes will actually be successful, or will ever be necessary.[12] Irrespective of why a lack of preparedness may exist in some areas, it can be concluded that these communities and cities are less prepared to cope with terrorism, and as such are less resilient if and when a terrorist attack occurs.

**When the threat of terrorism rarely materialises, the importance of targeting communities with specific information on terrorism risks drops down the list of priorities, as other, more pressing issues compete for the attention of policymakers.**

Academics have discussed the challenges of achieving a state of preparedness even when the desire to prepare exists.[13] A useful starting point comes in the form of investing time and resource into preparedness activities that can enhance resilience at the community level. This requires bridging the gap between the expert and public perceptions of risks and threats, which, understandably, can be difficult. Any disjoint in perception can lead organisations tasked with managing a threat to feel frustrated when members of the public do not view that specific risk or threat as relevant to themselves, or as a risk or threat that they can do something about. Evidence-based, effective communication must be developed in order to address perceptions of risk and understanding, thus enabling members of the public to make informed choices about risks that they consider to be relevant, and actions they can take to protect themselves and their loved ones. The only way to accomplish these objectives is through targeted engagement with members of the public.[14]

Ainuddin and Routray[15], have described how some cities can take a top-down, reactive approach, engaging communities too late and telling them what to do, rather than engaging and coordinating with communities as a matter of routine, raising their risk awareness and understanding of local-level resources and how each individual can contribute in response.[16] Furthermore, the historical 'avoidance' of disaster, where it is felt that 'It won't happen anyway', can play a role within cities. When the threat of terrorism rarely materialises, the importance of targeting communities with specific information on terrorism risks drops down the list of priorities, as other, more pressing issues compete for the attention of policymakers.[17]

Considering the role of community preparedness in respect to terrorist attacks is important for a number of reasons. This report has already demonstrated that organisational and community levels of preparedness inform the health, social and economic outcomes of extreme events. The qualities of the threat of terrorism can make it feel like an especially difficult threat for which to prepare, leading some to prefer leaving it in the hands of overt and covert departments and agencies to manage.

This report demonstrates that cities, irrespective of their size or prominence, are at greater risk from terrorist attacks, and so cannot assume that attacks will always be "avoided" through detection and deterrence. As such it is important to support communities and individuals to prepare to mitigate the impacts of terrorism on their cities and citizens in a similar way to mitigating the impacts of more familiar incidents.

This report demonstrates that preparedness measures are a primary mechanism for contributing to a resilient city. Having communities that are resilient and able to withstand the shocks of terrorism will increase ability to deter, detect, respond and recover when terrorists strike. This will be demonstrated through a review of the evidence in academic literature; an assessment of existing practices; and an analysis of gaps in order to offer strategic recommendations to inform city-level policy.

# It is important to clarify the terms and definitions we use in this report in order to provide consistent framing and understanding.

Although the definitions listed can be further interpreted and applied differently across sectors, they are used here to serve the objectives of this report.

**Preparedness**
The Federal Emergency Management Agency defines 'preparedness' in terms of processes: "a continuous cycle of planning, organising, training, equipping, exercising, evaluating, and taking corrective action in an effort to ensure effective coordination during incident response".[18] An important aspect of this cyclical process includes understanding how individuals and communities are identified, engaged, trained and utilised, as well as those institutions and responders that will play a crucial role in the response to a terror attack.

Preparedness is a complex process that takes place at individual, community, organisational and city levels. Preparedness can be co-produced by these stakeholders, to enable them to manage and minimise the consequences of terrorist attacks. The UK Cabinet Office emphasises that community preparedness includes activities that empower individuals and community groups to come together and take collective action to increase their self-reliance prior to and during attacks. This is founded upon a knowledge and understanding of the risks that they face, and potential mitigation measures that they can take themselves.[19] Although access to a range of services plays a crucial

role in the length of time it takes for cities to recover, the communities themselves can play a strong role in determining how they recover. There is arguably ample opportunity and a recognised need for authorities to better understand and utilise the assets and interconnectedness of their communities in order to embed preparedness.[20]

Preparedness focuses specifically on planning, mitigation measures and initiatives that contribute towards lessening the impacts and likelihood of harm for those affected by emergencies, including terrorist attacks. Examples of these activities include risk assessments, emergency plans, emergency-responder exercising programmes and awareness-raising campaigns.[21] It is important to note that counter terrorism work in Europe has specifically outlined organisational and community preparedness within the scope and remit of counter-terror work streams, for example the EU's Counter Terrorism strategy, and the UK Home Office's Prevent strategy.[22]

**Community**
Although there is variation in the understanding of the term 'community', it is accepted that communities can be defined as entities that have specific boundaries and a shared vision.[23] These entities may have geographic, social or economic boundaries, and can be composed of informal groups, neighbourhoods, businesses, formal or faith-based institutions or online platforms that reach a common audience. Entities can extend up to and even beyond entire sectors and political units. They are formed within the natural, social, built and economic environments, and can be individually examined or assessed in terms of complexity, in how they influence one another. Ultimately, they are networks of people who have a shared interest.

Communities can typically be very dynamic and interconnected:

"people's identities and allegiances may shift over time and in different social circumstances",[24] and as such people may belong to multiple communities at once or varying communities over time. For example, a business owner who belongs to an alliance that brings together other business owners in a unique geographic area may also belong to a specific faith group or Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Trans (LGBT+) network, and as such can receive different support from multiple communities in addressing differing needs post-terrorist attack.

> **If community resilience is the desired end state, then community preparedness can be seen as the process needed to get there.**

Social integration is important in this context and should be viewed in a broader light than the traditional categories of faith, religion, culture or ethnicity. It is also about age and gender and it affects all members of a society. In the context of a city, integration should be viewed as relevant to all who live in the city and should focus on fostering inclusivity and tolerance of difference without expectation of conformity.

**Resilience**
Organisations focusing on preparedness have begun to promote the concept of resilience, which covers a broader remit than preparedness to create "forward momentum and re-energize the field" of emergency management.[25] Resilience can be conceptualised as an ongoing process, or an ability, that must continually be worked on.[26] This report examines resilience, not as an end state that is simply reached, but rather as an ongoing process and strategy, as it relates to communities, organisations and societies when faced with the realities of terrorism

and the terrorist threat.[27] Elements that are embodied in these ongoing processes include but are not limited to: local knowledge, community networks and relationships, communication, health, governance and leadership, resource availability, economic investment, preparedness and outlook.[28]

It is broadly accepted that there is no single definition of resilience. Instead, it can be understood as a catch-all term for a range of elements that contribute to positive outcomes following disruption, including the disruption brought about by the terrorist threat. For the purpose of this report, we examine resilience as organisational and community capacities for successful adaptation when faced with disturbance, stress or adversity.[29]

### Realising Community Resilience via Preparedness

The concept of resilience as adaptive capacities and processes enables us to consider the ways in which preparedness activities increase local capacity, social support and resources, and decrease risks, miscommunication and trauma, in the preparation for and response to emergencies.[30] Resilient communities are recognised as communities where individuals are empowered to actively participate in resilience-enhancing processes, rather than waiting for and relying on assistance being given to them.[31] Any preparedness initiatives that hope to contribute towards enhancing resilient communities, must therefore address the need to engage, inform, teach and ultimately empower communities to act, thus positively influencing the return-to-normal functioning, or "new-normal" environments, following terrorist attacks. If community resilience is the desired end state, then community preparedness can be seen as the process needed to get there.

