

Anti-Radicalisation Report 2019

First Edition



About Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network

What we do

CTPN brings together strategic leaders, practitioners and academics to inform city-level policies and practices that build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism.

Why we do it

The threat from terrorism has not diminished, rather it has become more complex. Cities that develop strategic arrangements and explore policy design and implementation in an integrated manner can use this as a lever in developing resilience against terrorism.

How we do it

CTPN promotes dialogue, the sharing of practices and experiences, and provides a means of developing new approaches to counter terrorism, as well as the strategic preparedness and response arrangements of cities in this context.



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About us in numbers

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Member cities

12

Resilience leaders

7

Academic partners

7

Independent experts

Member cities




Barcelona



Greater Manchester



London



Paris



Rotterdam



Stockholm

Welcome to CTPN's first edition report on Anti-Radicalisation.

In this report you will learn about exciting and innovative initiatives from other cities across the globe and be presented with strategic recommendations to consider for your own city.

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The complex and changing nature of terrorism requires innovative and collaborative solutions at a city-level. Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN) enables cities to work together across borders to counter terrorism through the holistic lens of preparedness and resilience.

As a part of this, five first edition reports have been developed by CTPN to dive into pertinent areas of counter terrorism. They examine current counter terrorism initiatives from across the globe, delve into academic discussions, share learning and analysis, and offer strategic leaders and policy-makers recommendations that aim to build resilience to keep our cities and communities safe from terrorism.

This report focuses on the challenge of radicalisation and has identified the following key findings:

Involve communities in the integration process from the start

Challenge inaccurate perceptions and promote credible voices to ease community tensions

Consider the non-minority viewpoint by **engaging** all members of society

Map social sentiment to better understand community grievances and inform policy development

Design city policy **holistically** to avoid unintended consequences and displacement of issues

Normalise the discussion

Support **multi-agency** working

Initiatives from across the globe



Barcelona

Anti-Rumour Network

Offices for Non-Discrimination

Plan to Combat Islamophobia



Greater Manchester

RADEQUAL

Community Safety Partnership



Kungälv

The Tolerance Project



London

London Tigers

Mayor's Countering Violent Extremism Programme

#London is Open

Tell MAMA



International

The Redirect Method

Intercultural Cities

ISD Hate Mapping Tool

SCN Local Prevention Networks



Paris

Paris Pact to Combat Extreme Exclusion

Sens Critique



Rotterdam

Safety Houses

WEsociety



Stockholm

Regional Coordinator Against Violent Extremism

EXIT Fryshuset

Methodology

To produce this report, we engaged with academics, subject matter experts and practitioners in London and internationally, sent out a survey to CTPN cities, undertook a literature review and desktop research, and held three working groups.



Interviews



Literature review



Surveys

Radicalisation towards extremism is a complex and evolving process.

This report focuses on the extent to which city policy, and how it is put into operation, positively or negatively affects the vulnerability of individuals or communities to the radicalisation process.

The objective of this report is to illustrate how city policymakers can address some of the key challenges of radicalisation. This report examines how city authorities can support this process by working in a more informed way to view anti-radicalisation through a holistic systems context.

Specifically, this report focuses on polarisation and isolation as possible contributing factors in the radicalisation process, and examines the notion that community engagement and integration are key to reducing these vulnerability factors. Within this context, The European Radicalisation Awareness Network defines polarisation as:

“A thought construct, based on assumptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ identities. In a process of polarisation, the dominant and active narrative is about the perceived (and often exaggerated) differences and simplistic narratives about the others. There is a neglect of what the ‘us’ and ‘them’ might have in common. Polarisation therefore shows itself in negative thoughts and attitudes towards other groups, which could result in growing hostility and segregation. Ultimately this could lead to situations in which intolerance slips into hate speech and even hate crime. In such an environment, some (parts) of groups or individuals can radicalise towards violent extremism and terrorism. Recruiting for an extremist ideology is much more successful if there are susceptible

groups who feel their group and identity is being insulted and even threatened.”¹

Forms of community engagement and social integration are often seen as the answer to the issues of polarisation and isolation by policymakers.² There is also growing support for such initiatives by the public; for instance, the Mayor of London’s recent report on Countering Violent Extremism highlighted that “two-thirds of Londoners see strong integrated communities as effective in reducing the risk of extremism, hate crime and terrorism”.³

Where cities are able to explore policy design and implementation in an integrated manner, more value can be gained from similar levels of investment.

Although this report will outline a number of noteworthy initiatives in place that seek to address radicalisation, the way in which cities tackle the issue of polarised communities is becoming increasingly pertinent as research has shown some approaches can prove counter-productive.⁴ There are cases where community engagement has caused certain groups to feel targeted or marginalised, increasing the very conditions the initiatives were attempting to ease in the first place.⁵ Furthermore, some well-intentioned initiatives can cause individuals or communities who are not included in policy to feel “left behind” and this can increase grievances and community tensions.⁶

That is why this report will recommend that cities view social integration with a wide-angle lens inclusive of all within a city, and co-design policies with communities. It will argue that whether specific or broad, the development of any city policy should consider not only the ‘at-risk’ individual or groups, but

the extent to which the policy will impact the lives of other individuals and groups within the complex city system. There is no suggestion that by simply adapting one specific policy, that enough momentum will be generated to influence positive and widespread change in communities and cities. Rather that by considering policies simultaneously to cover issues holistically, and viewing key concepts more broadly, cities may begin to see a greater impact from anti-radicalisation initiatives.

This report will draw from discoveries made and advanced in the work of the Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities initiative that bear witness to the complex dynamics of city policy and the extent to which policy positions in one thematic area can have unintended consequences across other areas of policy-making that can serve to both magnify and/or neutralise intended benefits. In areas outside of violent extremism the 100 Resilient Cities programme has been able to demonstrate that where cities are able to explore policy design and implementation in an integrated manner, more value can be gained from similar levels of investment. This approach primarily focuses on increasing interdepartmental awareness of objectives and challenges: thinking more creatively about how resources are deployed and engendering a greater sense of shared goals.

Finally, this report outlines case studies that portray how cities are tackling these complex and evolving issues, as well as suggesting further points for consideration and improvement. It will do this by reviewing existing literature on radicalisation, polarisation and isolation, before progressing to map current approaches to anti-radicalisation through a series of case studies. The report will then highlight some key issues in anti-radicalisation followed by strategic recommendations of how cities can address them at a city-policy level.



Any discussions around terrorism, radicalisation or extremism come with a number of possible definitions or interpretations of those terms.

The research and engagement conducted during this project has indicated that a consensus of terminology and definitions are vital to successful collaboration among policymakers as will be discussed later in this report. A number of key terms are outlined below.

3.1 Radicalisation

Like many words in the study of terrorism, radicalisation is contested. Nasser-Eddine et al. noted that “about the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process. Beyond that there is considerable variation as to make existing research incomparable”.⁷ A common view of the term is that it is the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups.⁸ However, not all definitions or perceptions of radicalisation or radical ideas relate specifically to terrorism. This report acknowledges that not all forms of radicalisation, nor the act of holding radical ideas, are always detrimental in themselves. For instance Manchester’s RADEQUAL programme of community engagement focuses on rethinking the collective understanding of prejudice, hate and extremism by tackling a range of factors played out in communities and neighbourhoods.⁹ Instead this report, when mentioning radicalisation, focuses specifically on forms of radicalisation that lead to violent extremism, and acts of, or support for terrorism, and which threaten the peace and stability of European cities. This report

deliberately acknowledges the importance of viewing radicalisation and terrorism as encompassing emerging extreme far-right and white supremacy ideologies.

3.2 Anti-Radicalisation

Just as the term radicalisation is contested, it stands to reason that the term “anti-radicalisation” is just as challenging to define. There are many terms used to describe the process of stopping, preventing, halting or countering violent extremist behaviour and the radicalisation process. This report uses the term ‘anti-radicalisation’ to encompass any and all initiatives and programmes and policies that seek to either prevent and/or counter the process of radicalisation as defined above.

The term vulnerability is not used within this report to imply that individuals or communities possess any predisposition to violent extremism or weakness by being vulnerable.

3.3 Vulnerability

It is important to state that the term vulnerability is not used within this report to imply that individuals or communities possess any predisposition to violent extremism or weakness by being vulnerable. The United Nation’s Office for Disaster Risk Reduction¹⁰ defines vulnerability as “the conditions determined by physical, social, economic and environmental factors or processes that increase the susceptibility of an individual, a community, assets or systems to the impacts of hazards”. In the context of this report, vulnerability can therefore be viewed as the *susceptibility* of individuals or groups of individuals to be radicalised towards violent extremism.

3.4 Isolation

Isolation is a condition of physical or psychological exclusion. It is often used interchangeably with loneliness, and although the two are closely related, loneliness is a subjective and internal experience, whereas isolation refers to the isolated individual/group’s relationship and contact with other persons, groups or network.¹¹ Social isolation is typically described as the absence of social contact, or a state of being cut off from normal social networks.¹² Furthermore, in the case of violent extremism, social isolation is known and accepted to be a risk factor.¹³

It is important to acknowledge that with regard to the process of radicalisation, a deep sense of community and bonding may exist within the radicalised group where a group dynamic exists; this may be online, physically or idealised. Therefore when discussing isolation, this is not always being used in the traditional sense of an individual cut off from society, but may also refer to an isolated group or an individual whose isolation might have led them to find comfort in the group.

In addition, labelling individuals or communities as isolated may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. For example, unintentional marginalisation of minority groups may lead to social isolation and its associated negative consequences. This makes the use of terms such as isolation especially significant within city-policy and community engagement.



3.5 Polarisation

Using the Institute of Strategic Dialogue's definition, we can view polarisation as the extreme divergence of social, political and economic attitudes. This is often reflected in diverging social and cultural media consumption and cuts across gender, class, identity, age and geography.¹⁴ Furthermore, polarisation can be exacerbated by issues such as hate crimes, hate speech or dangerous speech, and these key terms are therefore included under this definition:

- **Hate crime:** a criminal offence against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender's bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender or gender identity.
- **Hate speech:** an expression of hatred towards another person or group of people using various means such as writing, speech or any other form of communication. The intention of hate speech is to harass and distress the intended target. In many cases the use of hate speech can incite violence from one group towards another.
- **Dangerous speech:** a subset of hate speech, dangerous speech has been recently defined as "speech (that) lowers human barriers to violence – online and offline". It can be any form of expression, whether images or speech, that increases the risk that people will condone or commit violence against members of another group. It overlaps with hate speech, which often has a legal definition but does not necessarily fully encompass hate speech, or vice versa.

3.6 Social Integration

The Greater London Authority defines this as the extent to which people positively interact and connect with others who are different to themselves. It is determined by the level of equality between people, the nature of their relationships, and their degree of participation in the communities in which they live. This report views social integration in a broader light than the traditional categories of faith, religion, culture or ethnicity. It is also about age and gender and it affects all members of a society. In the context of a city, integration should be viewed as relevant to all who live in the city and should focus on fostering inclusivity and tolerance of difference without expectation of conformity.

3.7 City Systems

Commonly characterised by the size, density, transient and multicultural nature of its population coupled with an extensive infrastructure and diversified economy, a city is a complex structure. By extension, a city system can be understood as the layers that bring this all together – the various elements that inter-relate to form an overall mechanism, an interconnecting network or an intricate whole. This includes the principles, strategic policies and procedures that influence, govern or serve as a nexus within a city environment.

4.1 The City-Systems Approach

This report proposes that a city-systems approach is taken when developing city-policy. This approach recognises that creating solutions to one issue can lead to unintended consequences in other areas, and seeks to overcome this through a joint policy approach at strategic levels. For example, effectively governing security in the city-system relies on coherent strategy and policy that responds to threats or security breaches and necessarily works across sectors and services to do so.

It is about creating cities that people feel are worth living for, worth investing in and worth protecting.

The State holds responsibility for the security of its people, deploying police and the criminal justice system to deliver this. However, it is the security mentality that has historically extended into the domains of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and anti-radicalisation. Like traditional modes of maintaining internal security, the approach has largely been reactive, and has been criticised for its perceived negative community-level impacts, particularly stigmatisation of social groups.¹⁵ Therefore traditional security approaches need to be considered alongside social policy consideration. This is already being recognised. For instance, the UK's Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Neil Basu, who is also the Senior National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism Policing, has recently stated that the police and security services are no longer enough to win the fight against violent extremism. He stated, "Policies that go towards more social inclusion, more social mobility and more education are much more likely to drive down violence... than all the policing and state security apparatus put together."¹⁶


It follows that in complex socio-technical systems like cities, security must also be established through anticipatory and preventative means. Policies and strategies must anticipate future challenges, on the one hand, while also considering the potential downstream consequences of narrow policy decisions on the other. The city-systems approach seeks to integrate anti-radicalisation policies into broader and coherent city-policy development, including identifying, mitigating and monitoring polarisation. The approach assumes that policies do not occur in a vacuum, and that failing to consider the broader implications of policy interaction will be counter-productive for the development of safe, sustainable and integrated communities.

4.2 System-Wide Benefits

By crossing multiple policy domains, the city-systems approach can yield multiple system benefits. Apart from the obvious objective of reducing radicalisation in cities and, subsequently, terrorism and harm to society at large, tackling polarisation in this manner can improve the state of city communities. Looking at the unintended consequences of city-policies in this way is also about supporting individuals and communities to live their lives in the best way they can. It is about creating cities that people feel are worth living for, worth investing in and worth protecting. It is also about reducing hate, isolation and its often understated by-product, loneliness.

When viewed in this light, system benefits begin to emerge. For instance, there is some evidence to show that disconnected communities could be costing the UK economy £32 billion every year, and according to research conducted by the Centre for Economics and Business Research, "neighbourliness" already delivers "substantial economic benefits to UK society", representing an annual saving of £23.8 billion

in total.¹⁷ Additionally, countering polarisation and isolation will consequently include tackling loneliness. This has a broader implication on the health of a city as studies continue to investigate the possibility that social isolation and loneliness could be greater threats to public health than obesity, among other diseases.¹⁸ Tackling radicalisation therefore should be viewed as part of a broader city-systems approach designed to address a number of social ills and not just radicalisation on its own.



Anti-radicalisation is a crowded policy space, with a significant body of literature. Naturally, a diversity of opinions exist with respect to the effectiveness of policy in countering violent extremism and interventions are most often context-specific. As will be seen in the next section there is not one clearly defined path for radicalisation; each case is unique, making it impossible to build a single profile of a violent extremist.

A healthy academic scepticism can also be discerned in the ability of city-policies to counter radicalisation. There is limited evidence on the effectiveness of counter-measure policies, largely due to insufficient monitoring and evaluation and lack of published programme data. There are many assumptions and critiques, but without a robust data set in the field it is difficult to analyse and to establish any empirical evidence of the effectiveness of counter-measures.

These concerns have in part, aided the research for this report by providing a deeper understanding of the complexity of the issues and the necessity of clearly outlining definitions and project scope. As a result the research for this report was focused on polarisation and isolation as key vulnerability factors, to be discussed in further detail later in this section.

5.1 Causal Factors and the Radicalisation Process

To understand how cities' policies can make positive inroads into addressing the radicalisation process, it is helpful to first examine what causes individuals or groups of individuals to become more or less vulnerable to radicalisation toward extremism. In particular, the complexity of the relationship between polarisation

and radicalisation highlights the importance of responding to this problem in a systemic fashion, and it is in this context that the city-systems approach is anticipated to be of most value.

The complexity of the relationship between polarisation and radicalisation highlights the importance of responding to this problem in a systemic fashion.

Although not typically presented as the result of a sudden or abrupt change on an individual level, but “a complex social change operating on numerous levels”,¹⁹ the UK police have recently highlighted that the pace of progression of potential radicalisation processes is increasing.²⁰

Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Neil Basu stated in 2018 that “the pace and tempo” of radicalisation and attacks has gone up.²¹ This is in part due to new methods of attack such as utilising everyday and easily accessible items like vehicles or knives.

Cities therefore need to consider developing effective policy at a

quicker pace, while balancing this with the need for long-term policy which can be deliberative and necessarily slow.

A wealth of literature and evidence from practitioners demonstrates that the causal factors of radicalisation toward extremism are varied and complex. In the first systematic search of its kind, Vergani et al. reviewed 148 articles (after reviewing an initial 6,335 items) between 2011–2015 on the causal factors of radicalisation.²² A common categorisation for these factors were “push, pull, and personal”. The research highlighted that the causes of radicalisation were not confined to simply the ‘pull’ of a radical ideology but include many circumstantial push factors, such as political or social situations or policies that may influence the vulnerability of an individual, or group of individuals, to being radicalised toward violent extremism.

This is important for the work examined in this report, which focuses on the way in which cities' policies can prevent or reduce radicalisation. Pull factors are typically those that attract people into radicalisation (the consumption of extremist propaganda, or monetary incentives for example).

The research highlighted that the causes of radicalisation were not confined to simply the ‘pull’ of a radical ideology but include many circumstantial ‘push’ factors, such as political or social situations or policies that may influence the vulnerability of an individual, or group of individuals, to being radicalised toward violent extremism.

Cities cannot impact on the ‘pull’ factors, but they can address ‘push’ factors – or ‘structural motivators’ – by understanding the impact their policies have on them.

By contrast, push factors are often seen as external circumstances (such as socio-political grievances and structural factors of a city, such as unemployment rates), which are used to justify the move toward radicalisation and can be seen to push someone or make them more likely to participate in violent extremism. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) further describes the drivers of radicalisation in a way that distinguishes between ‘structural motivators’ (such as unemployment, corruption, inequality, discrimination), individual incentives (a sense of purpose, adventure, belonging, acceptance, fear etc), and enabling factors (the presence of radical mentors, access to radical content and communities, access to weaponry, a lack of familiar support and so on).²³ Cities cannot impact on the ‘pull’ factors, but they can address ‘push’ factors – or ‘structural motivators’ – by understanding the impact their policies have on them.

The work conducted by Vergani et al. highlighted that in almost 60% of cases, radicalisation resulted from push factors, including inequality, marginalisation, grievance, social exclusion, victimisation, and stigmatisation.²⁴ Although it is worth noting that there is much debate in this area with many academics disagreeing on whether push factors are causative. The ‘personal’ drivers of radicalisation were cited as nearly as important, at 40% of cases. These factors included issues like personal alienation, isolation, friendlessness, loneliness and cultural/social misfit.

Examined together, the push and personal factors that drive

radicalisation work to polarise and isolate individuals. These factors contributing to people’s vulnerability to becoming radicalised are discussed in more detail in section 5.3.

Although the nature of the radicalisation process is changing, often it is non-linear. The Centre for the Prevention of Radicalisation Leading to Violence outlines the complex nature of this process and the factors that affect it (See Figure 3). It highlights that radicalisation follows a “non-linear, non-predetermined path, shaped by multiple factors”.²⁵ No one thing can therefore be attributed as a singular or primary cause of radicalisation: nonetheless, there are a range of vulnerability factors including those of polarisation and isolation.

5.2 Social Capital and Violent Extremism

Research has demonstrated that social capital and social norms can be associated both with preventing terrorism, or through an absence of social capital and norms, fostering it.^{26, 27, 28} This is dependent on the community (or place of interest) with which an individual is associated,²⁹ and the nature of the influential social norms.³⁰ Social capital describes the nature of social networks that are characterised by reciprocity, trust and cooperation.^{31, 32, 33, 34} In society it can facilitate cooperative activities and social norms³⁵ which can be beneficial – like shaking hands when you’re first introduced to someone – or undesirable, like alcohol misuse as a result of peer pressure. Importantly, the relationship between social capital and norm-building creates or maintains order in complex social situations.

Social capital reflects an intangible ‘resource’ established in the relationships among people that facilitate action.³⁶ Social capital is built through interactions that generate obligations and reciprocity (you help me, I’ll help you), trust (you said you’d do that for me, and you did, so I can rely on your help again), and expectations (I helped you, so I can






Figure 1 RUSI’s Drivers of Radicalisation

<p>Structural Motivators Unemployment, corruption, inequality, discrimination</p>
<p>Individual Incentives A sense of purpose, adventure, belonging</p>
<p>Enabling Factors The presence of radical mentors, access to weaponry, or radical content and community</p>



call on your help some time in the future). These notions go back to the basic philosophical concept of the social-contract theory, which sees social capital as integral to uphold democratic values in a society.³⁷ As a function of social relations, social capital can exist in ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ ways. For instance, inclusion in a violent extremist group may come with strong social cohesion, just as a positive community environment can.³⁸ As such, inclusion – and the association with positive, local community-oriented activities, people and issues – could make the difference between positive community inclusion and exclusion.

In contrast, inclusion in a negative environment with dangerous ideals and norms can lead to violent behaviour and greater risk to communities and cities. For this reason, attention must be directed to gaining a clear understanding of the way in which policy formulation might foster or restrain the formation of social groups that could perpetrate violence, or that hold negatively extreme views.

Where policy creation has an impact on social capital, this must be addressed to mitigate the possibility that the very problem the policy seeks to reduce is amplified by that policy.

5.3 Isolation and Polarisation as Key Vulnerability Factors

Societal-level explanations have often been cited as one of the most common explanations for radicalisation in wider literature.³⁹ RUSI’s literature review on the Drivers of Radicalisation identified a number of factors as significant, including political factors such as governance deficit, state failure and grievances, alongside social/psychological factors concerning group and individual identity.⁴⁰ The review also highlighted that “although the evidence is mixed, on balance the literature shows that

blocked participation can create grievances which may be harnessed to promote extremist violence.”⁴¹

Issues such as discrimination, Islamophobia, and hate crime can contribute to polarisation and provide the context in which radicalisation can take place.

Vergani’s review identified that the push factor appearing most often in the literature is the “relative deprivation of a social group”, which, he states, has also been framed in terms of “injustice, inequality, marginalization, grievance, social exclusion, frustration, victimization, and stigmatization.”⁴² The ‘failed integration’ theory has often been quoted as a cause for radicalisation, however this is widely challenged and, as will be seen later in this report, integration initiatives in themselves are not necessarily the appropriate response.