### Community and Societal Resilience

Patel et al.[32] argue that community resilience can be understood as "a reflection of people's shared and unique capacities to manage and adaptively respond to the extraordinary demands on resources and the losses associated with disasters". They go on to argue that communities can be deemed resilient when the "community as a whole is able to cope effectively with and learn from adversity". In the spirit of this statement, we examine preparedness activities that are effective and innovative, and that foster the potential to lead societies to become more resilient to current and future challenges.[33]

In doing so, we discuss society in terms of the general population, rather than identifiable individual groups, but acknowledge that communities are the fundamental building blocks of society. Societal resilience can be evidenced in the capacity of cities exposed to a terrorist attack to rebound from the damage inflicted.[34] When community groups are able to rebound and adapt to terrorism and even begin functioning at previous – or even higher – standards than before, society as a whole can be deemed to be resilient to terrorism.[35]

# Literature Review

The concept of resilience is rooted in the physical sciences. Early definitions focus on the characteristics of physical materials, their stability, and resistance to external shocks.[36]

In simple terms, resilience is the ability of a material to "bounce back" after being "bent", rather than to snap or break under pressure or stress.[37] Over the past 15 years, the notion of resilience has grown to subsume social and behavioural science, and, eventually, to the realms of policymaking and emergency response.[38] This has enabled the concept of resilience to be applied to understanding the "adaptive capacities of individuals" and communities.[39] Resilience is therefore understood as the ability to adapt to challenging or changing circumstances and maintain day-to-day function.[40]

The concept of resilience has been further developed to appreciate that systems may change over time, not just after shocks.[41] This concept of evolutionary resilience notes that cities and communities rarely return to exactly where they were prior to an extreme event like a terrorist attack.[42] This complements more recent literature exploring the concept of new norms and in some cases, even improved functioning compared to pre-attack situations.[43]

Terrorist attacks challenge the resilience of individuals and communities and can severely traumatise directly and indirectly affected populations. For example,

**This has enabled the concept of resilience to be applied to understanding the "adaptive capacities of individuals" and communities.**

the Norwegian Centre for Violence and Traumatic Stress Studies found strong emotional responses amongst Oslo residents including sadness, fear and anger following the 2011 terrorist attacks in Oslo and on Utøya Island. They also found that survivors of the Utøya Island attack (where 69 people, mostly youths, were shot dead by a right-wing extremist), felt that people did not understand or could not comprehend what they had experienced. These feelings impacted their help-seeking behaviours, which in turn affected their ability to recover from the incident.[44] As a result, individuals reported experiencing varying degrees of psychological stress for months to years after the attack.

Cities can prepare before incidents occur in order to mitigate the health impacts experienced in their wake. Much can be learned from studies of preparedness and resilience to a range of natural and manmade events when considering the ways in which these concepts interact in the face of terrorism. For example, Mathbor[45] has written extensively on how building social capital and community capacity is a method of preparedness that can positively influence levels of resilience of individuals and communities.

## 4.1 Building Community Resilience

Social capital has been associated both with preventing terrorism, or fostering it.[46,47,48] Its negative or positive influence will depend on the community (or place of interest) with which an individual is associated,[49] and the nature of the influential social norms.[50] Research into the relationship

between social capital and community capacity and preparedness highlights the positives of social capital and underpins the foundations of community resilience.[51]

Social capital can be understood as the ways in which "individuals invest, access, and use resources embedded in social networks to gain returns".[52] Network structures and links spanning individuals, families, neighbours, organisations, both voluntary and public sector, inform and influence one another. They are a means to receive emotional, informative and tangible support, and as such could be utilised when creating community preparedness initiatives.

Furthermore, social networks can be seen as existing capital that can be utilised as a resource[53] during response, in that well-networked groups of people have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to share their resources among one another, which can reduce reliance on public officials.[54] For example, people in existing social networks who know and trust each other are more likely to let other members of that social network stay in their homes in times of crisis. This reduces the need to find alternative accommodation for people who cannot return to their homes following a terrorist attack and policymakers, planners and public bodies must better understand these concepts in order to establish effective policy interventions. Most importantly, social capital ensures that communities have networks in place that link them together, which can influence information-sharing and risk-awareness between community members, collective action prior to and during response, and even mutual help, all of which are vital to successful preparedness initiatives at the community level.

**23**

people died at The
Manchester Arena
bombing in 2017

**£21m**

raised for charity
We love Manchester

Research has shown that communities who are empowered to help themselves and share responsibility for recovery embrace the unity and "togetherness" that comes in the wake of an extreme event.[55]

Movements such as Paris United following the 2015 terrorist attacks, the #LondonisOpen and #OpenStockholm initiatives encapsulate the ability of this sense of togetherness to move beyond the usual confines and boundaries of a geographic community. Tikka[56] discusses how following the truck attack in Stockholm, which killed five people in a busy shopping street and led to a city-wide lockdown to capture the escaped perpetrator, members of the public banded together using Twitter to encourage people to open their doors and allow people trapped in the city with nowhere to go to come and seek refuge. This crowd-enabled action highlights the role of the public and is indicative of the resource that can stem from bridging social capital.

Bridging social capital is particularly important as there are some risks associated with bonding social capital where it can be counter-productive and unhelpful in relation to ensuring community cohesion between different communities. That is why it is bridging social capital through, for example, work between faith leaders, is key in the aftermath of an attack. This helps to prevent divisions being made even greater as groups look inwards and harden their views of other groups or communities within the city.

Other positive components of social capital can include: social networks, social cohesion, social contacts and social interactions. For example, the We Love Manchester Emergency Fund that was set up in response to the Manchester Arena concert bombing to coordinate and distribute donations. It has since become a registered charity, demonstrating how

members of the public could come together to support those affected by terrorist attacks. Members of the public and organisations raised around £21 million. Through this community-based activity, money that has been used to support those affected who have suffered bereavement, sustained life-changing injuries, lost earnings, mental health challenges, or difficulties in studying and education. Such a fund needs coordination and accessibility, as well as timely access to funds for those affected, as prolonged payouts can leave people struggling to pay bills, funeral costs or for special care.

It is important to recognise that public donations are not always monetary. Instead, members of the public may be motivated to invest time in volunteering activities. These, in turn, open up opportunities for bridging gaps across ethnicity and culture, and building trust and cohesion in the process.[57] People and communities who have their needs addressed can go on to enjoy a high quality of life and healthy patterns of behaviour, thus demonstrating resilience.[58] Communities are important stakeholders in this process.

**Communicating with the public and other stakeholders is a crucial component of community preparedness.**

For some communities, perceived support is as helpful as receiving the support itself, although this will vary for individuals.[59] It is enough for some people to simply know that a resource is available, although they may not want to physically use it at that time. In simple terms, availability of resources brings peace of mind, whether that be material or psychological. Some of the necessary resources may be the traditional tools of emergency response such as an ambulance or a fire engine. Other resources exist at the community level including faith

groups that have people available to simply listen, or community services that can support vulnerable residents affected by terrorism in their homes. These formal and informal resources can facilitate coping responses and enhance resilience.

## 4.2 Enhancing Community Preparedness through Communication

Communicating with the public and other stakeholders is a crucial component of community preparedness. The importance of communication is recognised and formalised as a statutory duty in some countries, including the UK. Owing to this, many cities use awareness campaigns to communicate with the public, using posters, adverts and social media campaigns to engage as many people as possible. These are primarily used to alert the public to possible risks, with the intention of reducing exposure to risk, and mitigating potential impacts.[60]

The UK introduced the Civil Contingencies Act in 2004, which places a statutory duty on responders to "advise the public of risks before an emergency" and to provide the public with "information and advice as necessary if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred".[61] To achieve this, a National Risk Register, which contains details of risks and information on how individuals can be prepared for them, has been published to inform communities, cities and responsible agencies.[62] Although a risk register can be publicly available and may serve as a means of warning and informing the public, many of the risk registers are developed for local level emergency planners, rather than targeted directly at members of the public. As such, the information they contain has not always been written in an accessible manner for lay persons. Further refinement of these tools would better enable national risk registers to reach a large and varied non-expert audience in a meaningful way and

further work is needed in order to establish the utility of current national risk registers for lay audiences. When considering such challenges, other methods must be sought to ensure information reaches the public, as the end user, in more easily accessible formats.

There are still challenges regarding public perceptions of risk. The public's perception of terrorism and corresponding security measures must be considered when developing community preparedness initiatives. One risk may mean different things to different people, or lead to different ideas or responses. The use of background research and sample groups to inform the development and test the effectiveness of initiatives is an important first step before full-scale campaigns are implemented.[63] When public perceptions of risk are considered, it is more likely that risks will be managed in a sensitive way and communication campaigns are therefore less likely to cause undue stress or anxiety.