Polarisation and isolation are possible contributing factors, and as the Radicalisation Awareness Network states: “...by preventing and decreasing polarisation, we are creating the conditions that contribute to preventing individuals from being lured towards intolerant ‘us and them’ ideologies. Polarisation does not necessarily lead to radicalisation and radicalisation does not have to result in growing polarisation. The answer lays in the concepts of factors that make people vulnerable to extremist propaganda and recruitment.”⁴³

Polarisation and hate are increasing issues often accompanied by a climate of intolerance.⁴⁴ As the Director at the Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies at Teesside University stated in 2018

of the current climate, “This is the most propitious time for the radical right since the end of the Second World War.”⁴⁵ Such radical trends are further aggravated and prompted by the emotional and social dynamics of polarisation.⁴⁶

In Germany, hate crimes recorded by the police have seen a spike in recent years,⁴⁷ with attacks on asylum shelters surging to 1,031 in 2015, up from 199 in the previous year,⁴⁸ and homophobic hate crimes increasing by about 27% from 2016 to 2017.⁴⁹ In the UK, hate crime reporting is on the rise, with more than 94,000 hate crimes recorded by police in England and Wales in 2017/18 – an increase of 123% compared to five years ago, and a rise of 17% compared to last year.⁵⁰ The largest category of these (75% of all reported hate crimes) are race-motivated hate crimes (including crimes based on ethnicity, refugee status or asylum seekers), which is an increase of 14% from the previous year.⁵¹ The Tell MAMA initiative reported in 2017 the highest number of anti-Muslim incidents since its launch in 2012.⁵² The service highlighted that more than two-thirds of verified incidents occurred offline, or on street level (70%, n=839), which represents a 30% rise in offline reports.⁵³

As the Institute for Strategic Dialogue points out, these rises in offline hate-crime attacks have coincided with increasing concerns about hate speech on social media platforms.⁵⁴ Facebook’s Vice President of Public Policy in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, Richard Allan, claimed that in May and June of 2017 alone, Facebook took down 66,000 posts per week that were reported as hate speech, which makes about 288,000 per month globally.⁵⁵

Anti-Muslim hate groups are currently the most active type of hate group on Twitter, with over 25,800 tweets put out in 2016, followed by anti-migrant tweets, at 13,292.⁵⁶ This is significant because issues such as discrimination, Islamophobia and hate

crime can contribute to polarisation and provide the context in which radicalisation can take place. They must therefore be considered when tackling the issue of radicalisation.⁵⁷

5.4 Matching Policy to Social Complexity

It is important to note that there is not an expectation that changing one policy or only one element of an individual’s life will necessarily have a significant impact. Social structures, and their influence on the individual, are extremely complex.⁵⁸ However, changing a range of policies simultaneously may provide the groundswell of positive influence that makes the difference. In addition, by using the city-systems approach, the possible reduction of extremist acts as a result of policy considerations will be seen as one good outcome in a range of many outcomes.

The need to match policy to this social complexity is informed by a long tradition of research examining the unintended consequences of policymaking in the social context.^{59, 60} The city-systems approach taken in this research specifically frames anti-radicalisation policymaking in the context of the unintended consequences of non-systematic policy development. One way that unintended consequences can be avoided, or at least minimised, is by incorporating community input into policy decision-making, as will be discussed in the key themes of this report.

Already in 2006, UK policymakers recognised the importance of social policy and leveraging community resources in tackling violent extremism, with the development of Prevent following the 2005 London bombings.⁶¹ This approach is also evident in other regions, where building social resilience in the community is seen as a fundamental activity in the fight against violent extremism. Communities with strong social resilience support similarity and dissimilarity within their membership.⁶²

Figure 2 Average number of tweets per hate group type







Figure 3 Process of radicalisation leading to violence





The countries of each of the participating cities in the Counter Terrorism Preparedness Network (CTPN) Barcelona, Greater Manchester, London, Paris, Rotterdam, Stockholm – with the exception of Barcelona – are members of the Strong Cities Network, an international organisation dedicated to challenge and counter violent extremism. All have comprehensive national policies on countering terrorism, although the way that these

countries' national plans deal with anti-radicalisation and countering violent extremism varies in terms of how much responsibility rests with the national government, and how much is adopted at the city level.

The intention of this report is not to compare the cities against one another but rather to highlight the progressive and effective initiatives that are being carried out to tackle the issue of radicalisation

and polarisation, increase social integration, and build community cohesion. The following outlines some of the ways in which cities are carrying out this work, as well as highlighting some the challenges being faced.

National Contexts

France	France has a number of frameworks relevant to tackling radicalisation, namely the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, Prevent to Protect (2018), which aligns itself to other government initiatives responsible for prisons, urban policy and dialogue with France's Muslim community. ⁶⁷ The country is known for having a particular challenge with radicalisation in its prisons, where an estimated 1,400 inmates are believed to be radicalised. ⁶⁸
The Netherlands	From 2011, the Netherlands has adopted a localised approach to countering radicalisation and violent extremism, partly based on the belief that national campaigns, as opposed to local ones, can be counter-productive and instead stimulate radicalisation. Cities take on the majority of the responsibility for anti-radicalisation, and the government provides advisory and capacity-building services to local partners.
Spain	Spain's National Plan to Fight Violent Radicalisation was introduced in 2015 and is connected to the country's efforts to stop illegal immigration, integrate existing communities and promote social cohesion. ⁶⁶
Sweden	Sweden had a national Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy Against Violence Promoting Extremism, released in 2011 and the Swedish Police Authority produced its first version of a national educational programme against violent extremism at the end of 2011. In 2012, and in 2015 the Police Authority began developing national guidelines for how to prevent violent extremism on a local level. A big part of that work involves municipalities and multi-agency cooperation. In 2014 a National Coordinator was appointed in Sweden with a mission to protect democracy from violent extremism.
The United Kingdom	The UK's CONTEST strategy, with its four workstreams of: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare, ⁶³ was first introduced in 2006 following the 2005 bombings. ⁶⁴ Anti-radicalisation sits under the Prevent workstream, and since then a specific Counter-Extremism Strategy was also introduced in 2015. CONTEST specifically recognises that "communities which do not or cannot participate in civic society are more likely to be vulnerable to radicalisation" and "a successful integration strategy is therefore important to counter terrorism". ⁶⁵

6.1 Barcelona

In January 2017, Barcelona City Council developed the municipal plan to combat Islamophobia as a form of discrimination and improve social cohesion in the city. It was co-designed with representatives of human-rights organisations and discrimination experts, Muslim communities, and specialised municipal staff.⁸⁷

Supported by a budget of more than €100,000 and implemented by the Citizen Rights and Diversity Department, the plan has three key objectives:

1. Highlighting Islamophobia as a type of discrimination.
2. Revealing and denouncing prejudices and stereotypes.
3. Enhancing reporting mechanisms and improving support provided to victims of Islamophobic discrimination.

It includes 28 measures, such as establishment of the Hate Crime and Hate Speech Observatory, and training for municipal workers, including the city police. At least 1,474 people took part in 55 sessions on Islamophobia and multiculturalism.⁸⁸

A focus on hate speech was intensified following the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils in Tarragona in August that same year. This included the introduction of Barcelona's Anti-Rumour Network which is highlighted in more detail in the case study overleaf. Work was also enhanced to make Islamophobia visible as a form of discrimination and to counteract the generalisation of negative images about Islam and Muslims.

Two of the issues that have been most worked on are the prevention of stereotypes and raising awareness of the rights that all citizens have.

The Office for Religious Affairs in Barcelona is also noteworthy as a

service that works to guarantee the exercising of the right to religious freedom in Barcelona, so that all options of conscience, regardless of whether they are religious or not, are recognised and respected, and everyone can participate and feel included within the city. The office's activities include supporting religious entities with their activities in the city; facilitating collaboration between religious entities and the City Council; promoting the inclusion of religious entities in the citizen networks of their environment; and working to normalise their presence in the public space.⁸⁹

The three pillars of the Interculturality Plan are equity, recognition of diversity and positive interaction.

Barcelona City Council has adopted the Government's measure on "guaranteeing equal treatment for religious bodies holding occasional activities in public places". Among other things, it provides clear guidelines on the relevant needs and use of public space and facilities by religious groups.⁹⁰

In addition, Barcelona has an Office for Non-Discrimination (OND) run by its city council. The city has had a municipal service aimed at addressing human-rights violations related to discrimination since 1998. Its duties include provision of specialised legal advice and litigating if necessary, receiving, documenting and collating data, providing advice and training.⁹¹ It also places efforts on identifying structural problems that cause human-rights violations and proposes strategic recommendations on how to reverse or resolve them.

Since the 2017 attacks, anti-radicalisation work has been reinforced. Teachers have been trained in discrimination and racism, and the Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March)

Barcelona at a glance

1.7m

Population

10

Districts

101.4km²

Area

Barcelona's Anti-Rumour Network – Community Cohesion Campaign

Case study 1



In 2010, Barcelona's city council launched a public-service campaign called the Anti-Rumour Network to dispel rumours, misconceptions and prejudices held locally about minorities and immigrants.^{97, 98}


The network aimed to tackle disinformation and stereotypes that promote polarisation and extremist sentiment, and it began by researching and identifying dominant stereotypes and prejudices circulating in Barcelona. These included the arrival of new migrants and perceived associated abuse of social and healthcare services, or taking jobs from locals.

The project then recruited and trained “anti-rumour agents” to dispel myths and spread the campaign through local organisations and the city's neighbourhoods. The aim was to challenge and contradict misconceptions about immigrants and to combat discrimination by taking action in the everyday business of life. It did this by giving the agent accurate information about immigration and techniques for addressing misconceptions with tactful, situation-based action at work, home or in the street. For instance, when someone complained that “foreigners are receiving the majority of subsidised apartments”, the anti-rumour agent could interject with an accurate fact, such as how this is true for only one in 20 immigrants.

To address the challenge of getting the message out onto the streets, the campaign was launched through 80 local organisations all working in social cohesion and coexistence. The organisations are connected through a dedicated website that offers information and free training sessions, as well as online guides to address the key challenges.

As well as its city-wide advertising campaign, the project has also used innovative and at times unusual approaches to spread the message. These have included public debates with leading local figures, street theatre, the production of tongue-in-cheek videos, and comic books – the latter have proved to be the most successful.

More than 350 people have been trained as anti-rumour agents since the start of the project and Barcelona city council has created a dedicated intercultural dialogue fund of €200,000 per year for community-led projects that promote the goals of the Anti-Rumour Network. As further evidence of the success of the initiative, other city councils within Catalonia are now establishing their own versions of the Anti-Rumour Network, and Athens and Geneva have shown interest in creating similar structures.

 For more information visit: https://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/fighting-fiction-with-facts-the-bcn-anti-rumour-campaign/



6 Responses to Radicalisation

continued

is commemorated in schools, among other measures.⁹² Fighting discrimination and racist attitudes towards Muslim women and Islamophobia on social media and the internet were identified as additional priorities at a later stage and are now being addressed.⁹³ Overall, two key issues that have been prioritised are the prevention of stereotypes, and awareness campaigns about the rights that all citizens have, and what religious freedom and cultural diversity means.⁹⁴

Finally, the Interculturality Plan (2010–2025)⁹⁵ is the initiative of Barcelona's city council that aims to provide an intercultural strategy to tackle the challenges that arise in the city following the increase in socio-cultural diversity. The three pillars of the plan are equity, recognition of diversity and positive interaction. The intercultural approach was used to improve every service and policy of Barcelona's city council. The plan creates conditions for people from different backgrounds to interact and socialise in a positive way. It also has a dedicated interculturality programme, which serves as a key technical mechanism for its implementation. The city council closely collaborates with multiple associations and grassroots organisations in fighting discrimination and ensuring positive intercultural relations.⁹⁶

6.2 Greater Manchester

Manchester has been a priority area for anti-radicalisation initiatives since 2008.⁷⁸ Manchester City Council works with the Community Safety Partnership to deliver a set of tailored local priorities, developed to support the delivery of national anti-radicalisation objectives. In addition, the collaboration aims to enable communities to develop their own solutions and promote better alternatives.⁷⁹

The Manchester Community Safety Partnership demonstrates multi-agency working by bringing together Manchester City Council, Greater Manchester Police, Offender Services,

the National Health Service, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service, housing providers, the universities and voluntary and community groups.⁸⁰

The focus of anti-radicalisation in Manchester is early intervention and prevention, and the city strives to strengthen the confidence and skills of its staff to work with communities on this agenda. Included within this is understanding the community concerns, grievances and potential drivers that might lead to people engaging in extremist activities.⁸¹

In addition, the city works to strengthen the understanding of and relationship with communities in order to collectively deliver activities to support individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism.⁸²

6.3 London

Like all cities in the UK, London operates in line with Prevent, and each of its 32 local authorities have a Channel Panel. This panel meets regularly to discuss referrals of individuals who are considered to be at risk of radicalisation. The panel is made up of police, local authority staff and other relevant partners, such as social and healthcare workers, and creates a tailored wrap-around support package for individuals who have been referred to them via the Prevent programme. The police lead on the assessment of the counter terrorism risk, and the local authority look at any safeguarding concerns. There is a London Prevent network, where coordinators from each of the 32 local authorities meet regularly throughout the year to discuss key issues, including emerging threats, and to share good practice.

The Mayor of London also set up a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme in 2017 in response to the string of attacks in London that same year.⁶⁹ The programme recently released a report after conducting “the most comprehensive listening exercise on countering violent
(continued p21)

Greater Manchester at a glance

2.8m

Population

10

Boroughs

1,276km²

Area

London at a glance

8.9m

Population

32

Boroughs

1,572km²

Area

RADEQUAL – Community Cohesion and Resilience Programme

Case study 2



The Rethinking Radicalisation programme of community engagement started back in 2015 and recognised that the challenges faced today relating to our collective understanding of prejudice, hate and extremism (including global events and incidents) are far too complex for laws and powers to be the sole solutions.

It recognised that there are a range of factors that come together and play out in communities and neighbourhoods, which if tackled earlier would improve the lives of residents and increase opportunities for people to contribute towards how we build a safer and more resilient Manchester. Rethinking Radicalisation, delivered by the Peace Foundation, enabled communities to come together and engage with professionals, academics, critics and others about issues relating to challenging policy areas such as preventing terrorism, but also those topics that created tensions and division within and between communities.

The RADEQUAL campaign is aimed at getting into communities and neighbourhoods early, having honest and often difficult conversations and then problem-solving to proactively work together to prevent some of the drivers escalating into community tensions, conflict and in some cases criminal activity.

The RAD in RADEQUAL represents the radical history of Manchester as a city, and the EQUAL is about demonstrating equality in what they do.

The RADEQUAL campaign has been co designed with communities to build community resilience and has three key principles referred to as the three Cs, which build on the Our Manchester approach:

- 1. Challenge:** Identifying and understanding the concerns and challenges across and within communities that could create divisions and tensions (hate, prejudice and extremism).
- 2. Connect:** Connecting communities, groups and organisations, and building relationships to create a network of credible voices.
- 3. Champion:** Championing Manchester's radical reputation for campaigning for equality and inclusion, and welcoming difference.

 For more information visit <http://www.makingmanchestersafer.com/info/18/radequal>

See also the Rethinking Radicalisation report: http://www.makingmanchestersafer.com/downloads/file/55/rethinking_radicalisation_report



London Tigers – Civil Society Prevention Programme

Case study 3



Originally a football club in the City of Westminster, London Tigers was founded in 1997 by members of the South Asian community in London. It soon branched out into community projects, and in 2012, as part of the Government's Prevent strategy, the London Borough of Redbridge and the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham were awarded £255,345 by the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism to commission London Tigers to deliver a building community resilience project. After the success of the first year, additional funding of £319,183 was provided for 2013–14.

Since its conception the organisation has expanded and currently has more than 70 staff and 100 volunteers running youth-development projects across the city of London, with further expansion now in Luton.

The initiative uses sport as a vehicle to reach out to young people, provide positive pathways and facilitate meaningful opportunities. It works with young people from hard-to-reach communities to build their resilience

to radicalisation. In particular, London Tigers undertakes projects that deal with social issues, from gang-related and antisocial behaviour to providing resilience to extremist influences.

The activities delivered by London Tigers are designed to create an environment in which difficult issues can be discussed openly. Workshops are also run that aim to challenge extremist narratives, including on theological grounds, and to build critical-thinking skills. Their aim is to build future community leaders who can continue to challenge extremism among their peers.

One-to-one interventions are also offered in order to assist those considered most vulnerable in order to improve their critical-thinking skills and deconstruct terrorist narratives.⁷²



For more information visit:
<http://www.londontigers.org/>



#LondonisOpen – Community Cohesion Campaign

Case study 4



Following the UK's EU referendum in 2016, the Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, launched a major campaign called #LondonisOpen to foster cohesion and calm and to show that London is united and open for business.

A key aspect of the campaign was to reassure the one million EU nationals living in London that “they will always be welcome – and that discrimination will not be tolerated”.⁷⁴ Upon launching the campaign, the Mayor highlighted that London does not simply tolerate its inhabitants differences, it also celebrates them.⁷⁵

The campaign included various media campaigns to celebrate London's diversity, and the Mayor commissioned artists to design a series of posters for London's underground service, which declared the city “will not cut itself off from the rest of the world”.⁷⁶ These included statements such as:

- “Dignity has no nationality”.
- “Everyone welcome”.
- “No them only us”.
- “Work towards world peace”.

As part of the overall campaign, unique discounts on attractions, experiences, restaurants and bars, as well as helpful traveller information, have been offered on Visit London.⁷⁷

The campaign has received backing from a number of high-profile celebrities and major firms such as Google, Hilton, the City of London and business leaders like Sir Richard Branson.⁷⁸

It represents a relatively low-cost example of a place-based identity campaign that cities can easily replicate to help foster inclusion and a feeling of belonging among their citizens, and help push back against intolerance, hate and polarisation.

 For more information visit: <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/arts-and-culture/london-open>



extremism the city has seen”,⁷⁰ which sets out the opportunities to “better strengthen communities, safeguard vulnerable groups and stop the spread of extremist ideology”, and is supported by an investment fund launched by the Mayor.⁷¹ The Mayor’s Office works with London Councils (an umbrella organisation for all 32 local authorities) and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime works closely with communities to promote active citizenship, so that people can inform and co-design local responses to local problems.

In addition to policies and strategies specifically focused on countering radicalisation and violent extremism, London has a social integration strategy, and an equality, diversity and inclusion strategy. The social integration strategy takes a wider view of social integration to emphasise that it’s an issue that impacts all Londoners and is therefore a concern for everyone.⁷³ London’s equality, diversity and inclusion strategy – Inclusive London – also outlines how, in all areas of work, the Mayor can address inequalities, barriers and discrimination.

6.4 Paris

The Paris Pact to Combat Extreme Exclusion was published in 2015, after a period of consultation led by the city’s Mayor.¹⁰⁰ The pact provides a new landscape of Parisian social interventions, carried out not only for, but also with those considered to be most vulnerable to extremism.¹⁰¹ The Paris Pact is aimed at all individuals in situations of vulnerability or exclusion, and aims to support them at each stage of their life for durable social and professional integration.¹⁰²

The pact provides for 106 concrete measures aimed at ensuring lasting integration of all who are in a vulnerable situation in Paris. The first component is preventing isolation or exclusion. The fight against exclusion, according to the pact, starts by guaranteeing access to basic services for all. The second component is

efficient intervention, followed by ensuring social and professional inclusion and the right to health, social rights, right to work, right to leisure and sport activities. Three years after the adoption, 90% of the activities under the pact have been implemented or are being implemented.

The pact is complemented by the Plan of Mobilising Communities of Paris for the Reception of Refugees (Mobilisation de la Communauté de Paris pour l’Accueil des Réfugiés).

Paris has also conducted anti-radicalisation initiatives in prisons, including the isolation of radicalised inmates from common criminals, and investment in a higher number of prison imams.¹⁰³ The former initiative was ended in 2016, however, as there were concerns that it deepened radicalisation among extremist suspects.¹⁰⁴

6.5 Rotterdam

Rotterdam has been actively working on anti-radicalisation since at least 2005, when its action plan, called Participate or Be Left Behind, was adopted.

Two years after this, the Radicalisation Information Switchboard was introduced. In 2011, Participate or Be Left Behind was absorbed into broader counter terrorism policy and the Radicalisation Information Switchboard was transformed into the Radicalisation Contact and Advisory Point. The purpose of the Advisory Point is to provide support for volunteers and professionals regarding both general questions about radicalisation and specific questions about individual cases.

The #Safe010 (“#Veilig010”, in Dutch only) is the overall security strategy for Rotterdam, aimed at creating a safe city with reduced crime levels. For the most vulnerable areas, the city has appointed “city marines” as part of the strategy. These are local, on-the-ground city

Paris at a glance

2.1m

Population

20

Municipalities

105km²

Area

Rotterdam at a glance

635,389

Population

14

Districts

325km²

Area

WEsociety – Community Cohesion and Resilience Programme

Case study 5



Following the 2015 terrorist attack in Paris, Rotterdam galvanised community support by organising four “WE meetings” with hundreds of citizens in different neighbourhoods. From this, the WEsociety programme was launched under the leadership of Rotterdam’s Mayor Ahmed Aboutaleb. It is based on the principle of working towards a peaceful, just and resilient city, where there is a place for everyone regardless of their background or religion.

Its aim is to further connect citizens or groups by facilitating dialogue and meetings in the city that focus on listening without judgment or prejudice, building openness and mutual understanding.

Since its conception the programme has initiated several successful activities, including interfaith meetings and district-level dialogues. In partnership with Stichting

LOKAAL, the city also organised the G1000 Citizen Summit in July 2017, where 1,500 citizens of Rotterdam came together to have facilitated discussions on how peace can be maintained in the city via the following five topics:

1. Education and upbringing
2. Social media
3. Living together in a neighbourhood
4. Identity
5. Radicalisation

A report that captured these conversations – titled “The State of Rotterdam” – was published, and policy recommendations are being taken forward by the WEsociety programme.⁹⁹



Safety House – Prevention and Intervention Programme

Case study 6



The Netherland's Safety House provides an integrated community-safety service to deal with complex crimes and serious misconduct. The initiative uses a multi-agency approach, with a group of fixed key partners that include municipalities, the police, public prosecutors, healthcare (including mental health), and education. Where necessary, added partners can join the initiative, such as housing-corporation representatives or social workers.

Municipalities in the 25 security regions of the Netherlands have been running these initiatives since 2013. The initiative uses a holistic approach to focus on complex problems. An example may be a combination of a criminal offence, addiction and parenting problems. Cases are analysed as a group and a coordinator appointed who is responsible for a collective strategy in which each party is assigned its own role. Families are also considered in the analysis and creation of the plan.

In Rotterdam's Safety House, there is a particular focus on radicalisation. Participants of this initiative come together twice a week to review all Rotterdam's cases of either already-radicalised or at-risk individuals. These meetings are operational and on a case-by-case basis.

Twice a year they collate the information from cases dealt with throughout the year, in order to analyse it at a strategic level. This includes looking into any patterns or themes in the cases and allows strategic insight that is then sent to the Mayor of Rotterdam. The Mayor then discusses with other officials any implications for city-level policy before providing recommendations.