Terrorist methods evolve continuously and have been propelled by globalisation and developments in technology. More recently, some terrorist groups have moved towards

non-traditional targets such as busy roads, bridges and markets, as well as the larger concerts and events.[64] Academic literature recommends that prior to and during a terrorist incident the threat should be clearly defined by officials to alleviate public anxiety and fear.[65] Explanations around how to reduce negative consequences (such as in a chemical attack) should be provided, along with a description on what is being done by authorities to prepare.

Although, some countries do not use certain communication campaigns for fear of increasing public anxiety. This contradicts strong evidence indicating that, where terrorism is concerned, providing continuous, clear and accurate communications is a necessary part of preparation, response and recovery.[66] Furthermore, regular communication engenders trust, and leads to better relationships between communities and official bodies. This means communities are more likely to acquire and believe information from official sources, making them better informed and therefore better prepared to act.

Where citizens are considered partners in safety and counter terrorism, the threat of terrorism must be made relevant to their everyday lives. Public awareness of terrorism risks has been heightened due to recent global events. There can be no ambiguity surrounding their roles if organisations hope to enable the public to play an effective role in preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks. Balance must be achieved between potentially increasing the fear of terrorism by providing overly detailed information, and providing sufficient information to adequately prepare the public to collaborate in response efforts.[67]

Evidence indicates that effective, evidence-based communication about the threat of terrorism can enhance public levels of trust, encourage protective behaviours such as taking cover under fire, and discourage potentially dangerous actions such as engaging attackers.[68, 69] This suggests that communicators need to engage openly in order to raise awareness of the threat. This can be challenging for a number of reasons: the sensitive nature of counter terrorism is of critical importance to the success of deterrence activities; the potential for stigmatising communities is a real concern and can trigger retaliation attacks; the number and variety of voices operating in the counter terrorism space can cause confusion and lead to misinformation in communities.

Regardless of the concerns that transparency and information sharing may present, research consistently shows that people tend to "rise to the occasion" when the opportunity presents[70, 71, 72] rather than the notion often perpetuated by the media that the public act in an irrational manner in response to extreme events.[73] Indeed, evidence has shown that many people who are directly on the scene are the first to take action, helping the injured or with evacuations, and calling the emergency services.[74] Given the present-day frequency and severity of terrorist attacks in Europe and North America, it is possible to use the reality of recent events to engage with and encourage communities to participate in preparedness.[75] UK and German officials among others have been clear in stating that future attacks of a less coordinated and sophisticated manner are now inevitable, through the recent prevalence of smaller scale, lone-wolf and self-organised terrorist cells.[76]

When releasing information to the public, individuals who are informed perceive advice and guidance as legitimate, and adhere to official guidance and authority are more likely to be safe and avoid danger. This is because information has a transformative power, in that how communities and individuals respond to such information can either escalate or mitigate conflict.[77] This can, in turn, support the development of resilience in communities that are able to follow the given advice, support one another and cope with the stresses of actual and potential terrorism in their cities.

> **Any training that could be offered would require investment to reach sufficiently large numbers of people. Refresher training, like that highlighted in Paris' first aid case study, would be needed to maintain and boost skills-related knowledge, competence and technique.**

Innovative awareness campaigns do not, however, remove barriers to communication, such as language difficulties, quality of information provided or timeliness of communications.[78] Such barriers will still need to be addressed to ensure full and effective implementation of campaigns. Furthermore, the possibility remains that some campaigns may highlight the risk of terrorism from certain groups and subsequently can negatively influence social cohesion by deepening existing social divides. Without a positive narrative, negative stereotypes can be perpetuated, undermining social cohesion and harming risk-awareness campaigns. Engaging with all community leaders can help reach smaller or minority communities and bolster trust with authorities.[79]

Communicators must remember that any short-lived warning and informing activities lose their impact over time; these processes must be embedded into cultures and societies. Owing to the recent increase in frequency of terrorist attacks in Europe, it is clear that investment in preparedness is more crucial than ever; the risk is clear and the threat is high. Cities cannot ride on the back of old campaigns and information, or simply hope that communities will have their own connections, such as family, faith-based social circles or work- and hobby-related acquaintances to rely on. When community networks are engaged and informed, they can maintain the capacity and motivation for collective action and actively participate in response efforts.

### 4.3 Enhancing Community Preparedness through Training and Education

It has been found that following terrorist attacks, members of the public want to help, either by physically supporting those in need or if geographically distant, by means of donations.[80] It has been repeatedly observed that communities come together in times of terrorism and that communications by the public through social media are becoming common practice. There are multiple examples of individuals opening their doors to provide shelter to those affected by attacks by using a designated hashtag through Twitter in multiple places, including the US, Germany, Stockholm and Greater Manchester.[81] Given

that communities want to help in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, cities need to explore how to enable them through community preparedness programmes and initiatives.

The public are often the first responders during a terrorist attack.[82] In the aftermath of the Bataclan shooting in Paris, several instances were recorded of survivors who, both during the incident and once out of immediate danger, went on to rescue others. This demonstrated resourcefulness and rational decision-making in the face of the threat.[83] Longstaff[84], has argued that it is critical to resilience that communities not only have the information available to them about risks, but that they can, or are empowered to act so as to solve emerging problems themselves. This can be reinforced by providing education on terrorism threats, coupled with training that is available to communities.

Within communities, individual confidence can be increased when information is disseminated and received through training and in a format that supports risk understanding. This, in turn, can enable communities to contribute to response efforts. When emergency chemical decontamination procedures were tested in an experiment simulating a terrorist incident, perceptions of the necessity of the procedure were positive because responders had explained why the procedure was so vital, and provided frequent updates to those being decontaminated. It has been demonstrated that public confusion and anxiety are reduced, and cooperation and compliance increased, when the public receive a clear explanation on what they may need to do following a terrorist attack. In contrast, those who feel uninformed and uncared

for make these processes more complicated because they do not comply with instructions.[85]

Bystanders or casualties in terrorist incidents are increasingly playing a greater role in saving lives. Threats and hazards posed by active shooters or explosive devices, for example, mean that sometimes deployment of ambulance and rescue services may be delayed. For example, the Bataclan shooting in Paris 2015 saw people needing cover from fire and haemorrhage-control/breathing assistance. Rapid pre-hospital care was therefore crucial, even in scenes with persisting insecurity.[86] This was in part provided by everyday civilians nearby who demonstrated quick thinking and selflessness. This does present a difficult contradiction with some advice encouraging certain safety behaviours, such as 'Run. Hide. Tell". However, for those who find



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themselves in danger that they cannot escape, or who face a dilemma around if and how to help those that have been attacked, life saving skills are critical.

Any training that could be offered would require investment to reach sufficiently large numbers of people. Refresher training, like that highlighted in Paris' first aid case study, would be needed to maintain and boost skills-related knowledge, competence and technique.[87] It would be vital that any initiative didn't become a one-off project, but rather was part of the culture and fabric of communities. Individuals need to feel as if they won't make matters worse, and although research indicates that there is much opportunity for work to be taken forward in this area, and for existing tools to be better highlighted and utilised, some serious obstacles lay in the path of training and volunteering.

Barriers often quoted by those wishing to volunteer include age, disability, later-term pregnancies family caring responsibilities, or holding multiple jobs.[88] In some cases, research has shown that those holding routine and manual occupations are less likely to volunteer.[89] Additionally research undertaken in London in March 2018[90] showed that potential volunteers may perceive volunteer applications to be too onerous, or view security clearance checks as discriminatory. Other times individuals simply do not have awareness about the range of volunteering opportunities available to them.

Although all of these factors may contribute, social exclusion must also be considered as a potential barrier to widespread and diverse volunteering programmes. Social exclusion is defined as "what happens when people or places suffer from a series of problems such as unemployment, discrimination, limited skills, low income, poor housing, high crime, and family

breakdown".[91] Any of these issues can affect someone's ability to access social, economic and cultural resources in mainstream society. Paradoxically however, volunteering, like education, is also seen as one of the mechanisms that can connect people socially, bring a sense of pride, purpose and belonging to individuals and enhance skill sets that can be utilised elsewhere. A survey of Londoners[92] showed that the benefits of volunteering in communities include a positive impact on personal wellbeing, an increased sense of belonging and social connectedness.