For more information visit https://www.veiligheidshuizen.nl/ieuws/2016/120516_engelse-versie-animatiefilm-veiligheidshuizen#.XQeT3P6Wz08



Stockholm at a glance

965,000

Population

11

Municipalities

188km²

Area

workers who monitor safety, develop new security measures where necessary and engage with the local community to do so. The #Safe010 also encompasses radicalisation, reinforcing the centrality of the Advisory Point.

Rotterdam's revised approach to radicalisation, extremism and polarisation in 2018 highlights its collaboration between the municipality, the police and the judiciary, and has a particular focus on countering polarisation.

This is seen in its four courses of action, which include:

1. Depolarisation and tension reduction.
2. Bolstering resilience against radicalisation, extremism and polarisation.
3. Promoting expertise.
4. Disengagement and de-radicalisation.

Rotterdam's anti-radicalisation approach incorporates a multi-agency framework and brings together representatives from various parties, including colleagues from various clusters and districts, representatives from Rotterdam's community organisations, religious institutions, additional municipalities and ministries, and other relevant individuals.

6.6 Stockholm

Like all municipalities in Sweden, Stockholm has local responsibilities in countering radicalisation and violent extremism. This includes a regional Coordinator Against Violent Extremism, 19 local coordinators and the development and implementation of city-wide guidelines for the city's work against violent extremism. The municipality's 14 city districts and five (of 15) "administrative" city-wide districts (social services, labour market, education, culture and sports) are all expected to develop annual status reports and action plans for countering violent

extremism, together with appropriate measures. The methods and actions change from district-to-district as the challenges vary.

As a municipality, Stockholm's anti-radicalisation initiatives focus on raising awareness among city employees, strengthening democracy through education in schools, early prevention and, on an individual level, helping those who need support to leave a life of violent extremism. This relates to Sweden's national Action Plan to Safeguard Democracy Against Violence Promoting Extremism, released in 2011, which contains measures to:

- Increase knowledge about violence-promoting extremism.
- Discourage individuals from joining violence-promoting extremist groups.
- Facilitate, for those who have already joined, to leave such groups.

The city-wide objectives include continued evaluation of current initiatives, a review of their civil society grants programmes and the city's leasing of facilities, which have in recent years sometimes been taken advantage of by right-wing and Islamic extremist groups. It is important to ensure initiatives are continuously reviewed and evaluated to ensure funding and facilities go to appropriate projects.

One of the biggest challenges to countering violent extremism currently noted by Stockholm's Coordinator Against Violent Extremism is the issue of information-sharing. Legislation means social services are not able to share any information, including crime-preventative data, for any individuals over 20 years of age with schools, other municipalities' social services or even with the Police. This has posed significant barriers to effective multi-agency working and was noted through this project's consultation as an area that would have "the biggest impact" if a solution was found.

EXIT Fryshuset – Intervention Programme

Case study 7



Founded in 1998 EXIT Fryshuset is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) that provides confidential, tailored support to individuals and families of individuals wishing to leave white supremacy groups. It is only provided to those who have voluntarily come to the programme because it is important that the individual wants to change.

The project is funded primarily by government grants, and from time to time participates in EU projects funded by the European Commission (such as ISEC, Erasmus+, etc.).

The concept of EXIT is based on the understanding that the reasons for involvement do not stem from ideology but from social reasons, such as feelings of exclusion and lack of acceptance, and the search for identity, status and support, as well as power.⁸³ The work uses long-term cognitive treatment aimed at helping individuals to disengage from white supremacist groups and reintegrate into society.⁸⁴

The move of radicalisation and community-bonding processes of extreme right-wing movements to the online space has meant that former neo-Nazis engaged on the programme now enter internet chatrooms under pseudonyms. With their in-depth knowledge of extreme right-wing discourses and narratives, they can actively participate in discussion and debate. The process is designed to introduce doubt. Importantly, the focus of this form of engagement is not to prove users wrong, but to introduce doubt and gradually remove black-and-white thinking.⁸⁵

EXIT also provides support, information and training to relatives of neo-Nazis and conducts educational work with professionals who work with young people (such as schools, social services and the police).⁸⁶



For more information visit <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/63/exit-fryshuset>



The Tolerance Project – Intervention Programme

Case study 8



The Tolerance Project, more often referred to as the Kungälv Model, was developed and funded by local government of Kungälv in 1995. It was in response to the murder of a Swedish teenager of Czech origin by four neo-Nazis. The small coastal city of Kungälv embarked on a long-term commitment and social-investment approach. The project focuses on providing opportunities for youth “with an intolerant worldview” at schools to disconnect them from neo-Nazi groups or extremist behaviour.

One of the challenges faced by Kungälv was getting decision-makers to see the importance of a long-term social-investment approach on these questions of prevention. Curbing extremism is essential, but cities also need to see the real financial savings that investing in tolerance brings. The project quantifies the financial savings that investing in tolerance generates through a socio-economic analysis titled “The Price of Intolerance”. The success of the project led to a further roll-out of the initiatives in 20 municipalities.

Curbing extremism is essential, but cities also need to see the real financial savings that investing in tolerance brings ‘The Price of Intolerance’.



For more information visit https://citiesofmigration.ca/good_idea/rooting-out-intolerance-the-kungalv-model/



The Sens Critique Project – Prevention and Awareness Initiative

Case study 9



The Sens Critique pilot programme was a civil society project developed to support young people in countering the challenges that new communication technologies pose with the spread of disinformation, manipulation and online hate.

The project was initiated by the think tank Civic Lab via the initiative What the Fake, in partnership with the The Federation of Young Independent Producers (FJPI), Impulsion 75, ISD and Lumières sur l'Info, and supported by the Buffon and Pierre et Marie Curie sixth-form colleges, the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Prevention of Delinquency and Radicalisation (CIPDR) and Facebook France.¹⁰⁵

The pilot began in June 2018 with 22 students aged 13–15 from three schools across Paris. There were five creative workshops on topics related to digital citizenship, media literacy and critical thinking. Participants were also involved in the production of a campaign strategy and film, and engaged with various journalists, YouTube

creators, cyber-influencers, civil society experts and more. Among other things, the scheme's aim is to raise awareness of the dangers of fake news and hate speech through awareness-raising exercises concerning disinformation and emotional manipulation. It also supports students to build skills that could be used to pursue careers in the media or film industry.¹⁰⁶

Participants completed pre- and post-survey questionnaires to evaluate the programme's success. Measures of success included an increased confidence in identifying trustworthy sources of information, fake news, and emotional manipulation, and in creating online content of their own.¹⁰⁷



An evaluation report was developed by ISD. For more information visit: <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/building-digital-citizenship-in-france-lessons-from-the-sens-critique-project/>



Current responses to radicalisation across Europe act as a showcase of noteworthy initiatives, while also highlighting how cities can learn from each other.

For instance, the need highlighted by a number of cities for more effective ways to share information can be seen working effectively in Rotterdam's in-house IT system. The following sections discuss the key challenges major cities are facing with regard to radicalisation, along with recommendations of how they can tackle them.

7.1 Involving Communities in Integration Initiatives

Research has shown that community cohesion and social integration are two potential solutions (among a range of many) to the issues of polarisation and radicalisation.¹⁰⁸ For instance, there is evidence to suggest that people in more racially diverse neighbourhoods are more prosocial. Jared Nai highlights that those who have more frequent contact with other ethnic groups experience less anxiety about intergroup interactions and experience greater empathy towards 'outgroup' members.¹⁰⁹

The quality and type of engagement with both individuals and groups can, however, determine whether they support integration or actually polarise and isolate further, and this should be given greater consideration. Rahimi and Graumans state, "To attempt to explain or understand radicalization as a consequence of simple causes and direct pathways is not only naive but also dangerous... since it can lead to ineffective, or worse, counterproductive interventions that may damage intercommunal trust and push certain groups to their limits of resilience."¹¹⁰

Some argue that bringing communities together without meaningful integration can lead to conflict¹¹¹ or that integration initiatives can have the reverse effect, by highlighting 'otherness'.¹¹²

The quality and type of engagement with both individuals and groups can determine whether they support integration or actually polarise and isolate further.

One person who went to integration programmes in Austria said that they made him feel "excluded from his new friends and community, reminding him that he was an outsider".¹¹³

Furthermore, what is seen by a city as equality or integration, may not be viewed the same way by the community with which the city is attempting to engage or integrate. For instance, research has shown that Muslim women have criticised CVE strategies for seeking to impose Western understandings of gender equality on their communities.¹¹⁴ Therefore, when developing

There needs to be greater involvement from communities in the initial design and implementation of radicalisation-prevention policies.

integration initiatives that seek to bring equality and inclusion to communities, cities must consider which forms of equality they are bringing, and the way to do this is by engaging with those communities appropriately.

There needs to be greater involvement from communities in the initial design and implementation of radicalisation-prevention policies.¹¹⁵ Without greater involvement from the start of the design, all the way through to implementation, the mention of communities can sometimes have a “stigmatising effect”, and can “confuse their role as an interested party or stakeholder in a radicalisation-prevention policy by considering them as mere targets of the policy”.¹¹⁶

This can generate two counterproductive effects:

1. Encouraging the rejection and distrust of the targeted communities, increasing the feeling of being stigmatised and persecuted.
2. Not taking advantage of the necessary and crucial role of the communities, civil society organisations and community-based organisations to ensure the success of these policies'.¹¹⁷

Two groups need not necessarily interact on a daily basis to lead happy, fulfilling and prosperous lives. There are many examples across society of communities with differing cultural identities co-existing peacefully. What is, however, fundamental to peaceful co-existence is an acceptance by one community of the right of another to exist in-place.

Taking this train of thought a step further, it seems reasonable then for integration to be discussed within two stages:

1. At a basic level, communities can be considered integrated if each respects the rights of the other to exist, and neither negatively impacts the other in the exercise of those rights.
2. At a more advanced level, communities can be considered more highly integrated where cultures, economies and ways of life are accepted, and even in some cases shared.

Fundamental to peaceful co-existence is an acceptance by one community of the right of another to exist in-place.

Within this context, however, it should further be noted that peaceful co-existence is not necessarily a stable state nor one that can be maintained without some degree of effort. Where more advanced levels of integration are absent the opportunity for misunderstanding grows. Where reference points for other communities are few, the opportunity for ill-meaning manipulation of the ways communities perceive each other is high.

Considering the above, it could be said then that a key goal of social integration is one of moving communities from a position of non-peaceful co-existence to one of peaceful co-existence.

Recommendation 1

City policymakers to engage with and include community leaders in framing the integration process.

City-policy should seek to engage with appropriate and representative community leaders in the framing of the integration process from the outset. The ultimate goal is to develop a shared view of the extent to which integration is desired within the wider context of peaceful co-existence. It is important that cities ensure this engagement process is inclusive and not tokenistic. Community leaders need to be representative in practice, not just in name and standing, in order to avoid self-appointed leaders.

Cities must actively work to ensure community groups can be equally represented through holistic demographics, such as geography, profession, household size, and income. This is especially important because native population groups and groups that have community leaders who represent a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups are often very fractured, and it is harder to find a leadership voice for them.

Providing space for communities to retain a sense of their own cultural identity while living within a diverse community might reduce some of the factors that increase levels of isolation and polarisation.

Thereafter efforts clearly delineate into further work streams:

- Ensuring the circumstances and means that promote peaceful co-existence between communities who choose it are well funded and maintained.
- Providing opportunities for, and removing barriers to greater levels of community integration where those communities involved seek it out.