Therefore volunteering can form part of the solution to social exclusion issues, however, the personal, practical and structural barriers to volunteering that exist for individuals, particularly those that might be seen as socially excluded, means these benefits of volunteering are not always accessed. These complexities must be considered alongside volunteering programme requirements. Cities can help mitigate this through investment in volunteer coordinators, developing resources and good practice structures, and promoting volunteering and networks of volunteer organisations.

Through review of the available academic literature and practitioner guidance, it is clear that regardless of the challenges of preparing communities to deal with terrorist attacks, with communication, openness, trust and training, cities can be more ready to cope when the realities of terrorism reappear. Such measures will require ownership and accountability at the city level, so that strategy and direction can be agreed. This requirement underpins all other strategic recommendations set forth in this report; an umbrella is necessary to ensure the coordination and oversight of work to identify trends and drive progress.

## 4.4 Challenges for Community Preparedness and Resilience

Organisations interested in investing their time and energy into preparedness activities will want to know whether or not their approaches to building community resilience are effective. There are challenges with measuring how successful preparedness activities are, and how they influence or affect levels of resilience. Many of these challenges arise because of an absence of clarity around the appropriate level and unit of measurement for preparedness and resilience. Other challenges come in the form of questioning what type of evidence enables us to ascertain levels of preparedness and resilience, and the practical difficulties surrounding collecting such evidence.[93] These debates are yet to be effectively resolved, leaving cities with many opportunities, tools and approaches to consider. Consequently, as yet there are no formal standards for the identification of good practice.

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**Recommendation 1** ✓

Cities should consider approaches to benchmarking community preparedness activities and good practice, and as such develop methods for measuring the success of such initiatives.

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A lack of formal standards for preparedness activities to build community resilience does not preclude attempts to identify current knowledge and best practice in the field.[94] In 2018, a review of existing community resilience studies identified significant knowledge gaps and stressed that further research

was required to evaluate the link between preparedness activities and resilience. For example, whereas studies on physical infrastructure resilience exist, few studies explore the resilience of communities in terms of how they are impacted socially and economically through loss of access to physical infrastructure or infrastructure damage.

> **Programmes need to be holistic, but people-centred, tailored and prioritised towards need. This could include targeting areas that face a specific risk or threat, or community groups that have particular challenges or needs, for example social deprivation, low employment or high crime.**

When the actualisation of risk occurs less frequently, learning can be lost or forgotten.[95] Similarly, where communities lack previous exposure or experience of terrorism altogether, preparedness activities provide the opportunity for communities to learn, gain knowledge and altogether promote preparedness goals, such as instilling life-saving behaviours.[96] This reality must be coupled with the understanding that although some threats are infrequent, they are high impact when they happen.[97] It is unrealistic to expect communities to be prepared to deal with the terrorist threat when they have little to no knowledge of what to expect or what they may need to do.[98] Communication with communities then becomes a crucial aspect of any resilience agenda and preparedness programmes, no matter their size.

Although there are some studies that examine the resilience of communities following serious seismic events and the loss of utilities and homes through flooding,[99] and numerous studies assessing individual mental and physical health impacts (such as post-traumatic stress disorder) in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, there is little literature bridging the gap between preparedness activities, terrorist attacks and community resilience in the face of an attack.

Furthermore, there is limited academic evidence on how to successfully build community resilience through preparedness.[100] Therefore an area for further consideration includes the collation of data and evidence regarding the success of community preparedness initiatives. It is also important to clarify that some communities are already prepared, simply through the strength of their social capital. That is, their bonds and relationships are strong and as such they can rely on each other during difficult times. The focus in this situation then turns to studying such communities, and identifying mechanisms for building social capital that can also translate into preparedness initiatives.

Practitioners are in a unique position to recognise the communities that are coping and thriving in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, because they are close during response and recovery efforts. This includes working with the voluntary sector and faith groups to engage with communities, for example when creating memorials, managing donations, or working with family liaison officers who can provide information of those struggling.

Evidence of resilience within prepared communities can be demonstrated in the specific activities, initiatives and training of individuals in communities who then remain adaptive and flexible for future challenges.[101] Section 4 of this report provides case study-led evidence for initiatives that are helping communities be more prepared to face terrorism.

## 4.5 Convening a Community Resilience Steering Group.

Successful community preparedness programmes are typically shared by a variety of stakeholders. However, this can cause issues for identifying ownership and establishing where accountability lies for delivering on particular objectives.[102] Cities must work to harness the benefits of communities to better coordinate the response to terrorist attacks. This cannot simply be done post incident, but requires buy-in, understanding, local-level asset mapping and community engagement.

A Community Resilience Steering Group that convenes at a city-policy level can provide a platform for coordinating, delivering and monitoring community preparedness programmes. In London, this is achieved via a multi-agency forum led by local authorities, but with membership from other key partners, with an aim of identifying and capitalising on existing preparedness measures that have had a positive impact.

It is crucial that appropriate representatives are identified at local, regional and national levels who will assume responsibility for moving forward with community preparedness activities to ensure clear lines of accountability. Furthermore, community preparedness programmes must work with the right communities in the right ways. It cannot be assumed that communities are unable to identify and come together collectively to work on solving issues in their own spaces. It is arguable that the communities themselves are best placed to create solutions and problem solve, rather than being guided by a purely top-down approach. Programmes need to be holistic, but people-centred, tailored and prioritised towards need. This could include targeting areas that face a specific risk or threat, or community groups that have particular challenges or needs, for example social deprivation, low employment or high crime.

It is important that community preparedness programmes are underpinned by a clear strategy, and that they encourage combined approaches of bottom-up activity and top-down considerations. There is scope for city-wide commissioning and oversight of community needs assessments that are monitored and updated routinely, in order to inform a clear work programme and priorities. Needs assessments would allow policymakers to drive forward work, but it must be recognised that many diverse communities already exist and flourish, and cities should tap into these assets in order to use them for mutually beneficial means, especially in preparedness. Although programmes must have owners, they do not own the communities they seek to engage with, which means they need to build strong relationships and trust.

> ### Recommendation 2 ✓
>
> Cities to consider convening a Community Resilience Steering Group, or a local equivalent, at a city-policy level to coordinate, develop, deliver and monitor community preparedness programmes. This group should be responsible for identifying and mapping local community assets to channel existing strengths for preparedness activities.

# Initiatives and Experiences in Cities

**This section draws together information from the public, private and third sectors to reference case study examples of initiatives that have positively influenced and benefited the communities for which they were intended.**

As part of the research for this report, feedback was given from practitioners questionnaires on preparedness activities, with input from participating cities in the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network. This is mapped in Appendices 1–3. The case studies discussed offer transferable models that can be considered, adapted and applied by other cities according to need and expertise.

**5.1 Public Awareness Campaigns: France, Spain, Sweden and the UK**
Communications and awareness campaigns support community resilience. Findings from mapping of public sector programmes and initiatives, demonstrates that there is a focus on delivering public awareness-raising campaigns through a variety of methods, including media and print materials.

France, for example, launched a mobile phone app in 2016 to provide real-time information on how to react during an attack, sending helpful tips and a short summary of events and whether a police operation is underway. This includes a silent alert display if someone is near the scene of a terrorist attack.[103] This is a unique and modern technological approach to reaching target audiences, and such responsiveness to recommendations to improve communication with the public should be mirrored by all cities as where appropriate.

Following the 2017 Barcelona terrorist attacks, leaflets detailing typical psychological impacts of distressing events were handed out to help people identify what they might be going through. This led to 200 people calling a listed helpline for further support. During 2018, the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency distributed a booklet to every household in Sweden as part of an awareness raising initiative, aiming to improve people's ability to prepare for various situations, including a terrorist attack.

However, other cities may choose not to use campaigns of this kind if they consider it disproportionate to their current risk profile. This may be due to available intelligence; it may be imprudent to alert people to a risk when there is low likelihood of that city being targeted, and when other risks may be more prevalent. This notwithstanding, there has been a fundamental shift to accept and action recommendations to better inform the public on terrorism.

In addition to public health campaigns, European cities are also using public awareness campaigns to encourage the public to become their eyes and ears, both to prevent terrorism and to increase the likelihood that terrorist planning will be disrupted. For example, the UK "See it. Say it. Sorted." campaign encourages public vigilance and reporting on mass transit networks.[104]

**Recommendation 3**

Cities to deliver public-awareness campaigns to inform and prepare communities in counter terrorism; this should include the utilisation of social media and apps as a way to bolster the timely information exchange of correct messaging before, during and after an incident.

# 'Run. Hide. Tell' Campaign – UK

Case study 1

**Following the November 2015 Paris attacks, the UK National Police Chief's Council (NPCC) released the 'Run. Hide. Tell.' leaflet and film campaign to advise the public what to do in the event of a firearms or weapons attack.**

The London Metropolitan Police issued this guidance on social media during the 2017 London Bridge attacks and shortly afterwards released an updated version of the film for UK holidaymakers travelling abroad.[105] The campaign reached a large percentage of the population, with research showing that 26% of the UK public demonstrate spontaneous awareness of the campaign.[106] The Metropolitan Police also funded the campaign to be published through Facebook and Instagram stories, reaching a more diverse audience of one million people online.

During an experiment with Danish and UK residents, participants exposed to the 'Run. Hide. Tell.' film and leaflet campaign materials showed increased likelihood to adopt the recommended safety behaviours, and reduced likelihood of intended risky behaviours, such as calling the mobile phone of someone who might be hiding.[107] This experiment proved the potential for pre-event public awareness campaigns to save lives, where people understand what they should do to help themselves, prior to the arrival of first responders. This research also found that pre-event communication increased trust in police advice and security services but did not increase the perceived risk from terrorism. This is important because some EU countries have been reluctant to distribute such information out of concern that it would increase fear among the public.[108]

"Effective public communication has been shown to encourage appropriate protective actions from at-risk populations, reassure individuals who are not directly at risk by reducing rumours and fears, facilitate relief efforts, and maintain public trust and confidence in the agencies responsible for ensuring the welfare of the public."

# '#30Days30Ways' – UK

**#30Days30Ways is a month-long UK campaign to boost personal resilience and preparedness for individuals of all ages. This simple and empowering concept was developed by the Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency in Vancouver, Washington, and has been running since 2010.**

In the UK, the Northamptonshire County Council Emergency Planning Team piloted the concept in 2015 and it has been gaining momentum ever since. Following a successful run in 2016, a new, evidence-based framework is now in place. It is entirely non-profit and voluntary, run by dedicated professionals who are coordinated through Resilience Forums. Partnership engagement includes the emergency services, health services, as well as local celebrities.

The programme is based on a bingo-type game play with daily challenges or activities throughout. It is aimed towards a younger generation who are reachable online, heavily utilising social media, primarily Twitter. It includes information and activities on flooding, power cuts, mental health, giving blood and pandemics, but crucially also reiterates the 'Run. Hide. Tell.' campaign in the context of terrorism. This includes a mini-drill, encouraging the public to familiarise themselves with two quick exit and hide places in places they often go to. Questions include, "Which exits/hide locations did you chose and why?", with players encouraged to comment or post to share their story using the #30days30waysUK hashtag.

This is a creative and accessible way of raising awareness of risks that the public face. The #30Days30Ways campaign brings partners together in a way that messaging can be combined to benefit more participating agencies. Agencies have demonstrated their ability to implement public education campaigns about specific risks including fire safety and crime, but this campaign moves further than that, taking a holistic partnership approach to community preparedness that combines assets in order to strengthen campaigning.

**51**

people killed in the
Christchurch attacks

**1.5m**

videos removed by
Facebook relating to
Christchurch attacks

**5.2 Use of Social Media**

Another aspect of community preparedness is that communities are engaged with public services to ensure that people are supported and well advised. Evidence supports the use of social media as an aid to building community preparedness by connecting and informing people from various walks of life.[109] It has been emphasised that in an emergency situation, social media supports the dissemination of official messaging, expanding its circulation and outreach to diverse communities.

Taking into account the instant and intense participation of social media users following terrorist attacks, social media enables communities and individuals, to witness incidents, play a primary role in the production and construction of media content, and self-organise to support, commentate and express emotions.[110] This reinforces the transformative power of social media; it can both help and hinder official response efforts.[111]

Recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated that footage may not only be uploaded to social media platforms but livestreamed during attacks. For example, on 15 March 2019, 51 people were killed and another 49 injured during terrorist attacks at the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. These were the deadliest mass shootings in modern New Zealand's history and the attack was partially live-streamed on Facebook. Facebook has since said that it had removed 1.5 million videos of the attack in the first 24 hours.

Such footage, which has been used in inquests and trials as evidence on several occasions, presents many negative challenges, especially for survivors and those bereaved who attend such inquests. The public may speculate, point the finger and blame through social media platforms whether there is available footage or not.

> **It is no longer reasonable to stand by and hope that the public will wait patiently for information from officials. Responders, public authorities and government departments must acknowledge that where insufficient information is provided, people will instantly look elsewhere for sources, whether they are credible or not; they will look to what is accessible in real-time.**

The online circulation of videos can exacerbate these issues, which has in the past led to an increase in hate crime, copycat attacks and the glorification of perpetrators.[112] Emergency responders and public authorities must be prepared to inform the public in order to engage and support them, maintain and where necessary rebuild public trust. It is also important to communicate the potential unintended negative consequences of sharing distressing footage on social media or circulating unsubstantiated information about the attackers.

Although the Christchurch example demonstrates the serious negative consequences of the misuse of social media in response to terrorism, there are benefits that can be harnessed. For instance London has established a London Resilience Communication Group which supports the view that social media is a significant tool for reaching and informing a diverse public. Similarly, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has recommended action through social media to counter negative influence activities such as speculation and stereotyping specifically through the advanced building of networks to ensure that accurate messages are circulated to the necessary people.

# The We Stand Together Movement – UK

**Findings mapped through collaboration with the third sector (see Appendix 4), demonstrate that there is a drive towards awareness raising through social media sources and print materials, with the aim to promote preparedness.**

For example, a charity called the Peace Foundation launched the We Stand Together movement following the Westminster Bridge terrorist attack. This campaign sought to unite communities in positive action, building community cohesion and celebrating diversity in the face of those who perpetuate hateful ideologies.

The campaign reached approximately 50,000 people on social media through diverse communication and outreach methods. The successful outreach to so many people through this movement further emphasised the impact social media can bring to sharing communications and uniting communities. This is vital to repairing any social cohesion issues that so often accompany terrorist attacks, bringing people from multiple communities together as one in standing against terrorism, rather than standing against one another.



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# #OpenStockholm – Sweden
Case study 4

**Following the truck attack in Stockholm in 2017, the city was placed on lockdown until the perpetrator could be found. This included the closing down of all public transport, along with shopping centres and Swedish Parliament.[113]**

Stockholm's emergency planners realised early on that people would need temporary accommodation and opened a number of temporary rest centres which they then communicated to the public online and via social media. This served as an inspiration to the public and residents in Stockholm started offering their homes as a place of refuge through Twitter. Using the hashtag #OpenStockholm from a regular Twitter user, more than 40,000 original tweets were published to help monitor and coordinate support efforts from the public.

Thanks to the public's commitment, initiative and organisational ability, the effect of the city's message went far beyond expectations. This is a positive example of crowd-enabled collective action, with an online community self-organising to support the official response and mitigate some of the chaos that ensues after terrorist attacks. It also shows a need for emergency planners and those responsible for the official response to highlight areas where the public can help.

It is no longer reasonable to stand by and hope that the public will wait patiently for information from officials. Responders, public authorities and bodies and government departments must acknowledge that where insufficient information is provided, people will instantly look elsewhere for sources, whether they are credible or not; they will look to what is accessible in real time. Well-embedded preparedness measures such as outreach on social media can build trust and "presence" for officials that can be utilised when terror attacks occur. An uninformed public cannot be self-reliant and ready to respond. Pre-established networks are key to engendering mutual trust and readiness, and many online communities already exist, such as faith-related social media groups and community family pages that are area-specific.