Social media can play a vital role in challenging misperceptions and fake news, and championing credible voices. Although removing radically violent or extremist content from online can have a positive effect, other avenues are being explored.

These include redirecting individuals from seeking out such content towards alternative but credible voices. Barcelona's Anti-Rumour Network outlined earlier in this chapter is a good example of how cities can effectively counter and challenge stereotypes. In addition, the Redirect Method case study is another example of effectively redirecting the user to content that challenges the original extremist content that was being sought.

Social media can play a vital role in challenging misperceptions and fake news, and championing credible voices.

Recommendation 2



Cities to support self-integration between communities by challenging inaccurate perceptions and creating platforms for accurate understandings of differing communities

Where communities are unable to maintain a peaceful co-existence, effort should be directed towards distinguishing between causes that relate to inaccurate perceptions, and more fundamental levels of misalignment, because the ways in which these two challenges are addressed will differ significantly. In order to improve levels of integration, communities need first to have an accurate understanding of each other. By tackling challenges associated with misunderstandings, city-policy can help remove barriers to self-integration between communities.

7.2 Considering the Non-Minority Viewpoint

Involving communities in the framing of the integration process and supporting self-integration must also take into account all members of society. Integration initiatives that fail to do this can not only lead to some communities feeling stigmatised or targeted, they can also have an averse effect on the rest of the community. The Friends of Europe organisation discusses this issue

in the context of migration and polarisation, showing how “many well-intentioned programmes aimed at giving special preferences to migrants and refugees ignore the needs of local communities, thereby exacerbating rather than facilitating inclusion”.¹¹⁸ In this way, the “counter-jihadist” far-right narratives are also sometimes unwittingly supported by official security discourses when political leaders narrate issues of multiculturalism in ways that overlap with counter-jihadist ideology.¹¹⁹

This is because the narrative is often used by the far-right movement, particularly the feeling that the “non-minority” viewpoint is being left behind or even replaced. This translates into a fear among these groups that white people are being “deliberately replaced”, “erased by a growing non-white population”, “losing their heritage”, “slighted” and/or “left behind”.¹²⁰ A common complaint stemming from such groups is the “special treatment or preferences” given to minorities, migrants or refugees.¹²¹ Angela King, a former neo-Nazi and co-founder of Life After Hate, stated that many of the whites she grew up with held the belief that “people of colour get special treatment”.¹²²

(continued p32)

The “counter-jihadist” far-right narratives are also sometimes unwittingly supported by official security discourses when political leaders narrate issues of multiculturalism in ways that overlap with counter-jihadist ideology.¹¹⁹

The Redirect Method

Case study 10




The Redirect Method was developed via a global collaboration between Moonshot CVE in the UK, Google Jigsaw in the US, Quantum Communications and Valens Global. The Redirect Method connects individuals attracted to extremist content with compelling and credible alternative messages using targeted advertising.

It focuses on users engaging with high-risk extremist content online and offers them specially curated video playlists, web content, or intervention services. The Redirect Method challenges violent extremist propaganda using both existing content made by communities across the globe, and new content, often created in partnership with local organisations and designed to resonate with the interests of the at-risk audience.

Since the Redirect Method's launch, Moonshot CVE has partnered with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders to deploy the Redirect Method in over 39 countries and over 24 languages, responding to all forms of hate and violence.

Significant to this methodology is the particular focus on credible voices. Initiatives such as this one can help challenge inaccurate perceptions and foster a better understanding of communities, voiced by those in those communities. Initiatives like these can also help avoid the phenomenon of echo chambers.

 For more information visit <https://redirectmethod.org/>



A recent study on the alt-right showed that they are much more concerned that their group is at a disadvantage compared with the study's control sample of moderately leaning individuals. Furthermore they are afraid of being displaced by "outsiders" and see themselves as potential victims.¹²³

This is especially important when the threat of far-right extremism is rising across Europe.¹²⁴ In the UK, for instance, white extremists are gaining attention because they are forming the largest proportion of terrorist arrests seen in 15 years¹²⁵ and extreme right-wing referrals are up by 36%.¹²⁶ German authorities have also recently noted that the number of far-right extremists has jumped by 50% in the last two years.¹²⁷ Internationally, in the US, far-right extremists have caused more fatalities since 9/11 than any other category of domestic extremist.¹²⁸

Social integration can be viewed as more than ethnicity, faith and migration. It is also about overcoming other important aspects of social division, such as age, social class, employment status, sexuality, gender and disability.

Although there are strong sentiments around whether it is right to encourage discourse with extremist groups, for fear of giving a platform to hateful ideologies, it is important for cities to consider the need to foster dialogue with all members of society, and broaden views of traditional integration to focus more on inclusion and citizenship.¹²⁹ Referring back to London's social integration strategy, aptly called "All of Us", social integration can be viewed as more than ethnicity, faith and migration.¹³⁰ It is also about

overcoming other important aspects of social division, such as age, social class, employment status, sexuality, gender and disability.¹³¹

In the interest of fostering inclusive, cohesive communities, cities should consider moving away from targeted or 'special favours'¹³² type policies. Instead, efforts should be placed on across-the-board equality policies that cover the needs of all, rather than fuelling a feeling of otherness or resentment from those 'left behind'.¹³³ Examples of this could be found in affordable housing for all (that is, not just integrating new communities but also existing ones).¹³⁴

A broadened view of integration also points to the need for the city-systems approach. If integration is broadly taken to include aspects as diverse as those listed above, then city policy must also reflect that integration. If, for example, policies dealing with issues like employment status and social class are dealt with in a non-integrated manner, the fundamental interdependencies between these aspects of society will be overlooked. Not only should policies be co-designed with the people they will affect, but they also should be co-designed across policy spheres and departments. This will improve value-added effectiveness through cohesion and the reduced secondary consequences.

Considering all groups – not just those directly affected – can be done in a variety of ways. Like the idea of using Equality Impacts Assessments, cities can consider models such as the Intercultural Cities model. This however should ensure it includes all members of society and all communities, even those viewed as "the majority".

7.3 Displacement of Issues

The conversation with regards to non-minorities feeling left behind is just one example of how policy decisions designed to improve the lives of one part of the community

Recommendation 3



Cities to frame policies within the wider context of diverse multicultural city inhabitants, including consideration of groups not directly affected

When designing policy initiatives focused towards particular community groups within a city, interventions should be framed within the wider context of diverse multicultural mix of city inhabitants. If part of the process of deploying these initiatives included consideration of and/or engagement with groups that are not directly affected by the interventions, the wider context could be better understood.

have the potential to negatively impact perceptions in another. There is rarely a perfect solution, and to some extent it could be said that the one of the many goals of city leadership is to attempt to balance these decisions so that the lives of all city inhabitants are positively affected. To add to the challenge, this balancing act required by policymakers and city leaders can be significantly affected by domestic geopolitical movements and extremist ideologies, many of which are funded and promoted by state and non-state actors¹.

¹For more information on the challenges cities are facing in this regard, see "The Great Displacement: The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism" by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Available here: <https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-great-replacement-the-violent-consequences-of-mainstreamed-extremism/>

Intercultural Cities

Case study 11



The Intercultural Cities programme assists cities by reviewing their policies through an intercultural lens and developing comprehensive intercultural strategies to help them manage diversity positively.

The programme helps cities to:

- Create a sense of pluralistic identity embracing cultural pluralism and the complexity of identities through leadership discourse and symbolic actions based on the pride and appreciation of the city diversity.
- Set up a governance model empowering all members of the community, regardless of their origin or status, to develop their potential, realise their talents and enable them to contribute to local prosperity.
- Promote participation and power-sharing, involving people of diverse origins in decision-making in urban institutions, be they political, educational, social, economic or cultural.

- Open up spaces and opportunities for deep interaction and co-creation between people of different cultural origins and backgrounds, to build trust, cohesion and solidarity, and thus realise the creative potential of diversity.
- Foster intercultural competence and empower intercultural innovators in public, private and civil society organisations.
- Manage conflict, busting stereotypes and engage in a debate about the impact and potential of diversity for local development.

The Intercultural Cities Network provides expert and peer support to cities that choose to learn how to better harness diversity. It offers an internationally tested and validated methodology, and a set of analytical and learning tools, and helps with reshaping city policies and services to make them more effective in a diverse context.¹³⁵

 For more information visit <https://www.coe.int/en/web/interculturalcities/how-it-works->



However, this is not an easy task and this research has identified a particular effect of policy implementation that warrants further investigation: displacement. Understandably, policy interventions are typically oriented towards addressing a key challenge within a city – that is to say, something for which the symptoms are present and perceivable. Within the context of this discussion, for example, it could be a groundswell of negative feeling within a particular community as a result of perceived underinvestment over a long time.

This research has shown that a positive intervention in one area or community can trigger a decline in integration (or an increase in polarisation/isolation) in another. Although the benefits of the intervention may be easily measured, a consequential decline somewhere else takes time to manifest itself; the symptoms are neither obvious nor immediate. The timeframe and method typically used to measure the positive impact of policy interventions in one area does not lend itself to identifying associated delayed decline in others.

It is at times like these that the agility and adaptability of those seeking to radicalise comes into play. These individuals and organisations can be highly sensitive to shifts in community sentiment. Where interventions shift sentiment for the better (making effective recruitment less likely) they can quickly identify new target populations and adjust their approach accordingly.

7.4 Mapping Social Sentiment

When used in line with other forms of community engagement and in a city-systems approach, mapping social sentiment may help avoid displacing problems as cities develop policies in tandem with the views of their inhabitants. Although challenging to quantify, given the nature of the abstract notion of sentiment,

Recommendation 4



Cities to proactively consider the extent to which any given policy may displace, rather than address, polarisation.

Cities should consider using a 360° perspective to assess all aspects of their various communities and how they may be impacted either positively or negatively by cohesion, integration, or counter terrorism policy. This will ensure that by attempting to solve an issue in one community or one area of policy, the issue is not unintentionally displaced into another area.

mapping social sentiment is possible – as the UK’s Tell MAMA initiative has shown. Or, on a global scale over the last 19 years, Edelman’s Trust Barometer has detected and documented some of the largest opinion shifts shaping the world.¹³⁶

There is much being done by organisations across the public, private and third sectors not only in mapping social sentiment but in correlating how online opinion and hateful rhetoric can impact offline community relations. Cities can consider using social sentiment mapping tools, such as the Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s Strong Cities Network hate mapping tool.¹³⁷ Run in partnership with the Center for the Analysis of Social Media (CASM LLP), the technology has been used to:

- Identify extremist, hateful and prejudicial speech targeting a range of communities and groups.

- Geo-locate extremist, hateful and prejudicial messages across a city level (for instance mapping anti-Muslim sentiment in London at roughly a borough level).
- Understand the connection and correlation between online hateful sentiment and how it correlates to the volume, type and location of offline hate crime, over time.
- Identify key local, regional and international events that cause the greatest risk to community cohesion.
- Understand who receives the most digital abuse.
- Understand the communities who drive digital abuse, including the aggregated age and gender of those driving abuse.
- Segment digital abuse, including identification of conversations expressing support for violent activity.
- Identify the narratives that are most salient within digital abuse.¹³⁸

Such tools can be used to inform a range of responses, including identifying when particular communities are at greater risk of abuse in order to shape better community-reassurance measures, and the more effective targeting of preventative activity and communications responses. They can also be used to map sentiment regarding terrorist attacks themselves, and potentially assist policymakers and researchers in better understanding the relationship between hate crimes and terrorism. *(continued p36)*




Launched in 2012, the Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) programme is a secure and reliable service that allows people from across England to report any form of anti-Muslim abuse.