Enhancing community preparedness can be done best in this manner when officials and organisations access and build on current online assets.



> **Cities should seek to explore how partnerships can continue and evolve, assessing the skills and capabilities that other sectors offer and involve them in the various stages of planning, responding and recovering from terrorist attacks.**

Work must then be done to ensure that where social media is listed as a communications tool for public officials, there are processes in place for the construction, sign-off and dissemination of messaging that can reach a wide audience and harness assets of communities where feasible. It is crucial that this is done in a timely manner, as the public will seek other sources of information where it is not available from officials. This can also affect people's faith

and confidence in public services, organisations and government and, potentially, how likely they are to stick to official guidance as a consequence.[114] It could be that contacts are sourced in advance, for example with the leaders of diverse organisations. These contacts can then be used to disseminate warning and informing messages among their community contacts, to ensure the message reaches every end user.

### 5.3 Building Networks and Partnerships: London, Paris and Stockholm

Developing and maintaining relationships with organisations from other sectors has also been noted as an important element in building community preparedness, and are fostered through memorandums of understanding, community-based events and the formation of networks. Research has identified the direct benefits to communities through cross-sector partnerships in emergency management. For example, in response to the coordinated terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, the city created a "central single desk" (a one-stop shop) managed by a specialised non-governmental organisation for psychological

assistance, paperwork, insurance, housing, schooling, etc. This process was available longer term and it had a very positive impact.

Secondary stressors to recovery, such as low employment or high crime, including limited services, can have a negative impact on recovery after terrorist attacks. Any initiative that can draw services together in a centralised and more accessible way can reduce the stress on individuals and communities that are struggling to know where to go and to have their needs addressed. This does not mean that centralised initiatives do not carry challenges, but that the outcomes for the public themselves are likely to be better with proper planning, funding and collaboration.

Cities should seek to explore how partnerships can continue and evolve, assessing the skills and capabilities that other sectors offer and involve them in the various stages of planning, responding and recovering from terrorist attacks. This can include memorandums of understanding with the third sector, closer working with the private sector, and utilising the public in volunteering capacities.

Following the London Westminster Bridge terror attack in 2017, practitioner debriefs and feedback revealed that more engagement with businesses was needed, and that the business community needs timely and accurate information in emergencies. Where there is a strong desire to utilise the public as an active and critically useful stakeholder in emergency preparedness and response, similar effort must be taken to engage with the business sector. Such business networks are illustrated as a primary element and asset in supporting community preparedness.

There is evidence to suggest that the private sector can more effectively contribute to counter terrorism efforts with the support of public sector partnerships.[115] If maintained, these partnerships have significant benefits before, during and after an attack, which can strengthen community preparedness.

Findings from mapping of the private sector show a consistent trend that training and exercising is available for business, partners and the public in relation to counter terrorism, but this may not be as regular or as far-reaching as is necessary. The UK's National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) has developed a number of counter terrorism training and exercising initiatives for the private sector that seek to reduce an organisation's vulnerability to a terrorist attack, informing them of what to do and how to recover more quickly.[116] These tools are ultimately designed to help the economy to recover faster because businesses are encouraged to have continuity measures in place and may rely less on support from public services. It is evident through practitioner questionnaires that these packages are well received and used throughout a range of organisations in the UK, but it would seem that there is more work to be done to reach all partners and embed advice.

Nevertheless, there are areas of private sector preparedness that are lacking. For example, the lack of security guards in the private sector has been noted as a "significant gap in counter terrorism preparedness."[117] Targets such as hotels, transport hubs, restaurants, nightclubs and events are regularly selected by those aspiring to commit acts of terrorism, and as such the role of those immediate 'first responders' must not be downplayed. Not only can guards help identify reconnaissance activities and suspicious behaviour, which is the primary message of many public-facing police campaigns such as 'See it. Say it. Sorted.', but they are in a unique position to respond to incidents at tourism hotspots.[118] The public are also likely to report things to the private sector as well as to the police. For example, when they need help or see something suspicious, their first point of call is often the first employee they encounter, who may not necessarily have received security training.[119]

> **Where there is a strong desire to utilise the public as an active and critically useful stakeholder in emergency preparedness and response, similar effort must be taken to engage with the business sector.**

Furthermore, while standing guard at high-profile targets such as sporting events or hotel lobbies, security staff can provide immediate assistance. For example, in 9/11, 42 security guards died bravely helping thousands to get to safety before the towers collapsed.[120] They have a thorough knowledge of the buildings and surroundings that they guard, and many are first aid trained and have the response skills to support evacuations and lockdowns. Case study 5 demonstrates how

Stockholm has recognised and tapped into security personnel as a counter terrorism resource.

The creation of networks both physical and virtual can be seen throughout the private sector. A successful initative in the UK is the Cross-sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) hub, a partnership between law-enforcement agencies, local and national government organisations and private sector businesses. CSSC aims to help businesses remain safe and secure by providing information through a mass-messaging system that will assist them to develop their own robust resilience and emergency-preparedness plans. Not only does bringing these businesses together create networks, but it also encourages businesses to take some accountability for their own recovery, which stregthens the resilience of business communities.

Third sector organisations have also actively sought to build their networks by engaging with communities through multiple channels, including projects that seek to empower communities to help each other and provide support to public services during emergencies, engaging faith networks and local services. Numerous volunteer networks and reserve programmes can be found that are led by third sector organisations.

# Enhanced Cooperation between the Private Security Sector and Police – Stockholm

Case study 5

**Following the Drottninggatan truck attack in Stockholm in 2017, the private security sector has been recognised as an important resource that could be better utilised. Consequently, several initiatives have been developed and implemented.**

One such initiative included the police educating all the guards within the public transport sector and the city centre on how to respond to an act of terrorism and how to read the situation etc. In an operational capacity, the command centres (police and private security sector) have been directly connected and their radio systems integrated so that they can benefit from fast, reliable and uninterrupted communication flow.



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# West End Security Group – London

Case study 6

**The West End Security Group (WESG) brings together six Business Improvement Districts and six of the large estate owners in the West End of London to improve the ability of its members to react to and recover from a terrorist or major security incident.**

WESG has developed an ongoing programme of work that focuses on enhancing the capacity of the business community to deal with the terrorist threat by encouraging and improving cooperation and collaboration with counter terrorism initiatives. This includes business continuity measures and reporting on suspicious behaviour. Its work also highlights that working in conjunction with other sectors can develop and deliver strong initiatives.

WESG has established a close and integral partnership working with the police and local council, as well as key non-governmental organisations. The group has been very successful in developing and delivering a series of initiatives on security and training to staff. It has plans to grow its membership to ensure that training reaches more colleagues and that information relating to security issues is shared as widely as possible. Such work arguably helps to create and strengthen the businesses networks, or communities, and help build social capital and trust among colleagues from different organisations.



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## 2.3m

UK households are part of Neighbourhood Watch crime-prevention movement

The Octopus Community Network is a model that could be rolled out on a city scale, linking existing community hubs to create a wide network of shared resources. The network would also provide a way to strengthen social cohesion, which has previously been recognised as a method to enhance resilience within active networks.[122]

### Recommendation 4 ✓

Cities to identify, develop and strengthen partnerships among the public, private and third sectors, involving a wide representation of organisations in preparedness activities; this can include advocating for businesses to join together to create individual partnerships and ties within the business community.

### 5.4 Public Engagement and Volunteering: Barcelona, Paris and San Francisco

There are many benefits to engaging the public before and after terrorist attacks, using day-to-day issues that matter to them in order to better prepare them to respond to terrorist attacks. For example, Neighbourhood Watch is a crime-prevention movement that encompasses 2.3 million UK households. This national network is supported by the police and Home Office and aims to create safer neighbourhoods, where active community members are vigilant to antisocial behaviour and crime, and are familiar with the appropriate reporting mechanisms to law enforcement. This network deals with day-to-day issues of crime,

but also provides a mechanism for local community to report suspicious behaviour that could be related to terrorism.

**In complex urban environments, it is the development of networks through existing community hubs and businesses that may serve as anchors within often transient populations.**

Examples of how engagement with the public can lead to positive contribution includes the "We Love Manchester" fund, which was established by the Lord Mayor of Manchester's charity in response to the public's desire to help, support and contribute to those affected

in the arena bombing. It provided an accountable and secure fund into which the public could make donations, which has since developed into a charity.

The importance of engaging with and using the support of volunteers, through reserve schemes and community centres, has been recognised in the public sector. City-wide schemes such as Team London[123] seek to create active citizens and bring communities together through multiple volunteering opportunities. The City of Paris is developing a city-wide volunteer initiative, to train groups of citizens to be able to respond to natural and social crises. It has been identified that in times of crisis individuals actively offer assistance.

A city-wide volunteer scheme that is tailored to be activated in times of crisis could be a way of enabling a structured volunteer response. Regular communications, as well as training and exercising, would be a necessary part of the scheme to guarantee communities stay engaged, informed and valued.

This type of initiative would be directly relevant to increasing the preparedness of communities.

Cities whose residents are prepared for a terrorist attack will be able to achieve more than those cities whose citizens are uninformed and unprepared. One way to help develop community preparedness is to provide not only risk information and guidance, but also training. Although the public play a vital role in providing first aid during emergencies, intervention is only effective when the public have the skills, confidence and willingness to help.[124]

For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) of the US has been running the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) programme since 1993. FEMA has to this point trained 600,000 volunteers and works with more than 2,700 programmes across all states to build a culture of preparedness. The focus is on consistent, nationwide volunteer training that gives professional responders confidence in the ability of these community members during an emergency.

Furthermore, to assist with enhancing community connectedness and build preparedness, cities could create an inclusive online community-preparedness hub. The hub could provide a route for individuals to sign up for alerts, access training and locate information on local assets and resources. It could also be used to register as a volunteer and provide information regarding skill sets, as well as to advertise upcoming community events, initiatives and programmes. The hub would also provide a way of gathering information for use in emergency and social planning work.

A finding from San Francisco 72, or SF72[125], is that in complex urban environments, it is the development of networks through existing community hubs and businesses that may serve as anchors within often transient populations. The creation

of a community preparedness hub for the city could bring together and bolster community networks, whether this is an online hub, or a series of 'open days' that bring people together each year specifically for preparedness. Academic literature has found that communities lacking in existing community networks will find it more challenging to respond to stresses and recover.[126]

The British Red Cross have developed a range of free training materials relevant to enhancing resilience in a counter terrorism context in its "Emergencies and Disasters" and "First Aid" packages, aimed at primary and secondary education.[127] This report endorses the continuation of third sector organisations working with the education system, as well as maintenance and development of partnerships with other public and private sector organisations.

First aid knowledge is directly relevant to the preparedness of a community in a counter terrorism context and the utilisation of advanced technology to access training is an area to expand. The success of the apps developed by the British Red Cross at providing first aid knowledge and assisting in preparing for emergencies further supports this.

The Octopus Community Network is a registered charity and partnership of community centres in the London Borough of Islington.

The Network is focused on the development of community centres as hubs within the community, which can provide a variety of services and facilities targeted to the diverse needs of the community (Octopus Communities Network, 2012).[121]

Core values and principles are shared across the network, facilitating strategic thinking and peer-to-peer support, as well as encouraging collaboration and improving community cohesion. Octopus Communities share five goals, to engage, inspire, motivate, equip and support. This is a unique network that proactively enhances community preparedness through the creation and maintenance of networks across the borough. This network could be engaged as one that could provide emergency centres for survivors to gather or drop-in information centres in response to terrorist attacks in communities. These hubs are multi-purpose; they would be familiar and probably comfortable for communities to gather, and furthermore they could coordinate donations – as some community centres did after the Grenfell Tower Fire in London in 2017 – or become designated spaces for vigils.



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# We Love Manchester Communities Fund

Case study 8



The We Love Manchester Stronger Communities Fund provided funding for initiatives designed to bring communities together to celebrate diversity and help build stronger relationships in and across those communities.

This was a creative way of harnessing the financial contributions to help those affected. The title of the campaign sends a message, highlighting that people love Manchester and were actively looking to support the city. The campaign is proof that the people came together in a unified manner to face what had happened and help Greater Manchester to recover, demonstrating a sense of community and collective responsibility to help.

# Online Preparedness Hub – San Francisco

Case study 9



Developed by the San Francisco Department of Emergency Management (DEM), SF72 is an online hub for emergency preparedness and community building.

The hub provides information about what to do in an emergency; steps to get connected and useful guides to help individuals become prepared. The DEM also provides an emergency text alert service, AlertSF, which members of the community can sign up to receive alerts regarding emergencies.

SF72 highlights that during a serious emergency, services within the city will be impacted and advises that individuals should be able to be self-sufficient for 72 hours. SF72 encourages San Franciscans to connect prior to an emergency, so that in the event of an emergency these existing networks will provide support allowing communities to be better off. During an emergency the hub will provide real-time information on official updates, crowdsourced reports and a crisis map to navigate city resources. The services and platforms provide the capability to build up a community and encourages a culture of preparedness amongst

# First Aid Training – Paris
Case study 10

Following the November 2015 attacks in Paris, thousands of citizens actively requested first aid training to allow them to respond in the event of a crisis.

In response, the programme "Paris qui Sauve", or "Paris Saves", was developed by the City of Paris, in partnership with the Paris Fire Brigade, Public Hospitals of Paris, French Red Cross and Paris Civil Protection, which provided the trainers.

> It is estimated that 10,000 lives could be saved yearly if 20% of French citizens received the training, which provides basic emergency response skills.

The programme holds flagship events including "Saturday that Saves" and "All Young People Have Heart". The latter provides young Parisians aged nine to 11 with free first aid training on a specific day in the year. "Saturday that Saves" helps people to learn free first aid in one of the 20 town halls involved. They register to attend.

It is estimated that 10,000 lives could be saved yearly if 20% of French citizens received the training, which provides basic emergency response skills. Since its launch in 2016, approximately 50,000 citizens have been trained in life-saving skills. The scheme has also facilitated the deployment of 400 defibrillators in public facilities throughout the city, in large parks and banks.



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# International Federation of the Red Cross Apps

Case study 11

The International Federation of the Red Cross has created a collection of free apps to assist with learning first aid skills and preparing for emergencies, and these are available for multiple countries worldwide to download.

Their first aid app teaches the user first aid skills and how to prepare for emergency situations. There are five sections to the app: Learn, Prepare, Emergency, Test and Info. First aid skills are presented clearly, in a format that makes learning easy and covers a range of situations, as well as frequently asked questions on 18 everyday scenarios. Learning is facilitated by step-by-step instructions, animations and videos.

Tips on how to prepare for common emergency situations are covered, including terrorism, along with a checklist and useful tips to follow. The interactive quizzes allow users to test their knowledge and earn achievement badges. All information is contained within the app,

meaning the user will not need an internet connection to access material. Since its launch it has reached more than 100,000 downloads.

The emergency app enables users to prepare and recover for emergencies with clear and practical advice for a variety of emergency situations including crowd incidents, flooding, pandemic and terrorist attacks. The app will notify the user with real-time, emergency alerts tailored to the specific areas they have selected, as well as allowing them to add people they care about to each area. Users in the UK, for example, will receive updates containing information from the Met Office, Environment Agency (England only) and the current UK terrorism threat level, and it enables users to send an "I'm safe" notification to friends and family. It provides advice on how to stay safe before, during and after an emergency, and offers advice on mental and physical recovery. Since its launch it has reached over a million downloads.

A recommendation from the Kerslake Arena Review was for the government to increase its support for public first-aid training programmes, including those for children and young people.[128] The UK Government and the Swedish National Board of Education have both recognised the significance of first aid and CPR training. From September 2020, this training will be added to the primary and secondary school curriculum in England[129], and Sweden has decided that the training is to become mandatory from the youngest classes (six years) and then repeated up to 15 years of age. It has been found that individuals who have received training are approximately three times more likely to perform CPR if required.[130] Therefore, training in these skills should be widely available to communities to enhance their preparedness in helping to respond in times of crisis. It may be possible that funding is made available initially to those community groups, schools or organisations who want to participate in first aid training.