Initially funded by the UK Government for the first two years of its work, it is now a self-reliant independent, non-governmental organisation that works on tackling anti-Muslim hatred. It is therefore not influenced or wholly shaped by the Government. The programme does work with central Government, however, to raise the issues of anti-Muslim hatred at a policy level, and the work helps to shape and inform policymakers, while ensuring that an insight is brought in through the systematic recording and reporting of anti-Muslim hate incidents and crimes.

The service created a unique portal where anyone may address concerns and record any incident that they experience because of their Muslim faith, or because someone thinks they are Muslim. By using the Submit a Report section, people can describe the details of the

abuse, whether verbal or physical, and add the location of the attack so that Tell MAMA can map incidents across England.

Tell MAMA can also refer people to support through partner agencies if they have been a victim of an anti-Muslim incident.

 For more information visit <https://tellmamauk.org/about-us/>



When discussing social-sentiment mapping, there are important and complex considerations, such as civil liberties and privacy, that also need to be taken into account. This further highlights the need to take a city-systems approach to the development of policy and ensure it is co-designed with community leaders.

Recommendation 5

Cities to consider mapping social sentiment to monitor community polarisation and hate crimes, and shift policy in tandem with social sentiment

Mapping social sentiment can be a useful early-warning system for cities to monitor and combat community polarisation and hate crimes. More significantly, it can allow policy to shift in tandem with sentiment, therefore limiting grievances through good governance. Cities should consider using existing networks to engage with communities, as well as new technologies, such as the Stronger Cities Network's hate mapping tool to gain a greater understanding of the grievances held by its inhabitants.

7.5 The Unintended Consequences of Policies

This report has already discussed the unintended consequences and issues with displacement that city policies on integration and social cohesion can have. A glance at counter terror measures shows how they can have unintended consequences too, and much has been researched in this regard.¹³⁹

An example of this can be seen in Black and Asian participants in UK focus groups exploring public perceptions of citizenship. Some described increased feelings of isolation and disconnect from the State, and a reduced ability to participate in the public sphere directly caused by counter terrorism measures.¹⁴⁰

There have also been reports that young Muslims in the UK are disengaging from local mosques for fear of being 'tainted' with certain views, and British Muslim community and religious leaders have expressed feelings of pressure to "actively denounce every act of global terrorism so as to not be considered complicit."¹⁴¹ Respondents from the same focus groups also felt that other important policy areas, such as housing, health, education, employment and crime were neglected because of an "exclusive focus" on preventing violent extremism.¹⁴²

Further research is needed on how policies at a city level can impact local communities, however some examples of broader policies having unintended consequences on isolation and polarisation can be seen in housing and transport policies. These have been cited as unintentionally contributing to polarisation and isolation of communities.^{143, 144} Some housing projects in Western Europe are built in suburbs that require houses to be a minimum size, which makes expensive homes unaffordable for

many minorities.¹⁴⁵ Research in Dutch cities has also highlighted "a clear pattern of socio-spatial polarisation" which has in turn raised questions about the unintended consequences of area-based policies.¹⁴⁶ The way in which a city addresses affordable housing can also impact on isolation and loneliness.

The BBC's loneliness experiment found that across cultures, countries and genders, people aged 16–24 are the loneliest age group.¹⁴⁷ People who feel discriminated were also more likely to feel lonely.¹⁴⁸ In the UK, it has been argued that lack of affordable housing leaves most young people with limited choices, and as shared homes lose living rooms, and prices send millennials to the cheaper suburbs, opportunities to socialise are reduced.¹⁴⁹ Of course, lack of affordable housing is a widespread structural issue and cannot definitively be credited as having a causal relationship with the radicalisation process. What this illustrates, however, is the continued emerging need for cities to consider policy in a holistic way.

Transport can also unintentionally impact on isolation. For instance, a study from earlier this year in Northern Ireland showed that young people reliant on public transport in less well-connected areas of cities will be limited to participating in activities in their local area which may not always be adequate for their needs.¹⁵⁰ This made it difficult to reach opportunities outside their immediate area and increased their risk of social exclusion.¹⁵¹ The same study showed how transport can be a positive force, such as in London where free bus travel for young people was both a physically and socially active experience and provided "opportunities for meaningful social interaction, a sense of belonging and visibility in the public arena, and helped to alleviate chronic loneliness in the city".¹⁵²



Molenbeek is an interesting example of city planning (or lack thereof) having led to an isolated community. Although much work has been done since, this municipality proved to be very relevant to the string of terrorist attacks in France in 2015, and was known for being a hotbed of radicalism in Belgium.¹⁵³

The region has faced significant challenges with unemployment, lack of suitable accommodation, and low education levels. Located in central Brussels on a surface of less than 6 km²,¹⁵⁴ Molenbeek's population grew from 68,000 to 95,000 between 1995 and 2016 – in part due to a high birth rate and low mortality rate, and a high proportion of young migrants.¹⁵⁵

The chief of police of Brussels-West stated that during the influx of migrants in Molenbeek, newcomers were accommodated in houses officially declared “uninhabitable” because there was no alternative housing.¹⁵⁶ However, estimates have put the number of unused housing units in Brussels at anywhere between 15,000 and 30,000.¹⁵⁷

There is a need to reposition the narrative around Molenbeek away from the stereotype of a hotbed of radicalisation, as the long-term impact of this portrayal may have unintentionally further fuelled radicalisation and isolation.

In addition, it has been argued that the capacity of the police also decreased in the area because of “[t]oo much localism, too many overlapping authorities and too much politicisation of nominations”.¹⁵⁸ Another challenge the area faced was the high number of associations working in Molenbeek, but hardly any consultation between these organisations themselves or with the zonal police.¹⁵⁹ These various initiatives are supported by either the Brussels region, the Flemish community or the federal government, all of which are attempting similar outcomes, but with a lack of coordination.¹⁶⁰ Rik Coolsaet, expert in terrorism at the University of Ghent, has stated on the issue “It was (also) due to the gap between the political and intelligence worlds: intelligence people did not have friends in politics, and politicians did not appreciate the need to keep track of new developments like foreign fighters.”¹⁶¹

Referring back to the concept of vulnerability factors as push or pull, the municipality is responsible for addressing the push factors. In Molenbeek's case, this combination of socio-economic difficulties and lack of coordination from judiciary forces (push factors) “left Molenbeek vulnerable to gangsterism and opportunistic terrorism”¹⁶² as jihadists “prey on local insecurities, promising that youngsters can redeem themselves as heroes fighting infidels in Syria” (pull factors).¹⁶³ Jamal Saleh Momenah,



the director of the largest mosque in Brussels, has stated “If people had jobs and opportunities here, they wouldn't go [to Syria], believe me”.¹⁶⁴

Although the issues faced by Molenbeek are complex, and tie into wider challenges in Belgium with regard to fragmented governance structures, much has since been done by the city to counter this. The Ministry of Interior released its Canal Plan, which aims to improve issues “precisely where the needs are most pressing, where the problems pile up”.¹⁶⁵ The plan aims to address accessible housing requirements, the need for workplaces, workshops and sites directly related to the canal and the waterway, the need for recreational areas, natural spaces, places for learning, cultural and public spaces.¹⁶⁶ It also is believed it can “help counter terrorism and nip radicalisation in the bud” and although there is not yet research showing a direct correlation, the municipality of Molenbeek has seen a 14.2% drop in crime, and coordination and collaboration among the agencies is improving.¹⁶⁷

Although the situation is improving, perhaps considering the longer term unintended consequences of its housing, education and employment policies on its communities may have helped to reduce some of the difficulties it is facing today. Furthermore, perhaps there is a need to reposition the narrative around Molenbeek away from the stereotype of a hotbed of radicalisation, as the long-term impact of this portrayal may have unintentionally further fuelled radicalisation and isolation.

7.6 Designing Policy Holistically

Considering unintended consequences of city-level policy can be done through designing policies in a holistic manner and within the appropriate local context. When policymakers develop or redesign policies, they should consider the whole city, all communities, and how or if the new or redesigned policy might impact on polarisation or isolation. This can also be done through a positive lens of how cities can solve several problems through one initiative.

When tackling the challenge of policy decisions directly or indirectly influencing vulnerability to radicalisation, cities should first try to identify which of the policy areas are more or less likely to have an impact. By developing a matrix of policy areas, and the extent to which they could improve or worsen polarities in public sentiment and community sensitivity, cities will be able to narrow their field of focus to areas in which results are more likely. This approach can help decision-making because new techniques can be piloted and refined at a manageable scale before being rolled out more widely.

Figure 4 illustrates this point.

The last two decades have shown us that radicalisation and terror attacks are part of city life, no matter how undesirable.

7.7 Normalising the Discussion

As was the case with bringing discussions about risk management into daily life in the 1980s and 1990s, and resilience in the 2000s, cities should consider normalising the discussion of the extent to which policy decisions could exacerbate or even trigger tensions or grievances, which could increase vulnerability to radicalisation. This is not to say

that it should form part of every discussion, nor be a key design criteria in every policy the city seeks to deploy, merely that awareness of the possibility that policy decisions may affect – positively or negatively – the vulnerability of individuals or communities to radicalisation should be raised, and that its discussion is neither unusual nor any suggestion of failure on the part of the policymaker.

The last two decades have shown us that radicalisation and terror attacks are part of city life, no matter how undesirable. Empowering people to discuss these topics brings them into the light, which in turn encourages others to feel more comfortable in joining the discussion. It is in this way that greater insight, more informed opinions and further debate is fostered.

Recommendation 6



Cities to consider the unintended consequences of policies through a city-systems approach that weights policy areas to assess whether a decision is more-or-less likely to influence polarisation.

To consider unintended consequences of policies, cities should not only employ a city-systems approach and consider adaptation of frameworks such as the Resilience Framework or development of tailored equality impact assessments. This could help reduce displacement of problems and unintended (and undesirable) consequences to originally well-intentioned policies.


This is not to say, of course, that factors relating to the vulnerability of individuals to radicalisation are expected to be found in most policy decisions. It is to say that the likelihood of identifying the small number of policies that could (by accident rather than design) influence vulnerability in a secondary manner will be greatly increased if city employees feel comfortable in raising the topic in all environments.

The implementation of this recommendation will have the greatest chance of success if led from the top within a city administration where city leaders can provide clear and consistent direction to their teams, and where employees who raise considerations (whether or not they prove true after investigation) are praised for engaging in the debate and protected from negative consequences.

As a first step, fostering an inclusive environment will require an understanding of employees' own biases and experiences to ensure they are cautious of any (conscious or unconscious) prejudices they could bring to their work, and that they know how to recognise them.

For instance, anti-radicalisation literature has been dominated by a focus on countering Islamist extremism¹⁶⁸ and as seen throughout this report, anti-radicalisation initiatives – whether intentionally or not – can end up targeting particular communities. Prejudices can also be seen mainstreamed into society and even official rhetoric, such as the difficulties in calling white supremacist attacks terrorism.^{169, 170}

Figure 4 The relationship between city policy and vulnerability factors



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Awareness of the possibility that policy decisions may affect – positively or negatively – the vulnerability of individuals or communities to radicalisation should be raised.