To support the use of first aid skills by the public and business, the City of London Police launched a scheme providing emergency trauma packs to prominent buildings and businesses in the City of London. This initiative started as a result of terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017. Since civilians are often the first on scene, having the necessary tools could allow them to take life-saving action in an emergency. Each pack costs £450 and is maintained by the host businesses. Moreover, a free app (citizenAID) was launched alongside, to provide the public with guidance that they can follow to treat life-threatening injuries in a deliberate attack. However, the training itself can only go so far in the absence of life-saving equipment, such as haemorrhage bandages, therefore investment is needed to provide capability for the public to make a difference.

> **Individuals who have received training are approximately three times more likely to perform CPR if required.**

A public engagement initiative was established to work better with communities and manage the specific welfare needs of a population in Barcelona. Following significant "psychological first aid" needs, emotional management resource workshops were created to support those potentially affected by the terrorist attacks. This initiative highlights the importance of caring for people's mental health following a terrorist attack. Research has established the need to alleviate fear and anxiety of communities during a terrorist attack.[131] At-risk cities should consider both developing a workshop that is ready to be rolled out following a terrorist attack, and

running emotional-management workshops throughout the year to provide communities with information on recognising the signs of emotional distress within themselves.

The workshops could outline what symptoms they could experience, and furthermore that some of these reactions are not extreme, but normal and expected when exposed to extreme events. Emotional coping mechanisms that can be called on in the case of a terrorist attack would be explained, and signposting to further avenues of help would be available. It could be that this is a subsection of a first aid training programme, reaching a larger audience with first aid training, as well as emotional self-reliance and readiness. Cities should consider how the third sector can be utilised in the delivery of these workshops.

## Recommendation 5 ✓

**Cities to consider the introduction of public first-aid training programmes and volunteering schemes, including the introduction of mandatory, or "opt-in" first aid training within primary and secondary education.**

This should be done through collaboration with third sector organisations; schemes and training should take place regularly at different locations. This training could also include a sub-section on psychological support of distress in response to terrorist attacks.

## Recommendation 6 ✓

**Cities to consider creating coordinated online Preparedness Hubs, where communities can come together to access information and resources, as well as be coordinated for volunteering.**

Individuals can sign up for alerts, access training and find information regarding local assets and resources. Cities may also facilitate the connection of existing community hubs to create a wide network of shared resources.

# Emotional Management Resource Workshops – Barcelona

Case study 12

**Following the attacks in Barcelona on 17 August 2017, the Unit of Attention and Evaluation of those Affected by Terrorism (UAVAT) was created.**

The UAVAT is composed of psychologists and professionals who are experts in the care of victims of terrorist actions and major emergencies. The UAVAT focuses on delivering constant support and providing an active resource to offer advice and assistance to those affected, with the support of the Barcelona City Hall.

Four months after the Barcelona attacks, the City Council of Barcelona commissioned UAVAT to provide emotional management resource workshops to the population. The workshops consisted of psycho-educational groups to share the emotional situation of those affected by the terrorist attack.

Prior to attending the workshops, individuals undertook a telephone interview to ensure they attended a group with the same level of connection to the attacks. In addition to providing attendees with a way to discuss their emotional mindset, the workshops were used as a way to detect those most affected and refer them to specialised mental health services.

# Conclusion

**Considering the academic research, practitioner information and case studies reviewed, there are a number of preparedness measures that could be implemented by cities in order to prepare residents for the effects of terrorism.**

This report has discussed the practicalities of using warning and informing campaigns such as 'Run. Hide. Tell.' in order to provide the information for citizens to help themselves during terrorist attacks. The quick development and roll-out of first aid programmes in Paris has seen thousands of citizens given life-saving skills that can be used day-to-day, as well as during possible terrorist attacks.

There is evidence to demonstrate that the public play an important role in an effective counter terrorism response, and can actively participate in response and support efforts. This requires organisations such as the development of the We Love Manchester Fund Charity to financially support survivors and the bereaved following a bombing, and the use of Twitter to orchestrate support for people trapped in Stockholm following a city-wide lockdown after a terrorist attack. This latter example indicates how valuable social media can be in connecting people to unite against terrorism.

It is clear that information sharing is key in order to have an equipped and prepared community, and this requires openness in communications and dialogue relating to the terrorist threat. Such information is the foundation for all preparedness, so that the public are as much of a stakeholder as public bodies and private and third sector partners. Although no single medium will reach all individuals and communities, consistent messaging through multiple channels will reach a wide audience. Any existing networks form a platform of connectedness that can be engaged and influenced to reduce demand on services and encourage community support of one another.

It is nevertheless recognised that there is limited public demand for the promotion of readiness before an emergency owing to the myriad of other day-to-day concerns that the public face. However, if officials can engage with communities on everyday issues, the same platforms will stand ready for utilisation prior to, during and after terror attacks. Communities do not necessarily know their local risks and any initiatives or activities must be designed to address this.

**Given the ongoing threat of terrorism faced by cities, it is imperative that effort and investment is given to enhancing community preparedness, so that in the face of an attack, residents will be better able to react, respond, and recover.**

Agencies with a stake in resilience have demonstrated their ability to implement public-education campaigns about specific risks such as terrorism or crime reduction.

However, a sustained and holistic approach to community resilience is yet to be seen.

A city-wide community preparedness hub could serve as a way to bring people together and address the complexities of not just terrorism, but the many risks facing cities today.

The recommendations stated in this report will require funding and promotion, as well as policy and community buy-in. Increasing community preparedness will take time and sustained effort, and success may not be obvious or measurable in a short time period. It will be a governance challenge to develop mechanisms for monitoring, measureing success. Nonetheless, given the ongoing threat of terrorism faced by cities, it is imperative that effort and investment is given to enhancing community preparedness so that in the face of an attack residents will be better able to react, respond, and recover.

## Strategic Recommendations: Enhancing Community Preparedness

**1**    Cities should consider approaches to benchmarking community preparedness activities and good practice, and as such develop methods for measuring the success of such initiatives.

**2**    Cities to consider convening a Community Resilience Steering Group, or a local equivalent, at a city-policy level to coordinate, develop, deliver and monitor community-preparedness programmes. This group should be responsible for identifying and mapping local community assets to channel existing strengths for preparedness activities.

**3**    Cities to deliver public-awareness campaigns to inform and prepare communities in counter terrorism; this should include the utilisation of social media and apps as a way to bolster the timely information exchange of correct messaging before, during and after an incident.

**4**    Cities to identify, develop and strengthen partnerships among the public, private and third sectors, involving a wide represenation of organisations in preparedness activities.

**5**    Cities to consider the introduction of public first aid training programmes and volunteering schemes, including the introduction of mandatory, or opt-in first aid training within primary and secondary education.

**6**    Cities to consider creating coordinated online Preparedness Hubs, where communities can come together to access information and resources, as well as be coordinated for volunteering.

# Appendix 1: The Manifestation of Community Resilience

**Figure 1** The Manifestation of Community Resilience



Figure 1 offers a strategic illustration of the positioning of sectors (top-down) in relation to community engagement (bottom-up).

# Appendix 2: Public Sector Mapping

**Figure 2** Public sector links into community preparedness

# Appendix 3: Private Sector Mapping

**Figure 3** Private sector links into community preparedness

# Appendix 4: Third Sector Mapping

**Figure 4** Third sector links into community preparedness

# 7 Acknowledgements

The CTPN partnering cities of Greater Manchester, Paris, Rotterdam, Stockholm and Barcelona

London Community Resilience Steering Group

London Resilience Business Sector Panel

London Voluntary Sector Panel

London Prevent Network

Robert Hall, Resilience First

Marianne Mandujano, London Borough of Hounslow

Michael Wood, Monarda Solutions Ltd

Sharon Long, Partnership for Young London

Ola Slettenmark, County Administrative Board in Stockholm, Sweden

Sonja Weigl and Caitlin James, London Resilience Group

100 Resilient Cities

Communities Prepared National Group (CPNG)

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