Therefore frontline practitioners may be susceptible to absorbing attitudes and beliefs unintentionally that could impact on their neutrality in their roles. This can be mitigated through appropriate anti-bias or unconscious-bias training and cities should consider supporting employees both at a policymaking level and at frontline practitioners to address such issues.

7.8 Multi-Agency Working

Multi-agency working has been identified as a key theme for successful anti-radicalisation initiatives among practitioners in anti-radicalisation.¹⁷¹ This is not a new concept; collaboration among partners dealing with radicalisation is already well underway in many cities across Europe, and can be seen in initiatives such as Manchester's RADEQUAL programme and Rotterdam's Safety House.

Internationally there are also many cases of successful multi-agency working, such as the Strong Cities Network's establishment of Local Prevention Networks in the Middle East², and various initiatives throughout Australia, Canada and the US. The latter is evidenced in the city of Boston, which has been recognised for its collaborative efforts in this regard.¹⁷² The Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and a range of stakeholders in the Greater Boston region have worked together to develop a locally driven framework under the coordination of the US Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts: The Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism into Violence Prevention

Recommendation 7

Cities to work towards normalising the discussion of polarisation, isolation and radicalisation.

To normalise the discussion around polarisation, isolation and radicalisation, these issues should become part of the everyday decision-making process. This will take time, but policymakers should consider how they can support this at all levels of the society, including in public, private, and third sector organisations.

Efforts. The framework is intended to serve as a foundation for communities to build resilience and capacity in countering violent extremism.¹⁷³

More than mere cooperation and collaboration however, the case of Boston is noteworthy because it sees radicalisation as one of the many social ills faced by its city, and does not exceptionalise it. Boston embraced a comprehensive approach to the prevention of violence rather than focusing on only one form, and evaluative research has shown that in fact “a narrow focus on ideology and/or extremism rather than prevention of acts of violence of the motivation by which they are perpetrated, is counter-productive.”¹⁷⁴ And as seen in Molenbeek, a lack of a coordinated, multi-agency approach can have significant repercussions.

Although there is much more to multi-agency working than information-sharing and terminology, these two areas have been chosen as a focus in this report because they have been highlighted as a need through collaboration with partners in this project. This report acknowledges, however, that multi-agency working requires much more than just these two aspects in order to be effective. In particular, successful multi-agency working also requires the knowledge and understanding that different agencies have, providing different advantages in different areas.

7.9 Information-Sharing

Although much is being done, challenges remain for cities that wish to foster effective multi-agency working. In particular, the sharing of information has been noted as a challenge many times by partners during the research of this report. The Radicalisation Awareness Network has done significant work on outlining and deconstructing the barriers to information-sharing across agencies¹⁷⁵ and provides practical advice on how to overcome these.³ They have highlighted, barriers that are rooted in “cultures of secrecy in one agency (eg. security services) and cultures of client confidentiality in another (eg. health).”¹⁷⁶

More than mere cooperation and collaboration however, the case of Boston is noteworthy because it sees radicalisation as one of the many social ills faced by its city, and does not exceptionalise it.

Despite advances in communicative technology, sharing of information is also significantly challenging across national borders. In interviews conducted by Frontline with counter-terror veterans in Europe and the US, a number of systemic problems were outlined, including differences in laws and security cultures that hamper intelligence-sharing and law-enforcement cooperation among nations.¹⁷⁷ In 2016, Europol stated that the Paris attacks showed the “exchange of information... needs improving.”¹⁷⁸ Its director, Rob Wainwright, also stated “there is a strong consensus... We have to work much more together in the cross-border way.

And that includes sharing intelligence as well as understanding the need to pass new European laws.”¹⁷⁹

Furthermore, it has been noted that having a legal framework in place to share information freely while considering civil liberties and the implications on privacy would be of great benefit to such initiatives, and it is proposed that further research is invested into what this might look like.

On a city level, Rotterdam’s Safety House provides a noteworthy case study of how to overcome the data-sharing issue.

²The Strong Cities Network has developed models for multi-agency design. Beginning with a partnership between Danish cities and Jordanian and Lebanese counterparts, this initiative focused on how the multi-agency partnership at the heart of prevention models in cities like Aarhus, Copenhagen and Viborg could be fostered and contextualised to meet regional PVE needs. For more information and the policy guidebook see: <https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/scn-regions/middle-east-and-north-africa/>

³For practical advice on overcoming information sharing barriers, see: Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism: Approaches and practices by the Radicalisation Awareness Network. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/creating_counter_violent_extremism_infrastructures_en.pdf

Rotterdam's Safety House IT System

Case study 14



Like other cities, Rotterdam has faced challenges when it comes to sharing information across multi-agency partners. The Safety House model experienced these challenges, especially with regard to having healthcare professionals (in particular, mental health), social care workers, and police representatives on its panels, all of which have strict legislation and codes of conduct when it comes to sharing patient or suspect information.

To tackle this, the Justice and Policing Department funded a tailored IT system to store information of cases discussed in the Safety House. This was developed by experts, but housed in the municipality's server, and information stored in the system would be only accessible by those involved in the Safety House initiative.

Furthermore, that information could not be taken back to any of the representative's organisations and would remain secure within the municipality's system.

Although at first some partners experienced a period of adjustment when using the system, particularly in regard to cultural taboos around sharing information, in the long run this has greatly supported multi-agency working. It has been noted however that a specific legal framework tackling these issues would be of great benefit.¹⁸⁰



7.10 A Consensus of Terminology

Finally, the terminology used can be significant in supporting multi-agency working, not just within cities, but internationally as well. Academics^{181, 182, 183} have been highlighting for a number of years that despite its frequent use across the fields of security, integration and foreign policy, the term “radicalisation” remains, at best, an “essentially relative” term.¹⁸⁴ Six years ago, the development of a language and a taxonomy of concepts that inform academic and political discourse on the topic (of radicalisation and terrorism) was described as an ‘urgent priority’ in the field.¹⁸⁵

Additionally, conversations with numerous stakeholders in London, Europe and internationally has shown that there is still a difference in understanding of key terms and concepts when it comes to radicalisation.¹⁸⁶ If cities are to support multi-agency working, it is integral that they place some emphasis and resources on building a common understanding of key terms, at least within their own cities. Included in this would be not just developing definitions of key terminology but also coming to a consensus among stakeholders of aims, and measures of success. Agencies and networks such as CTPN and the Strong Cities Network can play an integral role in facilitating this.

Recommendation 8



Cities to support multi-agency working by

a) Investing in further research into IT and legal frameworks for sharing information

Further work and research should be invested into both legal frameworks and IT systems for multi-agency partners to share information, not just within cities but across borders as well. This is particularly important as extremist views are becoming more coherent as an international movement. For instance, online forums regularly share extremist ideas and content. If those carrying out terrorist attacks are sharing information, so must those who are trying to counter them.

b) Developing a consensus of terminology among key partners

Shared terminology and understanding of the key concepts in the field have been consistent issues for a number of years. Cities should consider how this barrier can be overcome. Possible solutions include a facilitated approach via international networks such as the Strong Cities Network to develop a consensus of terminology and share this widely.

The context in which cities find themselves today is one where society, technology and the climate are evolving faster than policy can develop.

Although many of the consequences of this change are beneficial, not all are. We live in a world in which political echo chambers can magnify smaller frustrations and polarise points of view, in which instances of hate and intolerance are increasing. As city leaders strive to support the growth of peaceful and inclusive communities, it is important to take these perspectives into account.

City-policy development and implementation can be a vital lever in the creation of welcoming, equitable and safe spaces for communities to grow and individuals to thrive.

Cities can be exciting, curious, fast-paced and energetic melting pots of culture, ideas and ambitions, but they are also under immense pressure. As we look to the future, cities of the world will house more of the planet's population than the rural areas that surround them.¹⁸⁷ As budgets fluctuate and political environments remain uncertain, public frustrations and apprehensions grow. Expectations of city leaders to steward rapid change, while providing security and stability to their populations, are greater than ever before. Citizens are conscious of the problems of inequality and the consequences of actions on the climate.

It is in these circumstances that cities are compelled to address the threat of radicalisation. Large enough to make a difference but small enough to push forward local change, cities are home to dense areas of residential and commercial development, as well as populous commuter and tourism destinations – both of which create sites for terrorist attacks. Those who might seek to promote hatred feed on the uncertainties, fears, inequalities, angers and resentments born of inequality within the urban environment.

It is clear that the drivers of radicalisation are complex and that not all are influenced by city policy decisions, but cities can still help to reduce the threat of radicalisation. They can influence the push factors of radicalisation by understanding how policy development and implementation impacts daily life on an individual and community level. City-policy development and implementation can be a vital lever in the creation of welcoming, equitable and safe spaces for communities to grow and individuals to thrive.

Like all city-policy however, anti-radicalisation policies should not be developed in silo but should be designed with the whole city in mind. The need to rapidly design and enact new city-policy must be in tandem with consideration of the consequences – intentional or not. Cities must not get so distracted by the need for change that they fail to recognise the consequences of it.

Common approaches to countering radicalisation and violent extremism have included targeted integration interventions. However, these can be problematic because they have not always taken into account all members of society. The consequences of this can not only lead to some communities feeling stigmatised or targeted, they can also have an aversive effect and create feelings of being left behind by the remaining communities. By framing policy decisions within the wider context of citizen needs, city leaders can prevent issues from being displaced rather than resolved.

By framing policy decisions within the wider context of citizen needs, city leaders can prevent issues from being displaced rather than resolved.

This report does not suggest that the question on the extent to which city-policy influences radicalisation is complete. Moreover, it has just begun. Although the data that is available today indicates a need for cities to focus on issues of polarisation and isolation in the fight against radicalisation, there is simply not enough to demonstrate this scientifically. Furthermore, the subject matter experts who have been engaged in the process of developing this report agree almost universally that there is more work to be done in this area. The city systems approach proposed here is fundamental to this.

Summarised Recommendations for Anti-Radicalisation


1	City policy makers to engage with and include community leaders in framing of the integration process.
2	Cities to support self-integration between communities by challenging inaccurate perceptions and creating platforms for accurate understandings of differing communities.
3	Cities to frame policies within the wider context of diverse multicultural mix of city inhabitants, including consideration of groups not directly affected.
4	Cities to proactively consider the extent to which any given policy may displace, rather than address polarisation.
5	Cities to consider mapping social sentiment to monitor community polarisation and hate crimes, and shift policy in tandem with social sentiment.
6	Cities to consider the unintended consequences of policies through a city-systems approach that weights policy areas to assess whether a decision is more-or-less likely to influence polarisation.
7	Cities to work towards normalising the discussion of polarisation, isolation and radicalisation.
8	Cities to support multi-agency working by: a) Investing in further research into IT and legal frameworks for sharing information. b) Developing a consensus of terminology among key partners.

9 **Appendix 1: The Resilience Framework**

The Rockefeller Foundation employs the city-systems concept through the Resilience Framework,¹⁸⁸ which seeks to find solutions for a resilient society that cut across numerous city-level policy domains, and that are not necessarily focused on a single (original) issue. This approach allows improved, forward-thinking city-policy that does not merely

displace problems, but looks at the city holistically. The approach has not been applied to the context of anti-radicalisation and countering polarisation, but lends itself well to the job of approaching radicalisation in a systematic manner.

Figure 5 City Resilience Framework



Credit: Arup, The Rockefeller Foundation, 2015

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The University of Warwick

Moonshot CVE

King's College University

Google Jigsaw (New York)

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